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Introduction
Aft er George W. Bush had fi nished his work in his father’s 1988 election campaign and 
transition he wondered what life would bring as “a fi rst son.” He asked an adviser to 
write a report on the lives of presidential children because he believed that historical 
examples were an instructive illustration. Th e outcomes were discouraging and dis-
turbing. In comparison with the general population, the children of presidents suff ered 
from higher measures of alcohol abuse, suicides and divorces. Th e document specifi cally 
mentioned the example of the life and political career of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.1
FDR, Jr. was the fourth child of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Eleanor Roos-
evelt . During the immediate postwar years FDR, Jr. was considered as “one of the most 
promising young politicians in the country.” 2 Politics was the Roosevelt family business 
and being Junior implied great benefi ts. He had inherited from his parents the invalu-
able assets of a political brand name and connections. However, despite being the most 
dynamic and natural campaigner of his era, FDR, Jr. did not electrify his generation. 
Th is failure is peculiar because he had, by birthright, a claim on the most compelling 
political memory of his time.3 
As the thirty-second president, FDR had guided American capitalism through the 
Great Depression and World War II. In the process, he transformed the offi  ce of the 
presidency and invigorated the Democratic Party with a majority electoral coalition. 
FDR proposed a United Nations’ structure to prevent further international confl icts to 
remake the post-World War II stage. His wife, Eleanor also became an American icon. 
Known later by her admirers as the “First Lady of the World” and as the conscience 
of America, she gave a voice to the plight of excluded groups as women, minorities, 
children and poor people. Eleanor confronted the leaders of society with moral obliga-
tions as a teacher, prolifi c writer and political adviser. Her crucial role in adopting the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations in 1948 underscored this 
1. Doug Wead , All the Presidents’ Children: Triumph and Tragedy in the Lives of America’s First 
Families (New York: Atria Books, 2004), 1–5; Elizabeth Mitchell, W: Revenge of the Bush Dynasty 
(New York: Hyperion, 2000), 234–235.
2. Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal : Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 163.
3. Stephen Hess , America’s Political Dynasties (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
1997), 7.








attitude.4 Both balanced notions of pragmatic political realism and celebrated idealism. 
Where FDR had let pragmatic matters of style, personality and image prevail, ER had 
stressed her moral mission and idealistic commitments. 
Aft er the death of FDR in April 1945, the question FDR, Jr. faced was how to use this 
daunting and complex inheritance. As the trustee of his father’s heritage the one thing 
FDR, Jr. could not do was live an average life. Life for a presidential child presented an 
incredible complicated challenge. Th e inheritance could help create his identity and role 
in society but could also contribute to the diminishment of it. Particularly, since he car-
ried the same name life beckoned as a series of pitfalls and false standards because his 
inheritance involved a reputation to be lived up to or rebelled against.5 FDR, Jr. claimed 
he “was fully aware of the great advantages we boys enjoyed, father’s prestige meant 
for us the friendship and intimacy of the prominent and the great but these privileges 
brought obstacles to our careers as well.” 6 
Th is ambiguous blessing has become known as the dilemma whether to become 
“Dad’s (and Mom’s) describer” and to cash in on the name and memory, or to establish 
your own identity and to carve out an independent role of signifi cance and distinc-
tion for yourself.7 As the political heir apparent the crux is then how FDR, Jr. used the 
magic of the name and assessed its value to learn to cope with these new responsibili-
ties. Th erefore, the key question of this study will focus on how FDR, Jr. interpreted the 
Roosevelt name and tradition during his life and political career. 
FDR, Jr. faced the standards of implied success set by his distinguished parents. He 
wanted nothing more than to “emerge as a man of independent distinction” and to fi nd 
ways to prove himself by standing on his own two feet.8 Th is analysis of FDR, Jr.’s per-
sonal and public struggle with his inheritance will demonstrate his attempts to fulfi ll 
the promise of his birthright, answer expectations and cope with pressures to defend 
the Roosevelt tradition and search for an identity, to interpret memory and achieve in-
dependence, to maintain commitment to public service and handle ambition.
Th is question is important against the background of the transformation of FDR 
from a popular president into a superhuman American icon. Th e spell of FDR con-
tinued to puzzle and fascinate contemporaries. Many people viewed him primarily in 
4. “Th e Story of FDR, Jr.,” folder FDR, Jr. biographies, box 236, FDR, Jr. Papers, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park , NY (hereaft er FDRL); Hess, America’s Political Dynasties, 192. 
5. Hess, America’s Political Dynasties, 192. Despite the pressures of the name, FDR, Jr. followed 
the patriarchal family tradition and juniored his fi rst born son: Franklin D. Roosevelt III.
6. Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 285–286; Bela Ko-
rnitzer, American Fathers and Sons (New York: Hermitage House, 1952), 284–285; J.J. Perling , 
Presidents’ Sons: Th e Prestige of Name in a Democracy (New York: Odyssey Press, 1947), 310–346; 
Hess, America’s Political Dynasties, 192, 215–216.
7. Edmund Morris , “Th e Fathers’ Curse,” Newsweek Memorial edition, July 1999, 74–75; Adam 
Bellow, In Praise of Nepotism: A Natural History (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 1. 
8. Peggy Noonan, “Grace Under the Glare,” Time, 26 July 1999, 42; Morris, “Th e Fathers’ Curse,” 
74–75.
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personal terms as a wise, benevolent friend who understood their individual problems. 
When asked to list one personal characteristic that mirrored his father’s memory, FDR, 
Jr. described FDR’s “ability to come across in radio broadcasts in such a way as to make 
every listener feel that he was talking to each individual personally.” People eulogized 
FDR as the champion of the common man who had guided the nation through the 
worst depression in its history and had committed the federal government to take care 
of its citizens.9 
Recollections of Cabinet members, the White House staff , the Roosevelt family and 
early biographies helped shape this legendary status.10 Th e legend of FDR began where 
his life ended. “Th e Roosevelt Story,” one of the fi rst movies about FDR released in 1947, 
depicted him as a man of the people who had risen from simple Hyde Park origins, the 
proverbial log cabin, and had early on been inspired by a passion for social justice. Th e 
fact that FDR had come from a privileged aristocratic background, spoke with an up-
per-class accent and took no interest in the plight of the disadvantaged during the early 
stages of his political career apparently went unnoticed.11 Th ough FDR, Jr. contributed 
9. Richard H. Pells, Th e Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s 
and 1950s 2nd ed. (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 50–51; Marquis Childs, 
“Th e Roosevelt Myth,” Look Magazine (25 October 1949), 23–25 and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 
“Th e Roosevelt Literature,” in Americans for Democratic Action: Th e Roosevelt Yearbook, vol. 1, 
1949, 26–29, all in Lesley Kuhn Collection, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, the Netherlands 
(hereaft er RSC).
10. William Harlan Hale, “Was Th ere Really a Man Named Roosevelt?” New Republic, 3 Janu-
ary 1949, 22–26; Childs, “Th e Roosevelt Myth,” 23–25, Kuhn Collection, RSC. FDR associates 
who publicized their recollections were Frances Perkins, Th e Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Vi-
king 1946); Raymond Moley, Aft er Seven Years: A Political Analysis of the New Deal (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1939); Edward J. Flynn, You are the Boss (New York, Collier Books, 1947) and 
Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., Th e Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 vols. (New 
York: Random House, 1938). Publications of the Roosevelt family included Elliott Roosevelt , ed., 
F.D.R.: His Personal Letters (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950); Eleanor Roosevelt , Th is 
is My Story (New York 1937); Sara Delano Roosevelt , My Boy Franklin (New York, Ray Long & 
Richard R. Smith, 1933); Early biographies included John Gunther, Roosevelt in Retrospect: A 
Profi le in History (New York: Harper & Row, 1950) and Dexter Perkins, Th e New Age of Roosevelt, 
1931–1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
11. Hamilton Basso, “Th e Roosevelt Legend,” Life Magazine (3 November 1947), 126–147, Kuhn 
Collection, RSC. Th rough these accounts the man behind the legend disappeared even more 
because they agreed on only one thing: FDR’s contradictions. Frances Perkins concluded that 
the enigmatic FDR had been the “most complicated human being I ever knew.” Th e secretary 
of labor who had known FDR since his days as Governor of New York described Roosevelt as 
evasive and frank, stubborn and fl exible, frivolous and grave, traditional and pragmatic. David 
Potter, “Sketches for the Roosevelt Portrait,” Yale Review (1950): 39–53; Lash , ER : Th e Years Alone, 
247; Stephen Hess , America’s Political Dynasties: From Adams to Kennedy (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1966), 190–191; Patrick Maney, Th e Roosevelt Presence (New York: Twayne, 1992), 111, 
168; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: Th e Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, 1956); Hale, 
“Was Th ere Really a Man Named Roosevelt?” 22–26, Kuhn Collection, RSC.








to the FDR mythology the claims on his father’s memory that other people advanced 
hampered his political career.
Th is question is even more important against the background of the rise and fall of 
liberalism. FDR, Jr.’s (political) life shed light on its evolution. Despite FDR’s enigmatic 
character and the New Deal ’s confusing “potpourri of policy initiatives” the notion of 
liberal reform dominated the political tradition between 1945 and 1968.12 Th e most im-
portant liberal vision of the 1930s that survived was the new role of the government as 
the defender of economic opportunity for its citizens. FDR’s innovations of a rudimen-
tary welfare state and federal intervention in the economy remained powerful enough 
to help translate the postwar decades in an era of liberal consensus.13 Most liberals ac-
cepted its fundamental beliefs: the basic soundness of American democracy, society and 
economy. 
Th is is not to say that New Deal liberalism did not change. Under the prevailing anti-
Communist Cold War mentality liberals focused on economic growth to increase op-
portunities rather than on class-based reforms. Even more important was that the 1940s 
saw an increasing number of individuals and groups stand up to claim their basic rights. 
Th is development revealed the ideological fl aws of the liberal orthodoxy. When liberals 
began to put equality of result rather than equality of opportunity on the agenda by the 
mid-1960s they ran into the limits of their ideology. Th e inclusion of this rights revolu-
tion on the liberal agenda provoked a confl ict between a white backlash over preferen-
tial treatment and a violent black reaction drawing attention to continuing social and 
economic deprivation. American liberalism also experienced the international limits of 
its power that helped trigger the break up of the domestic status quo. Th e war in Viet-
nam became the vehicle for a new generation of students, women, minorities and artists 
to highlight the alleged fundamental fl aws in the nation’s society.14 Th e politics of race 
and the war in Vietnam accelerated the return to conservative policies aft er 1968. 
12. William H. Chafe, “Introduction.” in William H. Chafe, ed., Th e Achievement of American 
Liberalism: Th e New Deal and Its Legacies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), xiii.
13. Timothy N. Th urber, Th e Politics of Equality: Hubert H. Humphrey and the African American 
Freedom Struggle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 8–9; Chafe, “Introduction.” in 
Chafe, ed., Th e Achievement of American Liberalism, xi–xviii. On FDR and the New Deal : Da-
vid Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: Th e American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
14. Chafe, “Introduction.” in Chafe, ed., Th e Achievement of American Liberalism, xi–xviii. See 
Alan Brinkley, Th e End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: Knopf, 
1995) for the evolution and transformation of New Deal liberalism. William E. Leuchtenburg, In 
the Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to Bill Clinton (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1993) is a classic on the legacy of FDR; See for the liberal consensus theory Godfrey Hodgson, 
America in Our Time (New York: Vintage, 1976); James Patterson, Grand Expectations: the Unit-
ed States, 1945–1974 (New York: Oxford University, 1996) and Allen J. Matusow, Th e Unraveling 
of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper & Row, 1986) are noted works 
for the rise and fall of liberalism. Walter Jackson, Gunnar Myrdal and America’s Conscience: 
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FDR, Jr.
When I attended the conference of the Organization of American Historians in Los 
Angeles in April 2001, Blanche Wiesen Cook , the feminist author of a multi-volume 
biography of Eleanor Roosevelt was asked why she had not devoted more attention to 
Eleanor’s role as mother. Cook replied that in her book she had paid as much attention 
to this maternal role as Eleanor had spent on her children. She pointed out that it was up 
to somebody else to describe and analyze the lives of the children.15 
Obviously, FDR, Jr. has been a minor fi gure when compared to his illustrious par-
ents. Yet, among the Roosevelt children, he deserved to be rescued from oblivion. FDR, 
Jr. was most fully immersed in the Roosevelt tradition and became inextricably bound 
up with his inheritance. To the extent that the Roosevelt memory lived on, “it lived 
through the family, and above all through the son who bore the name, the charm, and 
the burden.” 16 
FDR, Jr. exemplifi ed the set of self-evident assumptions within the Roosevelt family 
culture. Th is commitment to public service remained a constant factor in his life and 
as the heir apparent he became a national fi gure in American politics. James Roosevelt 
argued that of all his siblings FDR, Jr. truly represented the political memory of their 
parents because he had come closest to “continue the Roosevelt dynasty in the White 
House.” 17
FDR, Jr.’s political career off ered a fascinating angle to steer him away from the 
footnotes of history. He was the golden boy of the family, self-reliant and confi dent. 
Since his youth he had demonstrated a clear interest in politics and the Roosevelt family 
considered him the budding politician. Journalist Louis Howe , who had masterminded 
FDR’s career, predicted in 1931 that of all the Roosevelt’s sons FDR, Jr. was destined to 
have a great future in politics. At that time he was only seventeen years old but Howe 
saw in FDR, Jr. the same qualities he had discovered in FDR twenty years earlier.18 An-
other close associate of his father agreed that FDR, Jr. was the son most likely to follow 
in the footsteps of his father. Admiral William Leahy observed that “he was the most 
interesting and promising of the President’s children.” 19 FDR, Jr. claimed to New York 
Social Engineering and Racial Liberalism, 1938–1987 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1990) discusses the rights revolution. 
15. Biography Session, Annual Conference of the Organization of American Historians, 2001, 
Los Angeles, CA. 
16. Nancy Gibbs, “… Th e Lost Horizon,” Time, 26 July 1999, 29.
17. James Roosevelt with Bill Libby, My Parents: A Diff ering View (New York: Playboy Press, 
1976), 313; James Roosevelt, Aff ectionately, FDR (London: George C. Harrap, 1960), 142. 
18. Lela Stiles, Th e Man behind Roosevelt: Th e Story of Louis McHenry Howe (New York: Th e 
World Publishing Company, 1954), 159–160.
19. Henry H. Adams, Witness to Power: Th e Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985), 244.








Post publisher Dorothy Schiff  that he distinguished himself from his sister and brothers 
because “Mother always said that I looked more like him than the others did.” 20
Presidential Children
FDR, Jr. was not the fi rst and would not be the last political successor to face this silver 
spoon dilemma. A number of presidential children has published recollections on the 
relationship with their famous fathers. Alice Roosevelt Longworth wrote a memoir of 
her life. Michael Reagan also published an autobiography a half century later. Anna , 
James and Elliott Roosevelt published books on their presidential parents. So did Mau-
reen Reagan in the 1980s. John Quincy Adams edited the letters of his father. Margaret 
Truman , an accomplished writer, wrote biographies on her parents. Some off spring like 
Alice Roosevelt Longworth, who became a famous Washington socialite and Senator 
Robert Taft  have been themselves the subject of extensive biographies. 
In 1841, President John Tyler had issued a code for president children. “I hope that 
you [his children] will conduct yourselves with more than the usual propriety and de-
corum … You are to know no favourites …. You are to accept no gift s whatsoever. … 
You are to allow no one to approach you on the subject of offi  ce or favors.” 21 Yet, what a 
presidential child should do in life, how to earn his own living and search for an identity 
always remained an issue full with confl icts that created potential political controversy 
and public curiosity.22 In the 1830s and 1840s, John Van Buren , the second child of 
President Martin Van Buren had developed a notorious reputation. Despite his bril-
liant political potential Van Buren’s lifestyle of womanizing, alcohol abuse and gam-
bling marked his bad name. Th e public derided his cultivation of the rich and powerful 
at the royal courts in Europe and labeled him the “American Prince.” 23 His epithet of a 
poster boy for bad behavior foreshadowed the vicissitudes of a number of presidential 
children.
Despite this ongoing public fascination as fi eld of study the attention for presiden-
tial children has been underexposed. Presidential studies have focused upon politics 
and policies rather than devote attention to the consequences of a presidency, at least 
before George W. Bush , Jr. became president in 2001. Th ere were some exceptions to 
this lack of scholarly interest. J.J. Perling ’s Presidents Sons: Th e Prestige of Name in a 
Democracy focused upon to what degree presidents have aff ected their off spring. Pub-
lished in 1947, the author only studied presidential sons and his record ended with the 
sons of FDR. Nearly sixty years later, former presidential adviser Doug Wead wrote an 
analysis of presidential off spring entitled All the Presidential Children. In this summa-
20. Dorothy Schiff  , “Interview with FDR, Jr.,” 9 January 1973, box 258, Dorothy Schiff  Papers, 
Manuscript division, New York Public Library (hereaft er NYPL).
21. Carl Sferrazza Anthony, America’s First Families (New York: Touchstone, 2000), 323–324.
22. Anthony, America’s First Families, 324.
23. Wead, All the Presidents’ Children, 56, 63–64.
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rizing account Wead also recognized the unique position presidential sons and daugh-
ters inhabited.
Th e off spring of other (non-political) famous parents also occupied an exceptional 
position. Yet, presidential children distinguished themselves because they faced the 
impact of the most powerful and infl uential offi  ce in the world. Th erefore, they were 
unable to “rationalize away the success of their parents.” 24 Th is exceptional place also of-
fered them a unique perspective on the presidency. Th ey lived “their lives on a separate 
and diff erent level than their presidential parents” and saw the presidency in a whole 
new light.25 One of the consequences of a presidency was that the lives and careers of 
presidential children like FDR, Jr. signaled a dynamic life full of multiple confl icts. Th is 
minefi eld of balancing public and private spheres was a recipe for a complex life. It com-
promised and established an identity, inspired and intimidated, and involved invalu-
able benefi ts and immense burdens.26 
For the vast majority of presidential sons the burdens of expectations and inherited 
status have meant imprisonment rather than empowerment. Historian Edmund Mor-
ris has argued that, “if the greatest gift  our constitution can bestow is the presidency of 
the United States, one of its worst curses is to be the son of a chief executive.” 27 Morris, 
who wrote before the rise of George W. Bush , analyzed that of eighty-nine presidential 
sons born to forty-two chief executives only a handful have stepped out of the shadow 
of their father. Th e prime example was John Quincy Adams who became a president in 
his own right.
Other presidential sons oft en have had to relinquish their political ambitions. By en-
tering fi elds other than politics, the heirs of Th eodore Roosevelt partly solved the issue 
of political identity. Only his eldest son, TR , Jr. attempted to step in his father’s political 
shoes. He experienced that, “the children of a public man learned early that they cannot 
be ‘fi rst’ with their father. Th ey are robbed of much of his time and companionship and 
he of his children’s.” 28 Th e worst thing that could have happened to him was his father 
being President. It was not only the physical and emotional abandonment that made 
TR, Jr. acquiesce in his inevitable fate. He reasoned, “No matter what you do or don’t, I 
24. Ibid., 106–107.
25. Ibid., 162–164.
26. “Transcript of Speech by William J. vanden Heuvel,” Held at the Memorial Service for Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt, Jr., 15 September 1988, 16–17, Funeral Book Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., RSC; Per-
ling, Presidents’ Sons, 310–346; Hess, America’s Political Dynasties, 192, 215–216.
27. Morris, “Th e Fathers’ Curse,” 74–75. John Q. Adams, 6th president (1825–1829) was the son 
of John Adams, 2nd president (1797–1801). Others also developed successful political careers of 
their own. Robert Todd Lincoln, son of Abraham Lincoln, 16th president (1861–1865), became his 
own man aft er he became secretary of war and ambassador to Great Britain in the 1880s. Robert 
A. Taft  , nicknamed “Mr. Republican,” son of William H. Taft , 27th president (1909–1913), earned 
respect and independence as leader of his party in the Senate during the 1940s and 1950s.
28. Joseph P. Lash , Love Eleanor: Eleanor Roosevelt and her Friends (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1982), 136; Hess, America’s Political Dynasties, 215–216.








will always be spoken of as TR’s son.” 29 Th e position of a presidential child seemed to 
involve more diffi  culties than opportunities. Wead argued that despite a number of suc-
cess stories they faced “higher than average rates of divorce, and alcoholism, and even 
premature death.” 30
Presidential children also stood out because their political ambitions demonstrat-
ed the tension between America’s meritocratic ideal and hereditary practices. FDR, Jr. 
played down the appearance of hereditary claims. He argued that his father “was enough 
of a realist to realize that in American politics there are no dynasties, …, and that there 
really has never been a father-son relationship in American politics or equal success.” 31 
FDR, Jr. rejected the epithet of royal families and maintained that every generation had 
to fi nd the ability to stand on its own feet. James also stated that the Roosevelts were an 
average family. If the circumstances of their public parents would be disregarded, “we 
Roosevelts were a family with human problems not much diff erent from those of any 
average family,” … where parents had “the same high hopes, ambitions and disappoint-
ments” as any other family.32 
Th eir meritocratic claims for anonymity were understandable. Despite their con-
ferred aristocratic status, the history of the two branches of the Roosevelt family had 
hardly given any indication of producing royal leadership. Th e Hyde Park and Oyster 
Bay clans had lived inconspicuously for generations on their estates and had occupied 
themselves with making money. Until the rise of TR and FDR there was no foreboding 
of any imaginative public leadership. Alice Roosevelt Longworth , TR’s eldest daughter 
and a sniping critic of FDR and ER , jested that their ancestors were only “upstart Dutch 
who made a couple of bucks.” 33
FDR, Jr.’s observation denied the strong American tradition of dynasticism. Par-
29. Edward J. Renehan, Jr., Th e Lion’s Pride: TR and his family in Peace and War (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1998), 67–68; Hess, America’s Political Dynasties, 1, 8, 215. TR, Jr. emulated 
his father’s political career by serving as a New York State assemblyman and as an assistant sec-
retary of the Navy in the Harding Administration. Aft er he was soundly beaten by Al Smith , his 
Democratic opponent in the 1924 campaign for New York governor TR, Jr. left  elective politics. 
He became governor of Puerto Rico and subsequently of the Philippines. When FDR assumed 
the presidency in 1933, TR, Jr. disappeared from the scene altogether. He became a mere ceremo-
nial fi gure. Outside the political sphere he continued to chase the ghost of his father in planning 
exotic adventures that he modeled on the Rough Rider’s earlier hunting trips to Africa. Yet, TR, 
Jr. reemerged in World War II as a military hero when he served as a Major General in the Nor-
mandy invasion. Collier, Roosevelts, 302, 388–389; Hess, America’s Political Dynasties, 195–196.
30. Wead, All the Presidents’ Children, 1.
31. Schiff , “Interview with FDR, Jr.,” 9 January 1973, box 258, Schiff  Papers.
32. James Roosevelt , “My Father FDR,” Saturday Evening Post (10 October 1959): 96, Kuhn Col-
lection, RSC; William A. Degregorio, Th e Complete Book of U.S. Presidents, 4th ed. (New York: 
Barricade Books, 1993), 482. 
33. Betty Boyd Caroli, Th e Roosevelt Women (New York: Basic Books, 1998), 4; Editorial, Life 
Magazine (20 June 1949): 24–25, Kuhn Collection, RSC; Hess, America’s Political Dynasties, 
170–216.
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ticularly, his appeal to an undistinguished middle class normality must be seen in the 
light of the fundamental American notion that nobody could claim a “hereditary right 
to public offi  ce.” 34 In the Constitution the anti-monarchal Founding Fathers specifi cally 
and purposely banned any titles of nobility and European dynastic rule. In 1947, Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. reaffi  rmed the denial of caste privileges when he stated, “as a democracy 
the United States ought presumably be able to dispense with dynastic families.” 35
Since its inception, however, the American people had demonstrated a sneaking 
weakness for upper-class political dynasties to lead their country, both in business and 
politics.36 Th e phenomenon of family dynasties and its inherited leadership capabilities 
had been an American tradition and ingrained in its national history but particularly in 
34. Adam Bellow, “American Dynasty,” Newsweek Special Edition Issues 2004, December 2003 
– February 2004, 85. 
35. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “Two Years Later: Th e Roosevelt Family,” Life Magazine (7 April 
1947): 113, Kuhn Collection, RSC.
36. Caroli, Th e Roosevelt Women, 3–4; Bellow, In Praise of Nepotism, 1–7, 485–508; Bellow, 
“American Dynasty,” 82–85; Hess, America’s Political Dynasties, 1. From the end of the eigh-
teenth century onward, clans like the Adamses of Boston, Livingstones of New York and Virginia, 
patrician Roosevelts of New York, Taft s of Ohio, Progressive LaFollettes of Wisconsin, Populists 
Longs of Louisiana, Catholic Kennedys of Massachusetts, Stevensons of Illinois, and Bushes of 
Connecticut and Texas have been dominating the political scene. Before World War II the family 
dynasties generally represented the upper class of American society. Th is political elite had been 
born into privilege, wealth and connections that remained unavailable for the remainder of the 
population. In each generation they had transferred power upon political elites to which they 
attributed exceptional, hereditary qualities. Infl uenced by the noblesse oblige ideal, this political 
nobility established a family tradition out of public service. Th e rise of the Catholic Irish-Ameri-
can Kennedys aft er 1945 refl ected the decline of the old WASP Establishment. Th e political elite 
expanded and shift ed in character. Th e growing economy and processes of individualism and 
mobility helped enter a wave of diverse middle class, merit-based, groups. Th e 1990s also wit-
nessed the return of the WASP-related dynastic nepotism. Th is phenomenon was capped by the 
infamous 2000 election year contest that pitted the Juniors of two distinguished families against 
eachother. George W. Bush and Albert Gore, Jr. epitomized the comeback of the political dynas-
ties and the debate on the desirability of political and dynastic succession. Th e phenomenon of 
successor generations has become much more ingrained in state and local politics. According to 
Bellow, “the Longs of Louisiana had a family member in public offi  ce from 1917 to 1987.” Even 
more illustrative is the example of the grip the Daley family had on the municipal offi  ces of the 
city of Chicago. Th e Chicago Tribune estimated that since Daley was reelected as mayor in 1989, 
“at least sixty-eight relatives by blood or marriage have drawn city paychecks,” their combined 
salaries totaling over $3 million. Th e rise of a generation of successors had not been confi ned to 
the creation of the political governing caste. Americans had historically grown dependent upon 
the notion of families in big business and fi nance like the Rockefellers and the Morgans. In the 
last decade though partly based upon merit, the proliferation of family ties permeated also ar-
tistic fi elds like Hollywood, the music industry, literature, television, and sports. Th is leads one 
to conclude that despite imagining themselves as a society of self-made men and women, the 
increasing spreading of family ties suggested that the tradition of dynasticism was every inch an 
American phenomenon as the traditional meritocratic notion.








political life it found its critics.37 In America’s Political Dynasties, Stephen Hess focused 
upon this continuity and transfer of power from father to son. Th is alleged hereditary 
right was felt as “shockingly undemocratic and un-American.” 38 Despite constitutional 
guidelines Americans had always turned to political dynasties for leadership. Public 
service developed into a family tradition of “People’s Dukes” in the words of reporter 
Stewart Alsop . In a sense, American politics became a family business fi lled by a genera-
tion of successors.39
Th is “equalitarian blind spot” suggested that presidential children were “excep-
tional people [who] ought to get exceptional consideration.” 40 President Harry Truman 
described them as “the off spring of hereditary rulers … expected to be out of the ordi-
nary and to maintain a special prominence …” 41 Perling underscored this illustration 
of the sensitivity and vulnerability of American democracy to privileged treatment. He 
stated, “in a democracy where every boy is said to have an equal opportunity” the study 
of the lives and careers of presidential sons are a way to put this thesis to the test.42 
Hess also concluded, “the question of class leadership in a democracy deserves careful 
scrutiny.” 43 
Political Biography
How to treat FDR, Jr. as a subject of a historical study? I have cast this story into the 
mold of a political biography. Th e complex interaction and inevitable connection be-
tween private life and public fi gure and the handling of the silver-spoon dilemma have 
dictated this approach of FDR, Jr.’s political career. Th is characteristic that has been so 
striking among presidential children signaled the need for FDR, Jr. to balance identity 
and memory. His political motivation and decisions were directly interwoven with his 
name and tradition. Th is story of FDR, Jr. takes the shape of a political biography to il-
luminate the consequences of a presidency, how he interpreted the Roosevelt memory 
and dealt with ambition, promise, expectation and entitlement.
A biography is the story of a life. It is a fascinating genre because, in principle, it 
gives the impression that everything is possible. Some would argue that this argu-
ment demonstrates exactly why it is an impossible genre. Biography becomes a Don 
37. Bellow, In Praise of Nepotism, 1–7, 485–508; Bellow, “American Dynasty,” 82–85. I have been 
inspired regarding the argument of dynasticism by Bellow’s incisive book. 
38. Hess, America’s Political Dynasties, 1–2.
39. Ibid.
40. John Fisher, “Th e Editor’s Easy Chair,” Harper’s (August 1957): 16, quoted in Hess, America’s 
Political Dynasties, 1.
41. Quoted in Anthony, America’s First Families, 325.
42. Perling, Presidents’ Sons, vii.
43. Hess, America’s Political Dynasties, 7.
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Quichotte-like undertaking that involves respectable, yet unattainable goals.44 Literary 
scholar Stanley Fish therefore ridiculed the genre. He dismissed the biography as “mi-
nutiae without meaning” while “biographers can only be inauthentic, can only get it 
wrong, can only lie, can only substitute their own story of their announced subject.” 45 
Th e biographical genre does have pitfalls. FDR, Jr. cannot be considered as part of 
“Great Men” history. Yet for the reasons outlined above his claim on memory and politi-
cal career have made him exceptional. Th e aim of this study is not a full-scale biography 
of FDR, Jr. Th e interpretation and my astonishment focused upon FDR, Jr.’s life and 
active political career between 1945 and 1966 to understand him to a certain extent as a 
political son. A comprehensive and defi nite portrait that got to the bottom of his life and 
explained his character in full would be impossible.46 Rather than being le dernier mot 
this study should therefore be considered as a starting point to strike up an acquain-
tance with a complex and controversial scion of one of America’s leading dynasties. It 
might satisfy your curiosity about a famous historical fi gure that operated against the 
background of the rise and fall of liberalism.
Sources
Th is study will be the fi rst monograph on the life and political career of FDR, Jr. Schol-
arly works have mentioned the activities of FDR, Jr. only in the shadow of his parents 
and in the margin of presidents Truman , Kennedy and Johnson. Th erefore, this study 
is based on the personal and political papers of FDR, Jr. in de Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Library in Hyde Park , New York. Th e fi ndings of these largely unused sources have 
shed light on FDR, Jr.’s involvement in elections, his positions on political issues as civil 
rights and anti-communism, and his relations with local and national politicians and 
with members of his family.
FDR, Jr. did keep a fragmented diary but only during his service in the Navy in 
World War II and in the immediate postwar years. He did not publish a memoir on his 
life. Th e correspondence with Eleanor, Anna , James , Elliott and John revealed how the 
family dealt with the responsibilities of guarding the memory of FDR. Particularly, the 
candid letters between FDR, Jr. and his eldest son, FDR III , the diary of his friend Joe 
Lash and the private memos of New York Post publisher Dorothy Schiff  tell us about his 
inner life, his hopes and fears, dreams and deeds.
Many politicians and public fi gures have been associated with FDR, Jr. I have fo-
cused my research on their correspondence with FDR, Jr. in their archival collections. I 
limited myself to the main supporters and opponents such as John Kennedy , Robert Ken-
nedy , Lyndon Johnson , Senator Jacob Javits , Senator Herbert Lehman , Governor Averell 
44. S. Dresden, Over de Biografi e (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff , 2001), 239–250.
45. NYT, 7 September 1999 quoted in Reviews in American History 28 (2000): 45–49. 
46. Dresden, Over de Biografi e, 186–194, 223–238.








Harriman , Joe Lash , former New Dealers such as Ed Flynn and James Farley , Dorothy 
Schiff  and labor leader David Dubinsky of the Liberal Party of New York State .
I have used the New York Times to establish a chronological order of FDR, Jr.’s 
political activities. Numerous magazine articles and other newspaper accounts have 
supplemented the set up of this timeline. I have conducted interviews with two of FDR, 
Jr.’s former wives. Suzanne Kloman was married to FDR, Jr. during his active political 
career between 1949 and 1970. Linda Stevenson Weicker , his last wife, gave insight in 
the fi nal decade of FDR, Jr.’s life. Political advisers and close friends as Justin Feldman , 
Louis Harris and Trude Lash have off ered their opinions on the successes and setbacks 
of FDR, Jr.’s political career. Curtis Roosevelt , William vanden Heuvel , and Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. talked to me about the way FDR, Jr. interpreted the Roosevelt name and 
memory. I have applied these interviews to complement my picture of FDR, Jr. and his 
time and my fi ndings in the archives and literature. Obviously, in these personal and 
colored reminiscences you have to take into account the defect of human memory and 
the passing of time.
Th e answers to the question I raised above are detailed in the following chapters. 
Th e fi rst one, “Growing up in public” will discuss FDR, Jr.’s upbringing and education. 
Th is chapter emphasizes the impact of his parents’ public careers that culminated in 
the presidency aft er 1933. Th e next three chapters “Ambition,” “Heir Apparent” and 
“Entitlement” is a triptych that will focus on FDR, Jr.’s eff orts to follow in the footsteps 
of his father between 1945 and 1954. Th ese attempts in Congress and New York State 
will address issues of promise and expectations that FDR, Jr. faced. Th ese chapters also 
discuss the way he dealt with the responsibilities as a guardian of FDR’s memory and 
the subsequent disagreements with his siblings.
Chapter 5 “Salesman” will investigate FDR, Jr.’s fall aft er his defeat in the 1954 New 
York gubernatorial election and the rise from the political woods as a salesman in the 
service of the Kennedy clan. Chapter 6 “Achievement” will discuss his independent ac-
complishments in the Democratic administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. 
Johnson. FDR, Jr. worked in areas as poverty relief and civil rights where the Roosevelt 
name and memory were traditionally held in high regard. Chapter 7 “Respect” will ana-
lyze FDR, Jr.’s attempts in the 1966 New York gubernatorial election to demonstrate 
his commitment to issues and to receive respect. It outlines the ways he hoped to shed 
the label of naked ambition for political offi  ce from the 1940s and 1950s. Th e epilogue 
describes how FDR, Jr. dealt with the loss of personal and fi nancial security aft er he had 
left  active politics in 1966.
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CHAPTER 1
Growing up in Public
Introduction
“Future Admiral arrived last night” cabled Franklin D. Roosevelt to his superior, Navy 
Secretary Joseph Daniels , to announce the birth of his fi ft h child on 17 August 1914. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. was born on Campobello Island , a small Canadian island off  
the coast of Maine and New Brunswick where the Roosevelt family spent their summers 
in two cottages. Eleanor Roosevelt had apparently miscalculated the due date and since 
there was no telephone on the island, her husband had to hurry across the bay by boat to 
get a doctor on the mainland. Upon his return, Eleanor had already delivered the baby 
with the help of the housekeeper. Born in the evening by the light of an oil lamp the boy 
weighed over ten pounds. Eleanor reminisced later that she “never had a pleasanter con-
valescence.” 1 Sara Delano Roosevelt , her mother-in-law, uncharacteristically praised 
Eleanor how well she had done. FDR served as an Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the 
administration of Democratic President Woodrow Wilson . Th ey already had a family of 
three children; Anna was born in 1906, James in 1907, and Elliott in 1911. John arrived 
in 1916, two years aft er FDR, Jr. 
FDR, Jr. was born into the exclusive world of privilege and responsibility of Amer-
ica’s social elite. Th e distinguished Roosevelt family embodied this old White Anglo 
Saxon Protestant tradition. His grandmother, Sara Delano had inherited the fortune her 
father had earned in the trade on China. In 1880, she married James Roosevelt , a patri-
cian widower who had successfully replenished his large inheritance in the railroad and 
coalmine business. Th eir domain was the Springwood estate in Hyde Park where FDR 
was born in 1882.
1. Geoff rey C. Ward, A First Class Temperament: Th e Emergence of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1995), 250; Nathan Miller, F.D.R.: An Intimate History (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1983), 122; Betty Boyd Caroli, Th e Roosevelt Women (New York: Basic Books, 1998), 
264; Kenneth S. Davis, FDR: Th e Beckoning of Destiny, 1882–1928 (New York: Random House, 
1972), 358; Stephen O. Muskie, Campobello: Roosevelt’s Beloved Island (London: Down East 
Books, 1982), 31; Peter Collier with David Horowitz, Th e Roosevelts: An American Saga (London: 
Deutsch, 1995), 450; Joseph P. Lash interviews with Anna Roosevelt Halsted , 29 November 1971, 
box 44, Joseph P. Lash Papers, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, the Netherlands (hereaft er: 
RSC). 







Th e village was located in the upstate Hudson Valley, an area that was home to an 
unusually large number of upper-class families such as the Astor, Vanderbilt and Rock-
efeller clans.2 In this environment a Social Register helped defi ne who belonged to this 
world of Old Money. Segregated by religion and ethnicity and closed to outsiders as Jews, 
Catholics, and African Americans, the closely-knit WASP environment had for genera-
tions been providing the leaders of American society. Th e WASP establishment ruled 
the nation on the basis of their social standing and handed down its prevailing view 
and direction to the people. Th e old elite had its peculiar culture. Th eir confi dence and 
authority were preserved and fostered by institutions like boarding schools and colleges 
that prescribed the do and don’ts of the old elite’s way of life, their manners, language, 
tastes, fashion, education and travel.3 
James and Sara anchored their authority in the confi dence of the superiority of this 
Victorian way of life. FDR thrived on the unshakable aristocratic menu of responsibil-
ity and privilege that gave him a sense of self-worth and confi dence. James combined 
a code of strict moral conduct with a life as an English country squire. Oft en FDR ac-
companied his father on hunting trips and expeditions on the estate. Sara and James 
instilled in their only child a sense of civic responsibility and entitlement. Th e social 
elite notion of public service demanded to assist those that were less fortunate.4
FDR grew up as a spirited “Prince Charming” fed by the unrestricted doting at-
tention of his parents. In 1896, he entered Groton , the most exclusive private boarding 
school in the country. Aft er his father died in January 1901, Sara moved to a Boston 
apartment in the vicinity of Harvard University where FDR had started his studies. Yet, 
through his education, FDR had become more independent and the meddlesomeness 
of his mother, who had been very close to him, became suff ocating. Sara wanted her 
son to continue the family tradition and duplicate his father’s noblesse oblige role as 
gentleman of Springwood and philantrope of Hyde Park . FDR had other plans with his 
life than retire to a peaceful and quiet life at the estate. He wanted to stake out his own 
territory.
In late 1903, he announced to an astonished Sara his intention to marry Elea-
nor Roosevelt .5 FDR and ER descended from a common ancestor. In the 1640s, Claes 
Maertenszoon van Rosenvelt had emigrated from the Dutch province of Zeeland to 
2. Joseph P. Lash , Eleanor and Franklin (New York: Smithmark, 1971), 240; John R. Boettiger , Jr., 
A Love in Shadow (New York: Norton, 1978), 75.
3. Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny (Boston, MA: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1990), 3; E. Digby Baltzell, Th e Protestant Establishment (New York: Random 
House, 1964), 297–302; Robert W. Merry, Taking on the World: Joseph and Stewart Alsop . Guard-
ians of the American Century (New York: Viking, 1996), 304, 542, 544; Caroli, Th e Roosevelt 
Women, 6–8; Nelson W. Aldrich, Jr., Old Money: Th e Mythology of America’s Upper Class (New 
York: Knopf, 1988), 33–34.
4. A. Lammers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Koning van Amerika (Balans, 1992), 13–15.
5. Doris Kearns Goodwin, No Ordinary Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt in the White House 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 179; Lash , Eleanor and Franklin, 193.
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New Amsterdam. Some fi ft y years later the Roosevelt family tree had split into an Oys-
ter Bay-branch, where President Th eodore Roosevelt sprang from and into the Hudson 
Valley branch of FDR. Eleanor was TR ’s cousin.6 Both were raised in the same aristo-
cratic establishment. Yet, where FDR had enjoyed an aff ectionate, secure, and, in a sense 
uneventful upbringing, tragedy and emotional neglect had scarred Eleanor’s complex 
childhood. Born in 1884, she became devoted to her father, Elliot Roosevelt. Yet, TR’s 
unpredictable younger brother fought a lifelong battle with alcohol. He lived most of El-
eanor’s childhood away from home in an asylum. Anna Hall, her beautiful mother, was 
cold and self-absorbed. Her actions reinforced Eleanor’s self-image of an ugly duckling. 
Aft er her parents both died at a young age, relatives of her mother raised Eleanor and her 
brother Hall. Th e serious and shy ten-year-old girl was rescued from her unhappiness 
when the Hall family sent her to a boarding school in Europe. At Allenwood in London 
Eleanor started her life anew. Under the guidance of headmistress Marie Souvestre she 
discovered her capabilities, became appreciated, more secure and self-reliant.7
In 1900, aft er three years, Eleanor returned to New York. She got involved in teach-
ing children of settlement houses in lower Manhattan. Th e eighteen-year-old also bus-
ied herself in the Consumers League, a militant organization that called attention to 
the poor working conditions of women in sweatshops.8 In 1904, FDR graduated from 
Harvard. In the fall he moved to New York City to enter Columbia University to study 
law. Sara had gone to great lengths to dissuade her only son from marrying Eleanor. 
Finally, grudgingly, she relented. Th e wedding of FDR and ER took place on 17 March 
1905 in New York. Sara had lost the battle but was resolved to dominate the lives of the 
newly-weds.
TR ’s Model of Public Service: Albany and Washington, D.C.
When her grandchildren were still young, Sara used to read them the life of “Uncle 
Teddy.” Captured by TR ’s story of public service, the 4-year-old FDR, Jr. solemnly an-
nounced “Granny, I intend to run for the Presidency, and am beginning my campaign 
at your tea.” Sara asked her little grandchild how he would achieve that and FDR, Jr. 
replied “Oh, I shall get to know people, and when my name comes up, they will vote for 
me.” 9
Th e young child was not the only one who derived his inspiration from TR . FDR 
modeled his political career on the example set by his uncle. TR had been quite uncon-
cerned about the taboo on a political life that had been custom in the WASP environ-
6. Lash , Eleanor and Franklin, xvii; Lammers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 20.
7. Transcript interview Blanche Wiesen Cook , Th e American Experience: Eleanor Roosevelt PBS 
Documentary, www.pbs.org; Caroli, Th e Roosevelt Women, 260; Ward, A First Class Tempera-
ment, 11; Lammers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 23–24; Lash , Eleanor and Franklin, 74–77.
8. Lash , Eleanor and Franklin, 97–110.
9. Ward, A First-Class Temperament, 411.







ment. Th en again, his whole life had been that of a colorful, unconventional “American 
Renaissance Man.” As an intellectual and practical politician, TR inspired Americans 
to lead a “strenuous life” during his presidency. His uncle’s display of courage and exer-
tion of manliness made an enormous impression on FDR. Bored with the law and full 
of vitality, he wanted to be where the action was. In 1910, local Democratic Party lead-
ers off ered him nomination to run for a seat in the New York State assembly from the 
Dutchess County district. FDR campaigned as a reformer in the mold of his uncle and 
the Roosevelt name won him the race. A year later, FDR picked a fi ght with the bosses 
of Tammany Hall . He opposed the handpicked candidate of the political machine to fi ll 
a Democratic seat in the U.S. Senate.
FDR’s independent stand drew the attention of President Woodrow Wilson .10 In 
1913, FDR moved his family from Albany to Washington, D.C. aft er Wilson had named 
him to the coveted position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Not only had TR held 
this position, the house the Roosevelts inhabited on N Street had been owned by Aunt 
Bamie, Uncle Ted’s eldest sister. Life in Washington fi tted the dashing FDR like a glove. 
Th e New York patrician enjoyed the capital’s social life, energetically visited receptions, 
played golf, and went horsebackriding. Eleanor fulfi lled the duties as wife of an upper 
echelon administration offi  cial. Regularly, she accompanied FDR on Naval inspections 
and visits to the Navy fl eet. She would perform the Washington rite of visiting other 
wives of notables, Supreme Court Justices, members of Congress and diplomats.11 
Eleanor considered raising her children as a tremendous duty. Th is attitude refl ect-
ed her own austere and unhappy upbringing. Eleanor had no example to copy and she 
dutifully had breakfast with the children, read them stories, “taught them right from 
wrong” and listened to their prayers before they went to sleep. Despite these gestures, 
ER oft en seemed absent and preoccupied. Th ough she cared for her children Eleanor felt 
unable to connect to them, to show spontaneity and to answer their emotional needs.
Her children later sustained this puritanical picture. Anna , James and Elliott re-
membered these early days when Eleanor was an unhappy, insecure and aloof mother 
who was unable to fi nd a balance between aff ection and discipline. Anna felt that her 
mother did not “understand and satisfy the need of a child for primary closeness to a 
parent.” 12 She pointed out that the inconsistencies of her mother had made her child-
hood and upbringing a troubling experience. Anna could not rely on her mother. Elea-
nor could be caring and attentive one moment, but the next moment very cold and de-
manding. Oft en the children saw only a “bad-tempered disciplinarian.” 13 When Eleanor 
10. Mary Beth Norton et al., A People and A Nation (New York: Houghton Miffl  in, 2001), 596–
597; John M. Cooper, Jr., Pivotal Decades: Th e United States, 1900–1920 (New York: Norton, 1990), 
157–189; Lammers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 20–50.
11. Lash , Eleanor and Franklin, 184–187; Lammers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 40–42. 
12. Bernard Asbell, ed., Mother and Daughter: Th e Letters of Eleanor and Anna Roosevelt (New 
York: Fromm, 1988), 19.
13. William Youngs, Eleanor Roosevelt : A Personal and Public Life (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), 
104; Goodwin, No Ordinary Time, 179; Collier, Th e Roosevelts, 450–455.
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later admitted that she was conscious of her shortcomings as a mother in the early years 
of her marriage, it continued to underscore low self-esteem. She acknowledged that her 
greatest mistake had been a too strong emphasis on discipline and the qualities of self-
control when her children were young. She had been too preoccupied with raising her 
children within the strict traditional code of their social class and had failed to give 
them some leeway to make their own mistakes.14
Unlike the stiff  Eleanor, FDR clearly enjoyed himself with his small children. He 
was more responsive and aff ectionate than Eleanor was. FDR, Jr. recalled his father as 
“very warm and delightful.” In one of his earliest fond memories, FDR took him hiking 
in Rock Creek Park and ice-skating during the winter in Washington, D.C. Outgoing 
and at ease with himself, he enjoyed playing all sorts of unfamiliar games with his small 
children at the estate in Hyde Park . He loved to teach them to ride horses and the fi -
nesses of sailing on their boat the “Half Moon” in the waters around Campobello dur-
ing holidays. Th e Roosevelt children derived their passion and fascination for sailboats 
from their father. On the Hudson River they sailed model boats together that FDR had 
made and in the winter they went ice boating on the frozen river.15 Th e warmest family 
times were the happy Christmas gatherings at Hyde Park where the excitement of the 
discovery of stuff ed stockings loaded with presents competed with the ritual of listening 
at their father’s feet to FDR’s reading of Dickens’ “A Christmas Carol.” 16 Later, FDR, Jr. 
hailed his father’s encouragement of an environment of competitive family debates dur-
ing lunch and dinner. James reminisced fondly about the opportunity FDR had given 
them to view and participate in world history at his side.17
FDR’s frequent unavailability because of his public function determined his posi-
tion in the household. He assumed the role of bringing the good news, a position that 
served as an escape of the destructive confl ict between Sara and Eleanor and could be 
directly linked to his own upbringing. FDR wanted to raise his children to be indepen-
dent because he resented the way his mother had dominated his own childhood.18 By 
14. Blanche Wiesen Cook , Eleanor Roosevelt , vol. 2, 1933–1938 (New York: Viking, 1999), 22–23; 
Transcript interview Blanche Wiesen Cook, Eleanor Roosevelt PBS Documentary, www.pbs.org; 
David Roosevelt, Grandmere: Een persoonlijke geschiedenis van Eleanor Roosevelt (Rijswijk, El-
mar, 2003), 61. 
15. Ward, A First-Class Temperament, 272.
16. FDR, Jr., “As I Remember my Father,” New York World Telegram, 9 April 1965, box 5, Marion 
Dickerman Papers, 1918–1975, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park , New York (hereaft er: 
FDRL); James Roosevelt , “My Father FDR,” in Saturday Evening Post (10 October 1959): 15–17, 
93–94, 97; Elliott Roosevelt , An Untold Story: Th e Roosevelts of Hyde Park (New York: G.P. Put-
nam’s Sons, 1973), 118; James Roosevelt with Bill Libby, My Parents: A Diff ering View (Chicago, 
IL: Playboy Press, 1976), 50.
17. Goodwin, No Ordinary Time, 179; Merry, Taking on the World, 21.
18. Stephen Hess , America’s Political Dynasties: From Adams to Kennedy (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 1997), 198–200; Freidel, A Rendezvous with Destiny, 34; Ward, A First-
Class Temperament, 279; Joseph Alsop, FDR: A Centenerary Remembrance (New York: Viking 
Press, 1982), 37; Collier, Th e Roosevelts, 159, 251; Lash , Eleanor and Franklin, 197.







leaning over backwards not to do the same with his own children, he wanted them to be 
responsible for their own decisions and mistakes.
When FDR’s political career caused her son to grow apart from her, Sara renewed her 
determination to keep her grandchildren under her infl uence. It was Sara who dominat-
ed FDR, Jr.’s early childhood. He had to master peculiarities as the Victorian etiquette. 
She never grew tired of stressing to her grandchild the privilege of his inheritance and 
instilled in FDR, Jr. a sense of class-consciousness and entitlement. Th ey were special 
people who stood in a proud tradition and they were expected to act accordingly.19 At 
the age of four, FDR, Jr. already carried the characteristics that would label him as the 
most charming and extrovert son. James described his outgoing younger brother the 
“fl atterer” and the “sunshine boy.” He recalled during a walk with little Franklin, that 
every time when his brother “saw a child he would say hello as if he knew them.” 20 FDR, 
Jr. and John formed a team as did Anna and James. Elliott was left  out. He was Eleanor’s 
favorite; the sickly middle child and who had been born directly aft er the fi rst Franklin, 
Jr. who had died shortly aft er his birth.21
Sara controlled the Roosevelt family fi nances. In 1908, she had bought two adjacent 
brownstone houses on New York City’s East 65th Street for the whole family and or-
dered to construct interlocking doors on the second and third fl oors. Sara radiated the 
supreme confi dence that Eleanor lacked. Th e insecure young woman allowed the views 
of her mother-in-law to prevail. Sara lectured Eleanor on the raising of her children and 
taught her also how to run the household. Eleanor had wanted to run her own but she 
was ignorant about her children’s upbringing. She resented Sara’s doting intervention 
but felt inadequate to put an end to it. Ill at ease with herself in the fi rst decade of her 
marriage she longed for acceptance by her confi dent mother-in-law.
Sara substituted for the busy public lives of FDR and ER and grew accustomed to 
referring to their off spring as her own children. James emphasized the importance of 
Sara and the dependency on their grandmother in the Roosevelt household. He pointed 
out: “We were fortunate to have a grandmother who would do for us when we had a 
mother who could not and a father who would not.” 22 
Sara not only represented stability for her grandchildren but by taking over from 
a helpless ER and an absent FDR she also became a major culprit in undermining their 
parental authority and the children’s discipline. As a fairy godmother, Sara spoiled 
them lavishly with expensive gift s and she took the elder children on traditional trips to 
Europe. Th e children cleverly exploited the hostilities between their parents and domi-
nant grandmother because they knew how to drive a wedge between the grown-ups. 
James pointed out that when they wanted something, “Pa and Mummy would not give 
us … the best way to circumvent them was to appeal to Granny.” 23 One time when ER 
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and FDR had fi nally decided to punish FDR, Jr. and John for some nasty behavior by 
confi scating their pony, Sara just bought the two young boys a new horse.24
In later years, FDR, Jr. repeatedly called upon his grandmother to satisfy the im-
pulse of the moment when for instance he needed a new car to replace a smashed one. 
Th e Roosevelt children were raised in a charged atmosphere of three confusing sources 
of authority where oft en-tense communication and emotional distances separated the 
adult members. It produced an upbringing of impulse behavior in which FDR, Jr. never 
had to face the consequences of his acts. Without being given a childhood opportunity 
to become conscious of a relationship between cause and eff ect, this left  FDR, Jr. “feeling 
powerless to infl uence the course of his life.” 25 
It was not only the reform impulse of TR that cast a shadow over FDR. Both Roos-
evelts called for the enlargement and modernization of the American fl eet aft er World 
War I broke out in Europe in August 1914. Th ey became more and more bellicose as 
they denounced President Wilson , FDR privately and TR publicly, for his hesitant policy 
of neutrality. Aft er Wilson declared war on Germany and the other Central Powers in 
April 1917, FDR decided that, following Uncle Ted’s adventure in Cuba, he needed to 
be in uniform in the French trenches to fulfi ll his longing for adventure and to boost 
his political career. He petitioned Wilson and Secretary Daniels to allow him to depart 
for the European battlefi elds. Th ey rejected his requests. Instead, they sent FDR in the 
spring of 1918 to England and France to take care of naval business.26
Th e truce in November 1918 marked the end of the hostilities on the European bat-
tlefi elds but it did signal the start of domestic violence in America. Th e people released 
their wartime hatred at domestic radicals whom they held responsible for the economic 
downturn, job losses, infl ation and strikes. Th is Red Scare against communists and so-
cialists and Black Scare aimed at African Americans underscored the feeling of a coun-
try that was out of control. Th e bitter political division between Wilson and Congress 
over the acceptance of the president’s League of Nations treaty added to this unrest. 
World War I did stifl e the reform mood, not in the least Wilson’s crusade to make the 
world safe for democracy. His blueprint for a League of Nations to prevent future violent 
confl icts shipwrecked on the mutual distrust of European leaders, the Congress and 
the stubbornness of the president himself. As to underline the anxiety, the man at the 
nation’s helm, Woodrow Wilson , suff ered a massive stroke on 2 October 1919 that left  
him unable to control his administration until the end of his term in 1921.27
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Wilson ’s incapacity meant that the Democrats had to name a new ticket in the 1920 
presidential election. FDR actively campaigned for the vice-presidential spot. At the 
national convention Democrats nominated him to fi ll the ticket with presidential can-
didate, James Cox, the Ohio governor. Yet, they were no matches for the Republican 
normalcy ticket of Ohio Senator Warren Harding and Massachusetts Governor Calvin 
Coolidge . Voters were wary of overseas commitments and held Wilson responsible for 
the economic recession and domestic unrest. On the campaign trail, FDR did his best. 
He criss-crossed the country in the mantle of Uncle Ted who had suddenly died on 6 
January 1919. He had been shocked by TR ’s demise but it off ered FDR the opportunity 
to jump over the shadow of his hero. Th e electorate denied him that chance. In a 16 mil-
lion to 9 million-vote landslide it overwhelmingly choose Warren Harding as their next 
president.28
Polio
As the new era of the 1920s dawned, things had started to change within the Roosevelt 
family. It took a marriage crisis to empower Eleanor. By 1918, Eleanor fi nally found the 
strength to take her destiny in her own hands and gained a degree of independence 
from Sara and from her husband. While handling the correspondence of her husband 
during the summer of 1918, Eleanor had discovered love letters of her social secretary 
to FDR. Th e discovery of the extramarital aff air led to a crisis. Employed since 1914, 
the attractive Lucy Mercer had been a part of the extended family. Th e humiliating af-
fair aggravated ER ’s feelings of insecurity and she off ered her husband a divorce. FDR 
seriously considered marrying the Roman Catholic Lucy but was held back by the com-
bined opposition of Louis Howe and Sara. Howe, a former journalist in Albany who had 
masterminded FDR’s rise on the political ladder, warned that a divorce would surely 
mean the end of his promising career. Sara sat on the family fi nances and she informed 
her son “not expect to be given another dollar if he went through with the divorce.” 29
Eleanor appreciated Sara ’s attitude and intervention in the matter because the 
welfare of her children had been her chief concern to save her marriage. In the end, 
ER and FDR established a marital truce and agreed to start rebuilding their shattered 
marriage.30 For a brief period, the situation for FDR, Jr. and John stabilized aft er ten-
sions submerged in the household. As a consequence of repairing his marriage, FDR 
devoted more time to his children. Before FDR, Jr. and John could benefi t from these 
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new circumstances, however, prospects darkened again, dramatically this time, when 
FDR contracted polio.
In 1921, for the fi rst time in more than a decade, FDR had been free of the obliga-
tions of public offi  ce and he looked forward to spending the summer with his family at 
Campobello. In early July, the Roosevelt entourage that included the family of Louis 
Howe , tutors and a governess for the children arrived and settled in the island’s eigh-
teen-bedroom cottage. Th e marvelous isolation at the rugged island where there was 
no electricity, telephone or radio and the pioneering atmosphere seemed to subdue the 
tensions and confl icts within the family. Eleanor clearly enjoyed the summers because 
she could fi nally run her own home. She organized daily picnics, supervised a staff  
of fi ve servants, a housemaid, cook, butler, driver, captain and oversaw tutors for the 
three elder children and a Swiss governess called Seline Th iel for FDR, Jr. and John . Th e 
children usually had the best of times with FDR. He loved the life on the island and was 
the entertaining father his children would later romanticize about in their recollections. 
Th eir days were fi lled with riding, sailing, hiking and swimming trips with FDR as the 
center. James recalled his father’s presence on the vacation island, “He inundated us 
with fun. Sometimes we felt we did not have him at all, but when we did have him, life 
was lively and exciting as any kid could want it to be.” 31
Th is idyllic scene came to a sudden end in early August 1921 when FDR became ill 
during a swim in the waters around Campobello. Diagnosed as polio he became para-
lyzed from the waist down. Although FDR desperately exercised the following years to 
walk again, he never regained the use of his legs. Th e image of his helpless father being 
carried away on a stretcher aft er FDR had been struck by polio, had been inscribed in 
FDR, Jr.’s recollection for its dramatic character. It was the most vivid memory from his 
youth and confi rmed the sense of being on his own. Standing on the porch at Campo-
bello and watching the scary sight of his father who was visibly in pain, he recalled how 
FDR had attempted to reassure his terrifi ed children by fl ashing his broadest smile and 
comfortably claiming that he would see them soon.32
Polio had a tremendous impact on the Roosevelt family and on underlying pro-
cesses of independence and autonomy. It helped transform FDR. FDR, Jr. later observed 
that the illness gave his father a breathing spell and a time to refl ect. He pointed out, 
“polio taught father to concentrate on the things he was physically able to do and not 
waste time thinking about things he could not.” Having mastered adversity, it gave FDR 
patience and determination. FDR, Jr. noted that the affl  iction changed his father in an-
other way. He had become more aware and compassionate of the needs of common 
people while, “up until 1921, father was a rich playboy, living off  his cousin’s name and 
his mother’s money.” 33
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A number of FDR’s biographers support this transformation claim that has con-
tributed immensely to the legendary status of FDR. Other historians analyzed that his 
personality did not structurally change. Th ey argued that the polio attack reinforced 
positive characteristics as optimism and self-confi dence.34 In any event, the confi ne-
ment to crutches and a wheelchair did change FDR’s appearance. His athletic exercises 
and swimming eff orts that kept FDR in shape had resulted in a physical metamorpho-
sis.35 His appearance now displayed willpower and discipline that endeared him to the 
common man. FDR recuperated for months at a time in the sunny climate of Florida 
and at the waters of Warm Springs, Georgia. He had visited the healing wells in October 
1924 for the fi rst time and had fallen in love with the hamlet and its people. It became 
his house away from Hyde Park . In his characteristic dashing way FDR bought the place 
in 1926 and founded the Warm Springs Foundation whose aim it was to develop it into 
a cure center for patients suff ering from polio. Water gave him the impression that he 
could walk again. Th is ability would be the main condition to resume his political ca-
reer. It was this determination that kept FDR going.36 
Without the help of Eleanor and Louis Howe he could never have succeeded. Polio 
also transformed Eleanor’s world. She became a public fi gure. On instigation of Howe, 
who successfully tried to keep the Roosevelt name in the public eye, she joined the 
Women’s Division of the Democratic State Committee of New York. In her newfound 
identity, Eleanor made numerous political speeches and campaigned vigorously on be-
half of Democrat Al Smith , the 1924 candidate for New York governor.
At the Women’s Trade Union League headquarters, Eleanor taught reading for 
women workers and she learned about organizing women to improve their working 
conditions.37 Eleanor’s social conscience did introduce FDR, Jr. and John to the world 
of trade unions, slums and the working class. At the 1926 Christmas party of the union, 
disguised as helpers of Santa, they handed out the gift s and presents Eleanor had bought 
to the less-fortunate children of WTUL members. Eleanor’s eff orts at protective legis-
lation indicated that progressive successes continued at local and state levels. On the 
national level, however, prosperity stifl ed the reform impulse. President Harding, who 
died suddenly in August 1923 and was succeeded by Calvin Coolidge , had focused on 
domestic economic restoration. By 1924, technological changes and mass production 
paved the way for unbridled materialism and the coming of a consumer society. 
By 1924, FDR’s spirits had revived. Physically, he remained confi ned to a wheel chair 
though he had trained himself to walk short distances with heavy braces, usually on the 
arm of James . His political fate was tied to that of New York Governor Al Smith , one 
of the candidates to claim the Democratic nomination for president in the upcoming 
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election. Democrats had remained divided between the rivaling candidacies of Smith 
who opposed prohibition, represented the Catholic big city immigrants and William 
McAdoo , an experienced Wilson government offi  cial who embodied Protestant cultural 
beliefs. Th ey fought each other over the Prohibition laws, religious and ethnic tolerance 
and immigrants. At their Convention in New York City these confl icts came to a head. 
Only aft er 102 ballots wary Democrats decided upon Wall Street lawyer John Davis.
Coolidge, the incumbent president ran away with an easy victory. Yet, Smith had 
presented FDR the opportunity to initiate his political resurrection. FDR’s nominat-
ing speech at the national convention in Madison Square Garden and his inspirational 
stride on crutches to the lectern sealed his political comeback. Many Democrats shared 
FDR’s observation that the party needed to preach a liberal and progressive message to 
claim an electoral success.38
FDR’s successful eff orts to establish his re-entry into active politics and public life 
reinforced the private separation from his family. Th is absence added profoundly to the 
inability to stabilize a normal family life. Th e dramatic change had been frightening for 
FDR, Jr. and the other siblings. Th eir buoyant, dashing father and leading companion in 
all strenuous outdoor activities had suddenly turned into a helpless cripple. FDR made 
eff orts to dispel the fears of his children and his optimism gradually removed them. 
When the seven-year-old FDR, Jr. and fi ve-year-old John sat on his bed they would play 
a game to name all the muscles in his dead legs. FDR, Jr. recalled that to reassure them 
of his physical capabilities, FDR would sit down on the fl oor to Indian wrestle with him 
and he would be unable to beat his crippled father.
Th e time of the “father with the dead legs” was a blow FDR, Jr. felt very hard to get 
over. His family had split up. James stayed at Groton while Anna and Elliott lived with 
their tutor in Hyde Park . Eleanor traveled back and forth between Springwood and New 
York where FDR, Jr. and John remained with their governess in Sara ’s Manhattan house 
and went to Buckley , an upper-class private New York City elementary school.39
In the absence of their parents, the Roosevelt children were raised by an endless 
series of proxies and substitutes. It was Sara who selected the nurses, nannies, tutors 
and governesses who were oft en stiff , conventional, humorless, and comfortless women. 
Th e frightened children who suff ered greatly under her reign of terror called a particu-
larly mean governess “Old Battle-ax.” James recalled one sadistic incident, “One time, 
a proper English nanny locked Franklin, Jr. in a closet for so long, because of her rage 
she broke off  the key to the door, “that Junior claims from that day on he suff ers from 
claustrophobia.” 40 Despite their occasional viciousness the children did discover that 
the endless stream of nannies did not command any authority because sooner or later 
someone else always replaced them.41 
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FDR, Jr. was a sensitive child and he suff ered heavily from the long stretches of pa-
rental absence and the adjustments he had to make. FDR tried to keep in touch by mail, 
writing loving and amusing letters and Eleanor took care that their son spent parts of 
his holidays with his father. He longed for his father’s physical presence. In early Febru-
ary 1925, the eleven-year-old wrote his sister Anna , “Th e house seems like an empty 
wastebasket. Chief is very well but seems to grow more and more lonesome, like me and 
Johnny. Now that Father has left , Mother seems always to be on the go.” 42 Aft er FDR had 
given his son a seaplane to put together for his birthday in 1925, FDR, Jr. wrote his father, 
“Th e boat is an awful job to put together. I wish you were here to help me.” 43 During cru-
cial years FDR, Jr. had lost a tangible father. He resented the long-distance relationship 
and felt managed. To him FDR became a mere symbol and a cheery letter-writer.44 
As FDR and ER became more involved in public, the growing number of friends, 
confi dants and advisers that accompanied this career signifi ed yet another barricade 
between FDR, Jr. and his parents. Oft en Sara suggested the dislike of these members 
of the extended Roosevelt family to the children. She opposed politics because it meant 
a risky profession for a gentleman who should keep his hands clean.45 Sara embodied 
the noblesse oblige ideal of the WASP-gentleman who tended to his estate and involved 
himself in the community through charity work.
FDR, Jr. resented his father’s circle of assistants. As a child that was generous but 
also easily hurt, he felt jealous about these intimate relationships. Th ey received so 
much of his father’s attention and he so little. He grew increasingly irritated about the 
omnipresence of Louis Howe , FDR’s political adviser and Marguerite “Missy” LeHand , 
FDR’s secretary since 1920. FDR, Jr. regarded Howe, whose chain-smoking, foul-smell-
ing fi gure always appeared at breakfast as an intrusion into his life. Anna also resented 
“Missy” whom she felt had taken her place at her father’s side. FDR, Jr. later confi ded that 
he was sure that FDR had a physical relationship with his secretary.46
In a sense, FDR, Jr. benefi ted from his mother’s metamorphosis from a powerless 
daughter-in-law into a self-confi dent public activist. Polio had also changed Eleanor’s 
attitude toward motherhood. She handled the wildness of her two youngest children 
with more light-heartedness instead of answering the call of duty and discipline. She 
encouraged her two younger children to “live boldly and self-reliantly.”
By the early 1920s, she had found new friends among female political activists. She 
involved Nancy Cook and Marion Dickerman in this second phase of the two young 
42. Ward, A First-Class Temperament, 717.
43. FDR, Jr. to FDR, 18 February 1924; 28 July 1924; 28 August 1925, folder 3, 1922–1929, box 
19, Correspondence: family members, 1883–1945. Roosevelt, Franklin Jr. 1922–1929, Roosevelt 
Family Papers, donated by the children, FDRL.
44. Collier, Th e Roosevelts, 310–311; Transcript interview Nina Gibson Roosevelt, Eleanor Roos-
evelt PBS Documentary, www.pbs.org. 
45. Lammers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 70.
46. Joseph Lash , “Interview with John Roosevelt,” 4 June 1969, folder 52, box 44, Lash Papers; 
Ward, A First-Class Temperament, 615–616, 679.
Erik van den Berg BW.indd   38 27-Jan-06   13:58:27 PM
Growing up in public 39
boys’ education. Th e couple assumed a position like foster mothers for FDR, Jr. and 
John . In the Spring of 1923 the three women taught FDR, Jr. and John how to swim aft er 
the eight-year-old FDR, Jr. had fallen in Sara ’s ice pond in Hyde Park the year before 
and had only been nearly rescued by them.47 Eleanor persuaded them to join dancing-
classes. Aft er some practice, FDR, Jr. proudly presented his mother a gold medal and 
fi rst prize for being the best tango dancer.48 
Oft en accompanied by Cook and Dickerman, she took her young sons on expedi-
tions throughout New York State, engaged them in outdoor activities and picnicked on 
weekends at Hyde Park . Th e camping trips and summer holidays off ered not only an 
opportunity for Eleanor to substitute for FDR in a masculine role. FDR, Jr. oft en served 
as an aide and confi dant to his mother in this struggle for independence. Also, it served 
as an outlet for the abundance of uncontrolled aggressive energies of FDR, Jr. and John .49 
Th e boys constantly fought each other unable to channel their energies. Usually, FDR, Jr. 
had been the aggressor. When sleepwalking one time FDR, Jr. had even tried to throttle 
John in his sleep. 
Th e two brothers had grown up together, because of the small age diff erence, but 
had never been particularly close. Th e internal and outside pressures on the family had 
strengthened their aggressive and independent inclinations as they had done with their 
older sister and brothers. In 1926, twenty-year-old Anna had married Curtis Dall , a 
stockbroker ten years her senior. From the start, the marriage was clearly an escape 
from the tense atmosphere in the Roosevelt household and would fall apart in 1932. 
While James was unhappily enrolled at Harvard Law School, the restless Elliott rebelled 
at Groton and would fl atly refuse to go to Harvard.50
FDR, Jr.’s lack of discipline also struck Marion Dickerman. She had instantly liked 
the “happy, delightful and thoroughly lovable child” who was outspoken, thoughtful 
and generous. Despite the abundant charm, Dickerman also observed a disturbing de-
gree of selfi shness and carelessness.51 Th is translated itself in a twelve-year-old boy that 
lacked a signifi cant measure of eff ective (self) control and discipline. Th e headmaster of 
the Buckley School underscored this ambivalent assessment in a 1926-progress report 
to Eleanor. Near the end of FDR, Jr.’s stay he had observed that although his work had 
been “splendid” FDR, Jr.’s conduct in school had to improve. He had demonstrated “ir-
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responsible behavior” by taking “advantage of teachers” and a profound “disregard of 
class courtesy.” He warned Eleanor that if FDR, Jr. wanted to continue at Groton next 
fall he would have to channel his energies and “mend his ways immediately.” 52
In raising their children both FDR and ER had followed a doctrine of low levels 
of interference and applied autonomy as principle. Th is attitude refl ected their own 
struggles for independence. Eleanor needed to assert herself free from the dominance 
of her mother-in-law and, in the 1920s, to stand on her own feet in the male-dominated 
society. FDR needed to come out from under Sara ’s patronizing infl uence and regain his 
physical independence aft er polio had struck.53
Groton School
In the fall of 1926, exactly three decades aft er his father arrived at the Groton School in 
1896, FDR, Jr. registered in the fi rst form at the boys’ school, the most exclusive private 
school in the country. He had turned twelve in August and in the best family and class 
tradition his parents had sent him to Groton, a small New England town some thirty-
fi ve miles northwest of Boston. Th e boarding school served as “an academy for Ameri-
ca’s fi rst families” where the sons of the Roosevelt, Harriman, Whitney and Vanderbilt 
families prepared for their entrance into the Ivy League at Harvard or Yale and were 
trained for public service and leadership positions in society. Novelist F. Scott Fitzgerald 
called the New England Boarding Schools “St. Midas” because they confi rmed the posi-
tion of America’s upper-class families. Th e schools were crucial to the children’s sense 
of class-consciousness and were to replace the family. Th ey ensured a secluded environ-
ment that was relatively isolated from infl uences from the outside world.54
Th e other world of the mid-1920s was complex and full of contrasts. Mass culture, 
mobility and consumerism dominated everyday life. Th e economic prosperity was un-
derscored by ferocious advertising and had created an entertainment industry that pro-
duced new movie and sports stars such as Gloria Swanson , Charlie Chaplin , and Babe 
Ruth . Th ere were also lines of defense against the progress of modernity in these Roar-
ing Twenties. Fundamentalist movement fought back against what they considered as 
an attack on their traditional values and old-fashioned “American way of life” by the 
52. B. Lord Buckley to Eleanor Roosevelt , 7 May 1926, folder report card and progress reports, 
box 176, FDR, Jr. Papers, FDRL. 
53. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “Two Years Later: Th e Roosevelt Family,” Life Magazine (7 April 
1947): 113–119, Lesley Kuhn Collection, RSC.
54. Rudy Abramson, Spanning the Century: Th e Life of W. Averell Harriman , 1891–1986 (New 
York: William Morrow, 1992), 65, 71–73; Stephen Birmingham, America’s Secret Aristocracy 
(Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1987), 243; Merry, Taking on the World, 23–33, 35; Aldrich, Old 
Money, 42. Eventually all Roosevelt sons would join the ranks of the Groton alumni. Th eodore 
Roosevelt , Dean Acheson, Averell Harriman, Francis Biddle, and Sumner Welles were Groton 
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Erik van den Berg BW.indd   40 27-Jan-06   13:58:28 PM
Growing up in public 41
culture of excess. Th e resistance to adjust to modern society demonstrated itself in re-
strictive immigration quotas, the million-member Ku Klux Klan who build upon racial, 
ethnic and religious purity, and the attempt to ban the teaching of the evolution theory 
at schools.55 
In the peaceful and predictable atmosphere of Groton , where things had remained 
the same for decades, FDR, Jr. faced challenges of his own. Th e school’s rigid perfor-
mance schedule led Roosevelt historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. to observe that “to sur-
vive unhappiness at Groton was to be capable of anything.” 56 Endicott Peabody , whom 
the boys called rector, had founded the Groton school. Modeled on an English church 
school, Groton consisted of six classes that were called “forms.” Th e dominating Pea-
body liked to speak of Groton School, as a community where the boys were trained to 
behave like Christian gentlemen. Th e authoritative rector inspired respect as well as fear. 
Groton alumnus Averell Harriman later stated that the rector had been “an awful bully 
if he were not such a terrible Christian.” 57 
During six years FDR, Jr. and his fellow “Grotties” abided by Peabody ’s principles. 
Th e classic character-building curriculum stressed a crucial all round performance ide-
al where each boy would strive for one’s personal best because only performance and 
eff ort were to be rewarded. Th e spirit of a healthy competition and the inspiration of a 
moral Christian purpose would ideally off er pupils the ability to excel and give them the 
fulfi llment of their accomplishments. 
FDR, Jr. took up the challenge of physical and mental discipline. He met it with 
distinction. Th e notion of leadership appealed to him and he thrived on the Groton gos-
pel of competitive spirit. Enjoying the sense of accomplishment, FDR, Jr. joined whole-
heartedly in his school’s academic and athletic activities. Regularly, he reported to his 
father that he got along fi ne with the teachers and fellow pupils and was “having a great 
time.” 58 Usually, he struck an optimistic note with his father but he was more candid 
with his mother. At times, he complained to Eleanor about his sinus trouble that led 
to such headaches that he was unable to concentrate to study. His mediocre academic 
record was not only the result of having lost much time due to his illness. In the earlier 
forms, FDR, Jr. repeatedly acquired blackmarks against his record. He was oft en pun-
55. Norton, A People and A Nation, 665–669; Parrish, Anxious Decades, 115; Lammers, Franklin 
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ished for being late, leaving his cubicle aft er lights and being careless and sloppy about 
his belongings.
Athletically he excelled in later years, landing a place as high profi le tackle on the 
school’s football team and as an inspiring captain of the 1933 rowing crew. FDR, Jr.’s 
prominent extracurricular activities fi tted neatly into the spirit of performance. Aft er 
one lousy football season the yearbook editor argued that the sport was not about re-
sults, victory or defeat but about gaining an “understanding and appreciation of sports-
manship, team-play and self-discipline which will fi t them for the game of life.” 59
Older and wiser, FDR, Jr. gradually acquired a certain degree of self-control and re-
sponsibility though he kept having diffi  culty to keep his carelessness and unchanneled 
energies in check. In his fi nal year at Groton he became captain of the debating team 
and was awarded the highest honor of being elected Senior Prefect. FDR, Jr. even took 
his younger brother under his wing by coaching John ’s rowing crew. Peabody ’s reports 
to Eleanor refl ected her son’s new attitude. Th e rector praised her son’s “yeoman service 
for the school, rare power of observation” and position of a “tower of strength.” 60 FDR, 
Jr.’s invaluable experiences at Groton during his adolescence taught him the ability to 
stand on his own feet.
Politics excited FDR, Jr. By keeping a close eye on his father’s public endeavors, he 
could stay in contact with his father. During the 1928 presidential election FDR, Jr. heat-
edly debated the chances of Democratic candidate Al Smith with his classmates. FDR, 
Jr. was well liked but he took abuse for being rather political and particularly for being a 
Democrat. Th e boys in his form were overwhelmingly Republican and he encountered 
such fi erce opposition he reported to his mother that “at times, indeed it seems that the 
only solution is a fi st fi ght but we usually evade that.” 61
Groton ’s intensity and division refl ected the nasty election campaign and its out-
come. Republican Herbert Hoover , who was a nationally and internationally experi-
enced and respected government offi  cial, already appeared presidential. In an uphill 
battle, Smith only carried eight states whereas Hoover’s support of forty states signaled 
59. Report card FDR, Jr. form VI, 1933; FDR, Jr. to FDR, 22 and 25 October 1927, n.d., 1928, box 
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the satisfaction with the era of peace and economic prosperity the Republican had in-
herited from previous administrations. Democrats, however, did spot some encourag-
ing results. More people than ever had voted for Al Smith and the Catholic candidate 
had carried, in a major realignment, for the fi rst time a majority of voters in the big 
cities. One of the few Democrats in 1928 who benefi ted from his party’s urban popular-
ity was FDR. On the behest of Smith, he had grudgingly accepted the nomination for 
governor of New York, Smith’s old job. At Groton, FDR, Jr. had also rooted for his father 
and in a very close election FDR defeated his Republican opponent Richard Ottinger.62
Th e governorship of the Empire State, the largest in the country, made FDR the 
frontrunner for the 1932 nomination. In ways he could not surmise until later the col-
lapse of the stockmarket that signaled the approach of the Great Depression, off ered 
an opportunity to distinguish himself. Th e crash at the New York Stock Exchange in 
October 1929 sent shockwaves through the country and marked the end of economic 
prosperity. Th e depression that followed uncovered the structural fl aws of the American 
capitalist system. Rather than the “Great Crash” itself causes as high productivity, un-
derconsumption, debt-ridden corporations, hazardous speculation and a lack of federal 
control contributed to the fundamental economic weakness.
In the Governor’s Mansion in Albany FDR pioneered to design relief and recovery 
plans to help those who had been hit by the hard times. By appealing to solidarity and 
raising income taxes he managed to set up the fi rst state-run work-relief institution in 
the country. Besides this Temporary Emergency Relief Administration, FDR also took 
bold measures to improve public welfare in the fi elds of unemployment insurance, pub-
lic power and farming in which he also involved his family.63
During the early summers of 1929 and 1930, FDR, Jr. accompanied his parents on 
two inspection trips. FDR had designed these excursions as early summer cruises to 
examine the state’s hospitals, prison facilities, and mental institutions. Th e deprivation 
FDR, Jr. encountered came as a shock to the Grotonion. Years later, FDR, Jr. still remem-
bered the sense of horror and shiver of the visits. Eleanor, who functioned as the eyes 
and ears of the new governor, had brought her son along because she felt that an intro-
duction into the social institutions would benefi t his education and make him aware of 
the need to reform.64 
A few weeks later, FDR, Jr. took his fi rst extensive trip overseas. In late July, the fa-
miliar party of Eleanor, Nancy , Marion, and the two youngest children left  for the tour 
to Europe. Th e expedition signifi ed the last lengthy travel experience of Eleanor with 
her two sons whose fi ghting reached a climax. FDR had suggested the trip because he 
wanted to instill into his two youngest sons the educational experience and sense of the 
destruction and atrocities by visiting the World War I battlefi elds in France.
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Th e expedition had taken some doing. Eleanor was fearful whether she could han-
dle her wild fi ft een-year-old and thirteen-year-old sons. Also, an acrimonious confl ict 
preceded the European tour when at a Sunday evening dinner in late June, Sara opposed 
ER ’s intention to drive herself and camp out. Sara sternly disapproved of such casual 
means of traveling for a family of a governor. FDR, Jr. made matters worse by wisecrack-
ing on his mother’s driving skills. His remark hurt particularly because Eleanor had 
oft en trusted her son as an associate on their trips. FDR intervened, not by opposing 
his mother but by reprimanding his son, “more sternly than he had ever heard him use 
before, or aft er.” 65
Th e confl ict clouded the expedition. Eleanor made her son pay dearly for his com-
ment. During the trip she made their sons dress very formal, traveling like proper up-
per-class young gentlemen in the back seats of expensive rented cars driven by hired 
chauff eurs. For six weeks the party toured the many cultural and historical sights of Ire-
land, England, Belgium, Germany, and France. Th e roughhousing boys whom FDR, Jr. 
recalled, “fought like hell all the time” dominated the expedition. Eleanor had planned 
an exhaustive schedule to wear the boys down but the pressure of the constant battling 
boys became almost unbearable. Unable to administer stern discipline, Eleanor’s trial 
and anxiety came to a head at the end of the tour at Mont-Saint Michel. Eleanor had left  
the angry boys at their hotel to visit the church. Upon her return she found a crowd who 
had gathered to watch how FDR, Jr. had “pushed John out of the window of their room 
and was holding his younger brother down by his ankles.” 66 
During his years at Groton , FDR, Jr. hardly saw his father. He stayed in touch with 
FDR through irregular letters and through his mother who not only kept him up to date 
on the family aff airs but also visited her son when he suff ered from illness or got in-
volved in an accident. He became frustrated about FDR’s unavailability and complained 
about his father’s absenteeism who “always was in Warm Springs with Missy.” 67 In mid 
June 1931, FDR visited Groton to deliver the commencement address. In the fall of the 
previous year he had won a landslide reelection victory. Critics blamed the governor 
for catering to the interests of the bosses of the Tammany Hall political machine and 
for having been slow to respond to the emerging fi nancial and banking problems in the 
state. Th e popularity of his anti-depression measures largely outweighed these charges 
and aft er 1930 FDR became overnight the hands-on Democratic favorite to run for the 
presidency in 1932. 
In his speech he stressed the importance of public service. Th e bottom line FDR 
did not mention was that the pressure of public lives and duties meant a sacrifi ce for 
65. Lash , Eleanor and Franklin, 330.
66. Davis, Invincible, 93; Davis, Th e New York Years, 117; Blanche Wiesen Cook , Eleanor Roos-
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the children. Th ey could not be “fi rst” with their father.68 Despite the fact that FDR was 
devoted to his children, FDR, Jr. did not have a close personal relationship with his 
father, nor did any of his siblings. He claimed that his father had been a great family 
man and that he did not always have to make appointments to see him.69 Yet, FDR, Jr. 
revealed the true nature of his relationship with FDR in an unguarded instant when he 
pointed out to a reporter, “I spent relatively little time with father. Th e longest period 
I spent was an unforgettable fi ve weeks in July 1934 on a cruise (to the Caribbean and 
Latin America). I think that was the only time in my life that I was ever with father for 
such a long period.” 70 FDR, Jr. felt it very diffi  cult to have personal or private talks with 
his father. FDR was unable to establish a sphere of continuous intimacy and comradery 
and to off er advice and guidance to the life of his son.71 
Th e inability to relate to his children was due to his conceptions of parenthood as 
much as the individualistic personalities of his off spring. Above all, FDR was an absen-
tee father. During large parts of the children’s upbringing he was unavailable, having 
vanished into public service, illness, and offi  cial duties. Eleanor’s irritations grew when 
FDR refused to take responsibility to administer discipline to their children. Aft er FDR, 
Jr. had become involved in numerous car accidents and traffi  c violations during his 
education at Harvard, FDR revoked his driving license indefi nitely. Yet, aft er some dis-
cussion with his father, FDR, Jr. had reduced the punishment to a few weeks and a few 
moments later FDR admitted that the whole idea of the suspension came from Eleanor. 
FDR’s public and private preoccupation and his inability to discipline clearly af-
fected the children’s sense of security.72 James assessed critically that they had needed 
more guidance and support from their father in times of adversity. FDR, Jr. had been 
raised to be independent but admitted that this encouragement had turned out to be a 
“mistake because we did not learn to work as a cooperative partnership, as a family. We 
learned to be tremendous individualists.” 73 In fact, FDR, Jr. inherited such behavior and 
copied this pattern to his children. In the midst of the divorce to his fi rst wife Ethel Du-
Pont in 1949, FDR, Jr. pointed out to her that their oldest son FDR III lacked the ability 
to concentrate steadily. He confessed, “I guess he inherited this partly from me but it 
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also refl ects an absence of any real sense of security. I believe that both you and I had a 
similar lack in our childhood days…” 74 
Presidential Son
One evening in the spring of 1932 when FDR, Jr. was elected senior prefect at Groton , 
FDR called in to congratulate his son. On the phone, FDR, Jr. challenged his father to 
equal his achievement. He boasted, “Alright, I have won one election, now it is up to 
you to win the next one.” Th e result of the 1932 presidential election between FDR and 
incumbent president Herbert Hoover was never in doubt. Voters opted for change aft er 
three years of Republican policies that failed to deal with the plummeting industrial 
production and prices, record-breaking unemployed and homeless people and a disin-
tegrating fi nancial and banking system. Both contenders though ran as fi scal conserva-
tives and publicly demonstrated their commitment to a balanced budget. Yet, whereas 
Hoover seemed lackluster, his Democratic challenger radiated confi dence and fearless 
optimism. FDR built upon his New York experience in involving the government in 
direct-relief measures and other experiments to help facilitate economic recovery. Aft er 
FDR became president-elect in November he called his son at Groton, who had been 
practicing before a big football game. He retorted that he had drawn level and it was now 
up to FDR, Jr. to win the game.75
F. Scott Fitzgerald had once remarked “show me a hero and I’ll write you a trag-
edy.” 76 FDR, Jr. did not realize at all what a dramatic impact the presidential election of 
his father would have on his life and identity. He had been confi dent of the result and 
had been totally amazed that Rector Peabody in unprecedented fashion had entered his 
room in the middle of the night to awaken him with the news that his father had been 
elected president. Naively he had treated the 1932 presidential election campaign as a 
competition between father and son and he had been more preoccupied with preparing 
for the next football game. Th ough FDR had been involved in public life as long as FDR, 
Jr. could remember being a president’s son seemed far removed from his pre-occupied 
life in the pre-arranged environment of Groton . It took him a life to adjust to the new 
role that had been thrust upon him. 
Soon aft er his father’s inauguration in March 1933 the media singled FDR, Jr. out in 
his football and rowing games, regardless of the result. Slowly and uneasily he came to 
realize he had lost his status of just another Groton boy. Becoming aware of the impos-
sibility to reverse the situation he ruefully pointed out, “I was not to be allowed to ignore 
my father’s game, … I was being forced to be a starter in a game I had never contem-
74. FDR, Jr. to Ethel , 6 February 1949, folder no 4, box 419, FDR, Jr. Papers. 
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plated.” 77 FDR, Jr. resented his new position because the unsought spotlight of publicity 
impeded his ambition to be rejected and accepted for himself. He dreaded the fact that 
he would be held to a higher standard because the public expected “much more from a 
president’s son than from its own sons.” 78
Th at public life meant sacrifi ce for presidential children had become obviously clear. 
Anna analyzed, “… as you mature you learn and have to learn that your father belongs 
to the people whom he serves as a public servant … because there were other goals that 
did not include the children.” 79 Th e transformation of his mother as a “timid housewife 
of fi ve to become relentless Eleanor Everywhere” added to the complexity of FDR, Jr.’s 
new circumstances.80 
As fi rst lady, his mother continued her crusade for those who were left  behind by 
the system and by championing causes as women’s rights, civil rights, education, health 
care and labor. Not only did she serve as a hostess of the White House and involve 
herself in emancipation policies, she had her own radio program, wrote a daily column, 
held numerous lectures and served as FDR’s trusted adviser. FDR and ER formed a 
political team that seemed to be destined for higher purposes than merely being par-
ents. Th e urgencies of the children oft en took second place when dealing with national 
problems. Some of FDR, Jr.’s friends later argued that his parents were missing in action 
because they were parents to the world.81
Aft er the fi rst hundred days of being the president’s son FDR, Jr. graduated on 16 
June 1933 from Groton . Congress had adjourned the previous day and his parents would 
travel to the boarding school but FDR had been tied up with the intricacies of planning 
New Deal emergency measures at the last moment. Eleanor did attend the diploma cer-
emony where FDR, Jr. was praised as a promising youngster, winning the fi rst prize 
of the Senior Debating Society and receiving the “Charles Lanier Appleton Memorial 
Prize” for having excelled in the combination of athletics and scholarship.82 
Th e next week he boarded the forty-fi ve-foot schooner Amberjack II and joined his 
father and fellow crewmembers James and John for a weeklong cruise along the New 
England coast. Th eir fi nal destination was Campobello. For the fi rst time aft er he had 
been struck with polio in 1921, FDR would return to the island. Travel usually provided 
opportunities for privacy but FDR, Jr. found the trip somewhat more diffi  cult to enjoy 
because the presence of a presidential entourage had replaced the innocent, carefree 
sailing of the 1920s. Navy planes and ships, a Coast Guard boat that housed the White 
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House and Secret Service staff  and two press boats accompanied the Roosevelt expedi-
tion. Aft er days of foggy and stormy sailing weather FDR, Jr. returned with his father, 
Howe and Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau to Washington, D.C. on the cruiser 
Indianapolis.83
In early July FDR, Jr., accompanied by four friends from Groton , boarded an Amer-
ican liner to go on a two-month tour of Europe. His peculiar status as the son of the 
American president off ered the eighteen-year-old an opportunity to form an impression 
of a peaceful Europe that was unequaled by any other American of his age. He was re-
ceived by statesmen, ambassadors and prime ministers. Th ere was ample conversation 
on a “man called Hitler ” but the distinguished European offi  cials expressed optimism 
on the future of their continent. FDR, Jr. refrained from making political statements 
and evaded politically motivated questions as not to embarrass his father. FDR, Jr. later 
claimed that Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop of Nazi Germany, whom he 
allegedly met at a luncheon, did his best to convince the president’s son of the moral 
superiority of the Hitler Jugend over the American Boy Scouts.84 
Th ese diplomatic skills failed him when he recorded his impressions of a tour 
through Spain. In a column for the Associated Press he enthusiastically endorsed the 
tradition of bull fi ghting. FDR, Jr. had visited several bullfi ghts and on a couple of occa-
sions bulls had even been dedicated to him. When word reached the readers of the New 
York Times, a controversy ensued on its editorial page. Many readers worried that FDR, 
Jr.’s endorsement, as the son of a very popular president, of this “form of Old World 
savagery” would encourage promoters to legalize the sport in the United States. Oth-
ers defended his actions by pointing at the fact that support for bullfi ghting had been 
a tradition within the Roosevelt family since the days of TR and they called the sport a 
graceful form of art. FDR, Jr. stood his ground despite many messages that had urged 
him to speak out against the tradition. Th ough his praise had refl ected common cour-
tesy for a native tradition he had also genuinely enjoyed the sport where the element of 
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death was never absent. Th e controversy illustrated to FDR, Jr., to his increasing annoy-
ance, that in all his public appearances people would attempt to translate his opinions 
as offi  cial utterances of the government.85 
Th e trip to Europe had given FDR, Jr. the fi rst serious impression of his life as the 
president’s son. Th e experience shed new light on his role he had to play and on the 
benefi ts and drawbacks his new status contained. At the end of the trip, FDR, Jr. had be-
come dismayed at all the formality he had to endure and he began to realize, with some 
measure of shock, that he faced a lifelong identifi cation with his father. His combined 
sense of exhilaration and entitlement underscored the ambiguity of his new status. FDR, 
Jr. reported that apart from the regular college sightseeing, they were “meeting great 
men who were making history, through no act or achievement of my own.” 86
Harvard
FDR, Jr. returned from Europe in early September 1933. He entered Harvard University 
two weeks later. Th e transition from the sheltered Groton School to the public life at 
Harvard University signaled a test to come to terms with his new celebrity status. Th e 
inevitable media attention that accompanied a president’s son made it impossible for 
FDR, Jr. to lead a regular college life and stand on his own two feet. He was constantly 
singled out. 
FDR, Jr. was determined to start from scratch. On 22 September among some thou-
sand freshmen of his age FDR, Jr. registered at Memorial Hall. He had requested the 
University not to make an exception for him since he would like to be treated like his 
fellow freshmen and had also declined being interviewed for the traditional “Anoth-
er Roosevelt at Harvard” report. Yet, his entrance in a touring car with secret service 
agents standing on the running boards on the Harvard yard virtually nullifi ed his in-
conspicuous and anonymous debut.87 
Not allowed to enjoy a sense of anonymity and privacy, FDR, Jr. felt chased and ha-
rassed. Th e pressure he felt was reinforced by the fact that, at the age of nineteen, FDR, 
Jr.’s physical appearance closely resembled his father’s. His face with the blue-gray eyes, 
the strong chin and speaking voice, the charming smile and assuring manners refl ected 
FDR.88 Th e behavior and reputation of the Roosevelt sons as an aggressive and indepen-
dent tribe aroused interest and curiosity. Given the opportunities for criticism, FDR, 
Jr. and his brothers were oft en the targets of political attacks to embarrass their father. 
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Particularly James and Elliott became the archetypal presidential sons who were being 
accused of having succumbed to privilege and preference. Th e press attacked James 
for trading on his name by gaining fi nancial profi ts when he worked in the insurance 
business. Aft er FDR had named him his secretary, over the opposition of Eleanor, the 
media derided him as the “Crown Prince” and the “Assistant President.” FDR’s political 
opponents also used Elliott’s rapid rise in business and in the military to get back at the 
President. FDR, Jr. condemned the actions of his elder brothers and pointed out to his 
mother that James and Elliott did not need the money nor the image of the undeserved 
“president’s son.” 89 
FDR, Jr. did not get exposed to all the temptations of quick promotional money to 
the extent which his brothers succumbed. But he continued to make headlines in and 
outside the Harvard yard in his own way. FDR, Jr.’s rebellion and uncontrolled energy 
led to numerous incidents with the press. In his fi rst year, he reportedly quit the Uni-
versity’s freshman football squad because cameramen drove him off  the team. At the 
Newell Boat Club FDR, Jr. threatened to punch a photographer of a Boston newspaper in 
the nose.90 In early April 1934, Junior stole the show at a wrestling match in Philadelphia 
when he clashed with a photographer and ruined the man’s camera.91 
Aft er this incident the war with part of the media was on. Th e Hearst press, FDR’s 
archenemy, singled the temperamental FDR, Jr. out as the Roosevelt bad boy. Th e media 
created the impression that FDR, Jr. “spent 8 hours speeding his car, 8 hours in court-
rooms for hearings and 8 hours fi ghting with cameramen and reporters.” 92 Th e Hearst 
press even assigned a classmate of FDR, Jr. to cover him. Columnist Drew Pearson em-
ployed tipsters at Harvard who supplied him with rumors on FDR, Jr. such as being a 
“hard drinker” and having “annoying tactics on the dance fl oor.” 93 Other reporters tried, 
in vain, to get him to comment on the New Deal legislation. 
He also took a lot of abuse from upper-class students who came from families who 
felt the Roosevelt family were traitors to their class.94 In early October 1934, FDR, Jr. 
fi nished the initiation period at Harvard’s Hasty Pudding Club. Senior members of the 
exclusive Club made the president’s son march Harvard’s yard with a huge sign around 
his neck saying “boss capitalist.” Th e student prank drew the attention of a newspaper-
man, but before he could shoot a picture, John Roosevelt had already demolished the 
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camera. Aft er the incident university authorities announced that press photographers 
would be excluded from Harvard “to shield the Roosevelt boys from undue publicity, 
unless agreed to posing.” 95
FDR, Jr. became frustrated by having to take into account the political impact of all 
his activities and got wary of the continuous media attention. Th ough in his ambivalent 
attitude he also did enjoy the perks of his father’s offi  ce. FDR, Jr. had a chronic shortage 
of money during his college days, quickly spending his allowance of $800 every four 
months and becoming notoriously late in paying bills. In solving his fi nancial diffi  cul-
ties, FDR, Jr. not only asked for more money from FDR but also used the White House 
to confi rm plane tickets, reserve accommodation or to get tickets for sporting games.
Th is was what happened at the earlier wresting match where a careless FDR, Jr. en-
tered as the president’s son without paying a fee. Also, he feared that a photo in the 
newspaper would reveal that his girlfriend, Ethel Du Pont , had skipped class.96 He had 
met Ethel at a dance at Long Island in the summer of 1933 aft er his graduation from 
Groton . Th e tall “beauty of the eastern social set” was an accomplished equestrienne 
and a skillful swimmer. Th e slender girl with blue eyes and light brown hair was better 
known though as the oldest daughter of Eugene Du Pont , the head of the Delaware-
based chemical industry giant of the same name.97 
When every step he took became a news story, the responsibility of upholding the 
reputation of the family became at times a too heavy cross to bear. FDR, Jr. came to re-
sent being a Roosevelt. He developed a reputation among the family of hating the most 
the entire press clamor about him just because he was his father’s son.98 FDR, Jr.’s rebel-
lion against living a fi shbowl existence reinforced his independent inclinations. Traits 
as carelessness and lack of self-discipline that had lain dormant, resurfaced. FDR, Jr. 
demonstrated his daredevil streak and defi ance by reckless driving, car accidents, traf-
fi c violations and wild parties.
At times, FDR, Jr. bitterly complained to his mother about his public status. He 
realized that the prestige of the presidency yielded the friendship of the powerful but 
this position also meant he had to sacrifi ce his anonymity and security. He got frus-
trated that every time he acted his name stood in the way. In heated talks he argued 
that it would make him “more of a normal person” if he grew up as himself and not as a 
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president’s son. He would rather give up his name, live in anonymity and start all over 
again.99 
Eleanor fi rmly brushed aside her son’s rebellious arguments. She admitted that the 
situation of a refl ected prominence they faced was tough but explained that there were 
many compensations and benefi ts. Privately, however, Eleanor confessed that she may 
have been too strict on FDR, Jr.’s demands for privacy and oft en she was furious about 
the unfair attacks on her children whom, she felt, were made to pay for their parents’ 
public service. Eleanor’s acknowledgement touched upon FDR, Jr.’s underlying emotion. 
He later blamed particularly his father for never protecting him or his siblings from the 
severe public attacks. FDR could have learned from the experience of Th eodore Roos-
evelt who did not tolerate attacks against his sons.100 
Eleanor did make eff orts to protect her sons from being injured because of the suc-
cess of their father. She worried that the special privileges would turn out to be very 
harmful because they came without any demands for compensation. She made attempts 
to teach her two younger children that they had special responsibilities too. During the 
summer of 1932 Eleanor inquired of her brother Hall for a place to send FDR, Jr. to 
because by holding a regular job at a ranch and making some money he could learn to 
stand on his own two feet and be aware that he was treated no diff erent from the other 
workers.101
His defi ant behavior outside the college grounds had affi  rmed his image in the 
public eye as a “playboy.” Th e fl ood of deplorable publicity though obscured a diff erent 
impression of FDR, Jr.’s Harvard days. Th e limelight reduced his participation in col-
lege aff airs somewhat but he joined the prestigious Harvard Clubs “Fly” and the “Hasty 
Pudding.” Maintaining a B-minus average academically, he continued to thrive on the 
spirit of athletic competition. He made rowing his chief activity, which brought him the 
membership in the junior varsity crew. Th e June boat races at New London, Connecti-
cut, where Yale competed against Harvard climaxed the WASP social season. Watched 
by FDR on the presidential yacht Sequoia, the nineteen-year-old FDR, Jr. who weighed 
180 pounds and was 6.4 feet tall rowed the morning freshman race. Th eir Yale rivals 
soundly beat the Harvard team and they repeated that victory in the 1935 and 1936 
races.102 
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Living in Weld Hall where he shared a room with his cousin Th omas B. Delano 
on the third fl oor, FDR, Jr. remained politically engaged. He prided himself in making 
an eff ort to getting to know at least four hundred fellow freshmen by name. Gradually 
during his years in Cambridge he became acquainted with his father on a more adult 
level. By taking history and sociology classes FDR, Jr. acquired a more profound under-
standing of the political problems FDR faced. FDR, Jr. wrote a paper on the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act and off ered his father his opinion on the AAA. He advised FDR to 
emphasize the national and business interest of the measure instead of presenting it as 
class legislation.
FDR, Jr. also mentioned to his father that the instructors of the classes hoped to 
“prove the evils” of both New Deal programs. At FDR’s suggestion, the two critical Har-
vard professors came down to the White House to discuss the AAA with New Deal 
administrators. Upon his return to Cambridge, FDR, Jr. reported that they had been 
taught a clear lesson in the actual agricultural situation. In the same letter, he confessed 
that for the fi rst time he had some awareness about the scale and size of the problems 
his parents were up against. Despite his arrogance and rudeness in discussing politics 
with FDR and ER he had now realized the relative importance of his own situation. He 
had felt misunderstood and expressed his hope to quickly emerge from the narrowness 
of his environment and this “selfi sh and childish stage.” 103 At Harvard, in the long shad-
ows cast by his presidential parents, FDR, Jr. learned to live with the responsibilities that 
came with his name and position. 
By 1936, when FDR faced reelection, FDR, Jr. had matured and accepted the con-
sequences of his father’s presidency. At twenty-two, FDR, Jr. made his own decisions 
but this did not always mean that he took into account the obvious political ramifi -
cations. FDR, Jr.’s most fascinating example of ignoring the political impact and the 
one that drew nationwide attention, involved his relationship with Ethel Du Pont. Her 
father, Eugene Du Pont was not amused when the press revealed the secret courtship 
because the patriarch and his cousin Pierre were two of FDR’s most outspoken and bit-
ter opponents. 
Th e industrial leadership hated FDR and loathed the New Deal . Th ey had lost eco-
nomic security and power in the depression and accused the Hyde Park patrician of 
being a traitor to his class because he had attempted to bring big business under federal 
control. Th e upper class aimed their hatred at FDR personally. In its irrationality, they 
charged that FDR, among others, was a “liar, a thief, a rich mama’s boy, a Jew dictator, 
a madman, an alcoholic, a syphilitic and a Bolshevik.” FDR was also blamed for the 
kidnapping of Lindbergh’s baby and the Wall Street bombing in 1920. Apart from too 
much federal regulation and taxation, they condemned the New Deal for socialist prac-
tices and undermining American values. Th eir grievances were echoed and spread by 
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Lords of the Low Road as columnists Westbrook Pegler , Fulton Lewis , newspapers like 
the Chicago Tribune and media tycoon William Randolph Hearst. 
In the summer of 1934, these conservative opponents established the American Lib-
erty League . Th e organization pledged to uphold the constitution and protect the right 
to acquire property. In their crusade to thwart FDR, the League attracted disaff ected 
conservative Democrats and leaders of powerful corporations as US Steel, General Mo-
tors and a number of Wall Streets leading fi rms. Th ese fi nancial sponsors stood ready to 
spend hundreds of thousands of dollars in the 1936 presidential election to drive “that 
Man” out of the White House.104 
FDR, Jr. did not seem concerned that he associated FDR with the organizers of the 
movement who attempted to defeat his father and fi nanced his opponents. He used the 
proverbial Roosevelt charm to prove his bonafi des with the Du Pont family and suc-
ceeded by becoming “Mrs. Du Pont favorite son-in-law” and “a good egg” in the eyes of 
his father-in-law. Th ough, he declared that it would have been better if his new son-in 
law had “a diff erent last name.” 105 
Aft er the nomination, FDR, Jr. had joined his father on a cruise to Campobello. 
During the fall he looked forward to campaign with FDR. Yet, a serious sinus condition 
spoiled these alluring prospects.106 FDR, Jr. suff ered from a chronic sinus affl  iction that 
had troubled him through Groton and at Harvard almost ended his life. At the end of 
November, FDR, Jr. was admitted to the Massachusetts General Hospital aft er the strep-
tococci throat infection had spread into his bloodstream. Gravely ill and facing death 
from the infection’s high fever, he would remain in the Boston hospital for forty-fi ve 
days. Doctors at last successfully administered him a new, untested and experimental, 
drug, prontylin, to stop the bleeding of his nose and cure the infection. FDR, Jr. later 
claimed that he had been the new medicine’s “fi rst American guinea pig” and he boast-
ed that his name had popularized the use of the antibiotic.107 
Eleanor had rushed to the hospital when FDR, Jr.’s situation worsened and had spent 
Christmas with her son. In a way the image of Eleanor’s absence had to be adjusted. 
When her children ran into trouble, and they oft en did, she would constantly bail them 
out. Whether Anna , James or Elliott had fi nancial diffi  culties or FDR, Jr. lay seriously ill, 
they would turn to their mother and a devoted Eleanor would come to be by their sides. 
FDR reacted to Eleanor’s radioed message of her visit to the hospital by expressing his 
hope that FDR, Jr.’s sinus attack would be a mild one. She had not told her husband that 
the sinus attack had almost killed their son. 
Th e serious condition of his son kept from him, FDR focused his attention on his 
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second term. Th e outcome of the November election had given FDR an unprecedented 
mandate. Over 27 million Americans voted for the New Deal to 16.6 for the Republican 
alternative. Th e result in the electoral college embarrassed Landon even more. Only 
Maine and Vermont supported the Kansas governor. FDR celebrated his reelection vic-
tory on a “Good Neighbor” sailing cruise to Latin America. In his statements he de-
clared that the vitality of the American democracy would help the Old World to stave 
off  the catastrophe of war. Th is reinforced the interpretation that the election had made 
FDR a symbol of democracy that would spread its virtues and freedom to other parts 
of the globe. Yet, this overlooked the fact that FDR and Landon had completely ignored 
foreign policy in the campaign. Both candidates realized that the overwhelming na-
tional sentiment was isolationist.108
At the bedside of FDR, Jr., Eleanor was kept company by Ethel , her son’s fi ancée, 
whom Eleanor later called a “sweet child” but who had still “much to learn.” Aft er sev-
eral anxious weeks FDR, Jr. was released from the hospital in early January 1937. He left  
Boston to recuperate in Florida, ironically, at the Boca Grande home of Ethel’s father.109 
FDR, Jr.’s recovery in late March coincided with the announcement of his wedding to 
Ethel. Mrs. Eugene Du Pont announced their wedding would take place at the family’s 
estate in Delaware on 30 June 1937, a week aft er FDR, Jr.’s graduation from Harvard.110 
Th e wedding excited the entire nation. Th e press headlined the upper-class event the 
“wedding of the year” because it refl ected the coming together of two forces of opposing 
national leadership. Th e Roosevelts symbolized political and administrative leadership 
whereas the Du Pont family stood for scientifi c, industrial and business success. Th e fact 
that the political philosophies of the two families were diametrically opposed to each 
other and that nobody had forgotten the hatred they had publicly displayed during the 
1936 election provided ofcourse the real fascination for FDR, Jr.’s fi rst marriage.111 
Th e wedding was also politicized because it coincided with the climax of the strug-
gle to save FDR’s proposal to reorganize the Supreme Court. Despite intense opposition 
FDR had proposed an unprecedented enlargement of the number of Supreme Court Jus-
tices, because the Court’s conservative majority had repeatedly ruled New Deal legisla-
tion unconstitutional. Conservative critics denounced FDR as an usurper and a dictator. 
Democrats in Congress, who had been kept in the dark of the controversial plan and 
held the independence of the Court in high regard, revolted against their party leader. 
Remaining on the defensive during the early summer of 1937, ironically, FDR had to 
visit the lion’s den of the Du Pont estate a week before his controversial “Court-packing” 
proposal as his conservative opponents labeled it, would be debated on the Senate fl oor.
FDR had misinterpreted the overwhelming mandate of the 1936 election. Th e tur-
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moil generated by Roosevelt’s bold scheme led to FDR’s major defeat, to a revitalizing of 
his opponents in a conservative coalition and the preservation of judicial independence. 
During the same summer FDR made another decision that contributed to the end of 
the New Deal . To honor his commitment to a balanced budget, he cut back government 
spending when the depression seemed to have been cured. Th e ending of defi cit spend-
ing resulted though in a Roosevelt recession.112 
Wedding
Weeks before the wedding of FDR, Jr. and Ethel the attention of the entire nation fo-
cused on the event that temporarily united the country’s two most powerful families 
and unprecedentedly gathered politically irreconcilable enemies. Th e wedding became 
a huge media event. Some 150 reporters, photographers and telegraph operators cov-
ered the event. Newspapers described in great detail the interior of the church, its in-
spection by the secret service, the exchange of wedding gift s between Ethel and FDR, Jr. 
and the wedding day’s program. Secret Service agents, Delaware State Police and 350 
military troops posted around the church where the ceremony would be held and along 
the roads on the estate guarded the 1,200 guests present.
FDR, Jr.’s “wedding of the decade” also inevitably drew attention to the high divorce 
rate among the Roosevelt children. By 1938, when all fi ve children had been married, 
the elder three of them, Anna , James , and Elliott had already been divorced and re-
married. Observers carried the argument of their particular upper-class upbringing to 
explain why the Roosevelt children did not stay married. In this environment of emo-
tional immaturity, the lack of security and parental absence, divorce was a more com-
mon phenomenon.113 Eleanor later admitted that her children marrying at such a young 
age was due to the fact that “they were not really rooted in any particular home.” 114 
FDR, Jr. linked their failures to establish a stable family life also to fl aws in their up-
bringing. He blamed the mismatches on “what had gone on in the household when we 
had been young.” 115 Anna also placed the family marriages under a psychological lens. 
She detected a similar pattern through the relationships of her brothers, James , Elliott 
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and John in the sense that they had married unstable women. She argued that these 
daughters-in-law were unable to accept the dominant position of Eleanor and their hus-
bands’ emotional dependence upon their mother. FDR, Jr. was the exception because he 
had been “the only one of four boys who has become a self-suffi  cient and independent 
person.” 116 Anna described FDR, Jr. as her only self-reliant brother but she had not taken 
his fi rst marriage into account. 
Eleanor discussed her son’s wedding plans in her newspaper columns. She refl ected 
some ambivalence on the institution of marriage as an opportunity for happiness, no 
doubt fueled by her own experience. Th ese publications mirrored her private worries. 
She thought that her twenty-two-years-old college son was too young to commit him-
self and that cementing a bond between the Roosevelts and the Du Ponts would prove 
too hard. She did not dislike Ethel or the Du Pont family, only the power and money 
they represented, but she had advised FDR, Jr. on the disadvantages of their undertak-
ing.117 Eleanor had a point. FDR, Jr. and Ethel had grown up in the same social class but 
they diff ered fundamentally in their way of thinking and outlook to life. Ethel was quiet 
and insecure whereas FDR, Jr. acted extrovert and self-assured. 
Th e Du Pont family had employed a social secretary that had set up shop on the 
Delaware estate to organize the event. Th e wedding ceremony was held at an idyllic little 
stone church on the estate, the Christ Protestant Episcopal Church that was built by the 
Du Pont family in 1856. It seated only four hundred carefully chosen guests from both 
families who gathered to witness the simple service read by the regular Reverend Fred-
erick T. Ashton and Reverend Endicott Peabody of Groton School who performed the 
marriage. John Roosevelt served as FDR, Jr.’s best man. Watched by robber barons and 
social reformers alike, the fi erce political diff erences and personal hostilities dissolved 
for the duration of the event as almost every Du Pont clan attended as did numerous 
staunch New Dealers and Roosevelts.118
FDR thoroughly enjoyed infi ltrating his enemy’s fortress. Th e President held court 
and when the reception got underway under torrential rains, FDR mischievously noted 
that it seemed “a fi ne way to soak the rich.” 119 He relished being the guest of the Du 
Ponts particularly because he was accompanied by radical New Deal champions such 
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as Harry Hopkins , Henry Wallace , Francis Perkins and Henry Morgenthau . Eleanor’s 
biggest concern had been that FDR would take center stage as Uncle Teddy had at her 
own wedding in 1905. 
For the fi rst time in his life, for a very brief moment, FDR, Jr. did outshine his presi-
dential parents. Due to the tense circumstances within the Roosevelt family, he had felt 
a strong urge to establish a home and family of his own. In doing so, FDR, Jr. followed 
the path of his sister and brothers who had also hoped to fi nd security and stability in 
married life. Yet, through the policies of FDR, the political situation and the identity 
of the bride, FDR, Jr.’s wedding became a national event that emphasized presidential 
politics over personal interest.
Independence
Upon his return from his two-month honeymoon trip to Europe FDR, Jr. refused to 
answer questions of reporters on his future ambitions. When pressed for a comment he 
declared that the speculations on the possibility of a political career or a commitment 
to engage in a New York law fi rm were “too far in advance” and besides, “one should 
only look as far ahead as you can see.” 120 Th e press had begun to speculate about a pos-
sible political career for the “golden boy” of the Roosevelt family. Political insiders kept 
a thoughtful eye on the graceful and promising youngster, whose features and accent 
closely resembled those of his father. Th e intoxicating glamour of the fi rst family led 
some observers even to predict a Hollywood career as a movie heartthrob for the hand-
some and outgoing FDR, Jr.121 
FDR had advised him to study law in the preparation for a possible career in politics. 
As a lawyer FDR, Jr. would also be able to provide for his own income. He wanted to be 
independent and did not want to profi t fi nancially from the Roosevelt brand name like 
James and Elliott had done. FDR, Jr. stated ironically that by learning a profession, “he 
would not have to rely on Pa for business opportunities.” 122 
Th ough, for the moment at least, he still lived on monthly installments from his 
parents and grandmother. In September 1937, he did what his father had wanted James 
to do and enrolled at the University of Virginia Law School. He worked hard to fi nish 
his studies in three years. At Charlottesville, FDR, Jr. and Ethel occupied a comfortable 
six room colonial cottage and founded a family. In July 1938, Ethel gave birth to a seven-
pound baby at the Pennsylvania Hospital in Philadelphia. Th e baby was a great favorite 
of FDR and was called “Joe” by the family. FDR III was baptized in the White House in 
early January 1939 wearing the president’s christening dress.123 
120. NYT, 11 September 1937.
121. Stidger, Th ese Amazing Roosevelts, 73; Goodwin, No Ordinary Time, 178; Roosevelt, My 
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122. Collier, Th e Roosevelts, 363.
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FDR, Jr. appreciated the Roosevelt family tradition but also claimed independence. 
Despite FDR’s disapproval of the environment, Ethel and FDR, Jr. lived during the 
summer at Long Island to enjoy the gay social life of parties and foxhunting there. He 
complained of the annoyances of continuously having a service man in the house and 
unsuccessfully begged his father to discontinue this service.124 
FDR, Jr. also felt entitled to more autonomy in his marriage. FDR, Jr. had told Ethel 
during their engagement that he did not have political aspirations. Soon, however, he 
began to spend less and less time at home. Ethel had an aversion to politics and found 
this world that now identifi ed her as a Roosevelt threatening. FDR, Jr. felt that Ethel’s 
preference for quiet evenings at home thwarted the pace of his energetic life of political 
and social activities. Soon aft er the “wedding of the year” gossip magazines began to 
circulate stories about FDR, Jr.’s alleged involvement with other women that touched 
upon his boredom and inconsiderateness. “As a husband, F.jr. would undoubtedly drive 
me crazy” Anna observed to her mother.125 His philandering reinforced Ethel’s dark 
moods. FDR had called his nervous and unhappy daughter-in-law who talked to herself, 
“our hothouse fl ower.” 
Th e public insults contributed to the incompatibility and growing estrangement be-
tween FDR, Jr. and Ethel . Despite the relatively happy fi rst few years, the clash between 
public and private life caused an emotional rift  in their fl awed marriage that the couple 
could not bridge. Aft er FDR, Jr. joined the Navy in 1941 their marriage became increas-
ingly strained due to the forced separation of World War II. Eventually, Ethel would fi le 
for divorce in 1949.126
FDR, Jr. now stood on his own feet but for political training he continued to turn to 
his parents. Years later, he described his political education, “Father would sometimes 
throw a subject at us and then sit back and sort of sit as a judge.” Eleanor’s version was 
less fl attering. She pointed out, “My husband would let them talk, and then demol-
ish them at the end.” 127 Whenever he would come down from Charlottesville FDR, Jr. 
would discuss politics with FDR, Eleanor, family members and guests who happened 
telegram to his friends that read “Battling Frank III crossed fi nish line at 5 PM. Well ahead of all 
opposition, rowing in high fi ft ies. Stroke oar Ethel doing well. Love, Papa Frank.”
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to be at the White House. He also brought classmates to the White House to discuss 
politics with Harry Hopkins , his father’s adviser. 
Discussions during the spring and summer of 1940 focused upon FDR’s intention 
of whether to abide by the traditional rule of not holding the offi  ce of president longer 
than two terms. Among the Roosevelt family heated debate ensued. Eleanor, James and 
Elliott pressured FDR to decline a third term. Th ey based their claims for retirement on 
the two-term precedent, FDR’s deteriorating health and on political fairness. FDR, Jr. 
disagreed with their assessment that it was time to give political opportunities to oth-
ers. He argued that his father’s desire had been to make democracy work and solve the 
ills of the Depression. He claimed that FDR remained the person that was most able to 
safeguard the New Deal accomplishments and best equipped to deal with the imminent 
international crises.128 
Domestically, the political pressure mounted. FDR remained uncommitted in pub-
lic on a third term. He realized the unwritten rule he would break by accepting an 
unprecedented third presidential term but at the same time refused to rule out to run. 
In eff ect, FDR strengthened his prospects by claiming to put party politics aside to be 
able to turn all his attention to the war situation in Europe and the Far East. He felt re-
sponsible not to desert the ship at this particular point and had dropped hints to FDR, Jr. 
that he had tied his political future to the issue of (inter)national security. When FDR, Jr. 
urged his father to act upon an anti-lynching bill pending in Congress, FDR explained 
that his fi rst commitment had to be the national security of the United States.129
Aft er the convention in August FDR, Jr. had started working in the campaign as a 
volunteer coordinator of the youth organization of the Democratic Party. He replaced 
James who suff ered from serious health problems. Eleanor had discussed the role FDR, 
Jr. would play at the Democratic campaign headquarters with Ed Flynn . At the New 
York City Biltmore Hotel he organized Roosevelt Clubs in the universities and colleges 
and Young Democratic Clubs around the country.130 
FDR, Jr. proved an eff ective speaker when he hit the campaign trail. At rallies of the 
Young Democratic Clubs he spoke out for the liberal policies of his father’s administra-
tion and met with enthusiastic reactions from his audiences. He defended FDR’s choice 
of a third presidential term by charging that the election was a contest between the forces 
of liberalism and those of reaction. Th ough Willkie ’s campaign lagged far behind, FDR, 
terview in archives of the Roosevelt International Park Commission, Campobello Island , New 
Brunswick, Canada; NYT Magazine, 24 April 1949.
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Jr. warned against complacency among Democrats. He stressed the need for organiz-
ing and getting the (young) voters to the polls.131 FDR, Jr. made close to three hundred 
speeches around the country. He enjoyed his success on the campaign trail and gained 
valuable political experience. FDR reacted with pride to the successful appearances of 
his stand-in on the stump and the attempts to protect the administration’s record. He 
wrote FDR, Jr. “I heard you on the radio last night. You did a grand job ….” 132
Willkie ’s candidacy had removed any substantial discussion of foreign policy. Th e 
campaign gradually deteriorated into a competition of pledges which candidate was 
the more able to keep the nation out of the impending war. Willkie denounced FDR as 
a warmonger and accused his Democratic opponent of fi scal irresponsibility. A major-
ity of the press, who opposed a third term for FDR, and the virulent Roosevelt-hat-
ers of the anti-interventionist America First movement in their mass rallies backed up 
the charge that the Democrat would lead the country into war. FDR, Jr. came to the 
administration’s defense and reiterated his father’s belief in democracy. He retorted that 
FDR would not give up this faith “to thrust the United States into a war merely to win 
reelection.” 133
Despite these reassurances, Democrats had become nervous. Campaign manager 
Ed Flynn dispatched FDR, Jr. to the White House to convince his father of the need to 
change strategy to make some political speeches and to halt the momentum of Willkie ’s 
campaign. His visit paid off . FDR agreed to make fi ve major campaign addresses in late 
October and early November, in which he stated his belief that America would be kept 
out of war. Th is claim was tricky enough because through FDR’s policies the nation 
could easily be drawn into war but he got away with it.134 
On Election Day, FDR, Jr. gathered with FDR and ER , family and friends at Hyde 
Park to wait for the returns. While Sara entertained the ladies in the Library, the male 
population spent the evening in the dining room to gather the latest election results. Th e 
New Deal coalition of northern blacks, the urban masses, the “Solid South” and orga-
nized labor provided FDR with a comfortable victory of 449 to Willkie ’s 82 votes in the 
electoral college though the actual election had been much closer than this outcome sug-
gested. At midnight, FDR, Jr. supported his father on to the Springwood porch to greet 
the triumphant torchlight parade to celebrate the victory to a third term election.135
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FDR, Jr. limited the emulation of his father not only to politics. FDR, Jr. did take his 
parents’ advice to set a solid economic and professional base. Shortly aft er Labor Day 
the presidential son became a clerk in a Wall Street law fi rm. Upon the beginning of his 
clerking duties, FDR, Jr. had started boning for his New York State bar exams. He admit-
ted to Anna , “these were the toughest exams I have ever taken.” 136 When he learned the 
results in early April disappointment set in. He had only passed half of the exams and 
would be sworn in as a lawyer at the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court 
a year delayed, in May 1942.137 Like his father three decades earlier, FDR, Jr. showed only 
a half-hearted interest in the law and in his job. Oft en he got by through personal mag-
netism. Eleanor had recognized this trait early on and had warned one of his law-fi rm 
partners, “Now make Franklin work and don’t let him get by on his charm.” 138
FDR, Jr. waited for the world to come to him. He longed to become a part of the 
colorful crowd of the New York City clubs. At twenty-six, the huge 6 foot 4 socialite pre-
sented an imposing fi gure. When he ventured into the glamour world of the Stork Club, 
Cafe Society or “21” people gravitated toward the handsome and magnetic presidential 
son. In return, FDR, Jr. was intrigued and fascinated by what he called the “people who 
made New York glamorous and exciting.” 139 
He struck up a night-time friendship with another famous name who strolled 
around town, Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton Powell and his wife Hazel Scott , a 
popular piano player who combined classical and jazz music. In the late 1930s and early 
1940s, Powell became a celebrity role model. FDR, Jr. admired Powell’s social graces, his 
jazz knowledge, his exquisite manners and the fact that he made an eff ort to familiarize 
himself with the name of photographers and waiters in restaurants. 
Th e frequent visits to the city’s nightlife gave FDR, Jr. a reputation of a celebrity 
whose only qualifi cation was his name. It also stretched his income beyond its limits. 
Eleanor worried about the carelessness and negligence her son displayed. She wanted 
her son to lead a sensible life instead of relying on his name and position. She instructed 
FDR to make their son realize that it was “dishonest not to pay bills” and take the money 
he owed out of his allowance until FDR, Jr. was willing to earn his own money and work 
his way though life.140
In January 1941, FDR, Jr. continued his clerking job at another Wall Street law offi  ce. 
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He claimed that he had just walked in and was accepted aft er he had applied for a job. 
Yet, there remained enough magic in his brand name to draw up a chair, as a clerk, to 
join a social lunch with the fi rm’s boss and a Justice of the Supreme Court only a month 
later.141 As a presidential son FDR, Jr. would get by on his name, but he found it diffi  cult 
to fi nd a meaningful professional fulfi llment. He admitted that as much to his mother 
in October 1942, when he served in the Navy. He wrote Eleanor, “I never really wanted 
to go to work in a big Wall St. law offi  ce but it seemed like a good idea. I knew then as I 
know now it was just another stall for time hoping that the right thing would suddenly 
appear like a vision to me.” 142
World War II
Th ough it would be cynical to call the coming of war the right thing FDR, Jr.’s service 
in World War II did solve his problem of fi nding a focus on life. He felt it was up to him 
and his brothers to practice what their father preached. FDR, Jr. volunteered for the U.S. 
Navy in October 1940. During previous summers he had already completed training 
as a member of the Naval Reserve. When the war in Europe spread to the international 
seas, FDR, Jr. entered active duty as ensign with the U.S. Navy. On 3 April 1941, he re-
ported to the destroyer U.S.S. Mayrant. 
In Boston, FDR, Jr. quickly adjusted to the Navy life. During the fi rst few weeks 
he had the time of his life, living with Ethel ashore at the Ritz and hanging out with 
his brother John who had also joined the Navy. Th e young enthusiastic naval offi  cers 
enjoyed their days full of fun, alcohol and “occasional hangovers” disregarding the les-
sons of moderation from their mother. FDR, Jr. felt exhilarated by the new and diff erent 
environment. He confessed in his diary that he was “thrilled to play a minute part in 
the unfolding drama of the Battle of the Atlantic.” In contrast to the feeling of being lost 
in a big law fi rm he hoped to enjoy a sense of accomplishment, away from the spotlight 
and irrespective of his name and status.143
FDR, Jr.’s excitement sobered when the Mayrant started its regular patrol on the 
North Atlantic to escort convoying merchant vessels that carried the ammunition and 
weapons to England under the Lend-Lease Act. In a famous fi reside chat on 29 Decem-
ber 1940, FDR had argued that the United States should become the “great arsenal of 
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democracy” and had submitted this monumental bill in Congress.144 By lending the 
allied forces, which were broke, the weapons to fi ght, this would enable them to beat 
Nazi-Germany and Japan. At the same time, FDR would keep his election promise of 
staying out of the war. Th ough vehemently opposed by isolationists as Joseph Kennedy 
and Charles Lindbergh , the Lend-Lease act became law in March 1941. Many observers 
concluded FDR’s provocative policies served as an excuse to get into the war but the 
president remained convinced that it was basically a defensive measure to defend the 
national security of America.145
Lend-Lease signaled the end of America’s policy of neutrality and isolationism. FDR, 
Jr.’s destroyer technically violated the neutrality provisions by assertively searching for 
enemy submarines to aid the British. FDR, Jr. worried about his ship’s safety and fi ght-
ing capability when it would encounter enemy ships. Th e eff ectiveness of the Mayrant 
was curtailed by the lack of radar equipment. Th e American Navy had kept worn and 
frayed equipment in operation since the country’s war industry had not shift ed to full 
gear in the summer of 1941. Nothing happened to FDR, Jr.’s ship but other American 
destroyers were attacked, and sunk, by German submarines.146 
In early August 1941, FDR, Jr. had unexpectedly been taken off  patrol duty and 
ordered to the obscure port of Argentia in Newfoundland. Upon arrival, he received 
a message to report to the fl agship of the Commander-in-Chief, the U.S. cruiser Au-
gusta. He wondered why Admiral King should send for him. When FDR, Jr. entered the 
admiral’s cabin, impeccably dressed, he was only to be welcomed by roaring laughter. 
He explained, “the spacious cabin appeared totally empty until I heard a loud guff aw to 
my left . I turned to see my father sitting on the sofa in shirtsleeves and an old yachting 
hat close at hand. ‘What in the hell are you doing here, Pa?’ I asked. ‘You haven’t seen 
anything yet, he laughed. Churchill arrives tomorrow in the H.M.S. Prince of Wales 
and he is bringing Harry Hopkins with him…. We are going to have our fi rst conference, 
Churchill and me.’ ” 147 
Placentia Bay did establish the venture of wartime conferences, where the allied 
leaders conducted personal diplomacy, discussed tactics and strategy. Th e meeting in 
Newfoundland also established the custom for Roosevelt family reunions. On his trav-
els FDR had always liked to have family members accompany him. He continued this 
tradition throughout the war. FDR, Jr. and Elliott , who fl ew risky photoreconnaissance 
missions and who had also been ordered to the side of their father, were attached as 
junior naval aides to the president. He relaxed with his father on a fi shing trip and in-
spected the work at the Naval Station while they waited for the English Prime Minister. 
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Aft er Churchill arrived on 9 August FDR easily broke the ice despite their diff erent 
backgrounds and character. Churchill was a military man, eloquent and petulant while 
FDR was the quintessential politician, full of charm and deviousness who spoke the 
language of the common man. Yet, they shared their opposition to Hitler and their easy 
rapport and mutual admiration at Argentia helped start a warm personal friendship.
Th e British delegation had come to Newfoundland to draw the Americans into 
the war. During the strategy sessions, where FDR, Jr. was in charge of the seating and 
transportation arrangements, Churchill intended to persuade the American president 
of nothing less than a declaration of war.148 FDR held back. He knew that Congress 
and the American people opposed an all-out commitment. Without a public consensus 
FDR could only concede to let armed U.S. destroyers escort the merchant fl eet as far as 
Iceland. 
His main objective was to pacify the American people for an alliance with com-
munist Russia aft er Hitler had attacked Stalin ’s country on 22 June. FDR wanted a state-
ment that spelled out high-minded goals to enter the war. On 12 August, aft er four days 
of deliberations FDR and Churchill issued the Atlantic Charter , which laid out in broad 
terms the purpose for the war against the Germans, Italians and Japanese. Th e docu-
ment issued solemn goals for a post-war world that became the inspiration for the Unit-
ed Nations charter. Churchill and FDR agreed on principles of self-determination, a 
system of collective security, disarmament and economic collaboration and free trade. 
Despite the fact that postwar problems had been dealt with extensively and publicly 
for the fi rst time, the Charter did cover up political diff erences between Churchill and 
FDR. Th e British delegation felt that the Americans were reluctant to fi ght the German 
aggression. FDR had been determined to remain non-committal. He avoided the public 
mentioning of specifi c war aims to protect himself against domestic anti-interventionist 
sentiment. Yet, the meetings did cement, as FDR, Jr. recorded in his wartime diary, the 
awareness that the two countries needed each other to fi ght the Axis powers.149 FDR’s 
observation was right. Th eir real signifi cance lay in “the public display of Anglo-Ameri-
can cooperation.” 150 
FDR backed up the public proclamation of the alliance by ordering the Mayrant 
and another destroyer to escort Churchill ’s ship back to Iceland. On the island, FDR, Jr. 
was assigned as an honorary liaison offi  cer to Churchill to symbolize the Anglo-Ameri-
can cooperation. As his father’s stand-in, FDR, Jr. covered up for the lack of a decisive 
American commitment. Churchill toured the island for a joint review of British and 
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American troops, stationed there to prevent the Germans from using it as a basis for 
their lethal submarines and to help secure the sea-lane to the Russian ports. Churchill 
keenly used the publicity and the presence of the president’s son at his side to empha-
size the new British-American alliance. FDR, Jr. recalled, “whenever he saw a camera 
he would bellow for me and thrusting aside his generals and admirals, would plant me 
squarely by his side.” 151
When he returned to the anonymity of the Mayrant, FDR, Jr. came to understand 
what this meant. Th e war eff ort took priority, even over the personal concerns of a pres-
idential son. In early September 1941, Sara had died and FDR, Jr. was unable to get 
home for the funeral. Th e death of his mother was a heavy blow for FDR. Th ough Sara’s 
intense love had occasionally choked him, its unconditional character had given him 
security and strength. Sara had made no bones about her dislike of politics but had been 
fi ercely proud of her presidential son and admired his achievements.152 
Without her comfort FDR continued to prepare a divided country for a prominent 
and unifi ed role in the war. In the undeclared war in the gloomy Atlantic between 
March and December 1941, FDR had sought a provocation to offi  cially implement the 
escort policy. Th e incident between a German submarine and the U.S. destroyer Greer 
on 4 September provided him with such an opportunity. A week later, FDR delivered 
his “shoot on sight” fi reside chat in which he deliberately misstated the encounter. He 
announced that American destroyers would escort any merchant ship on the Atlantic 
and sink any hostile vessel they would encounter. Th is devious declaration of virtual 
naval warfare was as far FDR could go without endangering the national consensus. 
FDR had brought his country to the brink of war but Hitler shied away from open naval 
confl ict at least until the winter because he hoped by then to have completed the Russian 
invasion.153 
Th e Japanese attack on the American Naval base in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 
1941 dramatically ended FDR’s policy. Th e next day, a resolved FDR formally declared 
war on the Axis powers. Within weeks FDR, Jr. experienced the consequences of Amer-
ica’s offi  cial involvement in the war. Ethel had been expecting their second child. On 22 
December, FDR, Jr. received a coded message from his father with the news that Ethel 
had given birth to their second son, Christopher . Christmas passed without the tradi-
tional family gatherings at Hyde Park . He confi ded to his diary his growing feelings of 
homesickness and solitude.154 In early January 1942, FDR, Jr. returned to Norfolk naval 
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base but was denied leave. He resumed convoying merchant ships to Iceland. But the 
well being of his family was on his mind. He wrote Ethel that he feared never to see 
his family until the baby boy had “graduated from college.” 155 As a blessing in disguise, 
FDR, Jr. came down with acute appendicitis the next month. Th e Navy allowed him a 
few weeks to recuperate at Hyde Park. 
His recovery prompted a return of the Roosevelt bashing. In late February 1942, 
Congressman William T. Pheiff er singled him out and launched a frontal attack on FDR, 
Jr.’s alleged preferential treatment. Th e Republican representative charged that because 
he was the president’s son, FDR, Jr. had been given a month’s leave by the Navy aft er 
undergoing the operation. Democratic Majority leader John McCormack delivered a 
stinging rebuke. He declared, “these charges were an eff ort to undermine the respect 
for the president in the public mind and that the President’s sons are seeking the most 
hazardous duties that can be assigned to them.” McCormack’s defense sorted eff ect and 
Pheiff er off ered a public apology to FDR, Jr.156 Yet, the return of his parents’ enemies 
who continued to criticize and scrutinize every move he made, left  FDR, Jr. dispirited. 
When he left  the White House aft er talking to his mother, Eleanor tearfully told her 
secretary, “Th ey won’t let up on my boys until they are all killed.” 157 
FDR, Jr. rejoined the crew of the Mayrant as a full Lieutenant. Th e destroyer re-
sumed its dangerous patrolling duties in the U-boat infested Atlantic and convoyed 
merchant vessels to Murmansk to supply the Russian allies. In November 1942, FDR, 
Jr.’s destroyer was unexpectedly ordered to escort a convoy into Casablanca. When his 
ship arrived in the Moroccan city in mid-January, FDR, Jr. was temporarily relieved 
from his Navy duty and driven to a residential suburb on the city’s outskirts. Th ere 
he was reunited with his father and again assigned to him as an aide. Th e Casablanca 
Conference was the second summit meeting between FDR and Churchill . During fi ve 
days of talks between 14 and 18 January the allied leaders and their delegations engaged 
in strategy sessions. FDR, Jr. kept his father company, and related during dinner, to 
the admiration of FDR, how the Mayrant had withstood severe enemy attacks.158 He 
sat in with the meetings but there are no indications that he contributed to the actual 
negotiations. 
Th e wartime family reunions that withdrew FDR, Jr. and Elliott from the battle-
fronts at the insistence of their father led to renewed charges of alleged favoritism. Aft er 
the conference FDR, Jr. had grasped the opportunity to relax. He teamed up with Elliott 
to explore the pleasures of the town’s exotic nightlife.159 Inevitably, their nightly excur-
155. Entries 13, 15 January 1941, and 2 February 1942, Wartime Journal, FDR, Jr. Papers; Ethel 
to FDR, Jr., n.d., December 1941, folder Misc. and Correspondence, box 165, FDR, Jr. Papers.
156. NYT, 27 February and 3 March 1942; William D. Hassett, Off  the Record with FDR, 1942–
1945 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1958), 21–25.
157. Collier, Th e Roosevelts, 414.
158. Ibid., 404.
159. Interview FDR, Jr. by Diane Halsted and James Halsted, 13, Small Collections, FDRL; FDR, 
Jr. to Joe Lash , box 16, Lash Papers. 







sion had leaked out. Kansas Republican Lambertson had a fi eld day in Congress when 
he charged that not only had FDR, Jr. been removed from war at their father’s request, 
but also that “the Roosevelt children were boozing in night-clubs while American boys 
were fi ghting and dying far from home.” Again McCormack jumped to the defense and 
called the accusations “a deliberate lie.” 160 
FDR, Jr. had thought of answering the criticism in Congress himself but the mili-
tary censor withheld the story. In any event, FDR, Jr. wrote his mother that it would 
be best to try to ignore the accusations. He reasoned, “very few people read about such 
events anyway and your friends know the truth so it really does not amount to very 
much.” 161 In a letter to his Texas Representative Elliott did hit back at the partisan criti-
cism. He condemned the allegations as “unfair to his brothers who were doing loyal and 
patriotic service.” Elliott pointed out that the Roosevelt sons were tired of being singled 
out by their parents’ enemies and he urged to let them fi ght “without being stabbed in 
the back for the sake of politics.” 162 
FDR, Jr. fought bravely on the battlefi eld and saw heavy combat action, like all his 
brothers. On 26 July 1943, the Mayrant cruised some eighteen miles northeast of Pal-
ermo in the Mediterranean when two bombs exploded near the ship that resulted in 
two large holes in the hull. FDR, Jr.’s ship, which was involved in the Sicilian landings, 
off ered an easy target for the German bombers. It was operating alone, way ahead of its 
air coverage, and cruising so close to the Sicilian beach that the destroyer’s radar detec-
tion was severely handicapped. Th e damaged destroyer was brought back to the harbor 
of Palermo to patch it up. Less than a week later, FDR, Jr. rescued one of his seamen and 
saved his life during a massive German air raid on the harbor. Th e Navy awarded FDR, 
Jr. the Purple Heart and the Silver Star for his bravery.163 
He shared his pride and sense of accomplishment with James , who served in the 
160. NYT, 15 January 1943.
161. FDR, Jr. to ER , 20 March 1943, folder Roosevelt, Franklin D. Jr. 1923–1949, box 3, ER 
Papers.
162. NYT, 6 March 1943.
163. “Briefed Damage Report. U.S.S. Mayrant,” Offi  ce of Naval Operations, Navy Department to 
Admiral Brown, 28 September 1943, box 19, Roosevelt Family Papers; FDR, Jr. to FDR, 27 August 
1943, box 19, Roosevelt Family Papers. On instigation from FDR, Jr., who wanted to assure his 
family that he was fi ne despite a minor injury, Quentin Reynolds, a war correspondent reported 
the story of the attack and junior’s bravery to an anxious Eleanor. “Frank was on the bridge dur-
ing the raid directing the anti-aircraft  fi re,” Reynolds wrote the fi rst lady, “when an ammunition 
train was hit peppering the Mayrant with fl ying shells. A young seaman was standing next to 
Frank [on the bridge] when a shell came over from the burning exploding ammunition train, hit 
the kid right in the leg and took it off .” When there was no doctor available, Reynolds continued, 
“Frank asked for a needle of morphine … and gave the boy a big shot of the dope and then hoisted 
him on his shoulder. Despite the fact that the bombs were falling as close as fi ft y yards away and 
the shells were coming very fast, Frank carried this kid down the unprotected ladders to the deck, 
then over to the ship where there was a doctor. Th e doctor said that Frank saved the kid’s life.” 
Quentin Reynolds to Eleanor Roosevelt , 29 September 1943, box 19, Roosevelt Family Papers.
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marines when he received the Navy Cross. He relished his brother’s award, because 
James’ poor health could have prevented him from active combat duty. Also, FDR, Jr. 
pointed out to his mother because then “these small, petty jealous critics will never be 
able to say he got it through his name.” 164 
To the Roosevelt sons their service in World War II was important for their sense of 
independent achievements. FDR, Jr. demonstrated this new responsible attitude in his 
relationship with his mother and father. In numerous letters he emphasized to Eleanor 
that he had left  the socialite life at the Stork Club and “21” behind him. He condemned 
his old pals who had avoided the draft  and now complained about the rising prices of 
liquor. He pointed out that he had become a steady and serious person who now carried 
the nickname of “moderation Frank” aft er two years living on a destroyer.165 
A month aft er the bombing in the Palermo harbor, he also reassured FDR that he 
had grown up and changed a lot. He explained to his father, “I have got a fair set of 
values now and I think I have developed a pretty good sense of responsibility.” 166 As the 
executive offi  cer of his destroyer, FDR, Jr. felt responsible for his crew. Th eir average age 
was seventeen-and-a-half and most of them had never left  their hometowns before. Th e 
consequence was that when the Mayrant went ashore FDR, Jr. oft en had to bail out the 
crew the following morning. 
Th e fi rst time that FDR, Jr. stood up against his father illustrated this new sense of 
duty. Th ough he had expressed disagreements with FDR’s policies before in letters to 
Eleanor, he had never refused a request of his father. Aft er the reparations on his ship 
in Malta, where it was towed from Palermo, were delayed, FDR ordered his son by his 
side at the summit meetings in November 1943. In Teheran he would meet Churchill 
and, for the fi rst time, Stalin , to agree on a date for the second front in France. FDR, 
Jr., begged off  his father’s request to join him for the entire trip to Cairo and Teheran. 
In heated discussions he pointed out to FDR the responsibility he felt as the executive 
offi  cer to join his crew to help bring his damaged ship back safely to the US Navy yard. 
Finally, his sense of duty won out over FDR’s preference for the company of his fam-
ily. Th e commander-in-chief relented, tore up the order and FDR, Jr. returned with the 
Mayrant to the United States in mid-December.167 
FDR, Jr. spent the fi nal year of the war fi ghting in the Pacifi c where the Ameri-
cans captured island by island from the Japanese. Aft er spending Christmas 1943 with 
Ethel and their two little children and New Year at Hyde Park , FDR, Jr. completed a 
164. FDR, Jr. to ER , 10 October 1942, folder Roosevelt, Franklin D. Jr. 1923–1949, box 3, ER 
Papers.
165. Entries 1, 8 and 9 January 1942, Wartime Journal, FDR, Jr. Papers; FDR, Jr. to ER , 20 March 
and 20 July 1943, folder Roosevelt, Franklin D. Jr. 1923–1949, box 3, ER Papers.
166. NYT Magazine, 24 April 1949; FDR, Jr. to FDR, 27 August 1943, box 19, Roosevelt Family 
Papers; FDR, Jr. to ER , 21 October 1943, folder Roosevelt, Franklin D. Jr. 1923–1949, box 3, ER 
Papers.
167. Interview FDR, Jr. by Diane Halsted and James Halsted, 6, Small Collections, FDRL; NYT, 
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four weeks course at a Miami sub-chaser-training center to qualify as an offi  cer of a 
destroyer escort. In mid-April 1944, the Navy assigned FDR, Jr. to be commander of 
the U.S.S. Ulvert M. Moore. On his way to the war in the Pacifi c he refl ected upon his 
commanding position. He confessed to Eleanor in November 1944, “Mummy, it is a 
very sobering feeling that you are the only offi  cer on board who knows how to handle 
the ship and how to carry out signals correctly and to avoid being run down or running 
down someone else.” 168 
In the Pacifi c, FDR, Jr. led his destroyer in the landings on Luzon in the Philippines, 
Iwo Jima and Okinawa Islands. He stayed on as commander to fi ght the Japanese aft er 
the death of his father in April 1945 and returned to Washington, D.C. in early June 
1945 to become a Navy War College instructor.169
War had fulfi lled an important equalizing function in FDR, Jr.’s life as it had done 
in the lives of his brothers and the sons of Th eodore Roosevelt who had fought bravely 
in World War I. FDR, Jr. assembled a distinguished war record. He felt it was up to him 
and his brothers to translate the ideals of his father in practice. World War II refl ected 
a crash-course in maturity and responsibility for FDR, Jr. Th e war tested his manhood 
and he was decorated for courageous and successful fi ghting conduct. He had been able 
to set accomplishments. It indicated a newfound balance between standing on his own 
feet and the value of his brand name and position. FDR, Jr. asserted that his fi ve years of 
active duty in the service had been the most important period of development in his life 
because he felt, “the Navy taught me many useful lessons, which might never have been 
learned in a comparable period of civilian life.” 170 
FDR, Jr. claimed that the famous name neither helped nor hindered him.171 Yet, his 
peculiar position as the son of the commander-in-chief off ered him an unique opportu-
nity in the arena where history was being made. His name opened doors that remained 
closed for others. He discussed the aff airs of war with its leading political and military 
actors. He enjoyed Churchill ’s entertaining company at the summit meetings, and nick-
named him the “British LaGuardia .” 172 He toured the ancient Tunisian battlefi elds of 
Carthage with General Eisenhower and FDR in the back of Ike’s limousine. He sat in 
the jump seat listening to Ike’s impressive knowledge of the history of Hannibal and his 
early wars, before FDR told him that the General had passed the test and that he would 
168. FDR, Jr. to ER , 11 November 1944, folder Roosevelt, Franklin D. Jr. 1923–1949, box 3, ER 
Papers.
169. NYT, 7 February 1944, 13 January, 13 May, 8 June and 19 September 1945; “History of Op-
erations of USS Ulvert M. Moore,” folder Naval File, box 306 and Ulvert M. Moore, DE 442”: day 
by day-account of FDR, Jr.’s ship, 1944–1945, compiled by Cecil Davis, folder Ulvert M. Moore, 
box 424, both in FDR, Jr. Papers.
170. FDR, Jr. to Vice-Admiral W.S. Pye, 23 November 1945, folder Navy, 1945, box 429, FDR, Jr. 
Papers.
171. Ibid.
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assign him to command the planned invasion in France in June 1944.173 He debated his 
father’s health and policies with adviser Harry Hopkins and Treasury Secretary Henry 
Morgenthau . 
FDR, Jr.’s status also made him vulnerable for accusations of preferential treatment. 
FDR realized that his sons would not be treated like other American soldiers because 
presidential sons were “compelled because of public or editorial criticism to stay on the 
front lines of the battle…” 174 Yet, he did nothing to protect them from the inevitable crit-
icism when he ordered them by his side for moral support and to relieve his isolation. 
Th e ambivalence in FDR, Jr.’s involvement refl ected his father’s approaches to the 
war. FDR had successfully accomplished the mobilization of the nation for war. As the 
country’s rhetorical leader, he had embodied the public confi dence in total victory and 
had cemented the wartime alliance between America, England and Russia. Yet FDR’s 
mixture of Wilson ’s idealistic internationalism and Th eodore Roosevelt ’s realism led, at 
times, to an inconsistent foreign policy. It proved diffi  cult to keep the diplomatic bal-
ance between idealistic goals and making deals with allied leaders as Stalin and Chiang 
Kai Shek. Th e accommodation of utopian and realpolitik led to a misinterpretation of 
the status of England, a preference for waging personal diplomacy and a delay in the 
construction of the postwar world.175 
FDR, Jr. had not made his mind up about his life aft er the war. Elliott had pointed 
out to his mother the dangers of lacking a goal in life, “I do hope aft er this war he [FDR, 
Jr.] can settle down to some kind of work, because if he does not I fear that he may waste 
a brilliant mind like [Eleanor’s brother] Hall did.” 176 In late 1942, Eleanor had already 
advised FDR, Jr. to decide what he wanted “and then go aft er it, with self-discipline.” 
Th e Navy had been very close to his heart. At the last moment, he decided against ap-
plying for a permanent commission. FDR, Jr. realized that as a private citizen he would 
be able to represent the interests of the veterans and Navy better.177 More important, his 
name and claim on memory were of far greater use to help FDR, Jr. take the fi rst steps 
of his political career.
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Some observers claimed that raising children in American aristocratic families such 
as the Roosevelts was “a little like throwing dice.” 178 Th is argument underestimated 
the complexity and ambivalence of FDR, Jr.’s upbringing. He was raised in an environ-
ment where public life overshadowed family care.179 FDR’s political career, his recovery 
from polio and Eleanor’s emancipation implied a frequent absence and unavailability. 
Th e communication between Sara , FDR and ER and between parents and children was 
distant and oft en tense. 
Th e struggles for independence in public life signaled the Roosevelts’ inability to 
stabilize at normal family life. Th is had a strong impact on FDR, Jr. It turned FDR, 
Jr.’s youth into a complex experience without any real sense of security to defi ne his 
life. In the relationships with his parents he created attitudes of strong admiration and 
attention neglect. Th e ambivalence helped defi ne his personality. FDR, Jr. grew up as 
a charming, outgoing and confi dent youngster. In the relative anonymity of Groton 
he thrived on the competitive spirit of leadership and training for public service that 
helped channel his enormous energies.
FDR, Jr. did also develop a strong streak of independence and carelessness that un-
derscored the lack of parental guidance and lame discipline. FDR, Jr.’s individualism 
surfaced at Harvard University. In this fi shbowl existence he rebelled against his name 
and position of refl ected prominence. It underscored the revolt of his sister and brothers 
against their upbringing. In diff erent ways they demonstrated a search for individual-
ism by driving recklessly, rushing into marriages and divorcing fast, and celebrating 
glamorous lives. 
Aft er 1932, FDR, Jr.’s unique presidential position forced him to deal with the life-
long identifi cation with his parents. Th e continuous presence in the limelight could be 
exhilarating but the unrelenting public scrutiny was oft en discouraging. Unlike James 
and Elliott who matured too late, FDR, Jr. gradually outgrew his rebellion and became 
a lawyer. Th e adjustments to learn to live with the responsibilities that came with the 
Roosevelt name were the most powerful infl uences on his formative years. It made FDR, 
Jr. anxious to be accepted for himself and have his own accomplishments. Aft er World 
War II that opportunity to pursue his own career arrived when FDR, Jr. used the politi-
cal capital of his brandname to continue the Roosevelt tradition of public service. In the 
recognition of the voting public he hoped to fi nd the security that had eluded him in 
his upbringing.
178. Aldrich, Old Money, 42. 
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Early morning on Friday 13 April 1945 off  the coast of Japan in the Pacifi c, FDR, Jr. had 
just retired to his bunk in the Captain’s cabin directly below the bridge to try to get a 
little sleep. He commanded the destroyer Ulvert M. Moore that took part in the inva-
sion on Okinawa and had helped battle waves of Japanese kamikaze attacks as an anti-
submarine patrol. Soon aft er he had gone asleep, FDR, Jr. was awoken by his executive 
offi  cer who delivered a shocking message. He simply said that the Pacifi c Armed Forces 
Radio had broadcast the news that “your father, the President, died a few hours ago at 
Warm Springs, Georgia.” 1 
Devastated, FDR, Jr. sat stunned for about 15 minutes, then walked to the bridge, 
ordered a cup of coff ee and began pulling his thoughts together. Th e broadcast had 
quoted the words of his mother, who had declared, “I am more sorry for the people of 
the country and the world than I am for us.” 2 Th e fi rst lady’s statement underscored 
the fact that many people had felt the president had been a father to the nation. 
Th e news of the sudden death of FDR struck many with the force of a personal 
loss.3 Offi  cers and crewmembers conveyed their condolences and expressed their per-
sonal sense of loss and sympathy for FDR, Jr. and the family. Th e Ulvert Moore received 
continuous sympathy messages from other ships in the task force.4 Later that day all 
1. FDR, Jr. to John McHugh, 17 June 1969, box 171, FDR, Jr. Papers; Croswell Bowen, “FDR, Jr., 
A Young Man On His Way Up,” PM, 17 May 1946, Personality Clippings, box 144, Democratic 
National Committee Files, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA (hereaft er JFKL).
2. Time Capsule 1945: A History of the Year Condensed from the Pages of Time (New York: 
Time-Life Books, 1968), 13–16.
3. Kathleen Harriman to FDR, Jr., 14 April 1945, folder Harriman, Kathy, box 318, FDR, Jr. 
Papers. Upon his father’s death, Kathleen, Averell’s daughter had written him, “so many people 
lost so much, but to you it’s more. Ever still I feel it hard to believe.”
4. Joseph P. Lash interviews with Anna Roosevelt Halsted , 29 November 1971, box 44, Joseph 
P. Lash Papers, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, the Netherlands (hereaft er RSC); “Ulvert 
M. Moore, DE 442,” folder Ulvert M. Moore, box 424, FDR, Jr. Papers; Time Capsule 1945, 13–16. 
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Air Force, and John had enlisted in the Navy where he was notifi ed aboard the aircraft  carrier 







four Roosevelt brothers, who served in the armed forces, had received a personal mes-
sage from their mother that she had cabled before she went off  to Warm Springs. She 
wrote her sons “Father slept away and had done his job to the end and she knew he 
would want them to do so too.” 5 
FDR, Jr. decided against attending his father’s funeral in Hyde Park , New York. He 
felt the weight of responsibility for the crew of his ship because he was in command and 
in the middle of a crucial operation. He did not want to trade on his name by distin-
guishing himself from ordinary soldiers and sailors who had also lost parents and were 
unable to go home. A week aft er FDR, Eleanor formulated the challenge that lay ahead 
for the Roosevelt family. She wrote her close friend Lorena Hickok, “Franklin’s death 
ended a period in history and now in its wake for lots of us who lived in his shadow 
periods come and we have to start again under our own momentum and wonder what 
we can achieve.” 6
Shadow of FDR
FDR, however, remained a “living presence” not in the least for the Roosevelt family. 
FDR, Jr., and his sister and brothers devoted themselves as guardians of their father’s 
place in history.7 In the immediate postwar years, they learned to adapt to their new 
responsibilities. Th e discussions within the family revolved around fi nding ways to 
agree upon a single policy to preserve FDR’s memory. Th e bickering among the children 
started when they considered off ers from companies who wanted to dramatize the life 
and achievements of FDR in movies and pictures. James and John had moved to Cali-
fornia and started independently to negotiate deals with separate movie companies.8 
Hornet in the Pacifi c. Walter Cronkite, “FDR: As We Remember Him,” Saturday Evening Post, 
10 April 1965.
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1993), 259–260. 
7. Bernard Asbell, ed., Mother and Daughter (New York: Norton, 1988), 214.
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Th ey felt that they possessed the moral and legal rights to sell their father’s life to Hol-
lywood studios. In return they wanted to receive adequate remuneration. 
Anna opposed their notion that FDR’s memory was an asset that could be sold.9 
She argued that the best way to thwart allegations that they were making money on 
FDR’s memory was to principally agree that no family member should receive any mate-
rial benefi t from the proposed movies. FDR, Jr. stressed the need to remain loyal to the 
interests of the family. He hammered out a legal compromise to deal with future royal-
ties.10 FDR, Jr. advised his sister to agree to the arrangement, like Eleanor had done, 
that she could donate her share from the prospective fi lms to a selected organization. 
Eventually, Anna withdrew from her principled position. She faced fi nancial troubles 
when the Arizona newspaper that she owned with her second husband, John Boettiger 
continued to lose money.11 Elliott disapproved of the fact that FDR, Jr. handled these 
legal negotiations for the family. He criticized his younger brother for assuming “the 
mantle of head of the family.” 12 
Th e key issue for Anna , James , FDR, Jr. and John remained their mother’s favorit-
ism toward Elliott . All felt that their mother indulged Elliott. Th ey pointed to the fact 
that Elliott earned a substantial income by marketing his mother’s name and reputation 
and by selling off  large parts of their father’s Hyde Park estate.13 In early February 1947, 
Eleanor had let her children know that she and Elliott had been searching though FDR’s 
personal letters and were planning to publish a selection of them. She claimed that the 
book would be historically interesting and would counteract the propaganda that un-
dermined FDR’s reputation. Th e other children opposed the project not only because 
they did not believe in the purpose of the project but mainly because ER had suggested 
that Elliott would take the advance for the book because he had done all the work.14 
James reacted by proposing to list all their individual commitments and to agree 
to a moratorium of ten years before proceeding with documentaries, movies or books 
about FDR’s life. If accepted, this would mean that Elliott would have to abort his book 
project but with contracts having been signed other family members rejected James’s 
9. Collier, Th e Roosevelts, 435.
10. FDR, Jr. to Elliott , 6 August 1947, folder FDR, Jr. Personal Correspondence, mainly 1947-
1953, box 323, FDR, Jr. Papers.
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gust 1947, folder FDR, Jr. Personal Correspondence, mainly 1947–1953, box 323, FDR, Jr. Papers; 
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Years Alone (New York: Norton, 1972), 26, 180–181; Collier, Th e Roosevelts, 450–455.
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plan.15 Anna complained to FDR, Jr. about the unfair division of profi ts, “… letting El-
liott get most of the cake from the sale of the books of father’s letters is carrying things 
pretty far.” Elliott reassured them that they would receive royalties from the sale of the 
book. He argued that he was “not riding a free gravy train” because the book’s advance 
did not even cover the costs he had made in compiling his father’s letters.16 
Beneath the diff erences of opinion and resentments there remained a level of aff ec-
tion and loyalty in the complex relations between the Roosevelt children.17 Th ey shared 
the “common feeling of disorientation” without their father’s sense of security.18 Elea-
nor tried to pacify her strong-willed children but they interpreted her interventions as 
“emotional reparations.” 19 Her sincere eff orts to restore unity could not replace the feel-
ings of security FDR had represented. Anna , James and Elliott all experienced fi nancial 
hardship. Anna’s enterprise of setting up a daily newspaper the Arizona Times aft er the 
war in Phoenix turned into a personal and fi nancial disaster. Th e failure of the paper 
led to the breakdown of her marriage in 1949 and the suicide of John Boettiger in 1950. 
James became a leader of the Democratic Party in California but lacked independent 
political appeal. Elliott searched for a personal and professional goal in life. At the age 
of thirty-nine in 1949, he had been divorced three times and continued to live off  his 
parents’ name. FDR, Jr. did have it as a political fi gure and made a calculated eff ort to 
learn the ropes of public service in the immediate postwar years. Th is run for political 
offi  ce ran parallel with the ambition of James. It also signaled his deteriorating rela-
tionship with Ethel . As she became increasingly disturbed FDR, Jr.’s marriage was on 
the verge of a break up by 1948. John had turned away from elective politics. Upon his 
graduation from Harvard he worked as a salesman at a Boston department store. Aft er 
the war John continued his business career on the Westcoast and became a Republican 
by conviction.
FDR, Jr. referred to their upbringing to explain for the inability to subordinate their 
personal ambitions. He acknowledged that due to the atmosphere of parental absence 
and permissiveness, they had been “a very independent lot and we did not learn to work 
as a cooperative partnership, as a family.” 20 Th e children had been trained to argue their 
15. ER to James , 25 March 1947 and James to ER, 25 March 1947, both in folder Roosevelt, El-
eanor, box 73, James Roosevelt Papers.
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17. Asbell, Mother and Daughter, 214.
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diff erences at the dinner table but the competitiveness and sibling rivalry did not give 
them a detailed plan for family power.21
The American Veterans Committee and the Fight for Public Housing
Upon his discharge from the Navy in September 1945, FDR, Jr. returned to law prac-
tice. He accepted a position in the law offi  ce of former New York Lieutenant Governor 
Charles Poletti . Th e off er raised eyebrows among some law fi rm partners. Milton Dia-
mond complained, “he did not want glamour in this offi  ce” and other lawyers declared, 
“FDR, Jr. was rather off -hand about the detail work of law….” 22 Four years later when 
FDR, Jr. ran for Congress, Diamond’s criticism had disappeared. He found FDR, Jr. “a 
lawyer of potentially great achievement, brilliant, and clear-thinking, having a distinct 
fl air for getting on with people and one who could be very persuasive before a jury or 
judge.” 23
No doubt FDR, Jr. got the job through his name because he had little legal and trial 
experience. Th e work in the law fi rm helped him to pay for his new fourteen-room co-
lonial-style house in Oyster Bay, Long Island. More important, FDR, Jr.’s professional 
independence assured him of a base of income when he entered politics. 
In July 1944, young progressive veterans had established the Americans Veterans 
Committee (AVC ) because they worried about the post-war international situation. 
Prominent members as FDR, Jr., New Republic publisher Michael Straight , Gilbert Har-
risson and millionaire G. Mennen Williams argued that the country’s future depended 
upon a stable world. Only through an international organization as the United Nations 
could world peace and the interests of America be guaranteed. At the heart of the notion 
of the AVC’s Americanism lay its desire to advance the public welfare to improve society. 
FDR, Jr. echoed this idealistic sentiment when he explained his motives for joining the 
liberal group. He declared, “I was convinced that at the end of the war there would be a 
need for a new veterans organization that emphasized the veterans not as a special class 
but as a cross-section of the nation, as citizens fi rst and veterans second.” 24
Th e AVC wanted to serve as an integrative force and identify veterans with the 
problems of all the people in the post-war era. Its membership increased rapidly aft er 
1945. Th e National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP ), the 
United AutoWorkers Union (UAW), Th e Nation and Th e New Republic had endorsed 
21. Diary Entry, 1 May 1966, Diary Joe Lash , folder Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr. 1966, box 16, 
Joseph P. Lash Papers, FDRL, opened at my request on 29 July 1999; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 
“Two Years Later: Th e Roosevelt Family,” Life Magazine (7 April 1947): 113–119, Lesley Kuhn Col-
lection, RSC; Asbell, Mother and Daughter, 214, 225; Collier, Th e Roosevelts, 450.
22. New York Times Magazine, 1 September 1946 and 24 April 1949; New York Herald Tribune, 
21 November 1945.
23. New York Times Magazine, 24 April 1949.
24. FDR, Jr., “No Home for Veterans,” Th e Nation (10 November 1945): 486–488.







the organization’s progressive positions. Th e AVC’s wish list read like a New Deal menu. 
It supported labor to improve working conditions, wanted to continue price controls, 
maintain a Federal Employment Practices Commission and hoped to aff ect Congress to 
establish a national minimum-wage and public housing laws.25 
Th e fi ght for public housing became the issue FDR, Jr. had been looking for to dis-
tinguish himself in the political arena and to defend his father’s political program. In an 
article for the liberal magazine Th e Nation FDR, Jr. vividly described the deplorable lo-
cal housing situation, “Th e only places now available in New York City for the veterans 
are substandard tenement dwellings. Cold-water fl ats where you are lucky to fi nd one 
toilet for a whole fl oor instead of one for the whole building out in the backyard, and 
where the tenant has to heat his water, heat his own apartment, and wage continual war 
against roaches and rats.” 26 
Th e rapid demobilization made the lack of new homes an acute major national prob-
lem. Th e veterans who had returned from the war aft er August 1945 looked forward to 
acquiring their own homes. Yet, the weakening impact of the Great Depression and the 
restraint during the war years had led to a great shortage of post-war permanent hous-
ing. In late October 1945, as chairman of the Veterans’ Housing Committee for New 
York City FDR, Jr. addressed the New York Chapter of the AVC . He called upon Mayor 
LaGuardia and Governor Dewey to take action.27 LaGuardia objected to FDR, Jr.’s pres-
sure and the AVC’s proposal to construct temporary public housing facilities. He feared 
that the temporary dwellings would eventually become slums and community health 
menaces.28 
FDR, Jr. showed increasing impatience with the lack of improvement when the 
shortage of homes for veterans reached a crisis in December 1945. Th e situation wors-
ened in New York City because of post-war immigration. He proposed a two-track ap-
proach that would permit the most rapid construction of low-cost homes as well as 
the clearance of slum housing. He urged Dewey to take immediate action and to enact 
special legislation to fund housing projects in the city. Exasperated by his failure to get 
the Republican State government to commit to the issue, FDR, Jr. became more populist 
and declared, “Th ere are too many agencies formulating vague plans, but there are still 
no houses for veterans.” 29 
Republican leaders questioned FDR, Jr.’s intentions. Th ey accused him of using the 
housing issue and his AVC position to fulfi ll his political ambitions. FDR, Jr. denied the 
allegations of his parents’ conservative enemies. He declared, “my interest in veterans’ 
25. Editorial AVC Bulletin, 15 March 1946, folder AVC, box 1, Lash Papers; Rodney, G. Minott, 
Peerless Patriots: Organized Veterans and the Spirit of Americanism (Washington, D.C.: Public 
Aff airs Press, 1962), 103–118.
26. Ibid.
27. New York Times, 25 October 1945 (hereaft er NYT). 
28. Ibid., 13 November 1945.
29. Ibid., 11 December 1945; FDR, Jr. to Benjamin Feinberg, 22 January 1946; “Press Release” 
AVC , 22 January 1946, Political Papers, box 141, FDR, Jr. Papers.
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housing is purely that of a public-spirited veteran who is attempting to assist in the so-
lution of a very grave national crisis.” 30 FDR, Jr.’s emphasis on public service signaled a 
strong commitment to the defense of his parents’ tradition. Yet this stand also implied 
that when he shift ed his attention to Washington, D.C. in early 1946, he began to cross 
swords with the new President Harry S. Truman . 
Th e death of FDR had ushered in a political new era. During their twelve years’ 
reign in the White House the Roosevelts had symbolized the feeling of the nation’s 
longtime governing elite that they were owners of the world. To many it seemed the 
family belonged there.31 Th is sense of entitlement certainly did apply to FDR, Jr. Th e 
memory of his father framed FDR, Jr.’s decisions. He wanted to assure that his father’s 
liberal vision would survive under the new administration and determine where FDR 
would stand on current issues.32 Th rough his leadership and charisma FDR had become 
the personifi cation of the New Deal and the Democratic Party. It now fell to Truman , 
his successor, to guarantee the independent viability of the New Deal in the postwar 
era.33 Th e new president was in many ways the opposite from the charismatic and cun-
ning New York patrician. Th e Kansas City political machine had elevated Truman to 
Congress, where he had been a deserving and straightforward Senator despite his affi  li-
ations. Th e Roosevelt family scrupulously kept an eye on the inexperienced and paro-
chial Midwesterner.
In his 1944 economic bill of rights, FDR had formulated a general proposal for de-
cent and aff ordable housing. FDR, Jr. and the AVC expected the new Truman adminis-
tration to follow up with a daring FDR-style vision, and wage a bold fi ght to attack the 
immediate housing problems. FDR, Jr. was the organization’s chief national lobbyist to 
pressure the administration to adopt a New Deal type national public housing program. 
Truman responded. He announced a reform proposal to alleviate the housing crisis. 
Truman wanted to maintain rent and price controls to channel the scarce materials into 
housing projects instead of into lucrative shopping centers and restaurants. In the same 
message to Congress on 6 September 1945, Truman had also outlined a host of New 
Deal-style legislative initiatives on all other AVC proposals. Th is extensive reform pro-
gram included plans to establish a national health insurance and extend social security 
that continued the federal management of the economy.34 
30. NYT Magazine, 24 April 1949; FDR, Jr. to editor Hudson Dispatch, 28 March 1946, Political 
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FDR, Jr. remained unconvinced. He continued to make speeches and the AVC 
staged demonstrations across the country in favor of a European model long range and 
low-cost national housing program to keep the administration under pressure. FDR, Jr. 
singled out the housing issue to test the administration’s backbone because he feared 
Truman might cave in to the powerful real estate and builders lobby and their conser-
vative allies in Congress. When Truman delegated the responsibility to administer the 
program to an assistant who remained passive, it seemed to prove FDR, Jr.’s suspicions 
right. He declared, “Every night I pray that Mr. Truman’s voice will somehow change to 
that of a true leader.” 35
FDR, Jr.’s verdict clearly articulated the liberals’ disappointment of the accidental 
president. Liberals felt that Truman was unable to provide their community with the 
leadership and unity that resembled FDR’s style. Liberals had underscored their claims 
of Truman’s indecisiveness and lack of direction with references to the handling of 
the domestic situation. Waves of strikes in the steel, railroad and coalmine industries 
rocked the economy in 1946. Labor fought with Truman over pay increases and busi-
nesses battled with the president over the lift ing of wartime price controls. Consumers 
held Truman responsible for the ineff ective handling of the rationing system that had 
led to food shortages. Th e president’s impulsive and wavering responses to the manage-
ment of the economy led to a sharp drop in his popularity. Truman’s approval ratings 
plummeted from a high 87 percent in May 1945 to 35 percent in December 1946.36 
Truman attempted to shore up his liberal credibility by appeasing the Roosevelt 
tradition. Over the summer of 1946, staunch New Dealers such as Secretary of the In-
terior Harold Ickes and many offi  cials at lower levels were leaving the administration 
in fl ock.37 Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace followed in September. When he had 
to fi ll some thirty key positions, Truman made the bold move to commit the Roosevelt 
name to his administration. He off ered FDR, Jr. the assignment of Under Secretary of 
the Navy in June 1946. FDR, Jr. turned it down. He explained to Truman that he felt 
unable to take the job. Privately though, FDR, Jr. admitted to his brother John that he 
had rejected the off er for strategic reasons. He would have loved the position but at this 
time he wanted to stay out of front line politics and not be associated with an unpopular 
Democratic administration.38 
FDR, Jr.’s ambition to defend his father’s achievements and its public welfare tradi-
35. FDR, Jr. to Nathan Strauss, 5 March 1946, Political Papers, box 155, FDR, Jr. Papers; Davis R. 
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tion set up another clash with Truman on the housing issue. Th e major legislation in 
Congress that dealt with alleviating the housing shortage was the Wagner-Ellender-Taft  
bill. Th e proposal encouraged public housing as well as acknowledged the importance 
of stimulating the private building industries. It was thought that nothing could pre-
vent the bill from passing with substantial majorities in Congress because not only had 
Truman endorsed the proposal but also because the principal sponsors represented the 
major views in the Senate, an urban liberal Democrat, a Southern Democrat, and a 
conservative Republican. 
In April 1946, the Senate voted to approve the bill but it ran into trouble in the 
House where emotions ran strongly against another new federal program. A coalition 
of southern Democrats and conservative Republicans succeeded to sidetrack the mea-
sure by fi libustering the bill. FDR, Jr. publicly called the failure to pass the proposal a 
“real set-back to millions of veterans and their families who are able only to aff ord the 
low-cost dwellings provided in this bill, and who permanently suff er from the failure of 
Congress to act on it.” 39 He urged Congress to pass the bill in the next sessions because 
its important supporter, Truman , had also lost faith in the bill midway 1946.
Th e president had shift ed his priority to create the position of a Housing Expediter 
to execute the Veterans Emergency Housing Program. Th e bold measure called for the 
involvement of the federal government to reach the goal of the rapid construction of 
large-scale low-cost housing facilities. Under pressure from New Dealers and veterans’ 
organizations, Truman had appointed Wilson Wyatt , the liberal mayor of Louisville, 
Kentucky to break the bottlenecks in the housing production. Wyatt’s initiative cap-
tured the liberals’ imagination. He received wide praise from former New Dealers. FDR, 
Jr. called Wyatt “the veterans’ best friend in housing.” 40 
Wyatt , however, encountered fi erce opposition by builders’ organizations. Th e 
Home Building Industry Committee, the National Association of Real Estate Boards, 
the National Association of Home Builders, and the US Chambers of Commerce 
claimed that “the infl ation in material costs and wages made it impossible to construct 
the low-cost housing demanded by veterans.” 41 Th e powerful Washington lobby fi ercely 
argued against any role of the federal government in the construction of residential 
housing because that would irrevocably lead to “socialized housing” and subsequently 
drain money from their profi table luxurious building projects.42
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sonal Clippings Files, box 144, Democratic National Committee Records, JFKL.
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Th e American Legion sided with real estate lobbies in its attempt to defeat the mea-
sure. Th e AVC ’s idealistic interpretation of the concept of Americanism contrasted 
sharply with traditional organizations as the American Legion and the Veterans of For-
eign Wars. Th e Legion focused upon narrow, economic and nationalistic ends. Th e two 
million-member organization had guaranteed World War II veterans bread-and-but-
ter benefi ts such as pensions, life insurances, business subsidies, a system of veterans’ 
hospital and other benefi ts. Th e Legion wielded great political infl uence in Congress. It 
had lobbied for veterans’ housing in FDR’s GI Bill, but had strongly opposed programs 
for the general public. Th e Legion distrusted the involvement of the federal government 
in public housing and condemned the legislation as radical. Not so much out of prin-
ciple but the Legion worried that Congress would attempt to fi nance the proposed slum 
clearance and construction of new low-income houses by depriving veterans of their 
hard-won benefi ts.43 
FDR, Jr. became increasingly frustrated about the Legion’s continuous record of an-
tagonism to the housing program and the inordinate amount of infl uence of its conser-
vative real estate allies. In early 1946, FDR, Jr. had already complained to Wyatt about 
the failure of the largest veterans’ organization to take the initiative “in the solution of 
the many problems facing the boys who are coming back home now.” 44 He denounced 
its opposition as surrender to the builders’ interests and its decision a “betrayal of mil-
lions of homeless veterans” and angrily called the organization’s national commander 
Paul Griffi  n “the principal errand boy on Capitol Hill for the powerful real estate lob-
by.” 45 He blasted the building business for letting their industry bust, “in the face of the 
biggest demand for housing in the nation’s history.” 46 Th e vice chairman of the Legion’s 
housing committee, Richard Cadwallader acidly replied, “if anyone is betraying the 
millions of veterans it is the AVC . Mr. Roosevelt speaks only for the AVC, which is not 
a veterans’ organization and which has only a handful of veterans as members.” He 
warned FDR, Jr. to “quit playing politics with veterans’ housing as red herring.” 47
As the debate between liberals and resurgent conservatives intensifi ed during the 
autumn support within the administration for Wyatt dwindled. Congress remained 
hostile to a new federal program. Republicans aimed to leave the housing issue to the 
building industry by removing the federal government from the home-building fi eld. 
Th ey had sensed the mood of the nation that was fed up with controls, paternalism 
and alphabet agencies and had promised to keep the ineff ective government regulations 
all. Ever since they started, our public aff airs have been in a worse mess than ever.” Goulden, Th e 
Best Years, 135.
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out of their lives. Th e Republicans’ gospel of a hands-off  economy and their slogan in 
the 1946 congressional elections “Had enough? Vote Republican!” successfully captured 
this restiveness to enjoy the material fruits of victory.
Th e outcome sealed the fate of Wyatt and the VEHP program of price controls.48 
For the fi rst time since 1930 Republicans gained control of Congress. Th e dominance 
of the “back to normalcy” sentiment forced Truman to cut short the New Deal -style 
housing program. In December 1946, a frustrated Wyatt resigned, unable to complete 
the enforcement of his program. Truman anticipated the upcoming Republican session 
and under pressure from economic advisers and the business community he lift ed price 
controls. Truman sought pragmatic answers to critical issues to preserve the existing 
New Deal programs and prevent their emasculation by a hostile Congress.49 To FDR, 
Jr., the events illustrated Truman’s incapacity to wear the Roosevelt mantle. He off ered 
a scathing assessment of the eff orts of his father’s successor in Th e New Republic that 
while veterans were still living in cars, garages and even jails, “Truman fl opped on his 
fi rst post-war assignment.” 50 
Th e best hope for FDR, Jr. remained the early passage of the pending W-E-T hous-
ing bill. He concentrated on the legislative aspects of the battle and in mid-March 1947, 
FDR, Jr. appeared for the Senate Banking Committee to testify for the AVC . He urged 
homes for veterans and the maintenance of rent controls. He appealed to the committee 
“to save veterans from their in-laws,” and recommended extending the powers of the Re-
construction Finance Corporation to provide greater fi nancing for the prefab industry 
to ease the housing shortage.51 
As the 1947 session ended there was still no sign of passing the bill. It remained 
stalled in Congress, as Republican Senate majority leader Taft  was unable to commit his 
divided party upon a single housing program. FDR, Jr. maintained that the New Deal 
approach of public housing and slum clearance had not lost its merits. He continued to 
propose a dominant role for the federal government. At the end of 1946, FDR, Jr. had de-
clared, “we must now use the power of government and pool all its resources to provide 
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the veteran with a home-or we must run the risk of pitting veteran against non-veteran 
in a mad scramble for the necessities of living.” 52 
To New Dealers and a rising generation of young liberal political fi gures like FDR, 
Jr. the post-war situation promised an opportunity to reform American society. Yet, by 
1946 they saw their hopes for an activist administration on the domestic fi eld dashed. 
Th eir reform approach was increasingly out of step with the times but FDR, Jr. turned 
a blind eye to the changing post-war circumstances. Th ough hostile Republicans had 
settled scores with his father’s program in 1946 FDR, Jr. blamed Truman for failing 
to live up to the Roosevelt standard. During his fi rst two years in offi  ce he had failed 
to persuade liberals of his ability to protect the New Deal accomplishments. Truman 
did not achieve any real success on his Fair Deal program he had outlined in Septem-
ber 1945. Yet, Truman’s position was not to be denied. Th e looming standard of FDR 
prompted the critique of defending liberalism. Liberals exaggerated their description of 
Truman. Aft er all, Truman had been a loyal New Dealer. As president, he supported and 
defended liberal programs in an environment that grew hostile to increasing federal 
regulations.53
The AVC and the Anti-Communist Issue
When the rise of domestic communism threatened to endanger the accomplishments 
of the New Deal , FDR, Jr. rushed again to its defense. In January 1946, AVC leaders 
had still been optimistic about the growth of their organization and expected approxi-
mately a half million members in 1947.54 Yet, aft er unsuccessful attempts to infi ltrate 
the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign War, the American Communist Party 
encouraged its members to join the AVC and turn the organization into a propaganda 
instrument of the far Left . 
Two months before the fi rst national convention the Communists succeeded in tak-
ing over the two largest chapters in New York and Los Angeles. Th ey also aimed to wrest 
control from the AVC ’s leadership.55 Th e Communists condemned the members of this 
National Planning Committee, that included FDR, Jr., as a “handful of Ivy Leaguers.” 
Th ey argued that the members were neither liberal nor militant enough but were mere 
middle-of-the-roaders and claimed that the leadership used its position for personal 
and political gains at the expense of the average AVC member.56
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At their national convention in June 1946 in Des Moines, Iowa the AVC members 
convened for the fi rst time to settle the “commie issue.” Th e loose association of moder-
ates, who strove to oust the Communists, looked to FDR, Jr. to act as a unifying force 
because the veterans revered the name of his father. FDR, Jr. set out to establish “the 
fi rst pattern for a liberal organization outside of the labor movement on how to handle 
the Commie issue through organization and discipline the many shades of anti-Com-
munist thought.” 57 He did not condone tactics of some of the moderate members and 
condemned them for daring to investigate the political affi  liations of veterans who had 
fought for their country. FDR, Jr. warned that these activities would backfi re among 
liberal supporters. He urged the veterans that “the more subtle approach is the best way 
to beat the Commies eff ectively.” He stressed the use of democratic procedures “… to 
maintain the AVC as a genuine independent organization.” 58 
Th e veterans could not prevent Communists from becoming members but worked 
hard to outvote them when they ran for national offi  ce at the convention. Th e “progres-
sives,” as the Communists called themselves, hoped to secure a majority on the National 
Planning Committee. Despite pleas from the Communists for a “unity candidate” to fi ll 
the spot of vice chairman, the moderate faction was able to win a narrow victory. FDR, 
Jr. celebrated the success but recognized that “the fi ght has just begun, and it can be won 
only by a large and vital increase in membership.” Th e outcome signaled indeed no end 
to the internal division. Although the AVC issued a harsh denunciation of the Commu-
nist Party, the progressive faction had been able to secure the election of seven members 
in the Planning Committee, while it continued to dominate key local chapters.59
FDR, Jr.’s eff orts brought mixed results. He convinced the delegates that he took the 
obligations of leadership seriously. Michael Straight , a key AVC leader, reported to El-
eanor that her son had “established himself as a power in his own right.” 60 FDR, Jr.’s ac-
tions had impressed Straight. He credited FDR, Jr. for having demonstrated leadership 
combined with skill, resolution and judgement at the decisive moment. Joseph Lash , his 
friend and political adviser warned though against his inclinations to become careless 
and arrogant. He pointed out that FDR, Jr.’s charming ways sometimes worked against 
him when he tried to persuade the veterans. Also, he sounded boastful when he took 
the frequent patting on his back too seriously. FDR, Jr. was unable to serve as a unifying 
factor in the convention when he let other delegates force him into a position where he 
became the leader of a faction. His interventions in the caucus were not productive or 
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decisive. Lash sternly warned, “there were many shortcomings that you have to correct 
or one of them may at some point prove fatal….” 61 
On the critical postwar issue of anti-communism FDR, Jr. looked to the Roosevelt 
tradition for guidance. In January 1947, he outlined this interpretation in a foreign 
policy pamphlet for the Americans for Democratic Action, a new liberal group. FDR, 
Jr. proposed a liberal and coherent program to “replace the pre-war catch-as-catch-can-
policy” to establish “total peace” and he called for a role for the United Nations in im-
proving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. FDR, Jr. concluded, 
“opposing communism in the country does not confl ict with maintaining a friendly 
hand in striving for world peace with our ally Russia. If the Russians want communism 
that’s their business but we must work through the United Nations with Russia to secure 
peace.” 62
FDR, Jr. adjusted this idealistic position aft er he spent an instructive day with Ed 
Flynn , his father’s former adviser. Th e experienced New York political leader convinced 
FDR, Jr. that “anti-communism would be the most important issue in American politics 
for the next thirty years.” 63 Th e deteriorating relationship between the United States 
and the Soviet Union helped persuade FDR, Jr. to abandon his “soft  on communism” 
viewpoint. Th e fact that people began to lose faith in the AVC because Communists 
had infi ltrated the organization opened his eyes to his earlier innocence. Th e right-wing 
press denounced the AVC as fellow travelers of Moscow and conservative columnist 
Westbrook Pegler attacked its Committee as a “bunch of reds.” 64
Under these changed political circumstances FDR, Jr. declared that at the 1947 
convention he would favor an anti-Communist and anti-fascist resolution that would 
identify the AVC as a liberal organization. He pointed out that the resolution implied a 
statement of principle and was in no way a beginning of a witch-hunt. Publicly, however, 
FDR, Jr. began to equate Communists with fascists and to denounce their philosophy 
as “perverse.” 65 He argued that these tactics were required to battle this ruthless threat 
because he had “never seen any reason why Communists should be regarded as sacred 
cows and not labeled for what they are and fought for what they represent.” 66 
At the second national AVC convention in Milwaukee the moderates organized 
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themselves in a more disciplined way with help from the anti-Communist International 
Ladies’ Garment Workers Union. FDR, Jr. was credited for accomplishing the nomina-
tion of Chat Patterson as National Commander of the AVC. Time called him “the Jim 
Farley of the Convention.” 67 
Th e climatic confrontation at the 1948 national convention fi nally resolved the issue. 
Months earlier, a federal jury had indicted John Gates, a Communist leader and promi-
nent AVC member. Th e AVC leadership appointed a three-member board, including 
FDR, Jr., to rule on the case. It concluded that Gates was indeed a leader of the Com-
munist Party and opened the case for debate by the delegates on the convention fl oor in 
Cleveland. Aft er heated discussions, the progressive faction lost the struggle and Gates 
was expelled from the AVC. Th e convention adopted an anti-Communist platform that 
included a loyalty pledge stating that all members of the Communist party should be 
purged from the ranks of the AVC. Th e anti-Communist forces retained control of all 
national offi  ces.68 
Years before Senator’s Joseph McCarthy ’s witch hunt, the small AVC met the threat 
head-on and defeated the Communists by means of democratic resolutions and voting 
procedures. Th e victory proved to be a Pyrrhic one. Th e struggle had destroyed the 
AVC’s eff ectiveness and attractiveness. It now faced bankruptcy because its membership 
had been reduced by half. FDR, Jr. ruefully acknowledged, “from a fl owering, inspiring 
group of young Americans, interested in the nation’s welfare, we have become a tat-
tered and torn group.” 69 FDR, Jr. considered the fi ght against the Communist forces 
an “invaluable experience,” that had served as a “marvellous school of politics.” 70 It had 
strengthened FDR, Jr.’s resolve that New Deal liberalism and communism were basi-
cally incompatible and must collide.
President Truman and a majority of the American people, though hesitantly, had 
arrived at the same conclusion. Truman faced a diffi  cult task in continuing postwar re-
lations with the Soviet Union. He had inherited a foreign policy from FDR with ambigu-
ous intentions toward Stalin . Oft en during his fi rst year in offi  ce, Truman resorted to 
second guessing Roosevelt, what FDR would have done. When Stalin tightened his grip 
on Eastern Europe, Truman lacked the military power to react. He talked tough about 
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lumbia University Oral History Collection, New York City, NY (hereaft er cited: CUOHC); “Th e 
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the Russian violation of the Yalta accords but it had little eff ect on the Kremlin. Th e 
division in his administration whether to accommodate or confront the Soviet Union 
illustrated this inconsistent and confusing policy.
Th e early months of 1946 determined Truman ’s subsequent position toward the 
Soviet Union. In February, the Americans interpreted Stalin ’s major speech as a strong 
ideological policy to conquer a Communist world. Truman’s advisers urged the presi-
dent to get tough. In an infl uential telegram from Moscow , State Department adviser 
George Kennan urged the administration to develop a strong policy to contain the ex-
pansion of Stalin’s totalitarian regime. Domestic top-aide Clark Cliff ord advised the 
president to be determined to fi ght an imperialistic Soviet Union.71 
Churchill ’s “Iron Curtain” speech in March 1946 in Truman ’s home state of Mis-
souri signaled another voice for confrontation. Truman’s presence and the location of 
the speech seemed to imply the president’s agreement of the inability to trust Stalin ’s 
intentions. Truman’s evolving hard-line policy disappointed some liberals who still 
thought in terms of antifascist unity and were unwilling to accept a new era of interna-
tional tensions. Foremost among them was Henry Wallace . In September, the Secretary 
of Commerce openly defi ed Truman when he gave a speech that made strong concilia-
tory gestures to the Soviet Union. Th e forced resignation of Wallace gave further am-
munition to Truman’s get-tough attitude.72 
Th e interpretation of the threat of communism also demonstrated the emergence 
of political competition over FDR’s memory within the Roosevelt family. When Elliott 
published As He Saw It in late 1946, the book immediately became controversial not 
only because of Elliott’s method of inventing scenes and dialogue but also because it 
systematically denounced England and favored the Soviet Union. FDR, Jr. took the lead 
in criticizing the fi rst book on their father. He opposed Elliott’s interpretation of FDR’s 
secret negotiations with Stalin and Churchill and denounced Elliott’s political convic-
tions in a tense exchange of letters. In the midst of the Cold War debate, FDR, Jr. be-
came afraid that the content of Elliott’s bestseller might damage his political ambitions. 
Secretly, he provided columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop the ammunition to write a 
damaging review of his brother’s book.73
As He Saw It underlined the accommodation message that Wallace put forth. El-
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liott began publicly to support his father’s former vice president. He criticized liberals 
for their obsession with anti-communism. Elliott pointed out that the mayor threat of 
destroying his father’s heritage was the GOP instead of the Communists. A divided lib-
eral community only played in the hands of the Republicans. Labor unions and liberal 
groups such as the AVC had started to expel Communists and popular fronters from 
their organizations. Republicans took advantage of the split in the liberal movement. 
Th ey branded Wallace and his supporters as Communists and members of the Popular 
Front. In populous urban states where Wallace had a large following, Democratic can-
didates were caught between the two opposing wings of their party. In California, State 
Chairman James Roosevelt frantically attempted to unite Democrats who were torn 
between a conservative wing and a pro-Wallace faction.74
Split in the Liberal Movement
As the administration’s stand toward Russia hardened, American rhetoric escalated and 
anti-communism became also a domestic issue. In December 1946, Wallace supporters 
established the Progressive Citizens of America (PCA ). Th ey announced a bold liberal 
domestic program and an idealistic foreign policy that emphasized a friendly approach 
to the Soviet Union.75 
Anti-Communist liberals reacted within a week. United by the communist threat 
and by the disgust of Wallace , a group of four hundred liberals convened in early Janu-
ary 1947 in Washington, D.C. to found the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA ), a 
national lobby group for liberal legislation. Former New Dealers like Leon Henderson 
and Ken Galbraith , FDR, Jr., Minneapolis mayor Hubert Humphrey , labor leaders as 
Walter Reuther and David Dubinsky , journalists like Joseph and Stewart Alsop , and 
James Wechsler also wanted to use the organization to represent their appeal of anti-
Communist progressivism.76
Th e ADA exemplifi ed an alternative form of liberalism, expressed negatively as “lib-
eralism free from any Communist ties.” In its founding statement the ADA unequivo-
cally rejected communism as “hostile to the principles of freedom and democracy….” 77 
Its basic principles called for the defense and extension of the New Deal , the protection 
of civil liberties in domestic policy and opposition to communism and fascism in for-
eign policy. It practiced liberalism in the center of the political spectrum because the 
ADA believed that liberalism was not a fi xed dogma but a pragmatic faith that needed 
to be applied depending on the needs of the time. Historian and ADA hard-liner Arthur 
Schlesinger strongly objected to the Communist success in confusing and immobilizing 
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the American left . In 1949 he would elaborate on these ADA principles in his book Th e 
Vital Center.78 
For FDR, Jr. the ADA also became another way to defend the New Deal . Th e disas-
ter of the 1946 elections and Truman ’s incapacity to provide visionary leadership had 
prompted some liberals to unite to distinguish themselves from the Democratic admin-
istration. Th e presence of FDR, Jr. and Eleanor at the meeting identifi ed the ADA with 
that prevailing anti-Truman sentiment. Over the opposition of some members, FDR, Jr. 
became vice president of the new organization. Executive secretary James Loeb told a 
friendly reporter not to emphasize FDR, Jr.’s name because delegates had admonished 
him that a high-profi le position for the “glamourboy” with his jet-set reputation would 
seriously impede fundraising for the ADA.79 
Despite the demonstrated unity in the ADA ’s hostility toward communism, the dis-
cussion over the organization’s role in politics and its relationship to the Democratic 
Party could not be resolved initially. Labor leaders and a small group of intellectuals 
preferred the ADA to remain a lobby group with no heavy involvement in politics that 
would provide guiding (liberal) principles for both parties.80 At the meeting FDR, Jr. 
asserted that the ADA should abstain from any third-party movement because its pro-
gressive ideas would be valued most in the Democratic Party. He agreed with former 
New Dealers that the ADA should function as a political pressure group based on FDR’s 
program. Th e organization should also address new controversial social issues such as 
civil rights to steer the Democratic Party in a liberal direction.81 He hoped that the ADA 
thereby could become a “New Deal Government in exile.” 82 
Th e PCA had also adopted the New Deal program to save it from Republican at-
tacks and an indiff erent Truman administration, but clashed bitterly with the ADA 
over cooperation with Communists in the domestic fi eld and with the Soviet Union in 
foreign policy. Th e PCA considered themselves champions of the entire liberal move-
ment of the political left . It believed that the ADA was “obsessed with the Communist 
problem to the neglect of all the great fascist and war-making forces which are the real 
enemy of liberals.” 83 
Th e party’s key issue was to continue FDR’s conciliatory foreign policy toward the 
Soviet Union. Th is course, however, became increasingly unpopular as events in Europe 
in the spring of 1947 set Truman on an inevitable path to contain communism. Great 
Britain told the administration that they could no longer aff ord to supply economic aid 
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to Greece and Turkey. Th is message set off  alarm bells within the Truman administra-
tion. Apocalyptic scenarios doomed of Soviet domination of the Mediterranean and the 
strategic oil-producing countries in the Middle East. Th e experiences of Stalin ’s hostile 
and suspicious attitude and the anxiousness to stand fi rm motivated Truman to decide 
to take over the burden from the British. 
In a speech to Congress on 12 March Truman took the case of global commitments 
to the American people. He boldly declared to provide economic and military aid to 
all countries that felt threatened by Communist Russia. Th ree months later in June the 
administration followed up the so-called Truman Doctrine with the Marshall Plan to 
further protect American interests in Europe and the Middle East. Th e humanitarian 
program off ered fi nancial aid to European nations to rebuild their shattered economies. 
It also aimed to dilute the attractiveness of communism on the continent by committing 
them strategically and politically to the United States. Truman’s policies during the fi rst 
six months of 1947 were major steps in the emergence of the Cold War and also made 
anti-communism the core issue in the Democratic Party.84
FDR, Jr. illustrated the ambivalent reaction of the ADA liberals toward the Tru-
man Doctrine. He approved the program’s goals because the ADA’s endorsement would 
protect the New Deal program from redbaiting by the Republicans. At the ADA na-
tional convention in late March, FDR, Jr. subscribed to the urgency of anti-Communist 
measures. He told the meeting that if the United Nations did not act or was not strong 
enough to carry out military aid to Turkey or Greece, the United States should work 
unilaterally. FDR, Jr. resolutely declared that the national interest now dictated a less 
principled stand, “while liberals did not like providing aid to regimes that were not 
democratic, they had to hold their noses and give it.” 85 He did express concern about its 
fl awed procedures. At a press conference aft erwards, FDR, Jr. endorsed the administra-
tion’s loyalty program to investigate federal employees and ban fascist and Communist 
members from the executive branch, but he assailed attacks on the character of govern-
ment offi  cials.86 
Th e PCA did not swallow their reservations and condemned the Truman Doctrine. 
It warned that the aggressive, militaristic, and provocative policy would make it impos-
sible to cooperate with the Soviet Union, bypassed the United Nations, and escalated 
the confl ict to a global scale. Th e Marshallplan led to a fi nal split between the ADA and 
the PCA. It became a perfect way for the ADA to isolate the PCA and expose the organi-
zation’s subservience to Communist domination.87 FDR, Jr. triumphantly remarked to 
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fellow AVC and ADA member Barney Taylor in July 1947 that the program indicated a 
political dilemma for Wallace . He analyzed, “… for if he [Wallace] favors it he is backing 
Truman’s foreign policy, and if he opposes it he will prove even more conclusively in the 
eyes of the general public … that he is a stooge for Russia.” 88 
FDR, Jr. predicted that within six months Wallace would “kill himself off .” Wal-
lace initially endorsed the European recovery program but quickly rejected it when the 
Soviet Union refused to participate, as another attempt of Truman to isolate Russia. 
Th e ADA rallied to support the administration and offi  cially denounced the third party 
challenge. In a speech to the New Jersey chapter in March 1947, FDR, Jr. had spelled out 
the goal to counter Wallace’s popularity. Without mentioning him by name, he stated 
that the ADA had to “preserve the American democracy by exposing all totalitarianism 
in domestic movements.” 89 
Th e ADA took the initiative to wage an open fi ght at state level. FDR, Jr. reported 
to James though that at the moment there would be no personal attacks on Wallace 
nor had he been asked to lead this national strategy.90A few months later in November, 
aft er Wallace had announced his candidacy for the 1948 presidential election, the ADA 
opened an all-out attack on the popular front. 
Instead of fading into obscurity, Wallace and the PCA gained strength. In Feb-
ruary 1948, their prospects received an enormous boost aft er popular front candidate 
Leo Isaacson unexpectedly triumphed in a four-way contest to occupy a Congressional 
seat from the Bronx in New York City. A shocked FDR, Jr. now worried that the ap-
peal of Wallace’s movement would hand the Republicans an easy victory in November 
and virtually ensure an end to his father’s program. He stepped up the attack. Th e fol-
lowing month, FDR, Jr. issued a dramatic statement in which he made clear that the 
“Th ird Party candidate in no conceivable way refl ects or inherits the liberal objectives 
and principles of my late father.” 91 He called for liberal unity and accused Wallace of 
confusing and dividing the country in a moment of world crisis by taking Communist 
support for granted.92 
In February, the Cold War had heated up when Communists took over the Czecho-
slovakian government and the negotiations between the former allies over the unifi ca-
tion of Germany broke down. It suggested the need for consensus around the admin-
istration’s foreign policy of containment.93 Every member of the Roosevelt family now 
was actively engaged in this campaign to discredit Wallace and to take issue with his 
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claim that he had inherited FDR’s mantle. Eleanor Roosevelt condemned the third par-
ty assumptions in her “My Day” columns, while James and Anna strongly denounced 
Wallace’s assertions. Even Elliott now declined to support this third party candidacy.94 
In this campaign the Roosevelt family demonstrated a united front but this was one 
of the few times in the immediate postwar years they actually agreed on a concerted 
course of action. 
The President’s Committee on Civil Rights 
Th e issue of civil rights became another battleground of fi erce postwar political com-
petition on the interpretation of FDR’s record. Th e country’s habits of racial segrega-
tion went back to its seventeenth-century century origins. Between 1890 and 1910 white 
southerners had built a pervading system of legal segregation where white and black 
people were strictly separated by law. In the North circumstances were somewhat bet-
ter, but there still existed a de facto segregation that rigidly divided black and white 
neighborhoods. 
During the depression FDR had assigned a low priority to the eradication of the rac-
ist segregation laws. FDR did not feel compelled to act and refused to commit himself on 
the issue. He feared that by taking a defi nitive stand on the issue he would endanger the 
electoral and congressional coalition that supported his New Deal programs.95 Eleanor 
had been openly sympathetic to the protection of civil rights of minorities. She and 
many other activists became increasingly irritated by FDR’s indecision to formulate a 
policy in this fi eld. FDR demurred because he had to take care not to tax the ability of 
the Democratic Party “to carry water on both shoulders” and maintain the votes of the 
blacks and liberals as well as the southerners.96 
World War II forced FDR to abandon his approach of procrastination. Since the 
early 1940s African-Americans had migrated en masse to northern cities to replace the 
soldiers in the war production factories. Th eir votes and plights became the center of 
political attention. Th e New Deal programs that off ered work to blacks created an en-
during tie between FDR and black voters. Th is Democratic allegiance replaced the Re-
publicans as the traditional party of civil rights. Black leaders insisted on receiving full 
democratic recognition. Led by A. Philip Randolph, union leader of the Brotherhood of 
Sleeping Car Porters, black activists successfully threatened with a march on Washing-
ton in 1941 to pressure FDR to establish a Federal Employment Practice Commission. 
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Cornered by the demands for full integration, FDR gave in to create the FEPC . 
Th ough it had no permanent status and a limited impact, its establishment signaled a 
symbolic crack in the system of economic, political and social segregation. Th e struggle 
for civil rights had now become a national political issue. In 1944, Gunnar Myrdal ’s 
bestseller An American Dilemma, heightened the awareness of the issue. Th e Swedish 
sociologist did a moral appeal on the white population and demonstrated the striking 
gap between their ideal of equality and practice of racist segregation.97
Th e issue turned even more volatile under President Truman . He faced new ex-
plosive political realities that undermined the racial status quo. World War II and the 
ensuing fi ght against discrimination overseas had raised the expectations of the black 
population for a “Double Victory.” Black servicemen insisted on equal rights for their 
sacrifi ces in the military. Th e outburst of racial violence against black veterans in the 
south aft er the war, however, dashed these hopes and shocked Truman. Th e foreign 
Communist threat also heightened the political saliency of the issue. Th e battle against 
racial discrimination became part of the struggle against communism. Under pres-
sure from the emerging Cold War and the United Nations’ promise for human rights, 
Truman linked the need for racial domestic reforms directly to the ability to lead the 
anti-Communist coalition abroad. He was aware of the impact the racial problems had 
on the worldwide image of America and feared the ammunition it provided for Com-
munist slogans.
Aft er Congress failed to legislate on a permanent FEPC , Truman established a Pres-
idential Committee on Civil Rights on 5 December 1946 to provide him with recom-
mendations on the issue.98 In his eff ort to capture the liberals’ imagination Truman 
appointed FDR, Jr. as a member. Walter White , the NAACP leader, had recommended 
him to the administration.99 
At thirty-two, FDR, Jr. was the youngest member of the commission and an obvi-
ous symbol for continuity with the New Deal era. Yet, he had also demonstrated an 
independent commitment to the civil rights issue. Within the AVC FDR, Jr. had not 
only publicly supported proposals for a FEPC , but had also integrated its’ chapters and 
meetings. Despite the fact that he faced the same paralyzing political realities of a fun-
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damentally divided Democratic Party, Truman rather than FDR rose to the occasion in 
the controversial fi eld of civil rights. Th e mandate and composition of the commission 
refl ected his genuine interest. Th e commission’s broadly assigned task was to examine 
the problems of race relations and “to provide the Justice Department with tools to do 
the job.” 100 
Truman had selected independent and moderate commission members who were 
willing to consider racial reforms. Chaired by Charles Wilson , president of General 
Electric, the prestigious committee counted fourteen liberal-minded members includ-
ing African Americans, Jews, Catholics, labor and business leaders, college presidents, 
lawyers and women. Aft er a formal meeting with President Truman at the White House 
on 15 January 1947 the committee began its task of launching an ambitious program 
to survey the entire spectrum of race relations. It held ten meetings between January 
and September 1947. Th e members consulted numerous civil rights groups, federal 
agencies and individuals, interviewed Cabinet offi  cials, and organized hearings to hear 
witnesses.101 
At the second full-committee meeting in mid-February, three subcommittees were 
set up. One group would study the adequacy of existing federal legislation and the sec-
ond committee the social, economical, and educational aspects of the problem. FDR, Jr. 
participated in the third subcommittee that focused upon “the related aspects of the civ-
il rights problem and explore the organizations, membership and statutes of the groups 
operating against the minorities and civil rights.” 102 
Th e illness of its chairman, civil liberties attorney Morris Ernst , and the conspicu-
ous absence of FDR, Jr. hampered its progress. FDR, Jr. felt unable to attend most of the 
committee bi-weekly sessions because he had also engaged himself in the AVC conven-
tion, political speechmaking and legal business. He left  the tedious work of technical 
detail to other members of the committee and its staff .103 Despite missing the fi rst eight 
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meetings, FDR, Jr. did attend the crucial decision meetings in Hanover, New Hamp-
shire at the end of June. Fellow-members appreciated his engaging participation in the 
discussions and deliberations. Th e common sense, good judgement and wisdom of FDR, 
Jr.’s remarks led executive secretary Robert Carr to admit, “your absence from earlier 
meetings is now completely forgiven.” 104 
At Hanover the recommendations for the draft  version of the report were to be 
decided. Th e committee reached a quick agreement on most issues. It recommended 
anti-lynching and anti-poll tax legislation and urged a major role of the federal govern-
ment in guaranteeing civil rights. At the last meeting on 12 September the commission 
decided on the fi nal wording of the report. Th e members spent the most time heatedly 
debating two key issues that shaped the character of the fi nal report. 
FDR, Jr.’s subcommittee had dealt with the question of how to deal with segrega-
tion in the educational system. Morris Ernst strongly argued for a frontal attack on 
the “Jim Crow” system. He proposed to establish standards to deny federal funding to 
institutions that engaged in discrimination. Ernst lectured the committee that they had 
a moral job to do and not to worry about the political feasibility of the controversial 
recommendations they would write. Initially, FDR, Jr. had denounced Ernst’s radical 
measure to use the taxing and spending powers of the federal government to punish or 
reward organizations who practiced discrimination. At the previous meeting in June 
he had stated that the recommendation would do more harm than good.105 Yet, FDR, Jr. 
reversed his stand aft er consultation with a savvy political fi gure. Before the September 
meeting Eleanor persuaded her son that he had made a mistake. FDR, Jr. now argued 
that a strongly worded recommendation of federal sanctions would “put teeth in the 
report.” His change of mind gave the liberal members who supported the proposal the 
crucial vote to adopt it.106 
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Th e other key issue that still had to be agreed upon before publication was the al-
leged anti-Southern bias in the report. Again, FDR, Jr. actively argued for a radical and 
moral report. Moderate members had argued that the draft  version contained a too 
general indictment of the South. Th ey wanted to include more references to and illus-
trations of Northern discriminatory practices. FDR, Jr. refused to weaken the report by 
leaving particular testimonies of Southern policy brutality out of the draft . He argued 
that for a strong and outspoken report the commission needed to risk stepping on some 
toes. He contended that the report should address the “moral issues involved.” 107 
FDR, Jr. became impatient with the moderating sentiment of the Southern mem-
bers. He pointed out, “Now if we are going to fi x it up and doctor this report so carefully 
there will not be any detail for the South to hang their hats on, this report is not going 
to be worth issuing in my opinion.” 108 In the fi nal document the commission compro-
mised. Many references to Southern practices remained though some were phrased less 
sharp and specifi c.
Th e committee presented its report to President Truman on 29 October 1947. Th e 
remarkable document entitled “To Secure Th ese Rights” reiterated the noble Ameri-
can creed of freedom and equality and outlined how the “country had fallen short of 
these promises.” Citing moral, economic and international reasons the report launched 
a frontal assault on racial discrimination and segregation and outlined the key elements 
of post-war racial liberalism. Th e document gave a startling and unsettling picture of 
the cost of racism that included moral erosion, huge economic losses and psychological 
depravation and the threat of the country’s survival in a dangerous world.109 
Th e commission’s program of action stressed the need for the central involvement 
of the federal government to arbitrate civil rights, by guaranteeing equality and safe-
guarding freedom. It boldly issued a new agenda of over thirty recommendations aimed 
at correcting the social evils of discrimination. It proposed laws to end lynching, abolish 
the poll tax, and the establishment of a permanent FEPC , cutting off  federal funds to 
institutions who practiced segregation and the creation of a permanent civil rights divi-
sion in the Justice Department, and it advocated desegregation of the armed services.110 
Th e commission had produced a document that had put civil rights on the political 
agenda as one of the most urgent national issues. Its progressive vision and new liberal 
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orthodoxy undermined the “separate but equal” myth and paved the way for civil rights 
reforms.111 Th e political bombshell message was hailed enthusiastically by minorities 
but segregationist Southerners were up in arms about the fi ndings.
FDR, Jr. felt proud of his service on the committee and of his contribution to the dis-
cussions. Despite that fact that he had been appointed less for his own accomplishments 
than for the connection with the New Deal and his parents, he had played a prominent 
role to help produce the report that was hailed as a breakthrough for a generation be-
cause it established a new agenda and new moral climate.112 For his interpretation of 
the New Deal he had clearly drawn inspiration from Eleanor. It had strengthened his 
commitment to the civil rights issue. FDR, Jr. lauded Truman for advocating a visionary 
program that went well beyond any position his father had ever taken.113 Th e advisory 
commission surpassed the New Deal because they “did not repair what was out of order 
but they found something ideological and inherently wrong: racism.” 114 
Yet, FDR, Jr.’s praise did not signal any overtures or commitment to his father’s 
successor. A week aft er the committee had completed its task Attorney General Tom 
Clark tried to lure FDR, Jr. into accepting a political position in his department. Clark, 
who was no doubt conscious of the magic attached to the Roosevelt name, off ered him a 
position in the civil rights division of the Justice Department. FDR, Jr. politely declined. 
He wrote Clark that he was fl attered by the request but that because of the continuing 
illness of his wife Ethel and the fi nancial responsibilities of his law fi rm he could not 
accept the position.115 
In a special civil rights message to Congress in early February 1948, Truman en-
dorsed the committee’s recommendations. Th is unprecedented bold stand for a presi-
dent impressed liberals. Yet, when Truman refused to send the civil rights bill to Capitol 
Hill FDR, Jr.’s initial enthusiasm about the president’s speech and his promise to de-
segregate the armed services and the Civil Service cooled considerably. Th e legislation, 
where the proposal to penalize segregationist states by withdrawing federal funds had 
already been diluted, had set off  a revolt among Southern states and senators within the 
Democratic Party who feared the demise of the segregation system and the dissolve of 
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their party. To prevent a bolt of the southern states that would endanger his chances 
for reelection in November, Truman deliberately postponed the introduction of a civil 
rights bill until aft er the Democratic convention in July. 
Th ough the president’s careful and cautious course during the spring refl ected the 
political reality of the Democratic Party it disillusioned liberals like FDR, Jr. who had 
expected Truman to follow up with decisive action.116 Since FDR, Jr. was not burdened 
with any political responsibility to successfully guide a legislative agenda through Con-
gress, he could easily take a radical no-compromise civil rights position. More impor-
tantly, Truman’s lack of clear results on the civil rights issue only served to reinforce 
FDR, Jr.’s disdain for his father’s successor. Th is pragmatic approach tied in with FDR, 
Jr.’s existing sentiment of Truman as a poor defender of FDR’s accomplishments. It be-
came a major factor for FDR, Jr. to initiate a dump-Truman movement and use it as a 
stepping stone to run for political offi  ce during the 1948 election.
The Election of 1948
Since FDR, Jr.’s discharge from the Navy observers had started speculating about his 
political future. More and more articles circulated in the press on his activities. During 
1946 and 1947, FDR, Jr. had assembled a New York City-based brain trust that included 
law fi rm colleagues Milton Diamond and Bartley Crum, pollster Lou Harris , Stanley 
Lowell of the Young Democratic Club and Milton Stewart who was associated with the 
local ADA chapter. Th e small coterie frequently discussed the right timing to make the 
move for political offi  ce.117
Early 1948, the resurgence of the Republicans, the challenge of Wallace and Tru-
man ’s unpopularity convinced FDR, Jr. that he had to “get elected this year.” 118 FDR, Jr. 
looked for something to run for in New York City and had eyed a heavily Democratic 
West Side district. In March 1948, he turned to his father’s old allies to secure a nomina-
tion for this congressional seat. FDR, Jr. urged Ed Flynn , Senator Wagner and Governor 
Lehman that they should speak to its current representative. In his overconfi dence he 
instructed Flynn that they should not suggest Sol Bloom ’s retirement but “in case he 
was considering it would he consider me as successor.” 119 In case this ploy failed, FDR, 
Jr. even considered running against the popular front candidate Isaacson in the Bronx. 
Regardless of what district ended up with, he had already assigned Joe Lash as his cam-
paign manager to carefully work out a detailed campaign organization using outside 
manpower of Liberal Party workers, veterans and young people.120
Nothing came of FDR, Jr.’s impulsive scheme, at the moment. Ethel remained 
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strongly opposed to any political ambitions of her husband and FDR, Jr. refused off ers 
from Democratic bosses for the nominations of safe congressional seats in the Bronx 
and Brooklyn.121 Sol Bloom , the chairman of the powerful House Foreign Relations 
Committee saw, obviously, no reason to step aside for the alleged birthright claims of 
the presidential son. 
While FDR, Jr. plotted to get into active politics General Dwight D. Eisenhower 
announced that he would retire as chief of staff  and become president of Columbia 
University. Upon Ike’s alleged availability, political parties seriously began to regard the 
war hero as a possible presidential candidate. FDR, Jr. discussed the possible draft  with 
Lash who had concluded that a Democratic victory could only be won with Eisenhower 
heading the ticket. FDR, Jr. concurred with this strategy. He also realized that Ike’s 
nomination was a long shot and doubted if Eisenhower would accept a draft  unless the 
Republicans nominated fellow military war hero, General Douglas McArthur. 
Th e chances that Truman , who had just stated his willingness to run, could be forced 
to withdraw from the ticket were very slim. Even if the unions succeeded in tactfully 
convincing the president to step down they would be unable to unite the Democratic 
convention around a liberal candidate. FDR, Jr. feared that liberals would be worse off  
aft er a Truman withdrawal because Southerners would then force a conservative can-
didate on the party.122
Lash advised FDR, Jr. to only stress the general’s wisdom and stature of states-
manship which would inspire confi dence in his ability to govern and unite the coun-
try because Ike’s political views were not known publicly. He countered claims that a 
draft  would be considered as pure party politics because “Truman ’s decline at home is 
equaled only by the decline in American prestige throughout the world.” FDR, Jr. spun 
his dump-Truman argument in this way. He claimed that the current circumstances of 
fear and insecurity and Truman’s inability to uphold his father’s programs warranted 
this exceptional appeal to a military hero to defend the New Deal .123 
To James Rowe , a former aide in his father’s administration, FDR, Jr. outlined the 
ideal candidate as “a man who combines vote-getting qualities with a liberal view-
point.” 124 He pointed out that, “while I agree with you that liberals cannot support a 
man solely because he can win an election, it seems to me to be equally true that liber-
als should not support a man who, although he holds the right views, is so lacking in 
other attributes that he will cause a defeat of liberal principles and, having the Wallace 
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vote in mind, will ensure the selection of a reactionary administration and a Congress 
overwhelmingly anti-liberal.” 125
At the end of March, FDR, Jr. abandoned any hope of convincing the administra-
tion when Truman ’s approval ratings plummeted to a mere 36 percent. On 26 March 
he prepared to issue a bold statement that urged the Democratic Party to nominate 
General Eisenhower . Th at morning Truman made a last attempt to refrain FDR, Jr. from 
making the dramatic announcement. Secretary of State George Marshall, who acted on 
orders from the president, had contacted Defense Secretary James Forrestal to confer 
on the situation. Forrestal called Ike and persuaded him to contact FDR, Jr. to warn 
the impatient thirty-four-year-old of the domestic and international consequences his 
statement might have. Eisenhower relayed the message to FDR, Jr. who listened politely 
but refused to back down under pressure.126 
In a press conference at his law offi  ce that aft ernoon FDR, Jr. emphasized that he was 
speaking as “an individual, a veteran, and a citizen,” who was looking for an eff ective 
leader capable of securing the country’s unity and gaining “the confi dence and support 
of all Americans.” 127 FDR, Jr. expressed his hope that the critical world situation, ex-
emplifi ed in the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia would help convince Eisenhower 
of the need to draft  his services again, despite his previous expressed unwillingness to 
be a candidate. FDR, Jr. maintained that he stood on his own feet on this issue. He also 
made it clear that Eisenhower should not be draft ed by political leaders but that average 
citizens should form organizations at grassroots level as to pressure the general that he 
had a duty to serve when called upon by the people in times of crisis.128 
FDR, Jr.’s name appeal and public position as national vice chairman of the ADA , 
made disaff ected and anti-Wallace liberals jump onto the Ike bandwagon as fast as they 
could. Leaders of the Liberal Party in New York State claimed that Eisenhower would 
unify the New Deal liberal-labor coalition and that his coattails would result in a liberal 
Congress.129 Former New Deal politicians, labor leaders of the Congress of Industrial 
Unions (CIO) and powerful organization Democrats like mayors William O’Dwyer of 
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New York, Frank Hague of Jersey City and Cook County chairman Jake Arvey of Chi-
cago joined the boom.130 
Th e drive picked up speed aft er a spring poll demonstrated that Eisenhower topped 
all candidates with 24 percent of the votes as to who would make the best president. 
Southern Democrats also expressed their support. Alabama Senators Lister Hill and 
John Sparkman, Florida Senator Claude Pepper, and Senator John Stennis of Mississippi 
and Governors Th urmond of South Carolina, Laney of Arkansas, and Tuck of Virginia 
resented Truman ’s civil rights program. Th ey believed that Eisenhower would not inter-
fere in the race relations in the South.131
FDR, Jr.’s open rebellion against an incumbent president gave a voice to the restless-
ness and dissatisfaction in the Democratic Party. Many were convinced that Truman 
was unelectable. Th e New Deal coalition seemed fragile. Th ey feared that a Democratic 
defeat at the 1948 presidential election resulted in the dismantling of the accomplish-
ments of the New Deal and FDR.132
FDR, Jr.’s opposition to Truman did not accomplish his goal to create his own politi-
cal base. Liberal magazines like Th e Nation, Progressive and Th e New Republic remained 
cool. Some liberals questioned his motives and beliefs. James Rowe , who had been the 
main author of a memo detailing Truman’s campaign strategy, was disappointed at the 
opportunistic character of FDR, Jr.’s statement. Th e choice of Eisenhower tarnished 
the principled reputation and tradition of liberals and progressives because in the past 
they “could be distinguished in public life by the fact that what a man stood for was 
their only test.” 133 Rowe argued that they did not know where Ike stood on any subject. 
While he cherished no illusions as to the desperation of the frustrated organization 
Democrats who were in dire need of a “winner,” a startled Rowe would not recognize 
that “a man who bears the name of Franklin Roosevelt” could forsake the liberal prin-
ciples of leadership. Rowe urged FDR, Jr. “to stand for something” and to live up to the 
expectations.134 
Rowe was not the only liberal who criticized FDR, Jr.’s impulsiveness and expedi-
ency. Journalist Barry Bingham of the Louisville Courier-Journal expressed a dilemma 
many liberals faced. Bingham agreed that with Eisenhower on the top of the ballot, the 
Democratic Party would greatly enhance the chance to carry the election, elect a liberal 
Congress, and strengthen their foreign policy. He worried, however, about Ike’s willing-
ness to accept and asked FDR, Jr. if he had “any assurance that he would support liberal 
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policies in the domestic fi eld” to unite the country on national issues.135 He reminded 
him that his mother had pointed out that an eff ective foreign policy should go hand in 
hand with a progressive domestic policy.
Based upon what Eisenhower had told Leonard Finder of the Manchester Evening 
Leader FDR, Jr. was convinced that an honest draft  and a grassroots movement would 
persuade Ike to accept the nomination. While he had not talked to Eisenhower, FDR, 
Jr. nonetheless assured the journalist that the general’s basic philosophy was that of 
a “middle of the roader who would fi ght for a liberal domestic policy” and the best 
defense of the New Deal accomplishments against Dewey and Wallace .136 In any event, 
the discussion was largely academic because the Democratic platform could serve as 
Eisenhower’s liberal conscience.137 
Other Democrats disapproved of his tactics. Both Bernard Baruch and Ed Flynn , 
whom FDR, Jr. had called before his announcement to get some feedback, approved of 
his attack on Truman but the New Dealers found that he had marched too far in front of 
the troops. Flynn told him that it had been a mistake to assume that Eisenhower would 
be available as a candidate. His premature announcement had antagonized Democrat-
ic leaders and would make it harder to be accepted.138 To one observer the “unknown 
quality” of Eisenhower’s ideas and the strange coalition supporting FDR, Jr.’s call was 
evidence of “panic born of desperation.” 139 ADA members claimed that he should co-
operate with the administration in order to defeat the Republicans and to isolate Wal-
lace since the conservative Congress should be blamed for the halting of the New Deal 
programs.140 
FDR, Jr. had contacted Walter White to issue a similar statement urging Eisenhower 
to run. White demurred because the fact that the World War II hero “advocated the con-
tinuation of segregation in the armed services came as a horrible shock to Negroes.” 141 
Th e New York World-Telegram columnist derided the Eisenhower boom instigated by 
the Roosevelt sons as “the children’s hour,” while the Chicago Tribune scoff ed at FDR, 
Jr.’s impulsive choice of Eisenhower as “FDR in uniform.” 142 
“Virus E,” as James Rowe nicknamed FDR, Jr.’s appeal for unity also divided the 
Roosevelt family. James and Elliott joined the call of their brother. Despite the pres-
sure put on her by her brothers, Anna refused to endorse Eisenhower in the editorial 
of her Arizona newspaper. She claimed that it would be inadvisable to choose a mili-
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tary man for the presidential offi  ce.143 Eleanor remained conspicuously neutral. FDR, Jr. 
had called in advance to inform his mother of his statement but he had not sought her 
advice. Hubert Humphrey claimed that at several occasions she did discuss a possible 
Eisenhower candidacy.144 
Behind the scenes FDR, Jr. kept in touch with other liberals infected with “Virus 
E” to such an extent his law partners complained about his absence.145 Despite the fact 
that prospects had grown bleaker during April and May, he remained determined. FDR, 
Jr. privately urged an all-out and concerted drive to stop the president since Truman 
seemed to cruise to an easy win on the fi rst ballot at the upcoming convention. He ac-
knowledged though that such a move would be impossible to organize without the help 
of powerful political leaders who remained uncommitted and hesitant.146 Naively, FDR, 
Jr. hoped that ultimately Truman would become convinced to step down and off er the 
nomination to Ike.147 
When Eisenhower issued a statement to clarify his position that he was not a can-
didate for political offi  ce the dump Truman movement came to a halt.148 With Ike out 
of the running and his incapacity to break the resistance of the Democratic machine 
politicians, FDR, Jr. abandoned his quest. In early June, one month before the conven-
tion in Philadelphia, he made clear that he was ready to return to the fold and declared, 
“I am, have been, and shall remain a Democrat. I shall support the candidates, programs 
and decisions of the Democratic convention.” 149 
FDR, Jr. had surprisingly consigned the care of the preservation of the New Deal 
to a World War II hero. Yet, he overreached in his claim that Ike would be the “new 
FDR”. FDR, Jr. appealed to a charming and charismatic fi gure but it turned out that 
he drummed up support for a rock-ribbed conservative. Th e thoughtless acceptance of 
Eisenhower ’s views demonstrated his desire to come out from under the shadow of his 
father. FDR, Jr. hoped to reap the political profi ts by opposing the Democratic Party 
organization, a move that imitated FDR’s way of rising to power. Yet, FDR, Jr.’s new in-
dependence enhanced his reputation for political expediency. Th e draft  movement was 
foremost considered a reckless and ruthless way to dump Truman .
As the Democrats descended upon Philadelphia to hold their fi rst national conven-
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tion since the death of FDR, FDR, Jr.’s call for unity had ironically divided the Demo-
crats even deeper. Th e issue at stake was the ideological course of the party refl ected in 
the fi ght over civil rights. Truman had quietly rounded up the delegates in the Demo-
cratic primaries and secured the support of the party bosses to lock up the nomina-
tion. Although he had adopted the fundamentals of the liberal program, Truman felt 
betrayed by the Eisenhower drive. 
Th e liberal wing of his party continued to undermine Truman ’s position and want-
ed a fi rm commitment on civil rights. A week before the start of the convention, fi ft y 
liberal leaders had called upon the convention to act upon the fi ndings of the Truman 
Civil Rights Committee. FDR, Jr. stated that the adoption of its recommendations was 
“essential to the welfare of the nation.” 150 Over Truman’s opposition, who favored the 
moderate civil rights plank of the 1944 party platform, the insurgent liberals succeed-
ed in winning over a majority of the convention delegates to adopt the report of the 
Committee. Under pressure from an open rebellion, Truman abandoned his careful 
planning. At the end of July, he turned around and issued two executive orders to ban 
discrimination in the federal civil service and in the armed services.151 
Th ese liberal advances beyond the New Deal had sparked the walkout of a number 
of Southern delegations that went on to establish the segregationist Dixiecrat Party. Th e 
press had begun to write the Democrats out of offi  ce. Columnist Drew Pearson could 
triumphantly announce that this signifi ed “the end of the Roosevelt era, the winning 
era for the Democrats.” 152 Overconfi dent Republicans anticipated victory and they se-
lected New York Governor Th omas Dewey as their candidate. Yet, Truman ’s strategy 
to run on the New Deal liberal program was successful. Th e Soviet blockade of Berlin 
and its subsequent allied airlift  underscored the Communist threat and the approval 
of Truman’s containment policies. Th e mild recession in the economy and the drop in 
farm prices during the fall reinforced voters’ inclinations to trust Democrats to handle 
the economy better. Th e lethargic Dewey campaign, which ran a presidential “above-
the-battle-strategy,” had no answer. Th ese hidden advantages that Truman could rely 
on helped him to win the agricultural heartland that cinched the election.153
Th ough Truman made the 1948 election a referendum on his father’s New Deal , 
FDR, Jr. was uncertain about his involvement in the fall campaign aft er he had tried 
to pull the rug out from under the president. James Loeb , ADA ’s executive secretary, 
advised him to work actively for the election of liberal representatives in Congress. He 
assured FDR, Jr. that his involvement would not impede his political future. Loeb in-
formed him that at their Washington, D.C. headquarters, “we are getting all sorts of 
calls, and you are usually no. 1 on the list.” 154 
150. “Press Release, 5 July 1948,” box 146, ibid.
151. Martin, Civil Rights, 86, 89; Patterson, Grand Expectations, 149–151. 
152. NYT, 12 July 1948; Morris Ernst and David Loth, Th e People Know Best: Th e Ballots vs. the 
Polls (Washington, D.C.: Public Aff airs Press, 1949), 87. 
153. Patterson, Grand Expectations, 157–164; Barone, Our Country, 215–220.
154. James Loeb , Jr. to FDR, Jr., 6 August 1948, box 140, FDR, Jr. Papers.







His leading role in the Eisenhower drive did not result in a diminishing popular-
ity on the campaign trail. On the contrary, FDR, Jr. possessed an enormous appeal on 
the stump. He embodied the vivid remembrances of his father’s New Deal era that re-
mained popular, particularly because the party lacked a charismatic national nominee 
who could elect local candidates on his coattails. 
He lended the nostalgia and credibility associated with the Roosevelt name to local 
races that involved Democratic candidates. FDR, Jr. worked out a schedule for national 
and New York State speaking engagements with the Democratic National Committee 
in conjunction with the ADA , the CIO, and local organizations. At a luncheon in Chi-
cago to honor Governor Adlai Stevenson and Senator Paul Douglas, FDR, Jr. invoked 
the memory of his father. He pointed out that FDR’s combination of social vision with 
practical judgement had distinguished him from the far left  and the economic royalists. 
FDR, Jr. prescribed such a New Deal course for the liberal candidates because “social 
progress within the framework of freedom is the only hope of democratic survival.” 155 
He returned in late August to give the keynote address at the Illinois Democratic 
State Convention. In mid-August, gubernatorial candidate Chester Bowles invited FDR, 
Jr. as the main speaker to the Connecticut State Convention. Bowles explicitly asked 
him to sprinkle his address with references to his father. FDR, Jr. agreed to make two 
four-minute records to be played over the Connecticut radio stations. In a voice that 
resembled father’s he endorsed Bowles and praised his proposed housing program.156 In 
his speech, FDR, Jr. also defended the president’s housing and civil rights programs and 
assailed the reactionary record of the Republican Congress.157 
Th e successful addresses in Illinois and Connecticut also prompted Hubert Hum-
phrey to beg a campaign appearance in Minnesota. FDR, Jr. promised the candidate 
for the U.S. Senate to appear in mid-October for two days of vigorous campaigning. 
Humphrey expected no support from Truman because of his role at the convention and 
counted on the Roosevelt name. FDR, Jr.’s eff orts to stump the state on his behalf should 
off set the strategy of Humphrey’s opponents who campaigned with popular vote getters. 
155. FDR, Jr., “Speech To Be Delivered At Luncheon For Adlai Stevenson and Paul Douglas, 12 
June 1948,” box 156, FDR, Jr. Papers; NYT, 26 August 1948.
156. Bowles to FDR, Jr., 3 September 1948 and FDR, Jr. to Bowles, 8 September 1948, box 140; 
Bowles to FDR, Jr., 24 September 1948, box 109, FDR, Jr. Papers.
157. “Keynote Address of FDR, Jr. Democratic Party State Convention, Hartford, Connecticut, 
13 August 1948,” box 156; Chester Bowles to FDR, Jr., 9 August 1948, folder Bowles, Chester, box 
195, ibid.; NYT, 14 August 1948. FDR, Jr. had urged labor leaders and Democratic Party offi  cials 
to pressure their members of Congress to force the bill out of the House Committee where it 
was buried. Th e real estate lobby had delayed the fi nal decision on the measure by “dragging out 
the hearings” to such an extent that he feared such apathy would led the imminent victory slip 
through their fi ngers. Th e fi nal solution for the housing crisis came in the late 1940s when the 
mass market opened for veterans with the GI Bill guaranteed of low-cost loans and the enact-
ment of the 1949 National Housing bill into law. FDR, Jr. to labor leaders and Democratic Party 
offi  cials, 24 May 1948, folder Taft  -Ellender-Wagner bill, box 386, FDR, Jr. Papers; Huthmacher, 
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Th e PCA had brought in Henry Wallace and the Republicans had toured with presiden-
tial hopefuls Dewey and Lodge.158 
FDR, Jr. considered the active participation of the labor unions essential for a 
Democratic victory. He gave special attention to labor because relations between the 
Democratic Party campaign organization and the unions were strained. Th e two main 
labor organizations, the CIO and the AFL remained lukewarm about Truman aft er the 
outcome of the 1946 mid-term elections and their failure to sustain Truman’s veto re-
garding the Taft  -Hartley Act. At times, labor refused the Democratic Party to join in 
sponsoring their rallies. Rather than working for the national ticket, the unions ac-
tively aided the local races of liberal candidates for Congress who favored repealing Taft -
Hartley by supplying manpower, registrating voters and raising money.159 Some unions 
did eagerly await their opportunity to launch an anti-Communist, labor-liberal party 
aft er Truman’s expected defeat in November.
FDR, Jr. urged the party to maintain the closest and friendliest relations with the 
leadership of anti-Communist unions such as Walter Reuther , Emil Rieve, and David 
Dubinsky . He reported to the Democratic National Committee that he felt his appear-
ances and eff orts could contribute to head off  such a move by “binding them [the unions] 
more closely to the Democratic Party.” 160 Th e Truman campaign actively courted labor 
and successfully won their vote by a wide margin at the polls. A recurrence of wartime 
malaria fever in September, however, took FDR, Jr. out of the running.161 He was forced 
to give up all active participation in the campaign. Humphrey advised FDR, Jr. to take 
his time to recuperate fully. He expected a nation-wide defeat for Truman and the lib-
erals. But aft er the election Humphrey claimed, “You’re needed in the aff airs of this 
country.” 162 
In early November, Truman scored an upset victory over Dewey winning 49.6 per-
cent of the vote to Dewey’s 45.1 percent. Th e ratio in the Electoral College was 303 votes 
for the Democrat to 189 votes for the Republican. Th e PCA and the Dixiecrat Party 
gained relatively little support.163 Among Democrats, the result was subject to discus-
sion. In the eyes of FDR supporters Truman had failed to emulate Mr. Big. Th ey argued 
that Truman’s come-from-behind win owed more to the looming shadow of FDR than 
to his personal appeal. Th ey were right to argue that the Democratic coalition formed 
the basis of Truman’s victory. Th e votes from blacks, Jews, Catholics, large cities, work-
ing class, farmers, and labor helped him secure crucial majorities in key states.164
Yet, there is little evidence to credit the interpretation of the close Democratic vic-
158. Hubert Humphrey to FDR, Jr., 30 August 1948, box 140, FDR, Jr. Papers.
159. Alanson Edwards to FDR, Jr., 8 September 1948, box 140, ibid.
160. FDR, Jr. to Alanson Edwards, Speakers Bureau DNC, 9 September 1948, box 140, ibid.
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162. Hubert Humphrey to FDR, Jr., 28 September 1948, box 109, FDR, Jr. Papers; NYT, 23 Sep-
tember 1948.
163. Patterson, Grand Expectations, 161.
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tory as a rebirth of the New Deal as some liberals did.165 Truman succeeded to achieve a 
broad consensus for support on the New Deal and for his activist, anti-Communist for-
eign policies. Th e outcome signaled the voters’ appreciation for Truman’s holding action 
but did not give the new president a mandate for large-scale reform. Th e majority of the 
American voters had decided against the incumbent president. Any new legislation of 
Truman’s Fair Deal ran into a brick wall of the conservative coalition in Congress.166 
Conclusion
FDR, Jr. argued that during the time of his father’s greatest infl uence he had been away 
at Harvard, Law School and in the Navy. Th erefore, FDR had not “infl uenced his future 
very much.” 167 On the contrary, his father’s absence and his unique presidential position 
forced him to deal with the lifelong identifi cation with his parents. In the immediate 
postwar years, the compelling memory of his father continued to run FDR, Jr.’s life and 
drove his ambition to enter politics. Th e crux would be how FDR, Jr. applied the magic 
of the Roosevelt brand name.
FDR, Jr. sought to protect his father’s memory in the postwar political competition 
with rivaling claims on the interpretation of FDR’s record. Th is commitment to the 
Roosevelt tradition set up clashes with President Truman and hostile Republicans in 
Congress. FDR, Jr. rushed to its defense in the public housing issue because he feared 
that Truman lacked the backbone to stand up against Republican proposals to emascu-
late New Deal -type federal programs. Both FDR, Jr. and Truman considered themselves 
as the main interpreters of the New Deal and competed for the status of heir to FDR’s 
throne. Both wanted to defend and extend the New Deal but diff ered on the feasibility to 
do so. FDR, Jr. interpreted his father’s accomplishments to favor a more radical, reform-
minded approach to deal with the postwar problems. Truman interpreted the political 
realities diff erently. He concluded that he needed to maneuver more cautiously in an era 
of increasing international tension, liberal confusion, rising conservatism and domestic 
wariness about the involvement of the federal government in people’s lives. 
In the President’s Committee on Civil Rights FDR, Jr. worked to continue the lib-
eral spirit of his parents on the issue. During the late 1940s, FDR, Jr. realized that part 
of the system needed to be fi xed because the racist structure of segregation denied fun-
damental opportunities and rights to the black minority. He acted in the spirit of the 
New Deal to use the federal government to produce equal economic opportunities for 
minorities.
165. Kirkendall, “Election of 1948,” 3144.
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When domestic communism threatened the accomplishments of his father, FDR, 
Jr. helped beat off  the attacks of Henry Wallace and his Popular Front supporters. De-
spite initial doubts he fought communists and fellow travelers to regain control over the 
American Veterans Committee. Th e fi ght with his father’s former vice president and 
FDR, Jr.’s experiences in the AVC and ADA made him an ardent anti-Communist Cold 
War liberal.Th e immediate postwar years taught FDR, Jr. how to cope with the respon-
sibilities as the guardian of his father’s place in history.
FDR, Jr. distinguished himself not only as the defender of his father’s memory. More 
important, he wanted to profi t politically from his trusteeship to fulfi ll the promise of 
his birthright. As heir apparent, FDR, Jr. felt the tremendous weight of private and pub-
lic expectations and he used his claim on memory to build a political career. He plotted 
to get into active politics by using the opportunities to sell the prestige of his name. Th is 
notion of entitlement meant opposing President Truman and the policies of his admin-
istration in issues such as public housing and as co-founder of the ADA , the “New Deal 
Government in exile.” 
FDR, Jr.’s individual ambition also led to the fl awed Eisenhower draft  in which he 
emulated the model of his father to create a political base by opposing the unpopular 
Truman and the establishment of the Democratic Party. Th is failed miserably because 
he demonstrated expediency rather than an FDR-type vision of national interest. FDR, 
Jr. continued to look for opportunities to run for offi  ce aft er the 1948 election.
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Th e day aft er the election FDR, Jr. left  on a business trip for Europe to visit the Nether-
lands and Belgium. In his diary he expressed joy over the Democratic victory. Th rough-
out 1948, FDR, Jr. had plotted the right timing of his run for offi  ce but in early Novem-
ber he confi ded to his diary that he hedged on his political plans.1 Th is hesitation was 
prompted by a crisis in his marriage. Ethel maintained that his ambition and selfi shness 
had hurt his family. FDR, Jr.’s political preoccupation reinforced her feelings of neglect. 
Ethel had never gotten used to the standard of public service instilled in the Roosevelt 
family. When FDR, Jr. had gone off  to war Ethel stayed in the White House all by herself. 
Th at was not easy to do, recalled Trude Lash , a close friend of Eleanor, “particularly with 
a mother-in-law who took it for granted that everybody worked.” 2
Th e marriage had disintegrated rapidly aft er the war. In September 1948, FDR, Jr. 
moved out of their house. Milton Diamond , his law partner off ered him accommoda-
tion in his New York City apartment.3 FDR, Jr. stressed that this was a temporary situ-
ation, to comply with Ethel ’s request to think things over. He attempted to preserve his 
family and to accommodate his wife. FDR, Jr. admitted that because of his immaturity 
and lack of understanding he had been “a diffi  cult person to be married to.” 4 He still 
loved her and he tried to persuade her that the messy situation was unnecessary. 
Ethel , who had increasingly fallen ill with paranoia attacks, gave little opportunity 
for reconciliation. She told her husband that she had not felt any aff ection for him since 
1941. She claimed that FDR, Jr. had treated her with extreme mental cruelty. Ethel told 
her lawyer she had hired a bodyguard to protect her because she was afraid that he 
would hurt her physically. He had been a bad infl uence on their children. Aft er FDR, 
Jr. had spent an innocent weekend with his sons Frank and Chris on their farm, Ethel 
1. Entry 8 November 1948, folder FDR, Jr. Diary, 8 November 1948 – 6 October 1951, box 418, 
FDR, Jr. Papers, FDRL.
2. Author interview with Mrs. Trude Lash , 1 July 1998, Menemsha, Martha’s Vineyard, 
Massachusetts.
3. Interview with John S. Stillman by Owen Bombard, New York City, November 1949, 4, Co-
lumbia University Oral History Collection, New York City (hereaft er cited: CUOHC).
4. FDR, Jr. to Files, 14 February 1949, folder 4, drawer 4, envelope 6, box 419, FDR, Jr. Papers.







accused him of setting the children up against her and that he was “practically raping 
the children.” Th ese irrational fears led the lawyers involved in the case to conclude 
that Ethel’s condition required psychiatric treatment. In mid-January, Ethel and FDR, 
Jr. fi nally agreed to a permanent separation. Th ey continued to argue for two months in 
an acrimonious atmosphere over the custody of the children and the division of their 
assets, the house, wedding presents, and Roosevelt memorabilia.5 
On 7 April Ethel traveled to Reno, Nevada to establish residency of six weeks to fi le 
for divorce. She quickly left  for a small town to elude the newsmedia. Th is was unsuc-
cessful and her lawyer had to request the inevitable journalists to “treat the story with 
decorum,” because “it involved a future President of the United States.” Ethel obtained 
her divorce on 21 May.6 Aft er the divorces of Anna , James , and Elliott (twice), FDR, 
Jr.’s break-up was the fi ft h in the Roosevelt family.
Tammany Hall 
Ironically, on the day that Ethel arrived in Nevada, FDR, Jr. offi  cially announced his 
candidacy for Congress in New York City. FDR, Jr. indicated that the dramatic divorce 
helped clear the path for his political self-advancement.7 During the early months of 
1949, FDR, Jr. had unleashed his political ambition. He was very eager to be in the middle 
of things and over dinners he discussed politics with friends who expressed confi dence 
that he would fulfi l the high expectations. Aft erwards they played ginrummy and poker 
for money. Th e coterie egged FDR, Jr. on to run for offi  ce, even overexcited him with the 
prospect of becoming the candidate for the US Senate in the fall where he could take on 
Th omas Dewey , the then likely Republican candidate. FDR, Jr. consulted old advisers of 
his father on his intention to run for Governor at the end of the year. Th ey counseled 
him to be patient. He had a career of great promise and ability before him but Albany 
came too early.8 Nothing came of the match-up with his father’s former adversary ei-
5. FDR, Jr. to Ethel , 15 January; 6 and 14 February 1949; F. J. Wolf (Lawyer FDR, Jr.) to Files, 
17 December 1948, 13 and 31 January 1949, all in folder 4, drawer 4, envelope 6, box 419, FDR, Jr. 
Papers; Entry 7 January 1949, folder FDR, Jr. Diary, 8 November 1948 – 6 October 1951, box 418, 
FDR, Jr. Papers; “Complaint,” Plaintiff  Ethel DuPont Roosevelt vs FDR, Jr., Defendant, 21 May 
1949, Nevada folder 2, drawer 4, envelope 6, box 419, FDR, Jr. Papers. 
6. FDR, Jr. to A.K. Bullen, 14 March 1949, folder 4, drawer 4, envelope 6, box 419, FDR, Jr. 
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box 68, Anna Roosevelt Halsted Papers, FDRL; “FDR’s Foes Are Laying for Junior,” Washington 
Post, 29 May 1949; Wesley Price, Jr., “Th at Man, Jr.,” Saturday Evening Post, 24 September 1949, 
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7. Interview with John S. Stillman by Owen Bombard, November 1949, 9, CUOHC.
8. Lou Harris to FDR, Jr., 8 January 1949, folder Politics-Upstate New York (Confi dential), box 
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Erik van den Berg BW.indd   112 27-Jan-06   13:58:46 PM
Heir Apparent 113
ther because Dewey stayed on as New York Governor and John Foster Dulles became 
the Republican candidate. 
In early March 1949, Sol Bloom had suddenly died. Th e infl uential Congressman 
from Manhattan’s West Side had been a staunch New Dealer and a representative for 
twenty-six years of the twentieth congressional district. Aft er Bloom’s funeral, the rebel 
district leader, Robert Blaikie inquired of FDR, Jr. if he would accept the Democratic 
nomination if off ered. FDR, Jr. said he would. Th e general feeling among his friends 
was that FDR, Jr. was mature enough to run for Bloom’s old seat. Th ey considered him 
well informed politically, intellectually bright and liberal.9 FDR, Jr. expected that Tam-
many Hall would give him the nomination for Bloom’s seat. If the bosses were to deny 
him his birthright he would run as an independent reformer.
FDR, Jr. was so confi dent of his ability to run on his name that he already had prom-
ised to Alex Rose , the leader of the Liberal Party to accept its endorsement. Rose had 
recognized the potential of FDR, Jr. and the magic of his name early on. He was also a 
savvy political strategist who moved quickly to strengthen the position of the Liberal 
Party. He publicly announced that if the Democrats would nominate someone else, the 
Liberals would run FDR, Jr. anyway. Th is was no idle threat because aft er the anti-Com-
munists had broken away from the American Labor Party in the late 1930s and founded 
the Liberal Party, they held the balance of power in New York City politics. Since neither 
the Democrats nor the Republicans were able to win a majority, the endorsements of the 
Liberal Party in the 1940s usually meant victory for the candidate who received their 
backing.10 
FDR, Jr. conferred with Hugh Rogers to force the hand of the Tammany Hall leader. 
Th e boss of the political machine held a tight grip on the selection of the candidates and 
FDR, Jr. hoped that the pressure of the Liberal endorsement produced the approval for 
the Democratic nomination. Rogers was far from enthusiastic about being cornered 
by the president’s son. He told FDR, Jr. that “he was playing with the wrong crowd.” 11 
Rogers stated that he was not interested in statesmen only in politicians to represent the 
district. Tammany’s opposition and Alex Rose ’s persuasion cinched his decision to run 
and FDR, Jr. plunged ahead. On 15 March FDR, Jr. announced his candidacy.12
9. Entries FDR, Jr., 2, 3, 4 and 8 January 1949, folder FDR, Jr. Diary, 8 November 1948 – 6 Oc-
tober 1951, box 418, FDR, Jr. Papers; James Lanigan to ER , 7 March 1949, folder Lanigan, James 
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Interview #5, with Ben Davidson by Ed Edwin, New York City, 17 August 1977, 251, CUOHC.
10. Price, “Th at Man, Jr.,” Saturday Evening Post, 24 September 1949, 31 in Personality Clippings 
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11. ER to Henry Morgenthau , 4 May 1949, folder Roosevelt, FD, Jr., box 806, Henry Morgen-
thau, Jr. Papers, FDRL.
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Th e twentieth district was bounded by Central Park on the East Side and the Hud-
son River on the West Side, and stretched from West 26th street in shabby Chelsea to 
the illustrious Columbia University on West 116th Street. It inhabited a cross-section of 
the American population mixing Jewish, Italian, Black, Greek, Irish, Puerto Rican and 
Polish groups. Th e fi ve hundred thousand residents of the district lived in buildings 
ranging from slums to luxury dwellings.13
Th e nomination developed into a struggle between FDR, Jr.’s supporters who be-
lieved he should be selected as a tribute to the memory of his father and local Democrats 
who argued that the candidate should come from the district.14 Since there was no 
regular primary in a special election, the only way for FDR, Jr. to pressure Tammany to 
nominate him was picking up endorsements.15 He tapped into the reservoir of Demo-
crats loyal to his parents. Th ey formed an independent committee of enrolled Demo-
crats to support FDR, Jr. Members included FDR offi  cials such as speechwriter Robert 
Sherwood, chairman of the National Labor Relations Board Lloyd Garrison, former 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau , Jr., chairman of the Democratic National 
Committee Frank Walker, and adviser Anna Rosenberg.16 Senator Wagner, Mayor O’ 
Dwyer and Herbert Lehman also endorsed FDR, Jr. Th e former governor, who was one 
of the most infl uential state party members, was confi dent that his character and ability 
would serve him well on Capitol Hill.17 
FDR, Jr. successfully secured union support to put together a liberal and labor co-
alition. On his behalf supporters established an independent Four Freedoms party to 
attract union workers who did not wish to vote for the Liberal Party. Louis Hollander, 
New York State president of the CIO, called FDR, Jr. “one of the most labor-minded 
and liberal persons in the city.” 18 Nostalgic advertisements portrayed him as the “labor 
candidate … who can best carry on the labor tradition and the Roosevelt tradition ….” 19 
interested in statesmen only in politicians.” Th ereupon, FDR, Jr. decided to seek “Mr. Bloom’s 
place even if I had to run on a laundry ticket,” New York Times, 13 April 1949 (hereaft er NYT). 
Th e account of Lilian de Sales, FDR, Jr.’s private secretary also pointed to the role of Tammany’s 
opposition in his decision to run. She recalled the agonizing aft ernoon in his offi  ce when FDR, 
Jr. reached the decision to run: “I can remember him sitting and just thinking and thinking. I do 
know that when he went to the funeral of Representative Sol Bloom, who was such a devoted fol-
lower of his father, of course, he had no idea of running. But at the funeral a reporter asked him 
if he would run, and he came back to the offi  ce and thought and thought. Th e thing that cinched 
it was the news that Tammany was against him. Th at made him want to fi ght and win.” Tex Mc-
Crary and Jinx Falkenburg, “New York Close-Up,” New York Herald Tribune, 26 September 1949, 
in Clippings Files, box 144, DNC Records, JFKL.
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14. NYT, 20 March 1949.
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16. NYT, 17 March 1949.
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Th e party was also placed on the ballot as an incentive to rebel Democrats who could 
use it to vote for FDR, Jr. Robert Blaikie gave a ringing endorsement of FDR, Jr.’s claim 
on memory. Th e insurgent Tammany district leader declared that “the things his father 
stood for, were the things the majority of the people in this area stood for, and there is 
no one that I know of who can bear the Roosevelt banner with the same distinction, 
and with the same assurance of progressive support of the Truman administration as 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.” 20 FDR, Jr. assumed that the emulation of his father’s outspo-
ken coalition would make Tammany jump on the bandwagon. Some maintained that 
the New Deal assembly of labor unions, liberals, former administration offi  cials and 
Young Democrats “could have elected a well-behaved horse.” 21
Yet, it did nothing to impress Tammany Hall . Aft er a fi nal meeting with FDR, Jr. on 
22 March Rogers followed suit. Th e Tammany chief referred to FDR, Jr. as a “nice boy 
who would make a good candidate,” but that the nomination should go to a resident 
of the twentieth district.22 Th is obviously was meant to exclude FDR, Jr. who (legally) 
lived on a fashionable estate in Woodbury, Long Island. FDR, Jr. denounced the resi-
dence excuse as “phony.” He noted that in 1948 in a neighboring district, Tammany had 
nominated Paul O’ Dwyer, the mayor’s brother, as the Democratic candidate, “although 
he was a non-resident of the area.” 23 Moreover, the New York election law stipulated 
that a candidate could establish his residency in the district before the day of election. 
Th e residency argument served only to conceal a political scheme concocted by the 
Tammany leadership. Th ey foresaw a fi erce four-way battle in the district between the 
Roosevelt Liberals, the American Labor Party, the Republican Party, and the Demo-
cratic Party. Tammany was confi dent to pick up the seat while the other three parties 
would squabble over leavings.24 
What really drove their rejection was the belief that FDR, Jr.’s entitlement as a presi-
dential son did not earn him the nomination. Opponents called FDR, Jr. a carpetbagger 
and an interloper whose “connection with the district seems to be very obscure and in-
direct.” 25 Tammany feared his independence and inability to control him. When FDR, 
Jr. announced that he would run as an independent on the ticket of the Liberal Party 
regardless of the decision by the Democrats, Tammany felt entitled to name its own can-
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didate. On 25 March Municipal Court Justice Benjamin Shalleck received its blessing to 
run on the Democratic ticket. 
FDR, Jr. reasoned that if he backed down now under pressure from Tammany, his 
political career would be fi nished. FDR, Jr. drew inspiration from the memory of FDR. 
He stated that the new circumstances gave him an opportunity to start a “political ca-
reer in the face of opposition from Tammany Hall as my Father did many years ago.” 26 
Tammany’s solid reputation for corruptness and its association with leaders of the un-
derworld served as the perfect legitimization for FDR, Jr. to run as a reformer against 
the vested interests.27 
Founded in 1789, the Society of Saint Tammany established itself as a social club, 
sponsored festivities, and organized parties at their headquarters, Tammany Hall in 
New York City. When the urban population in the late 19th century and early decades 
of the 20th century dramatically increased, Tammany fi lled a void left  by a non-exist-
ing welfare state. Tammany performed social services for its members that varied from 
building sewers, paving streets and building homes to providing jobs, running schools 
and improving living conditions in general. Tammany manipulated the system to es-
tablish an, oft en corrupt, reward network that derived favors from Democratic organi-
zation politicians in return for votes. By the end of the century the political machine 
established control over the Democrats so completely that at the turn of the century 
they were looked upon as almost indistinguishable.
It was not until FDR assumed the Presidency that Tammany suff ered a series of 
crippling blows. FDR had learned aft er his defeat at the hands of Tammany in the 1910s 
that he needed to cooperate with the local machine. He recognized that he depended in 
national elections on the organization’s ability to get out the vote. Th rough intermediar-
ies as Ed Flynn and James Farley , FDR set out to court the confi dence of organizational 
politicians by giving some federal grants and patronage that eff ectively subdued the 
machine. Despite these occasional compromises, FDR also accommodated in New York 
City with reform mayor Fiorello LaGuardia , a fi erce and independent ally of the New 
Deal . He quietly funneled the distribution of the New Deal welfare programs through 
his local government to build a new political machine and replace the old one.28
26. FDR, Jr. to S. H. Philips, n.d., box 153, Political Papers, FDR, Jr. Papers; Interview #5, with 
Ben Davidson by Ed Edwin, New York City, 17 August 1977, 253, CUOHC; NYT, 23 March 1949.
27. LaCerra defi ned a political machine as a “non-ideological organization focused on secur-
ing offi  ce for its leaders and members by establishing an oft en corrupt reward network.” Charles 
LaCerra, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Tammany Hall of New York (Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 1997), 2–11, 17, 24.
28. Chris McNickle, To Be Mayor of New York: Ethnic Politics in the City (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), 7; Richard Hofstadter, Th e Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 
1960); 8–9; Lyle W. Dorsett, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the City Bosses (Port Washington, NY: 
Kemnikat Press, 1977), 4; J. F. Zimmerman, Th e Government and Politics of New York State (New 
York: New York University Press, 1981), 77.
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The 1949 Election Campaign
Th e 1949 election campaign became a referendum on the magnetism of the Roosevelt 
name and the memory of FDR. FDR, Jr. underscored this theme in his formal announce-
ment to enter the race. On 8 April he declared, “Th e electorate of the 20th district is intel-
ligent, discriminating, and liberal. Th ey will vote for no candidate on faith alone. Th ey 
will expect a full discussion of the issues of the day.” 29 Yet his statement also read as an 
imitation of his father’s model to run against the “bosses.” He maintained that he was 
a loyal party Democrat but ran as a maverick because “party organization must rest on 
the fi rm foundations of support from its enrolled and voting constituency.” 30 
Th e support of the Young Democrats refl ected this maverick stand. FDR, Jr. had ac-
tively courted this new generation of reformers who wanted to wrestle control over the 
party from Tammany Hall and had formed a city-wide organization called the Fair Deal 
Democrats on which ticket FDR, Jr. would also run. Th e young activists denounced the 
machine as “a rather small clique interested in patronage, control and plunder.” 31 Th e 
Liberal Party backed up FDR, Jr.’s eff orts to frame the election in an anti-Tammany, 
moral contest. Murray Baron, its chairman declared that the issue at stake was the “op-
portunity to elect an outstanding liberal and to deal a mortal blow to the nefarious 
forces arrayed against him.” 32 
In the opening rally of the campaign on 19 April FDR, Jr. lashed out against Tam-
many Hall . “When we have a situation where a Costello can tell a Roosevelt that he can-
not run on the Democratic ticket, then thank God for the Liberal Party.” 33 Th e eff ective 
appeal of FDR’s job creating agencies and social security programs had undermined 
the power of Tammany. When LaGuardia booted many of the Tammany holders out 
of their municipal jobs, the fi nancially deprived machine came under the infl uence of 
the New York underworld. Tammany’s leadership handed control over the organiza-
tion to Mafi a “slot-king” Frank Costello, a notorious gangster gambler and one of the 
nation’s foremost criminals.34 Aft er FDR had died and LaGuardia had declined to run 
29. Statement Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., 8 April 1949, box 107, General Campaign Correspon-
dence, FDR, Jr. Papers.
30. Ibid. Not all the organization’s leaders agreed to turn FDR, Jr. down cold and brand him 
as an outsider. Bert Stand, district leader on the Lower East Side, warned his colleagues on the 
dangers of denouncing the namesake of the party’s popular hero. Stand vainly suggested to select 
FDR, Jr. to make him Tammany’s debtor because its reputation for corruptness and the accusa-
tions of alleged Mafi a connections the organization “might need a character witness some day.” 
Warren Moscow , Th e Last of the Big-Time Bosses: Th e Life and Times of Carmine DeSapio and the 
Decline and Fall of Tammany Hall (New York: Stein and Day, 1971), 74.
31. NYT, 14 and 15 April 1949; Oliver Allen, Th e Tiger: Th e Rise and Fall of Tammany Hall (New 
York: Addison-Wesley, 1993), 275; McNickle, To Be Mayor of New York, 70.
32. NYT, 14 and 15 April 1949.
33. Tyler, “Th e Roosevelt or the Tiger,” New Republic, 16 May 1949, 9; NYT, 19 April 1949.
34. Moscow , Th e Last of the Big-Time Bosses, 21, 23–25, 27; LaCerra, Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
and Tammany Hall of New York, 89. 







for another term in 1945 the era of relative Democratic unity ended. It had signaled a 
resurgence of Tammany power and infl uence to City Hall. Th e machine succeeded in 
electing William O’Dwyer to the mayoralty in 1945 and consolidated its power in his 
reelection in 1950.
Initially, FDR, Jr. was the underdog. He ran against American Labor Party can-
didate Annette T. Rubinstein, the head of the Robert L. Stevenson School, Republican 
William McIntyre, an insurance man who had never run for offi  ce before and Democrat 
Benjamin Shalleck . All lived for many years in the district and had built a network of 
political support. Shalleck and McIntyre would be listed on the fi rst two lines of the 
ballot, traditionally the place for the Democratic and Republican candidates. Th ey also 
held the edge in party organization. Normally, in a special election interest with inde-
pendent voters was low. Th erefore, it was imperative for FDR, Jr.’s young liberal-labor 
coalition to eff ect a voter turnout as large as possible to put another nail in the coffi  n 
of what Morris Ernst called “this triple alliance of Communists, Tammany politicians 
and mobsters.” 35 FDR, Jr.’s campaign divided the district in 180 parts, each headed by a 
district captain whose job it was to “see to it that every home is canvassed and reported 
to Headquarters; that each potential Roosevelt voter is located; that each Roosevelt voter 
gets to the polls on 17 May.” 36 
Th e fi rst goal was to get on the ballot. Volunteers of the Fair Deal Democrats, the 
Liberal Party, the ADA , and labor unions by 4 May had collected over 25,000 signatures 
for nomination petitions, whereas only 3,000 were required. FDR, Jr. reported to Adolf 
Berle , State Chairman of the Liberal Party, “I think our 26,000 signatures were a shock, 
to put it mildly, to our Tammany opposition.” 37 Th e result gave FDR, Jr. momentum 
and he became the frontrunner in the race. FDR, Jr.’s election team shrewdly made use 
of his magnetism and glamour and had organized a walking campaign throughout the 
district to counter the argument that he was an outsider. Every morning and aft ernoon, 
FDR, Jr. toured the district walking up and down the main arteries giving street-corner 
speeches, ringing doorbells, kissing babies, meeting people, and discussing local issues 
with residents, literally campaigning on his own two feet. Nightly radio discussions and 
regular TV appearances contributed to this personal campaign. Th e street gatherings 
were dramatized by the use of sound trucks that were planted up and down Broadway. 
Oft en fi ghts broke out between supporters of rival trucks. 
Th e show of strength had not thrown FDR, Jr.’s opponents totally off  their stands but 
a nervous Shalleck stepped up the attack. He charged that FDR, Jr. was an “outsider who 
crashed the district on his father’s name.” Rogers blasted “Mr. Roosevelt off ers us noth-
ing but the name of his illustrious father. He wants to jump over the heads of everybody 
35. Tyler, “Th e Roosevelt or the Tiger,” New Republic, 16 May 1949, 11.
36. “Canvassing—General,” box 156, Political Papers, FDR, Jr. Papers.
37. FDR, Jr. to A.A. Berle , Jr., 6 May 1949, box 107, General Campaign Correspondence, FDR, 
Jr. Papers.
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because his name is Roosevelt. So long as I am leader nobody comes into the district 
from outside and gets a job.” 38 
Shalleck would not let go of his main theme. Th e Democratic candidate compared 
the challenge he faced in his race to the 1924 gubernatorial campaign that put Alfred 
Smith against Teddy Roosevelt, Jr. Smith had dealt eff ectively with the issue of the fa-
mous name. He had declared that he was “opposed by a name, a glorious name in Amer-
ican history,” though “the individual who bears that name has no record of achieve-
ment, no record of accomplishment. He is a simply a name.” 39 Tammany instructed its 
volunteers to never refer to FDR, Jr. by his name, but just call him “Junior.” Th ey should 
denounce him as an “irresponsible young playboy running on his father’s name and 
reputation who does not live in the district and does not know its problems and who 
is running just because he is a sorehead and was turned down by his own party.” One 
resident of the district captured the sentiments of the Roosevelt-haters perfectly when 
he told a FDR, Jr. volunteer, “listen, I voted against the old man four separate times for 
the Presidency, and it will be a pleasure to vote against his son.” 40 
FDR, Jr. dismissed the accusations that he was trading on his name. He asserted 
that he was “not running on my father’s record or on my mother’s, I am running on my 
own.” FDR, Jr. claimed his own record because although he “was brought up in an at-
mosphere of campaigns and politics, crisis and statesmanship, victory and responsibil-
ity what the name stands for in the fi eld of public service cannot be made into a personal 
legacy; it can only be acquired by individual and independent eff ort.” 41 Th erefore, FDR, 
Jr. emphasized his achievements in the fi elds of civil rights and housing, and supported 
Truman ’s Fair Deal program, particularly the repeal of the Taft  -Hartley anti-labor law.
Th e tense contest developed into a race between FDR, Jr. and Shalleck . Both favored 
federal aid to education, stronger rent control, broader housing and social security legis-
lation, and also supported Truman ’s foreign policy. On a local level, they called for slum 
clearance, improvements in schools, hospitals, and the fi re and police departments. 
Since they did not diff er substantially on the main issues, the contest developed in a race 
of Roosevelt against Tammany. Th e fi nal two weeks of the campaign saw an avalanche 
of activity, unprecedented for a special local election. Th ousands of outside campaign 
workers fl ooded the district. Money was spent lavishly. Th e candidates stepped up the 
frantic pace of speech making. Th e New York Times reported that the campaign frenzy 
reached “Presidential year proportions.” 42 
38. NYT, 22 April 1949.
39. NYT, 5 May 1949.
40. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., “How We Won,” Collier’s (6 August 1949): 13, in Clippings Files, 
box 144, DNC Records, JFKL.
41. FDR, Jr. to Lionel Shapiro, 13 May 1949, “Insert for Election Eve Speech,” all in box 108, 
Subject Files, FDR, Jr. Papers. He also realized the controversial value and claimed he was “not 
running on the Roosevelt name. Some people love it, but some hate it just as much.” Richard G. 
Harris , United Press Report, box 108, Subject Files, FDR, Jr. Papers.
42. NYT, 13 May 1949.







Although the district was only four blocks wide and 90 blocks long, the four-way 
race and the drama of the name attracted wide scale national attention. Millions felt 
compelled to take sides because of FDR, Jr.’s shadow of “the vote-pulling magnetism 
of the best-loved and worst-hated President in our time.” 43 People realized that FDR, 
Jr.’s election could have national repercussions. If FDR, Jr. did well in Congress, they 
expected him to go even further.44 
Financial donations and nation-wide endorsements to FDR, Jr.’s campaign high-
lighted the national interest. Former government offi  cials such as Henry Morgenthau , 
Averell Harriman , and Joseph Kennedy, executives from movie moguls Metro Goldwyn 
Mayer and glamorous Hollywood movie actors such as Henry Fonda, Carl Van Doren, 
Ralph Bellamy, and Douglas Fairbanks, Jr. expressed support for Roosevelt. Columnist 
Drew Pearson, Congressman John F. Kennedy, and NAACP Secretary Walter White 
publicly endorsed FDR, Jr. Anna raised money for her brother’s congressional race in 
California.45 Th e Roosevelt-hating newspaper, New York Daily News denounced the 
support of the national celebrities as “fat cats who do not even live in the district,” but 
“are kicking in for sentimental reasons or because they hope for a Roosevelt Dynasty.” 46
Th e number of insults charged at one another increased. FDR, Jr. called his Dem-
ocratic opponent “the candidate of the sinister clique of Tammany Hall .” 47 Shalleck 
challenged the validity of the nomination petitions the Roosevelt coalition had col-
lected. Tammany fi led objections with the Board of Elections. Charles Horowitz, FDR, 
Jr.’s campaign manager, charged that the Democratic campaign was panicking because 
Tammany had urged all her leaders from outside the district to work for Shalleck’s can-
didacy. When Tammany withdrew its objections to the petitions some days later be-
cause time was too short to decide on the issue before election day, Horowitz lambasted 
the political machine for its “shameful attack on the right of real Americans to vote.” 48 
43. Price, “Th at Man, Jr.,” Saturday Evening Post, 24 September 1949, 30 in Personality Clip-
pings Files, box 144, DNC Records, JFKL.
44. Interview #5, with Ben Davidson by Ed Edwin, New York City, 17 August 1977, 256, 
CUOHC.
45. Copy of telegram from John F. Kennedy to FDR, Jr., 7 May 1949; “Endorsements cards”; 
Walter White to FDR, Jr., 11 May 1949, all in box 107, General Campaign Correspondence, FDR, 
Jr. Papers; “Draft  suggested speech for Drew Pearson in behalf of FDR, Jr.,” n.d., folder Roosevelt, 
Franklin, Jr. (1936–1969), box G296, Drew Pearson Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, 
TX; FDR, Jr. to Anna Roosevelt Halsted , 20 June 1949, File FDR, Jr., box 68, Anna Roosevelt 
Halsted Papers.
46. Dexter Teed, “Th e New York Press Th is Morning: Why Do People Back FDR, Jr.?” New York 
Post, 16 May 1949, 33, box 68, Anna Roosevelt Halsted Papers.
47. NYT, 27 April 1949.
48. NYT, 7, 8, 9 and 10 May 1949. Abraham Kaplan, Shalleck ’s campaign manager, accused the 
Liberal Party of buying the election with $250,000, an amount that “surpasses any other attempt 
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FDR, Jr. kept hammering away at the political bosses. When the New Jersey politi-
cal machine of Frank Hague went down to defeat, he warned that “we cannot let up for 
a moment. It is time we do here what we did in Jersey City last Tuesday.” 49 In a brochure 
distributed widely in the district, the Liberal Party alleged that Tammany had consis-
tently opposed President Roosevelt and that Rogers had told FDR, Jr., “your father never 
had any use for the Hall, and the Hall had no use for him.” 50
FDR, Jr. appealed to the voters that the powerful tradition he represented would 
be needed in Congress to fi ght the conservative coalition. He underscored his claim 
by bringing his mother into the campaign. At fi rst, Eleanor’s reaction on the entry of 
her son in politics had been non-committal. She feared that FDR, Jr. was too ambitious 
and “couldn’t imagine why her son or anyone else wants to get into politics, but if he 
wants to, he has as much right to run as anyone.” 51 Eleanor did make an appearance at 
a reception and tea of the Women’s Division for the election of FDR, Jr. Her inclination 
to defend her children drove her also to denounce those Tammany Democrats such as 
James Farley who opposed her son.52 
During the last week of the election campaign FDR, Jr. had picked up two impor-
tant endorsements that signaled the outcome. Th e New York Times favored FDR, Jr. “not 
because he is the son of a famous father, but because we believe he has demonstrated 
aft er four years of creditable service in the Navy during the war, a bona fi de and active 
interest in public aff airs, an intelligently liberal approach to national problems and a 
clear understanding of the nature of democracy.” Th e New York Post also editorialized, 
“It is a privilege to endorse FDR, Jr. on his own merit and his own record.” 53 
Aft er voting early in the morning on 17 May FDR, Jr. spent a relatively quiet day in 
his apartment. He visited the four campaign headquarters and awaited the returns in 
his apartment with Eleanor, Elliott and his brother’s wife Faye Emerson , a glamorous 
actress. FDR, Jr. learned within half an hour aft er the polls closed at 7:00 PM, that he 
had won overwhelmingly. FDR, Jr. had won more votes than his three opponents com-
bined and a stunning 60 percent of the electorate had cast their vote.54 FDR, Jr. excitedly 
reported to Anna , “Th e campaign was really great fun, although a little exhausting”. He 
hired automobiles from all over the state, Philadelphia, and other states,” to drive voters to poll-
ing places. NYT, 14, 15 and 16 May 1949.
49. New York Post, 15 May 1949.
50. “Th e Amazing Story Why Tammany Rejected Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.,” box 106, Political 
Papers, FDR, Jr. Papers.
51. NYT, 23 March 1949.
52. NYT, 9 May 1949; Eleanor was wrong in critiquing the former postmaster general, “If you 
did not come out against him [Franklin, Jr.] I apologize for believing what I had heard.” Eleanor 
Roosevelt to James Farley , 1 June 1949, Presidential File, 1928–1976, Roosevelt, Eleanor, 1940–
1962, n.d., box 34, James A. Farley Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
53. NYT, 5 May 1949; New York Post, 8 May 1949.
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boasted to Anna that his personal touch really paid off  “… I averaged ten speeches a day 
and about four hours of walking through the district and at the end I fi gured out that 
I had personally spoken to and shaken the hands of some 45,000 people.” 55 Campaign 
strategist Lou Harris also praised this personal approach and his natural ability to mix 
well with people.56 
It took fi ve hours to complete the victory tour through the district. People encour-
aged him to go on to “Albany” and even the White House. His sweeping victory received 
enormous recognition. Th ousands of messages from all over the country were sent to 
his house, even to Eleanor that praised and paid tribute to FDR. FDR, Jr. received con-
gratulatory telegrams from President Truman , Vice President Barkley , congressmen, 
labor unions, Jewish organizations, and even from ordinary people as far away as Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, Algeria and the Netherlands.57
Many liberal observers claimed FDR, Jr.’s victory signaled the start of a promising, 
independent career. Th e New York Post judged that FDR, Jr. had proven himself as a 
worthy heir apparent. Th e election had established him as the voice of independent lib-
eralism.58 Th e Washington Post also came away convinced that his “impressive victory 
… was not achieved by mere trading on personality.” 59 Th e large plurality in the election 
gave him a powerful status. Th e New York Times concluded that FDR, Jr. was the “fi rst 
new national fi gure of importance to emerge in New York City since the election of 
Th omas Dewey as District Attorney in 1937.” 60 
A voter survey of the district aft er the election corroborated the conclusions of the 
press. It found that Tammany’s charges of trading on the Roosevelt name did not stick. 
For a majority of the voters the memory of FDR nullifi ed the damage done by these 
accusations. Although his marital diffi  culties were oft en mentioned, in the end they 
deemed FDR, Jr.’s independent record on issues such as housing, civil rights, and the 
repeal of anti-labor legislation more important.61 FDR, Jr.’s election victory refl ected 
an endorsement of Truman ’s Fair Deal program and above all support for his Cold War 
policies. Th e American Labor Party had branded all other candidates as “war candi-
dates” for their support of the Marshall plan and NATO but the result soundly rejected 
the view of Henry Wallace .62
Increasing international tensions had toughened the stand of Truman toward the 
55. FDR, Jr. to Anna Roosevelt Halsted , 20 June 1949, File FDR, Jr., box 68, Anna Roosevelt 
Halsted Papers.
56. Lou Harris to FDR, Jr., 20 May 1949, folder Harris, Lou, box 264, FDR, Jr. Papers.
57. “Congratulatory messages and telegrams,” box 106, Political Papers, FDR, Jr. Papers.
58. New York Post, 16 May 1949.
59. Washington Post, 19 May 1949.
60. NYT, 19 May 1949.
61. “Press Release Opinion Researcher William A. Yoell, 19 May 1949,” General Campaign 
Correspondence, box 107, FDR, Jr. Papers.
62. David Dubinsky to all NY Managers, 26 April 1949, folder 2c, box 136, David Dubinsky 
Papers, International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union Archives, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY; 
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Soviet Union. It led to an unprecedented American military commitment to Europe in 
the establishment of NATO in April 1949. Th e shock of the discovery that Stalin also 
possessed Atomic bombs was reinforced by the Communist victory in China in the 
fall. Truman decided to a greater militarization of the Cold War and larger American 
defense expenditures. 
National Figure
In the space of six weeks FDR, Jr. had become a national contender but was he ready for 
it?63 FDR, Jr. found a new stability in his personal life. In early July, he announced his 
engagement to Suzanne Perrin, daughter of a New York socialite. Th e couple intended 
to marry the next month. Sue was the opposite from his fi rst wife, Ethel . Th e former cor-
poral in the Women’s Division of the Marine Corps was an independent, outspoken and 
strong-willed woman who was able to domesticate FDR, Jr. During the weekends they 
settled on the farm he had bought in Poughquag in southern Dutchess County, some 
twenty-fi ve miles away from Hyde Park . FDR, Jr. did a lot of the manual work himself 
and Sue devoted herself with keeping the books of their enterprise. Th eir partnership 
also extended to the political sphere. Sue looked aft er FDR, Jr.’s presentation. She did his 
shopping and kept a close eye on his clothes and haircut.64
As Sue guarded his public image, FDR, Jr. could work at making a political impres-
sion. Anna had warned him that the political road ahead was more diffi  cult for him 
than for most people just because he was a literal reminder of FDR. FDR, Jr. realized 
that he inherited the Roosevelt supporters as well as the Roosevelt haters, and the latter 
would not hesitate to trap him. He replied, “Th e job ahead is a tough one and unless I am 
awfully careful, I can easily fall fl at on my face. As you can imagine, there are plenty of 
people in Washington and New York who have their hooks out for me.” He would keep 
his mouth shut and his eyes and ears open.65 
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Some reporters argued that FDR, Jr.’s fi rst year in Congress would be decisive. Since 
many would be ready to pounce him to prevent a Roosevelt dynasty the establishment 
of an outstanding record was imperative. He stood at crossroads, they pointed out either 
“to become an important political fi gure or be forever marked as nothing more than the 
ebullient son of his father who never quite outgrew his collegiate tendencies to battle 
photographers, collect speeding tickets … as an end in themselves.” 66 
Lou Harris appealed to him to repay his campaign workers by becoming the best 
Congressman of his generation. He advised his friend to make a good record on a few 
issues and to strike a balance between “not off ending the seniority of the House, but at 
the same time convincing the voters of NY that you have produced.” 67 Th e press also 
warned him to avoid the pitfalls of Congress. Th e Saturday Evening Post wrote that 
the “House gives him a sounding board, but few congressmen parlay the echoes into 
national fame.” 68 Th e Washington Post was confi dent that FDR, Jr. would establish a 
satisfying record in the House although “by tradition freshmen Congressmen are sup-
posed to listen instead of lead, assuredly Mr. Roosevelt’s fl air for politics will keep him 
before the public.” 69 
In mid-June, FDR, Jr. traveled to Washington, D.C. Accompanied by his mother, 
friends, and colleagues, he took his oath of offi  ce on the fl oor of the House chamber. 
Aft erwards, FDR, Jr. paid a humble courtesy call on Truman to reaffi  rm his loyalty to 
the Democratic Party. He told reporters aft er the meeting, “Th ere is no question that I 
am a member of the Democratic majority of the House.” … “I will work as a member 
of the team of which President Truman is captain and quarterback.” 70 Th e thirty-four-
year old New York congressman joined a small group of young Representatives that 
included John F. Kennedy, Colorado Representative John Carroll, and John Blatnik of 
Minnesota who met informally from time to time to talk and adjust to Congressional 
life. In due course, he was back in good standing and given committee assignments as 
a Democrat.71 
Th e advice of his advisers to establish an outstanding record and that the rest would 
follow, did not fall on deaf ears. FDR, Jr. realized that he occupied a unique position in 
Congress, because of his name and because of his special place within the Democratic 
Party aft er his spectacular defeat of Tammany. He thrived on the curiosity and interest. 
66. Chalmers M. Roberts, “FDR’s Foes Are Laying for ‘Junior’, ” Washington Post, 29 May 1949. 
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67. Lou Harris to FDR, Jr., 20 May 1949, folder Harris, Lou, box 264, FDR, Jr. Papers.
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He started off  well to apply his knowledge to work for federal housing programs. He 
introduced a middle-income housing bill and strongly supported the National Hous-
ing Authority, which fi gured prominently on Truman ’s liberal wish list.72 On the fl oor 
of the House, FDR, Jr. warned his colleagues that the “slums of America are breeding 
spots of communism and in passing this legislation, we will be striking a blow against 
socialism and communism.” He repudiated the Republicans who blocked this type of 
legislation because they branded the measures as “socialistic.” 73 
FDR, Jr. was an instinctive politician by nature, able and articulate. Th is major as-
set turned into a source of weakness. Journalists Joe and Stewart Alsop reported that 
in the political arena FDR, Jr. behaves like the bright boy whose lessons come too easy, 
and who therefore rarely bothers to do more than get by.” 74 Th is attitude of enormous 
assurance was oft en interpreted for arrogance. On 23 June, only a week aft er his ar-
rival on Capitol Hill, FDR, Jr. gave his maiden speech in which he urged the passage 
of Truman ’s national housing bill. Charles Bartlett of the Chattanooga Times recalled 
that aft erwards FDR, Jr. telephoned John Kennedy , who had been in the House for three 
years and told him, “Jack, the Speaker and I would like very much to have you come over 
this aft ernoon and vote with us on this important bill.” 75 Initially, FDR, Jr. was well mo-
tivated and interested but aft er a few months he started to express a sense of frustration 
and confusion “by the mountain of problems that confront a Congressman and upon 
which he is expected to vote intelligently.” 76
Despite the advice to apply himself, the election triumph had overexcited FDR, Jr. 
Its immediate eff ect was to fuel his ambition and interest in getting elected. In late June, 
FDR, Jr. headed the polls as the most popular candidate to serve as New York City mayor 
and to replace the ailing Robert Wagner , Sr. as U.S. Senator. He was the leading Demo-
crat of Manhattan but FDR, Jr. kept denying that he was available for any public offi  ce 
other than his seat in Congress.77 Instead, he urged Herbert Lehman to run for Senate. 
In early October, FDR, Jr. returned from his Campobello wedding trip to New York 
where Lehman counted on his active participation in the campaign. During an eight-
day speaking tour in the upstate counties, FDR, Jr. drew large, enthusiastic crowds. He 
stumped for Lehman in the role of hatchet man, attacked the alliance between the Re-
publican Party and the conservative Democrats in Congress and denounced the GOP 
candidate John F. Dulles as a “tight-lipped, calculated Wall Streeter who makes Taft  
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look pink by comparison.” 78 FDR, Jr. also helped form a coordinating committee of In-
dependent Democrats. Th e committee that had grown out of FDR, Jr.’s victory sought to 
serve as a rallying point for independent Democrats to vote for the party slate.79 Lehm-
an won handily while the ticket in New York City headed by Mayor O’ Dwyer gained a 
landslide victory over his opponents, Newbold Morris who had run on the Republican 
and Liberal Party tickets and Vito Marcantonio , the ALP candidate.80 
FDR, Jr. got a “personal kick” out of the November campaign.81 Th e result estab-
lished his reputation as one of the state’s foremost vote getters. FDR, Jr.’s popularity at 
the grassroots level and his support in New York City impressed political observers. 
Th ey noted, “Roosevelt is believed to be defi nitely a candidate for the Gubernatorial 
offi  ce ….” 82
FDR, Jr.’s eff orts to build himself up for the 1950 elections, however, alienated the 
Liberal Party. Its leaders, David Dubinsky and Alex Rose , who had endorsed Morris, 
were upset with FDR, Jr.’s support of the entire Democratic ticket.83 Th ey had engi-
neered his election victory only six months before and felt he was too independent and 
ungrateful for their eff orts.84 FDR, Jr. argued that although he had stepped on the toes 
of the Liberals, the “people overwhelmingly agreed with me” by handing the Demo-
cratic candidates large pluralities. He had not bothered to notify the Liberal Party of his 
plan to support Democrats. Th is arrogant attitude tapped into the Liberal resentment 
over FDR, Jr.’s disloyalty to register as a Democrat in Congress and his refusal to send 
patronage that infuriated Rose and Dubinsky.85 
FDR, Jr.’s support of Tammany-backed candidates in the campaign also demon-
strated to young liberals that his commitment to reform the political machine had only 
been skin deep. In May, FDR, Jr. had still been their spokesman and had predicted an 
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end to the “monopoly on big-city party organizations formerly held by irresponsible 
club house loafers.” 86 Th is was too premature. His victory though had greatly dimin-
ished Tammany’s prestige and lead to demands for change. It paved the way for a reor-
ganization of the political machine. In late July, Carmine DeSapio had replaced ousted 
leader Rogers as head of Tammany Hall . Six months later, FDR, Jr. was forced to deny 
his implicit Tammany endorsement. He reaffi  rmed his reform credentials and declared 
that the new Tammany leadership had not satisfi ed him but that he was willing “to give 
them a chance to eliminate those infl uences, which I so bitterly denounced during my 
campaign for Congress.” 87 
Th is modifi ed position refl ected FDR, Jr.’s reluctance to get involved in the over-
haul of Tammany Hall because he needed to mend fences with the machine to get the 
support of the bosses in 1950.88 When the fi rst session of the Eighty-fi rst Congress 
closed its doors for the year, the search for a Democratic candidate for the 1950 New 
York Gubernatorial election went ahead full speed. Th e name of FDR, Jr. fi gured most 
prominently among the leading contenders for the state’s top position. Publicly, FDR, 
Jr. continued to discourage stories predicting that he would quickly rise to higher of-
fi ce. Privately, however, he took a great interest in the contest for his father’s old seat in 
Albany. He explained to Jean Poletti , wife of his law partner, that he was “playing very 
hard to get for some time to come.” 89 
Egged on by his advisers and his popularity FDR, Jr. had already decided to test 
the electoral waters and behind the scenes his close aides were defi nitely caught with 
“Albany-fever.” In late November, campaign adviser Oscar Kanny assessed FDR, Jr.’s 
chances and foresaw a golden future. He noted that “every discussion regarding Albany 
leads to your name. Enemies fear your nomination. Friends, and politicians who are 
interested only in votes would like to start cheering, but need some assurance that you 
are ready for the job.” 90 He stressed that a combined Lehman -Roosevelt ticket could 
also count on the support of Truman . Truman would stand a better chance in the 1952 
election when he was supported by a strong Democratic government committed to the 
continuation of the New Deal programs in New York State. Kanny concluded that the 
establishment of an outstanding record in Congress would be the missing piece of the 
jigsaw puzzle to complete the trip to Albany.91 
Strategist Harris also joined in the planning for 1950. He submitted a detailed, top 
secret strategic memo that spelled out the plans and organization of the upcoming cam-
paign. Harris outlined a so-called pre-campaign period running from December 1949 
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until September 1950 where FDR, Jr.’s eff orts would be concentrated upon committing 
Democratic leaders to his cause, rounding up convention delegates, and to win the nom-
ination. Th e second phase would start aft er Labor Day and involved the setting up and 
running of the actual election campaign. A buoyant Harris expected to win by a record 
margin and boasted that “we can run a campaign, such as New York State or the coun-
try has never seen the likes before.” 92 Th e pollster urged FDR, Jr. to make the race but 
recommended securing the early support of party leaders to be assured of the backing of 
a unifi ed Democratic Party. Other than the behind-the-scenes campaign preparations, 
Harris counseled, he should keep a low profi le. He warned the eager FDR, Jr., “Th ere 
should be nothing from you or anybody around you that indicates in any way that you 
are interested in the Governorship.” To prevent that his offi  ce in Washington would 
become a “bee-hive of activity on the Governorship,” FDR, Jr. should start planning 
his reelection campaign for Congress as to defl ect the attention of the media. Th e only 
headlines FDR, Jr. scored in the newspapers should deal with his fi ght in Congress for 
issues as civil rights, housing, and other measures of Truman ’s Fair Deal program.93
Congress
When the second session of the Eighty-fi rst Congress opened in January 1950, FDR, Jr. 
took up the battle for the establishment of a Fair Employment Practice Committee. Tru-
man had given priority to the passing of this civil rights legislation. Liberal and labor 
groups had interpreted the jubilant victory of 1948 as a mandate for reform but when 
New York Representative Adam C. Powell in late April 1949 introduced the FEPC bill 
the proposal fared badly. A coalition of Democrats from the South and conservative 
Republicans opposed the measure. Th e conservative coalition continued to dominate 
and had succeeded in stalling most of Truman’s Fair Deal program and its progressive 
philosophy of agricultural reform, national health insurance, federal aid to education 
and a comprehensive civil rights program. In the Senate, Democratic leader Scott Lucas 
postponed action until the next year but in the 1950 session Truman could not aff ord 
to endanger what was left  of his legislative program by pushing all-out for the FEPC 
bill.94
Still, liberal members with FDR, Jr. in the forefront attempted in January 1950 to 
bring the bill out of the House Rules Committee where it had been bottled up by its op-
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ponents. On 23 January, FDR, Jr. called a newsconference to highlight the fact that he 
had fi led a discharge petition to bring the bill out of committee. Th is was a bold move 
because powerful Speaker Sam Rayburn was dead set against the measure. While it 
needed the consent of a majority of 218 members FDR, Jr. took it for granted that the 
necessary number would sign his petition in time, before the deadline of 1 February. 
Two days later at a meeting of the Rules Committee, Southern Democrats succeeded in 
preventing the measure from going to the House fl oor. While Republicans and Demo-
crats blamed each other for the blockage, ALP Congressman Marcantonio hit the nail 
on the head when he called the struggle a political game where “everybody wanted the 
FEPC as a campaign issue but not as a law.” 95
Th e next day the fi ght took a bitter turn when FDR, Jr. and Adam Powell clashed on 
the House fl oor. Powell had fi led a second petition because the Harlem Congressman 
felt that FDR, Jr.’s only motivation was to enhance his bid for the New York Governor-
ship. FDR, Jr. heatedly denied the charges of expediency and off ered to withdraw his 
petition and let his colleague prevail. Powell exploded and claimed, “as a Negro I can 
go no higher. I can never run for Governor of New York State and I will allow no indi-
vidual to stop the FEPC movement for reasons of personal glory on his part.” 96 FDR, 
Jr. emphasized his accomplishments and his commitment to the cause. He replied that 
Powell had had ample time to fi le a petition since August but had neglected to do so. 
Aft er the shouting match had ended the old friends shook hands but the result of their 
controversy was that the FEPC bill was still held up in the Rules Committee. 
FDR, Jr. aroused further controversy when he took the issue outside Congress. He 
assailed the foes of the FEPC bill at a fundraising dinner for Mayor O’Dwyer . FDR, Jr. 
did not mention his dispute with Powell but blasted the Republicans by comparing its 
stand on the issue as a “man riding slowly backwards on the stagecoach of history.” 97 
Ohio Representative Clarence Brown, who had been singled out by FDR, Jr. when he 
accused the GOP of “hypocrisy, double-dealing, and political manoeuvring,” reacted 
furiously to the allegations. Brown denied that he had reversed his vote by pledging to 
release the FEPC bill but later voted to bottle up the measure. He counterattacked and 
accused FDR, Jr. of excessive absenteeism from his job. Th e Republican pointed out that 
his colleague had missed 69 out of 129 roll calls since his arrival in Washington, D.C. 
He concluded that FDR, Jr. “could not keep up with Congressional matters in New York 
night clubs or by nocturnal meditations on 52nd street.” 98 When the FEPC bill was fi -
nally voted upon in February its opponents weakened the bill by stripping the measure 
of its enforcement powers. In the Senate the conservative fi libuster hit the measure so 
eff ectively that it blocked the bill from becoming law. 
FDR, Jr. acceptance of outside speaking engagements to build a national reputation 
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proved counterproductive. Th ese headlines played into FDR, Jr.’s opponents’ hands who 
were quick to exploit his lack of involvement to prove that he was irresponsible and had 
betrayed the trust of his electorate. Most colleagues in Congress commented, “Frank’s 
smart as a whip, but he does not always do his homework.” 99 New York Congressman 
Jacob Javits ridiculed FDR, Jr.’s careless attitude to take things for granted. “At times 
that even when he did espouse a good cause he might fail to show up on the fl oor of 
the House when it was being debated or when it was necessary to support or oppose 
amendments.” 100 
The New York Gubernatorial Election of 1950
FDR, Jr.’s attempts to pass civil rights legislation failed to enhance his reputation as a 
diligent member of Congress. He felt thwarted and frustrated by the clubhouse senior-
ity in Congress.101 Impatiently and ambitiously, he searched for higher political offi  ce. 
Many Democrats considered FDR, Jr. the strongest candidate the party could nominate 
against Dewey , the incumbent governor. Th ey reasoned that he was irresistible. Th e 
Party would have to nominate FDR, Jr. for Governor eventually, so why not now in 
1950?102 
FDR, Jr. brought impressive assets to the job. He was the physical reminder of his fa-
ther’s memory, carried the famous name, and was an experienced and glamorous cam-
paigner. His 1949 victory had won him a strong following among independent voters 
and labor unions.103 Th e New York Herald Tribune had predicted that “the enthusiastic 
supporters who … began calling out the names of Albany and points beyond struck a 
note which will undoubtedly be sounded again in more sober councils.” 104
It did but FDR, Jr.’s individualistic attitude to get rich quick politically did not reas-
sure Democratic leaders that he was ready. In the campaign strategy that Harris had 
mapped out, FDR, Jr. began to seek commitments from state leaders to support him as 
a candidate for governor. In early January 1950, he conferred with Flynn . He told FDR, 
Jr., in no uncertain terms, to stick to his job as congressman for several years. FDR, Jr.’s 
campaign team interpreted Flynn’s advice as not only that their candidate needed more 
seasoning but that the boss of the Bronx “would not be for FDR, Jr. this year.” 105 
99. Draft  Article Joseph and Stewart Alsop , “Can FDR, Jr. Get His Father’s Old Job Back?” box 
42, Article, Book, and Speech File, 1937–1963, Joseph and Stewart Alsop Papers.
100. Jacob K. Javits with Rafael Steinberg, Javits: Th e Autobiography of a Public Man (Boston, 
MA: Houghton Miffl  in, 1981), 203.
101. Levitas, “Rise, Fall and … of FDR, Jr.,” New York Times Magazine, 23 October 1966, 27, 42, 
44, 49–52, 57–70.
102. Warren Moscow , “New York Politics, and Farley and Flynn,” NYT, 25 June 1950.
103. Leo Egan, “Politics in New York: Dewey vs. Roosevelt?” NYT, 5 February 1950.
104. New York Herald Tribune, 19 May 1949.
105. “Advisor script,” 9 July 1999, PBS Documentary Eleanor Roosevelt . Th e American Experi-
Erik van den Berg BW.indd   130 27-Jan-06   13:58:50 PM
Heir Apparent 131
Liberal Party leaders advised him to continue to work as a member of the House, 
establish a good record and travel the road to Albany at the next elections in 1954. Th ey 
were not opposed to ambition per se, but they reasoned that FDR, Jr. should fi rst earn 
the respect and confi dence of the voters to win the right to higher offi  ce than to base his 
claims on mere entitlement. Eleanor also tried to curb his ambition. She advised him 
to stay in Congress to learn the ropes. She worried that he relied too much on his feel-
ing of irresistibility and on his ability to charm. He needed to work hard and be more 
disciplined in his job.106 
FDR, Jr.’s delusions of grandeur fuelled the criticism of a young man in a hurry. 
Th e Democratic leadership strongly opposed FDR, Jr.’s possible candidacy. State chair-
man Fitzpatrick warned the liberal reformers of the Young Democratic Clubs, that 
the “young people in the party should not go out on a limb for FDR, Jr.” 107 Th e Young 
Democratic Clubs had been the backbone of strength in the 1949 election and they had 
appointed FDR, Jr. as a member to their advisory committee to actively involve young 
people in the Party. Resentment ran so high that his nomination enfl amed old animosi-
ties in the party between the young liberal wing and its conservative leadership. Th is 
struggle, FDR, Jr.’s opponents feared, would result in a fi erce battle at the state conven-
tion, endanger their chances to regain control of the state and would possibly mean a 
break-up of the party. 
Strong contenders like Federal Security Administrator Oscar Ewing, and former 
DNC chairman James Farley had jumped in the race. Farley was FDR’s old nemesis and 
was dead set against the candidacy of “Th at Man, Jr.” Th e Irish Catholic used his candi-
dacy as a rallying point among Democrats and church groups for the opposition against 
FDR, Jr.108 Opponents charged that FDR, Jr. was a political newcomer who was trading 
on his father’s name and “should have earned his spurs before he rode.” 109 
His candidacy in New York also coincided with his brother’s career in California. 
FDR, Jr. had been the fi rst son to successfully use the brand name to run for political 
offi  ce. His 1949 victory seemed to have signaled the fi rst step in the realization of the 
prediction of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in 1947 that, “Th e Roosevelt family is obviously 
not a spent force in American political life. In ten years, maybe sooner, two of the most 
important states might have Roosevelts as governors.” 110 
James felt, as the eldest son, that it was his birthright to trade in his father’s foot-
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steps.111 He had worked hard to become state Democratic chairman and in November 
1949 announced to run for governor of California. FDR, Jr.’s campaign debated the con-
sequences of James’ candidacy for their chances. Th e question was whether to announce 
before or aft er his brother’s primary campaign. Th ey decided before the spring of 1950 
because otherwise it would appear as a “me too” coat tails business. Yet, they also tried 
to pay as little attention as possible to Jimmy’s campaign but realized the inevitable: “the 
news stories are going to play them both together.” 112
Th e publicity did hype the competition and revived the rivalry between the two 
Roosevelt brothers. Reporters asked “Jimmy” if the rumored stories were accurate that 
he had begged his younger brother not to seek the Governorship in New York because 
it would be viewed as a blueprint for a Roosevelt dynasty and might endanger his own 
chances. James empathetically denied the allegations. He declared that there was no 
competition in the Roosevelt family because “we stand and fi ght for the same things.” 113 
Th e political competition highlighted the fears of opponents that the restoration of 
a Roosevelt dynasty would be realized within a few months. In early February, Chicago 
Sun-Times cartoonist Burck had depicted the GOP as an elephant located in the Mid-
west with FDR, Jr. on the East and James on the West side. Th e animal exclaimed, “Help, 
I am surrounded!” 114 Th e ongoing speculation that FDR, Jr. would be a candidate in 
New York and that brother James had already thrown his hat in the ring in California, 
caused Alice Longworth Roosevelt to deliver a chilling snub. Th e daughter of Th eodore 
Roosevelt , whose dislike for the Hyde Park clan was well known, denounced the claims 
of her distant relatives derisively as, “Caesar of the East, and Caesar of the West.” 115 
Asked by reporters in late March if he still considered himself a candidate for gov-
ernor, FDR, Jr. denied and declared, “I have said that I am a candidate only for re-elec-
tion to Congress.” 116 Th e public demand for his nomination did not subside with this 
statement. FDR, Jr. remained a strong vote getter in New York City. Th e upstate coun-
ties, however, favored party stalwart Farley. New York Times journalist Warren Moscow 
summed up the dilemma of the Democratic leadership. “To nominate young Roosevelt 
is to risk a party fi ght. To pass him up may mean the loss of a party meal ticket for years 
to come.” 117 Since the Democratic leaders could not ignore the popularity of FDR, Jr. but 
also aimed to keep party unity they decided to postpone the defi nite selection of the 
candidate until the September State convention. 
Truman was also getting worried at the ongoing party infi ghting. Th e edgy Demo-
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cratic standard bearer hesitated to interfere in state matters. Yet, during the summer 
memos circulated in the White House that urged Fitzpatrick , Flynn, and DeSapio to 
“get together, agree on a candidate for governor, and work out a program so that Demo-
crats can win in New York this fall.” 118 Th e annoyed president expressed his concern 
about Farley’s machinations “who was trying his best to muddy up the waters,” and even 
thought about inviting the quarrelling New York leaders to solve the problem.119 What 
Truman did was off er FDR, Jr. an appointment as Secretary of the Navy. Anna urged 
him to take the traditional Roosevelt position because the Cabinet post gave him the 
opportunity to move faster politically.120 FDR, Jr. stuck to his campaign plan. 
In mid-July, New York CIO union leaders who met with Democratic Party leaders 
to discuss the nomination, urged the selection of a liberal candidate for Governor and 
named Averell Harriman and FDR, Jr. as examples. Th e demand for a progressive can-
didate in New York surged when liberal Senators Claude Pepper in Florida and Frank 
Graham went down to defeat. Th e popularity of the Democratic administration, Tru-
man ’s domestic program, and the liberal movement had declined dramatically. Public 
confi dence in liberal reform programs had dwindled while conservatism was on the rise. 
Increasing international tensions had toughened the stand of Truman toward the Soviet 
Union and these increased hostile attitudes ignited a full-blown Red Scare. Republican 
Senator Joseph McCarthy instigated a hunt for alleged communists and fellow travel-
ers that overwhelmed the Fair Deal. To make matters worse, the administration was 
charged with pervasive corruption. Investigators found the Democratic National Com-
mittee an “happy hunting ground for racqueteers, gamblers and special interests.” 121 
Th e outbreak of the war in Korea in June 1950 buried Truman’s legislative program.122
In June, James captured the Democratic nomination. Despite its success, he lacked 
political appeal and his father’s sense of timing. In the fall election, he faced an uphill 
struggle against popular Republican incumbent Governor Earl Warren . Even the sup-
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port of popular Hollywood fi gures did not off set the Roosevelt backlash. He turned to 
his mother for political support and fi nancial help. Eleanor lent her son $100,000 to back 
up his candidacy and traveled to the West Coast to campaign with James in the state.123 
A New York Post endorsement in late August, two weeks before the start of the 
Democratic State convention, fuelled FDR, Jr.’s defl ated candidacy. New York Demo-
crats had convened in Rochester in early September. On the eve of the political gather-
ing the Democratic leaders traditionally held a dinner conference. At the meeting Ed 
Flynn , Paul Fitzpatrick and the leaders of the larger counties, who held the majority of 
the votes, picked the loyal Representative Walter Lynch of the Bronx as their candidate 
for governor. Th ey felt FDR, Jr. lacked the experience and profoundly distrusted his 
independence. Invited by Flynn, FDR, Jr. conferred with Lynch that evening but re-
jected their off er to become his running mate as candidate for the position of lieutenant 
governor.124 
Reluctantly, he congratulated Lynch the next day because he had become convinced 
of the weakness of the party’s nominee. FDR, Jr.’s announcement and appearance led 
to a furious demonstration by his supporters. Emboldened by this manifestation FDR, 
Jr. called on Albany leader Dan O’Connell . He asked the old ally of his father, “Should 
I submit my candidacy to the convention at large?” “Stay out of it” O’Connell, an old 
political hand replied, “they have the votes and it is too late for you.” 125
FDR, Jr. turned his attention to his re-election campaign in the twentieth Con-
gressional district. DeSapio , who wanted to halt the decline of the political machine 
by instituting reforms, had assured FDR, Jr. already in early 1950 that he would be the 
candidate of the Hall.126 In mid-June, during a routine meeting of Tammany’s Executive 
Committee FDR, Jr. had offi  cially returned to the good graces of the political machine. 
In particular contrast to the rowdy meeting in April 1949, the bosses unanimously 
named him to be the Democratic candidate. Assured of the Democratic and Liberal 
nominations, he ran away with the race in the fall election against Republican opponent 
Henry Poor who unsuccessfully attacked FDR, Jr.’s absentee record in Congress.
Not all Democrats were as successful at the polls as FDR, Jr. His brother James lost 
by a margin of two to one to Earl Warren despite Eleanor’s campaign eff orts. James rue-
fully wrote his victorious brother, “I think I will follow your example and next time pick 
a more reliable constituency.” 127 Lynch went down to defeat against Dewey . Th e Demo-
cratic Party dropped twenty-eight seats in the House and fi ve in the Senate. Voters held 
123. FDR, Jr. to Elliott Roosevelt , 5 February 1954, folder 3, drawer 1, envelope 2, box 217, FDR, 
Jr. Papers; “Joseph P. Lash notes of meeting with FDR, Jr.,” 9 March 1966, folder FDR, Jr. 1966, 
box 16, Lash Papers; Hess, America’s Political Dynasties, 208–210.
124. Moscow , “New York Politics, and Farley, and Flynn,” NYT, 25 June 1950.
125. NYT, 7 September 1950.
126. NYT, 14 June 1950.
127. James to FDR, Jr., 28 November 1950, folder FDR, Jr. Personal Correspondence, mainly 
1947–1953, box 323, FDR, Jr. Papers.
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the Democrats responsible for the Korean War related infl ation and charged that they 
were soft  on communism.
Conclusion
FDR, Jr.’s overwhelming victory in the 1949 special election demonstrated his talent 
in the political arena. On the campaign trail he displayed a natural ease and ability 
that drew large crowds. FDR, Jr. formed a youthful braintrust that shrewdly framed the 
election in a moral anti-Tammany contest. He established a liberal-labor coalition to 
put him on the ballot and provided him with a large number of enthusiastic campaign 
workers. 
Despite FDR, Jr.’s claim that he ran on his own record, the 1949 contest signaled a 
referendum on the magnetism of the Roosevelt name and memory of FDR. His entry in 
the twentieth district evoked memories with Roosevelt supporters and haters of “good 
old times.” Tammany’s opposition gave him a campaign theme to defl ect the inevitable 
attacks that he was trading on his father’s name. FDR, Jr. imitated the model of his fa-
ther and successfully used his claim on memory to win public offi  ce. His victory served 
as a tribute to the memory of FDR. 
FDR, Jr.’s new responsibilities signaled the need for an answer to the crucial ques-
tions how important public offi  ce was to him and what he wanted to use it for.128 In 
Congress he had the opportunity to build an independent record of accomplishment 
and truly become a national contender. Yet, FDR, Jr. did not commit himself. He quickly 
became frustrated with the slow-moving process of legislative wheeling and dealing. 
Higher political offi  ce beckoned for the young man in a hurry. Democratic Party leaders 
tried to slow down FDR, Jr.’s ambitious pace of self-advancement. Leaders of the Liberal 
Party also found him diffi  cult to control. Th ey reasoned he needed more seasoning on 
Capitol Hill rather than run for New York governor in 1950. 
During these fi rst years as heir apparent, FDR, Jr. tried to emulate his father but 
based his claim on public offi  ce on the prestige of his name. Rather than imbibe his par-
ents’ sense of public service he thrived on the recognition of the voting public. Th e four 
years ahead of him in Congress gave him the opportunity to acquire this commitment. 
He needed to tone down his attitude of entitlement and display of individual ambition 
to make a successful bid for the next New York Gubernatorial election of 1954. 
128. Joe Lash to FDR, Jr., 2 April 1950, folder Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr. 1940–1965, box 16, Lash 
Papers.








1. FDR, Jr. campaigns for his father in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, 30 October 1940.
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2. FDR, Jr. with FDR who speaks at a campaign really at the Brooklyn Academy of Mu-
sic, 1 November 1940. Left  to right: Jack Dempsey, Herbert Lehman, FDR, Jr., FDR, 
James Farley and Ed Flynn.








3. FDR, Jr. campaigns for John F. Kennedy in West Virginia, 27 April 1960.
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4. FDR, Jr. at Glen Ora, the retreat of the Kennedys in Middleburg, Virginia, 16 Febru-
ary 1963.








5. Swearing-in ceremony of FDR, Jr. as Undersecretary of Commerce, 26 March 1963.




FDR, Jr. returned to Congress in January 1951 and continued to advocate progressive is-
sues that were close to his heart. His major involvement was in a typical New Deal plan. 
FDR, Jr. teamed up with Senator Lehman to press upon the development of the potential 
of the Niagara Falls River for public power by the government. Th e ultimate benefi t 
would be low cost electricity because the rates for the people of New York State were 
substantially higher than in other parts of the country. Th e state also needed additional 
electricity because the demand was expected to double in the next decade.1 Simulta-
neously, Truman called on Congress to approve the St. Lawrence Seaway project. Th is 
was a message to labor leaders in the Great Lakes area because it would link the region 
with the Atlantic and unlock it economically. Th e question became who would control 
the electrical energy from the St. Lawrence and Niagara and its distribution to the state. 
Under the terms of the Roosevelt-Lehman bill the federal government constructed the 
project and would sell it to New York State government.
Republicans denounced the measure as “socialistic” and throughout 1952 and 1953, 
FDR, Jr. reported to his labor supporters that conservatives gradually scuttled the public 
power character of his proposal.2 Without the safeguards called for in his bill FDR, Jr. 
feared that the Federal Power Commission license to the New York State Power Author-
ity would make the public institution “the front only for the private utilities.” Th is would 
set the pattern for their taking over the much vaster resources of the Niagara because 
the Authority would have to “sell to the private utilities at their price … for transmission 
over lines owned and constructed by the private utilities for distribution….” 3 Gover-
nor Dewey opposed the distribution of the hydro-electricity by a public agency. FDR, Jr. 
urged union leaders of the need to coordinate the opposition of labor, rural cooperatives, 
municipalities and civic groups against the “private electrical monopoly grab of Niagara 
1. Congressional Record, (hereaft er C.R.), 81st Congress, 2nd session, 3 May 1950, box 113, FDR, 
Jr. Papers, FDRL; T.L. Hills, Th e St. Lawrence Seaway (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), 74; 
New York Times, 18 January 1951 (hereaft er NYT).
2. NYT, 20 September 1951.
3. FDR, Jr. to Dorothy Schiff  , 13 November 1952, folder Roosevelt, Jr., Franklin D., 1950, 14 
September – 1966, 23 October, Editorial Files, box 65, Dorothy Schiff  Papers, NYPL.







Falls.” 4 Th e 1954 St. Lawrence Seaway Act that did not include any mentioning of public 
power dashed FDR, Jr.’s hopes of revitalizing the liberal-labor coalition.
In his struggle to maintain the relevance of the New Deal , FDR, Jr. championed a 
proposal to extend and improve social security.5 He also fought for civil rights. In the 
1952 and 1953 sessions FDR, Jr. introduced various bills to prohibit lynching, outlaw the 
use of poll taxes, and legislation to end discrimination in employment and to reorganize 
the Justice Department for the protection of civil rights.6 His proposals went nowhere. 
Liberals in Congress had been relegated to a minority and FDR, Jr. reported to Dorothy 
Schiff  that he was “learning fast how to fi ght in the opposition.” 7
Despite his best intentions in taking up worthy issues FDR, Jr.’s attitude determined 
his reputation. Congressional colleagues disputed FDR, Jr.’s claims that he had matured 
and questioned his seriousness and dedication to the job. Th ey found him charming and 
intelligent but oft en absent when they needed him.8 Sam Rayburn also emphasized the 
absentee record. On his swearing in as a member of Congress, he reminded James to 
avoid his brother’s pitfall. “If you follow these same tactics,” the Speaker warned him, 
“you are not going to be as eff ective as I would like to see you.” 9 James pointed out that 
his brother considered the job beneath him and that he oft en coasted instead of worked 
at his congressional duties.
New York City Democratic leader Ludwig Teller off ered an insightful opinion on 
FDR, Jr.’s behavioral fl aws. He “gave the people around him the impression that every-
thing that existed were simply the means whereby he was to achieve whatever he wanted 
4. FDR, Jr. to David Dubinsky , 5 December 1953; FDR, Jr. to Dubinsky, 2 March 1954; FDR, Jr., 
“Dewey and the Niagara Grab,” C.R. 83rd Congress, 1st session, 17 July 1953; “Eisenhower Gives 
State St. Lawrence Go-Ahead,” New York Herald Tribune, 6 November 1953, all in folder 3, box 
306, David Dubinsky Papers, International Ladies Garment Workers Union archives, Industrial 
School of Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY (hereaft er ILGWU archives); Hills, Th e 
St. Lawrence Seaway , 85.
5. H.R. 6036, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1 July 1953, box 143; H.R. 3846, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 10 March 
1953, all in box 145, FDR, Jr. Papers; Steven F. Gillon, Politics and Vision: Th e ADA and American 
Liberalism, 1947–1985 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 124.
6. C.R., 21 May 1952, box 115, FDR, Jr. Papers; H.R. 2576, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 3 February 1953; 
H.R. 3887, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 11 March 1953, all in box 143, FDR, Jr. Papers.
7. FDR, Jr. to Dorothy Schiff  , 13 November 1952, folder Roosevelt, Jr., Franklin D., 1950, 14 
September – 1966, 23 October, Editorial Files, box 65, Schiff  Papers.
8. Stephen Hess , America’s Political Dynasties: From Adams to Kennedy (New York: Double-
day, 1966), 21; Draft  Article Joseph and Stewart Alsop , “Can FDR, Jr. Get His Father’s Old Job 
Back?” box 42, Article, Book, and Speech File, 1937–1963, Alsop Papers, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C. (hereaft er LC); Doris Fleeson , “FDR, Jr. Comes of Age,” New York Post, 23 
September 1954, Personality Clippings Files, box 144, Democratic National Committee Records, 
JFKL (hereaft er DNC); FDR, Jr. to Robert Bush, 24 March 1952, cited in Robert Bush to Ben 
Hibbs, editor Saturday Evening Post, 3 September 1954, box 123, FDR, Jr. Papers.
9. James Roosevelt with Bill Libby, My Parents: A Diff ering View (Chicago, IL: Playboy Press, 
1976), 314. Interview with James Roosevelt, recorded by Steven J. Simmons, 26 March 1979, 9, 
Former Members of Congress Oral History Project, LC.
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to achieve.” 10 FDR, Jr.’s arrogance and individualism developed into an annoying care-
lessness. He conspicuously displayed this shortcoming in being late for appointments 
or missing them completely. “A whole meeting would be built around Frank,” a disil-
lusioned admirer revealed, “and at the last minute he would conk out on you. He would 
say he was sick, and later you would fi nd he had been seen in a nightclub.” 11
Th ough FDR, Jr. dismissed the criticism that he lived off  his father’s heritage and 
used his name to advance political ambitions, his self-confi dence sometimes became 
an irritating brashness. Th ere were a number of New York party leaders whose feel-
ings FDR, Jr. had ruffl  ed because he had talked down to them. Th ey did not think that 
the Roosevelt heritage was a priceless asset and complained about his “intellectual ar-
rogance, brusqueness in dealing with subordinates, and his boyish irresponsibility in 
meeting his commitments.” 12 To another New York Democrat he represented, “a care-
free peripatetic aphrodisiac who owed his standing to the power of his name and good 
looks.” 13 Berle denounced FDR, Jr. as “a young man in a hurry, fi lled more with ambi-
tion than ability or ideas.” 
FDR, Jr. had been schooled from the cradle to politics but he displayed a public im-
age that had “no goal beyond self-advancement.” 14 Th is living off  the family name ham-
pered his attempts at national leadership in Congress. He was rather undisciplined and 
lacked his father’s skill at creating political coalitions when the intricacies of legislation 
were being negotiated in committee. FDR, Jr.’s aimless attitude demonstrated ambition 
rather than steady commitment to leadership and responsibilities.15 
Liberal Party: Marriage of Convenience
Journalists Joseph and Stewart Alsop warned that his “Junior” reputation could eas-
ily be fatal to all the glorious prospects.16 An exasperated Ben Davidson regretted the 
squandering of FDR, Jr.’s promising political future. Th e Liberal Party’s executive direc-
10. Interview with Ludwig Teller by Donald Shaughnessy, New York City, 6 November 1961, 
73–74, Columbia University Oral History Collection, New York City, NY (hereaft er CUOHC).
11. “Campaign quotes about Franklin Roosevelt, Jr.,” Republican State Campaign Committee; 
New York Post, 7 October 1954, all in folder 1954 campaign, series 5, subseries 1, box 39, Jacob 
Javits Papers, State University of New York at Stony Brook (hereaft er SUNY at Stony Brook).
12. Chris McNickle, To Be Mayor of New York: Ethnic Politics in the City (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), 109; “Campaign quotes about Franklin Roosevelt, Jr,” folder 1954 cam-
paign, series 5, subseries 1, box 39, Javits Papers, SUNY at Stony Brook.
13. McNickle, To Be Mayor of New York, 110.
14. Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 258.
15. Jacob K. Javits with Rafael Steinberg, Javits: Th e Autobiography of a Public Man (Boston, 
MA: Houghton Miffl  in, 1981), 203; Chris McNickle, To Be Mayor of New York: Ethnic Politics in 
the City (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 109.
16. Draft  Article Joseph and Stewart Alsop , “Can FDR, Jr. Get His Father’s Old Job Back?” box 
42, Article, Book, and Speech File, 1937–1963, Alsop Papers, LC; David McGregor, Leadership 







tor analyzed, “in many respects he was his own worst enemy, because he was hurting 
his own political future and the potential he had for doing a lot of good.” 17 By charm-
ing forgiveness, FDR, Jr. was sometimes able to overcome these resentments. Forgive-
ness, however, was not enthusiastic support. Th eir encounters left  many politicians with 
mixed feelings as if they were “torn between personal and sentimental aff ection and 
resentment over past rebuff .” 18
Th is ambivalence and reputation hurt FDR, Jr.’s relationship with the Liberal Party. 
Aft er 1950, a chill had settled over their marriage of convenience. One leader stated that, 
“we have not heard from him since, except for re-endorsement.” 19 Moe Falikman, the 
1949 chairman of the Party’s trade union campaign committee expressed the prevailing 
sentiment. He complained, “just because his father was a great man, does not mean I 
have to keep apologizing for his mistakes.” 20 Th e fall out revealed that FDR, Jr.’s popu-
larity among the party’s professionals was only superfi cial.
In January 1951, aft er he had won his second term with endorsements from both 
parties, FDR, Jr. informed the Liberal Party leaders that for reasons of seniority he 
would register himself as a Democrat in the Offi  cial List. With such a designation he 
would be part of the Democratic organization and thus win better committee assign-
ments. FDR, Jr. called attention to the precedent Congressman Jacob Javits had set when 
listed offi  cially as a Republican. Th ereby, he conveniently ignored the fact that Javits 
had won both the Republican and Liberal nominations whereas he had been denied the 
Democratic endorsement in 1949. 
He recognized the contributions of the Liberal Party in directing the Democrats 
toward more liberal goals. But he had also tentatively come to the conclusion that the 
place to achieve his goals to reform the Democrats was within the Democratic Party, 
which meant he had to engineer a break with the Liberals.21 FDR, Jr. off ered to “con-
tinue to refer to myself in all press releases, as a Democrat-Liberal.” 22 Berle sarcastically 
Roles in New York Democratic State Nominating Conventions, 1952–1966 (Ph.D. diss., Colum-
bia University, 1969), 193.
17. Interview #5, with Ben Davidson by Ed Edwin, New York City, 17 August 1977 262, 
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art Alsop, “Can FDR, Jr. Get His Father’s Old Job Back?” all in box 42, Article, Book, and Speech 
File, 1937–1963, Alsop Papers, LC; James Wechsler , “Roosevelt: Th e Backstage Story,” New York 
Post, 8 September 1966, folder 6a, box 36, Louis Stulberg Papers, ILGWU archives.
19. McGregor, “Leadership Roles,” 171.
20. Lee Berton, “Marriage of Convenience,” Wall Street Journal, 3 October 1966, folder 6b, box 
36, Louis Stulberg Papers.
21. Houston I. Flournoy, “Th e Liberal Party in New York State” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton Univer-
sity, 1956), 115, 117.
22. Lee Berton, “Marriage of Convenience,” Wall Street Journal, 3 October 1966, folder 6b, box 
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thanked Roosevelt for “advising me of your decision in advance of its appearance in the 
press.” 23 
To shrug off  the Liberal Party tie made no sense politically. Th e desertion and FDR, 
Jr.’s attitude aroused the antagonism of Alex Rose . It marked the start of a feud of monu-
mental proportions.24 FDR, Jr. had allowed his pride to go too far. He refused to consult 
Rose on every political decision he made, and “to call him up every time I voted” in 
Congress like Javits did and thereby pretending as if they “needed their sense of impor-
tance to be built up.” 25 
FDR, Jr. disliked to be lectured or controlled. In due course, lingering resentment 
over his independence spilled over. Disagreements arose over his refusal to accept 
anybody on his staff  recommended by Rose . FDR, Jr.’s congressional aide disputed the 
claim and maintained that the Liberals got almost half of all the jobs in the offi  ce.26 Th e 
Liberal Party would back FDR, Jr. on national issues but expressed frequently disap-
pointment with his support of machine Democrats against Liberal backed independent 
candidates in local elections. In May 1952, they publicly reprimanded FDR, Jr. by tem-
porarily omitting his name from a party slate of congressional candidates in Manhattan. 
Rose had seen the writing on the wall. He declared, “Some people who think there is 
a short cut to the Governorship by walking out on principles and friends are in for a 
disappointment.” 27
The 1952 Presidential Election
FDR, Jr. was determined to push the party in a liberal direction. When the 1952 presi-
dential election approached, he explained to Chester Bowles , a former offi  cial of his 
father’s administration, that “there was too much at stake both in international policy 
and the continuation of the liberal program of the last twenty years that many of us felt 
that we could not let the nomination go by default to Kefauver or a Southerner.” 28 Sena-
tor Russell of Georgia and Senator Kefauver of Tennessee had already announced their 
23. A. Berle to FDR, Jr. 23 January 1951, folder FDR, Jr. Personal Letters, box 59, FDR, Jr. Pa-
pers; Berton, “Marriage of Convenience,” Wall Street Journal, 3 October 1966, folder 6b, box 36, 
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ber 1966, folder Liberal Party, box 287, FDR, Jr. Papers.
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presidential ambitions. FDR, Jr. feared that the growing conservatism and infl uence of 
the South he encountered in Congress would take over the Democratic Party and would 
endanger his father’s achievements. 
In the run-up to the 1952 national convention the party’s sectional and ideological 
diff erences reached its culmination. Aft er FDR’s death Democrats framed each fi ght in 
terms of ideology. Th e northern wing pinned their hopes on the instrument of federal 
power. Southern Democrats railed against New Deal type intervention that symbolized 
the coming of an urbanizing and industrializing postwar age and that went far beyond 
their desire for social change.29 
Even worse, behind these reforms loomed the threat of racial integration within 
the region. By March 1952, the only issue they seemed to agree on was the replacement 
of Truman . Th e stalemate in Korea, the war-related infl ation and the anti-Communist 
xenophobia had made the president and his administration increasingly unpopular. Th e 
frustration and continuing casualties of the war fuelled McCarthyism. Th is Red Scare 
immobilized Truman’s ability to persuade Congress and lead the country. On 29 March, 
Truman announced his decision not to seek reelection. 
At a press conference the next day in New York, State Party Chairman Paul Fitzpat-
rick announced four “favorite son” possibilities. He gave as order of preference: Herbert 
Lehman , Averell Harriman , James Farley and FDR, Jr. Harriman was the only serious 
candidate since Senator Lehman was barred because of his age and religion. He had 
mentioned FDR, Jr. to build him up for a possibility of a Senate nomination in the fall 
or for governor in 1954. Fitzpatrick explained Farley was on the list, “to keep peace in 
the family.” 30 Liberal sentiment moved to Harriman aft er Illinois Governor Adlai Ste-
venson declined to be a candidate. FDR, Jr. urged him to run on as heir to the New Deal . 
FDR, Jr. optimistically noted that Harriman had a good chance of winning the nomina-
tion.31 On 22 April Harriman declared his candidacy and promised to “preserve and 
continue” the progress of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations.32 
When the excitement subsided, FDR, Jr. refl ected more soberly on Harriman’s can-
didacy. He recognized there was little time because the convention would be held within 
three months. He wrote James , “on his record, I think we have a chance of selling Aver-
York: Morrow, 1992), 491; FDR, Jr. to Chester Bowles , 29 April 1952, box 55, Congressional Pa-
pers, FDR, Jr. Papers.
29. John F. Martin, Civil Rights and the Crisis of Liberalism: Th e Democratic Party, 1945–1976 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 47, 93; Arlene Lazarowitz, “Years in Exile: Th e Liberal 
Democrats, 1950–1959” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1982), 73.
30. “New York,” Confi dential Draft  16 March 1953, Part 1: Political Files, reel 5, President Harry 
S. Truman ’s Offi  ce Files, 1945–1953, Roosevelt Study Center microfi lm edition, Middelburg, the 
Netherlands (hereaft er RSC).
31. FDR, Jr. to Chester Bowles , 15 April 1952, box 55, Congressional Papers, FDR, Jr. Papers.
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ell and his winning the nomination,” but realistically added that “it will not be easy.” 33 
Although Harriman had a magnifi cent public service record the railroad millionaire 
had never sought or won elective offi  ce and was considered a spiritless campaigner. Par-
ty professionals derided the aloofness of the diplomat and called him “Honest Ave the 
Hairsplitter.” 34 
Despite the assurances Truman had given FDR, Jr. in a private meeting the presi-
dent remained a hesitant supporter. Truman wanted Stevenson as his successor and 
used Harriman’s candidacy as New York’s favorite son as an opportunity to rally anti-
Kefauver Northerners. Th erefore, he could pull the rug from under Harriman’s feet at 
any time.35 Th e campaign acknowledged that the key to their eff orts was broadening 
their narrow base. FDR, Jr. argued that it was essential to convince the big northern 
states and “impress on as many state chairmen as possible that Harriman’s candidacy 
was neither a holding operation, nor a bargaining for the vice presidential spot or for a 
Cabinet position” because only then would “Harriman be seriously considered.” 36 
Harriman Campaign
FDR, Jr. accepted the top position of the campaign’s national chairman. He generated 
good publicity by his radio and TV appearances and received encouraging, if non-com-
mittal, reactions from labor and political leaders.37 He used his infl uence with the Po-
litical Action Committee of the CIO to prevent that the labor unions came out for Ke-
fauver . FDR, Jr. pressed on political leaders in various states to remain uncommitted 
until he had an opportunity to discuss the situation with them.
By mid-May, he had made little headway. Most state chairmen expressed reserva-
tions to FDR, Jr.’s queries. Th ey admired Harriman personally, praised his ability as an 
administrator and devotion to public service but gave no encouragement to his candi-
dacy.38 FDR, Jr. fl ew to Chicago to confer with Stevenson and Jacob Arvey , the power-
ful local boss who was close to the Governor. In April, he had met Arvey in Miami 
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who had confi ded that Stevenson was privately telling all his friends that he heartily 
supported Harriman. To stop Kefauver , FDR, Jr. suggested solidifying all liberal sup-
port behind Harriman. Arvey wanted to delay any action until aft er the Illinois State 
convention on 12 May.39 Th e meeting produced no results. Stevenson was reluctant to 
support Harriman because he and Arvey wanted to keep the Illinois delegation together 
by continuing to talk of a possible draft . If Stevenson would withdraw their state delega-
tion would switch to Kefauver.40 FDR, Jr.’s phone call in late May had no eff ect on their 
arguments.41
Stevenson remained the formidable roadblock to Harriman’s candidacy. FDR, Jr. 
devised a strategy to stake an uncompromising civil rights position to attract more lib-
eral support and to become a credible alternative to Kefauver , who at that time had won 
every primary.42 He considered civil rights the vital issue of the election. Th e campaign 
endorsed Truman ’s program of anti-lynching legislation and abolition of the poll tax 
and it called on the federal government to accept responsibility for enforcing civil rights. 
FDR, Jr. persuaded Th urgood Marshall, chief of the NAACP ’s legal division and a num-
ber of nation-wide black leaders to endorse Harriman.43 
Th e strategy worked in the Washington, D.C. primary, where Harriman and Kefau-
ver were active opponents. Harriman advocated a forthright position of integration in 
the predominantly black capital. Harriman accused Kefauver of soft -pedaling the issue 
because he wanted to compromise these views to appease southern opinion.44 On June 
17, the New Yorker beat the Tennessee senator with a stunning 80 percent of the vote. 
Th e huge win boosted Harriman’s confi dence. Yet, it hardly stopped the pace of the 
Kefauver movement.45 By mid-July, the Tennessee Senator had claimed victory in all 
other primaries. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. , a Stevenson supporter, praised the Harriman 
campaign for their superb strategy of all-out support for the New Deal . Th is was also 
smart politics because it awakened “the liberal spirit in the party, the spirit which won 
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the last four elections and without which the Democratic Party is not likely to win this 
time, a fact that Adlai does not seem altogether to understand.” 46 Harriman had re-
minded the Democrats of their New Deal past. Schlesinger, Jr. claimed that by running 
as heir to the New Deal he had “made it almost impossible for the party to retreat from a 
fi ghting progressive position in Chicago.” 47 Th e historian shrewdly suggested that this 
empowered Harriman to endorse Stevenson and claim his possible nomination at the 
convention as a liberal victory. In return, Stevenson would consider him for the position 
of secretary of state.48 
FDR, Jr.’s tactics to wrap up Harriman in the mantle of the New Deal brought him 
into open confl ict with his family. He had pressured Anna to direct the Harriman cam-
paign on the West Coast but she had declined.49 Eleanor also committed herself to 
guarding FDR’s memory. In April, she had quickly quashed a draft  to hand her the 
nomination. She declined to run for public offi  ce because she did not want to stand in 
the way of her bickering children.50 Eleanor told reporters before she fl ew to the con-
vention in Chicago, that she had no preference for a candidate. Yet, she leaned toward 
Stevenson and tried to persuade FDR, Jr. of the inevitability of his nomination.
Her attempts to moderate her son’s radical civil rights views were also unsuccessful. 
She pointed out that a principled stand sometimes needed a strong pragmatic attitude. 
He should downplay the controversial civil rights issue to preserve party unity. Eleanor 
claimed that “understanding and sympathy for white people in the south is as impor-
tant as understanding and sympathy for the colored people.” 51 FDR, Jr. was dead set 
against compromising on this issue and publicly opposed his mother.
In Chicago, FDR, Jr. also denied James the opportunity to pass the New Deal torch 
when he claimed their father’s memory for Harriman. In his nominating speech FDR, 
Jr. pointed out that he had been the only member of his family who had been elected to 
public offi  ce. Th is was a direct slap in the face of his brother. James had switched sup-
port from Kefauver to Stevenson and had just made a seconding speech for the Illinois 
Governor. Th e display of divisiveness and public quarrel within the Roosevelt family 
46. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. to Averell Harriman , 9 July 1952, box p-16, Private Files, Arthur 
M. Schlesinger, Jr. Papers, JFKL.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Bernard Asbell, ed., Mother and Daughter: Th e Letters of Anna and Eleanor Roosevelt (New 
York: Fromm, 1988), 293.
50. Joseph P. Lash , Eleanor Roosevelt : Th e Years Alone (New York: Norton, 1972), 206.
51. Gillon, Politics and Vision, 94; Interview with Mrs. Anna Rosenberg Hoff man by Dr. Th om-
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embarrassed the delegates.52 Elliott and John abandoned their father’s party altogether 
and came out for the Republican candidate, Dwight Eisenhower .53 
Loyalty Pledge
FDR, Jr. became Harriman’s fl oor manager at he convention. He rallied progressive 
forces in a fl oor fi ght with southern delegations over party loyalty.54 Th e Southern states 
remembered the futile bolt from the party four years earlier. In their attempts to reas-
sert control they were aided by Democratic leaders who preached unity and looked for 
a compromise candidate.55 A number of southern delegations had announced that only 
aft er the convention they would decide whether to abide by the decisions of the con-
vention. A subcommittee of the convention revived the issue when it voted to seat the 
anti-Truman conservative delegations from Texas and Mississippi. Rival pro-Truman 
delegations contested the move. Harriman leaders felt that the decision, later ratifi ed 
by the national committee, was a complete insult to the president. Th ey were so upset, 
Warren Moscow , FDR, Jr.’s braintruster recalled, that “they were mad enough to order 
full steam ahead at this point on the loyalty pledge.” 56 
FDR, Jr. strongly denounced the action and came up with an idea to exact a pledge 
from all the delegates to agree to support the decisions of the convention.57 He had good 
reason to resist the seating of the conservative members. Hubert Humphrey pointed 
out that they were “the same people who ganged up on Roosevelt, then his wife, then 
his children, then his dog Fala.” 58 Aft er hours of negotiating and laboring on the fi nal 
version of the oath, he announced at a press conference the next day, that a coalition of 
52. Interview with Joseph. L. Rauh , Jr. by Dr. Th omas F. Soapes, 31 January 1978, Eleanor Roos-
evelt Oral History Transcripts; FDR, Jr. to James Roosevelt , 23 April 1952, box 176, General Cor-
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Harriman and Kefauver forces would wage a fi ght on the issue through the temporary 
or permanent rules of the convention.
Th at night, Michigan Senator Blair Moody , chairman of the rules committee, and 
FDR, Jr. introduced before that committee a loyalty oath amendment. Th is amendment 
read that, before delegates to the convention from any state be permitted to vote for the 
presidential candidate of the Democratic Party, they must take an oath to use their best 
eff orts to see that the candidate chosen through the regular democratic process of the 
convention be listed on the ballot in their home state in November.59
Th at same night, FDR, Jr. and Moody persuaded the convention to adopt the oath 
as part of the temporary rules and to be written in the permanent rules of the next 
convention. Th e South screamed bloody murder because the delegations feared that the 
amendment invaded their states’ rights and improperly limited their freedom of action. 
Th ey attacked FDR, Jr. for using the issue to drive the South out of the convention and 
the party to improve Harriman’s nomination prospects.60 Th ey had a point because 
prospects were indeed bleak. Democratic national chairman McKinney told FDR, Jr. 
that as long as Stevenson was still available, many state delegations considered Har-
riman their second choice. Contact with the White House had been cut aft er Truman 
switched support to Alben Barkley a week before the convention because he thought 
his vice president had a better chance to stop Kefauver . A move Truman later regretted 
not only because labor leaders soon told Barkley to withdraw because of his age but also 
since Harriman had made a successful claim as the New Deal -Fair Deal candidate.61 
Aft er Truman withdrew his support the Harriman campaign radicalized. Th ough 
FDR, Jr. later claimed that he had been willing to settle with Stevenson , the strategy of 
confrontation led to the decision to press the loyalty pledge. Moscow explained that the 
campaign refused to compromise because “… we could not carry the northern states 
with any candidate the South would accept. Th erefore we might as well try and win on 
a straight New Deal candidacy in the North and let the South walk out of the party if it 
wanted to.” 62
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Despite his conspicuous display of “irritating brashness” FDR, Jr. feigned his inno-
cence.63 He explained to Wright Morrow, Democratic National Committeeman from 
Texas, that his interests were “dedicated only to the welfare and victory of the Demo-
cratic Party.” 64 He insisted that he wanted to unite the party by preventing the bolt of 
the South. Th e amendment should be considered an “anti-kidnapping rule” instead of 
a loyalty pledge.65 By introducing this rule Republicans would be unable to kidnap the 
line on the Democratic ballots. If he had not taken the controversial action, FDR, Jr. ar-
gued, “Eisenhower and Nixon would have been on both the Republican and Democratic 
lines.” Th e result would have been a disaster because in “at least three and possibly seven 
southern states the voters would have been not only disenfranchised but the Electoral 
College votes of these states would have been delivered to Eisenhower by mechanical 
chicanery.” 66 FDR, Jr. considered the importance of the new rule “second only to the 
elimination of the two-thirds rule in 1936.” 67
Th e liberals’ claim to victory was premature. Lehman and Harriman had expressed 
doubts about the stringent character of the pledge because they felt it was an attempt 
to bind the conscience of the delegates. Th ey worked behind the scenes to weaken the 
measure. Labor was opposed because its leaders feared if a conservative became the 
nominee they had to pledge him support.68 Moderate southern leaders attempted to 
persuade New York congressmen to water down the pledge. Without the support of 
the solid South, northern machine leaders feared to lose all decisive power. Loeb noted 
that “as a consequence they used all the parliamentary tricks in the book, and many 
that were not in anyone’s book,” to defeat the liberals.69 McKinney called a series of 
meetings where representatives from the South, Moody and FDR, Jr. worked out a com-
promise. In the end, FDR, Jr. agreed to add a qualifi cation to the pledge that “no del-
egates need take action in violation of his state statues or state Democratic Party rules 
or instructions.” 70 
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Aft er the meeting, FDR, Jr. explained his behavior to Moscow . He told his aide taci-
turnly, “Well I gave them some language to prove that I was a reasonable man.” 71 Th e 
press interpreted the compromise as meaning that the pledge did not apply to the 1952 
convention. It castigated the fi ght as a failed attempt by radicals to take over the party. 
Th e fi ght raised eyebrows elsewhere. Liberal Party Chairman Adolf Berle noted in his 
diary that “young Franklin Roosevelt and his mindless militants” were “out of control” 
and “really wanted to drive the southern states out of the Party.” 72 Loeb defended the 
strategy of FDR, Jr. and blamed southerners for the disagreements and division.73 
Civil Rights Plank
FDR, Jr. also foresaw “a real fi ght to modify the civil rights plank” at the convention.74 
Th e debate over the platform resulted in another liberal confrontation with the South 
and the Democratic leadership. It also led to renewed accusations that FDR, Jr. used 
the issue to advance Harriman’s political ambitions. Th e Harriman campaign used the 
fi ght over the civil rights plank to split the convention into a liberal and conservative 
bloc. Th ey hoped that Stevenson would end up as the candidate of the South by forcing 
him to take sides.75 
FDR, Jr. received the support of labor, the ADA , and the NAACP , and lobbied tire-
lessly for an enforceable FEPC and repeal of the Senate rule on cloture. Again the pull 
for unity overwhelmed the liberal forces. A clear majority of the most delegates shared 
the reservations of ADA leader Reinhold Niebuhr when he condemned the position 
of the Harriman campaign as motivated by “purely political considerations.” 76 Even 
dell H. Link, 13, CUOHC. Several southern states refused to sign even this watered-down ver-
sion. In a fi nal eff ort to unite the party behind Stevenson , Arvey and convention chairman Sam 
Rayburn , engineered the seating of the contested delegations anyway. Humphrey denounced the 
move as the “fi rst dagger in the back of the New Deal -Fair Deal.” J.M. Arvey, as told to John Ma-
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Humphrey , the hero of the 1948 civil rights rebellion, had assured party leaders he 
would not lead a fl oor fi ght on the issue. Aft er much discussion agreement party leaders 
worked out a compromise on the civil rights plank by omitting the adjective compul-
sory to describe the FEPC and transferring the fi libuster rule to a neutral section of the 
platform.77
In an ultimate eff ort to halt the Stevenson steamroller, supporters of Harriman and 
Kefauver met at the Congress Hotel on the last night of the convention. Th ere was talk 
of a Kefauver-Harriman or a Kefauver-Roosevelt tickets. An exasperated FDR, Jr. made 
an angry speech in which he blasted Stevenson as the “Northern Dixiecrat” for sur-
rendering to the demands of southern reactionaries.78 Frustrated, liberals aborted their 
meeting in the wee hours of the early morning. 
Labor boss Walter Reuther tried to convince FDR, Jr. to accept the second spot on a 
ticket with Stevenson if he could persuade Harriman to endorse the governor. FDR, Jr. 
bristled at the suggestion of “cutting a deal for himself behind Harriman’s back.” 79 He 
told Reuther that the selection of a vice presidential candidate was “entirely in the hands 
of the presidential nominee and President Truman .” 80
In the fi nal convulsions of the rebellion, anonymous leafl ets were distributed among 
the delegates that urged them to nominate the “son of our former great President and 
the First Lady of the World” as vice president. Th e statement read, “With Roosevelt, Jr. 
as the Vice-Presidential Candidate, the Young Voters of America Will Rally Behind the 
Democratic Party.” 81 Th is made FDR, Jr. prone to accusations that he used his name to 
advance his political ambitions. Berle attacked him for creating a deadlock to become 
the running mate on a ticket, thereby selling Harriman out in the process.82 FDR, Jr. 
denied any ambition to occupy the second spot because he revealed that “having lived 
so close to it, it holds none of the glamour for me that it does for so many others.” 83
Rather than to unite the party under the New Deal banner, FDR, Jr. had become a 
divisive fi gure. His weakening hold on the New York delegation contributed to the rap-
idly diminishing prospects. Since FDR, Jr. was much occupied in the thick of the loyalty 
and platform controversies, he acted more as Harriman representative than delegation 
leader. Despite frantic eff orts to drop their favorite son, the delegation held fi rm on the 
fi rst ballot. FDR, Jr. had a slim hope that Stevenson would fall short of a majority and 
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liberals would regroup with Harriman.84 Hopes dashed when they met Truman dur-
ing the recess aft er the second ballot. Th e president told Harriman to withdraw. Harri-
man announced the switch from the platform before the balloting resumed because he 
felt that Stevenson should owe his nomination to northern rather than to conservative 
votes.85 On the next ballot, Stevenson won the nomination. 
FDR, Jr. blamed bad breaks for the outcome. He sulked that if Truman had not 
come out for Stevenson , they might have overcome their biggest handicap, the short-
age of time. Labor leaders had forced Stevenson candidacy on the liberals and had only 
wanted to discuss the vice presidential spot on the ticket.86 Yet, FDR, Jr. argued that the 
adoption of a loyalty pledge had “eliminated the threat of another Dixiecrat Party as in 
1948.” 87 Aft er Democratic governors of Texas, Louisiana and South Carolina announced 
their support for Eisenhower , Harriman praised FDR, Jr.’s foresight and claimed that his 
struggle “had been vindicated by these developments.” 88 
FDR, Jr. concluded that his eff orts had been successful because “Harriman’s can-
didacy did much to keep the party from relaxing into a middle-of-the-road-attitude 
and instead to continue its liberal forward drive.” 89 Harriman assured FDR, Jr. that 
his principled positions at the convention had won him widespread respect and had 
strengthened his political position. He declared that he “demonstrated to all of America 
the capacity for intelligent and courageous leadership. Th e Convention was Frank Roos-
evelt’s fi rst test of national leadership. He met it brilliantly.” 90 Eleanor heaped more 
praise upon her son. “Everyone I see feels you have put up a magnifi cent fi ght,” she 
wrote him, evidently ignoring their disagreements on the presidential candidate and 
the civil rights issue before the convention.91 
A number of Democrats criticized FDR, Jr. attitude and tactics. Liberal New York 
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Post columnist Murray Kempton called the campaign quixotic though it had “held aloft  
lamp of the New Deal .” 92 Sam Rayburn , the House Democratic leader, indicated that 
the 1956 national convention would be much more amicable if FDR, Jr. did not control 
the New York delegation.93 An annoyed James Farley told him face to face that he had 
found “his attitude in Chicago in 1952 most off ensive; that he was contemptuous of us 
older men; and that he and Blair Moody had not acted properly.” 94
Introspection set in aft er the convention. FDR, Jr. humbly off ered his apologies to 
Farley for his alleged arrogant behavior.95 FDR, Jr. admitted to Ed Flynn , his political 
mentor that he had “personally really missed your sure and experienced hand, guidance, 
direction and leadership.” 96 He had come to the conclusion that Flynn’s wise counsel 
“would have helped us over some bumps that were rather jarring and would have helped 
us to avoid actions which I now realize should have been avoided.” 97 His condescend-
ing tactics and self-confi dent attitude had pressed the loyalty oath too far and put off  
Democratic leaders.98
FDR, Jr. had claimed that the memory of FDR could unite liberals under the ban-
ner of the New Deal , but used it instead to advance political ambitions and Harriman’s 
candidacy. Some observers concluded that the outcome of the convention meant the 
demise of the New Deal. Th e Wall Street Journal declared, “Last week came an end to a 
revolution. Th e Democratic Party itself called a halt to a militant movement that for 20 
years has been known as the New Deal or Fair Deal.” 99 Th e general public had accepted 
the basic size and scope of the New Deal programs. In the fall election, Eisenhower ben-
efi ted from the mood of the voters who yearned for change but not for violent change 
back to the New Deal.100 Th e war hero and Republican candidate handily beat Stevenson 
to occupy the White House.
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The 1954 Election: Campaign Strategy
Aft er the 1950 debacle, FDR, Jr. was determined to win the 1954 Gubernatorial prize. 
He did not have to worry about reelection because he held a secure Democratic seat. 
Th erefore, FDR, Jr. could freely aim his political arrows on higher offi  ce to prove that his 
heredity was more than skin-deep. Since 1948, FDR, Jr. had spent time on the campaign 
trail oft en “fl ying into remote, unpaved airports, accompanied only by the pilot of the 
tiny airplane, to be the feature attraction at a Saturday or Sunday aft ernoon clambake” 
as a Saturday Evening Post reporter described it.101 Th ese visits also eff ectively “boosted 
the morale and stiff ened the backbones of numerous despairing local Democratic orga-
nizations which had not seen or heard from a state party offi  cial in decades.” 102 Th rough 
his barnstorming tours he became one of the most wanted and available speakers for 
political rallies throughout the upstate region. He expanded thereby his popular appeal 
beyond the delegates from his own and neighboring New York City districts.103
At the end of 1953, FDR, Jr. seemed the most likely Democratic nominee for the Gu-
bernatorial election. Th e state CIO as well as the New York Young Democrats organiza-
tion had pledged their support.104 FDR, Jr. could also take advantage from the outcome 
of the 1950 and 1952 elections for governor and senator. Since these state-wide contests 
had seen unknown, conservative Democratic candidates going down to crushing con-
secutive defeats, FDR, Jr. looked the perfect candidate. He was popular, an inspiring 
campaigner and had liberal credentials.105 Th e fact that even Republican hero Nelson 
Rockefeller , a possible formidable opponent, refused to run against FDR, Jr. underlined 
his frontrunner status.106
In compliance with the New York State tradition, he denied being a candidate 
though stated that he would be available to accept the Democratic nomination when 
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draft ed.107 Yet, FDR, Jr. had devised an ingenious strategy that portrayed him as the 
strongest available candidate who could beat any Republican opponent. He predicted 
that he would have three hundred delegates by early August, a number that would give 
him an aura of inevitability and virtually assured him the nomination. 
New York was one of few states where candidates for all state offi  ces, including gov-
ernor or senator were selected at party conventions. Th e goal was to win votes among 
convention delegates by winning support among the party leaders who controlled the 
delegations. Since the New York City county leaders controlled the majority of those 
delegates, 509 votes, they in eff ect chose the candidates, if they could agree among 
themselves. Th e process lent itself to classical smoke-fi lled-room bargaining.108
During a meeting in early 1954, the shrewd New York county leader, Carmine De-
Sapio had suggested to FDR, Jr. to secure upstate support and build momentum by qui-
etly courting upstate Democratic chairmen and to line up commitments from those 
men who controlled the county delegates. Th is way he also avoided the appearance of 
being the captive of the New York City machine.109 DeSapio would then win over the 
city leaders for him.110 
Th e strategy took eff ect almost immediately. In a mid-January swing through Elmi-
ra, Ithaca and Binghampton, DeSapio “escorted, chaperoned, and managed” FDR, Jr. in 
the hope “to get Junior elected on his father’s name.” 111 Aft er 1950, FDR, Jr. had mended 
the fences with Tammany and supported Democratic candidates in New York City races. 
DeSapio needed the Roosevelt name to back up his claim for reforming the machine. 
FDR, Jr. discussed his run for the governorship with his mother. Eleanor supported 
his strategy to arrive at the convention as the upstate favorite son, which would remove 
the big city boss stigma from his candidacy. She disagreed over using DeSapio as an 
advisor and warned FDR, Jr., “do not ever trust him.” 112 Close friend Dorothy Schiff  also 
saw no need for him to become DeSapio’s lackey. Th e New York Post publisher bluntly 
told FDR, Jr. that at times he was inclined to play down to certain people because he did 
not realize his real and potential strength. Schiff  felt that FDR, Jr.’s cynicism led him to 
underestimate his strength with the Democratic leadership and to the feeling he had to 
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make deals with the leadership that could be damaging in the long run. She advised him 
to better learn to use some of the arrogance like his father had done.113
FDR, Jr. realized he took a bold gamble. If nominated, he would have to give up 
his seat in Congress. If he would then lose the gubernatorial election, he would end 
up without political offi  ce, as a mere country squire who bred cattle and horses on his 
Hudson Valley farm. If successful, FDR, Jr. would play a major national role in selecting 
the party’s next presidential nominee at the 1956 national convention.114 Th e calculated 
strategy drew praise from observers who termed it “shrewd and original.” Veteran po-
litical pundits called the campaign “one of the cleverest ever seen for the Democratic 
nomination.” 115 Joseph and Stewart Alsop warned against underestimating FDR, Jr. 
When it came to politics, “Roosevelt had never been an amateur, not even when he was 
in knee pants.” Th ey termed his campaign strategy not that of a “feckless youth, a politi-
cal hobbledehoy but of a thorough-going professional.” 116 
Th e strategy enabled FDR, Jr. to shed the “Junior” image of a youthful playboy that 
had dogged him and replace it with a responsible, well-informed and matured attitude. 
A team of youthful braintrusters executed the campaign strategy. Jonathan Bingham , 
whom FDR, Jr. had known ever since they went to Groton School together, gave him a 
cram course in New York State issues by arranging some twenty-fi ve briefi ng sessions to 
cover all major aspects of the state government. He saw to it that FDR, Jr. applied himself 
to master them in detail, a fact that was facilitated by FDR, Jr.’s capability of remember-
ing and reproducing what he heard almost verbatim.117 James Lanigan was responsible 
for lining up upstate support and the offi  cer in charge of winning the nomination. Justin 
Feldman arranged appointments and accompanied FDR, Jr. on the campaign trail. Lou 
Harris served as executive secretary and political analyst. FDR, Jr. oft en kidded Harris 
for having the same initials and name as Louis Howe , his father’s invaluable assistant, 
and mocked that it must have been made in heaven.118
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FDR, Jr. cut down on eating and drinking for the 1954 election and the campaign ad-
vertised him as the “New Roosevelt.” 119 Still, there was nothing new about the squab-
bling among the Roosevelt family. Th e rivalry lessened the public glow of the Roosevelt 
name.120 Aft er James ’ second marriage with Romelle Schneider ended in divorce, a letter 
surfaced in February 1954 in which James confessed to intimate relationships with nine 
women. He had written and signed the multiple adultery apology in 1945 because the 
devout Roman-Catholic Romelle, who had strong beliefs in repentance and a purge of 
the soul, hoped thereby to symbolize a new beginning in their marriage. James was also 
concerned over his father’s bad health. He was aware how disillusioned FDR had been at 
his fi rst marital break-up. He feared that the news of a second stranded marriage would 
be too much an emotional strain on his father.121
Since he had also announced his candidacy for a Congressional Democratic seat 
from Los Angeles, the question quickly became what eff ect James ’ marital diffi  culties 
would have for the Roosevelt name in general.122 Th e acrimonious exchanges between 
Jim Halsted , Anna ’s husband, and James revealed fundamental disagreements as to the 
harm the Roosevelt name would be subjected to. Halsted argued that the reentry of 
James into politics would have a devastating personal eff ect on the whole Roosevelt fam-
ily. Since Romelle was motivated, he wrote James, “by hatred and a desire to destroy 
you the incessant publicity would not subside”, and continue to incalculably damaging 
the name and legacy of FDR.123 He accused James that by pursuing his “obsession to be 
elected to Congress,” he would aid the McCarthy forces by laying “your father’s name 
and administration open to nefarious attacks resulting from your personal diffi  culties.” 
He warned not to succumb to the Roosevelt habit of believing that you accomplish re-
habilitation only through the ballot and public approval.124 James confi rmed that the 
hatred of his former wife ran to the whole Roosevelt family in name, but diff ered on the 
proposed solution. He stubbornly noted that the most eff ective way to blunt Romelle’s 
weapon and displace her sensational charges was to build “a record of service to people 
in the tradition of liberalism and the family name.” 125
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FDR, Jr. also tried to dissuade James from running for offi  ce. He argued to Elliott 
that by staying in politics, James would irreparably damage the public esteem for the 
Roosevelt name because it was “impossible for him to stay out of the limelight.” 126 FDR, 
Jr. harshly judged that his brother’s well being would only benefi t by completely with-
drawing from politics, not to mention his own political prospects. He advised James to 
establish a sound fi nancial and personal reputation before returning to public service 
because “chances for political offi  ce always come to those who are eminently qualifi ed 
rather than to those who desperately seek.” 127
FDR, Jr. sought to enlist Anna ’s and Elliott ’s support in the political competition 
with his eldest brother. FDR, Jr. requested that Anna and Elliott remain neutral in the 
California campaign because “to oppose him would be disloyal, to support him would 
be hypocritical.” 128 Unable to convince James to withdraw his candidacy, Anna and El-
liott agreed to do nothing. Th e atmosphere within the Roosevelt family further deterio-
rated during a tense dinner at Elliott’s house in early April. James appealed to Eleanor 
for help.129
FDR, Jr. also jockeyed for his mother’s approval. He suggested remaining impartial 
on her trip to California in April by not saying anything that could be interpreted as op-
posing or supporting James ’ nomination.130 He became angry aft er he heard that Elea-
nor had privately approved and supported James’ decision to run. He felt that instead of 
running for offi  ce, James should devote himself to the repayment of his $100,000 debt of 
the 1950 election to their mother.131 As a result of the sibling rivalry, Eleanor maintained 
a public silence on the race of her eldest son at the westcoast as well as on the contest 
at the eastcoast. She feared that her endorsements would add ammunition to existing 
charges of nepotism and dynasty building.132
In all their diff erent ventures the children continued to rely on their mother for 
support and advice. Eleanor oft en was critical of the lack of commitment in their deal-
ings but felt responsible and attempted to compensate for her inadequacy as a mother. 
Th e continuing quarrelling among the children over the division of profi ts from FDR’s 
memory distressed her. Eleanor wanted to develop a joint family enterprise but oft en 
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she had to act as the referee to appease family rows. Th e one thing the Roosevelt chil-
dren agreed upon was their hostility towards Eleanor’s “adopted family”: particularly 
her young doctor and close friend David Gurewitsch . Th ey were united in their jeal-
ousy of Eleanor’s display of permissiveness, approval, and attention to her coterie. Anna 
called them “hangers on.” FDR, Jr. even admitted to Edna Gurewitsch that her husband 
David, “was more of a son to my mother than any of her sons.” 133
Th e Republican press was delighted to have such a big story unfavorable to the 
Roosevelt family to play up. Th e fact that James and his wife were feuding was a routine 
story. When Hearst’s International News Service published the infi delity letter, the New 
York Journal American headlined the story as “FDR’s Son,” in an attempt to harm his 
political future by implying that the son was FDR, Jr.134 
Th e liberal New York Post had trouble determining how to report the aff air to the 
public particularly in a town where, as editor James Wechsler stated, “Roosevelt is prac-
tically a religious name.” 135 Wechsler discussed the matter with Dorothy Schiff  to assess 
its true value. He wondered if the story was this big because “Jimmy is a political fi gure 
in his own right, or,” he argued, “because most papers want to prove the Roosevelt fam-
ily is a mess?” 136 Schiff  regretted that the Post had “missed a terrifi c opportunity” to 
clear the name of FDR, Jr., “because Jimmy is a very minor political fi gure, but Frank 
is a major political fi gure.” Th ey should have carried the aff air on the front page under 
the name of James Roosevelt rather than having buried the story in the inside pages. It 
had become such a major story because the subject was FDR’s son. Schiff  explained, “the 
other Roosevelt boys had been well-known as playboys in the past, they seemed to have 
reformed but now Jimmy is in more trouble than his brothers ever fell into.” 137
Th ough a Roosevelt supporter, Schiff  was a publisher fi rst. She argued that a news-
paper also had a duty to inform its readers. Since everything FDR’s immediate family 
did was of intense interest to the public, she reasoned, the people had a right to know 
and make up their own minds “about whether it thinks the children are all no good 
or whether they should be judged by their individual records.” Schiff ’s main concern 
therefore was “with immediate results in circulation.” 138
On the surface, FDR, Jr. confi dently faced the repercussions of his brother’s aff air 
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and the revived rivalry on his own political future. He told Anna in early March, “very 
honestly, I do not feel that Jimmy’s situation will in the slightest degree aff ect me in New 
York.” 139 Hidden behind these optimistic words, his campaign team did fear that their 
candidate would be hurt. Th e announcement of James second divorce underlined FDR, 
Jr.’s own divorce from Ethel in 1949. Th ey took precautions to secure their virtual hold 
on the nomination. Th e results of the public opinion surveys were so reassuring to FDR, 
Jr. that he could boast to Anna “our polls have shown that among the voters it has abso-
lutely no eff ect” on the election.140 It was merely a question of minimizing the impact of 
the unfortunate matter. Th e most eff ective way, FDR, Jr. explained to Elliott and James 
Halsted was for “Jimmy to settle this immediately” and “to withdraw completely from 
politics,” because then “it will all be forgotten.” 141
Th e whole controversy could become a banana peel for FDR, Jr.’s candidacy to slip 
on because it tapped into the resentment among the Catholic community directed 
against the Roosevelt family. Already the New York Times had reported that because of 
James ’ divorce many Catholics would refuse to vote for FDR, Jr.142 Th is came on top of 
the controversy between Eleanor and Cardinal Francis Spellman over fi nancial support 
to Catholic schools. In the summer of 1949, Eleanor had written a column in support of 
the Barden Bill pending in Congress that would have given federal aid to education. She 
endorsed the principle but demanded to bar fi nancial assistance to parochial schools to 
the chagrin of Cardinal Spellman who led the fi ght for the inclusion of Catholic schools. 
Spellman attacked Eleanor personally and denounced, “her record of anti-Catholicism 
unworthy of an American mother.” 143
Th ough Eleanor had made eff orts not to hamper her political sons by taking too 
intransigent a stand in public, FDR, Jr. suff ered from the consequences of his mother’s 
opposition. It left  him vulnerable to Catholic wrath at future elections because Eleanor’s 
position had cost him many votes.144
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New York Democratic Party Leaders
FDR, Jr. publicly declared his candidacy on 11 June 1954, just days aft er James had won 
the California Democratic primary. His perceived strength as the frontrunner discour-
aged other Democratic candidates to enter the race. FDR, Jr.’s popularity neutralized 
the danger from the conservative wing and also kept dark horses on the liberal side at 
bay. In the absence of Democratic competitors support continued to come in. At the end 
of June, FDR, Jr. could claim over 234 delegates.145 
Yet, FDR, Jr. remained anxious how downstate Democratic leaders would react to 
James ’s troubles and how they viewed what eff ect the issue might have on the voters. 
Campaign adviser Joe Lash had found out that of the fi ve leaders, DeSapio , Lehman , 
Mayor Robert Wagner , Jr. , State chairman Richard Balch , and Charles Buckley of Bronx 
county, some felt that FDR, Jr.’s candidacy was “being hurt badly.” 146 
Eleanor’s warning to “never trust DeSapio ” had been prescient when the Tammany 
Hall leader took his fi rst direct action to slow FDR, Jr.’s drive. On 6 July DeSapio an-
nounced a postcard poll of 5 percent of the enrolled Democrats to test candidate prefer-
ence. Since it was to be returned by mid-August, it was clear that other county leaders 
would hold back their support until the results came in before committing themselves. 
Th e Roosevelt campaign acknowledged the move as an obvious attempt to delay and 
“coming from DeSapio, we knew it meant trouble.” 147
DeSapio recalled past instances of arrogance and unreliability and feared that they 
were unable to control FDR, Jr. Balch found that FDR, Jr.’s personality and name were a 
mixed asset, impeded by the confl ict raging around the family both within and outside 
the Party.148 Th ough the hatchet of the 1949 Spellman aff air had been long buried, Cath-
olic opposition did catch up with FDR, Jr. in the long run. It hurt his prospects because 
it reinforced the impression that had been planted in the minds of the bosses.149 
Party leaders also expressed concern over maintaining their positions. By meeting 
his 1 August deadline of three hundred delegates by the end of July, FDR, Jr.’s quick 
gains made him an independent force and a threat to the state leadership. An FDR, Jr. 
victory, backed by upstate chairmen, would not only lessen their infl uence but Governor 
Roosevelt might even supplant the present state leadership.150 
Th e idea of an Averell Harriman ’s candidacy had taken root with the party leaders. 
Harriman had been waiting in the wings but privately feared that FDR, Jr.’s name and 
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frontrunner’s status would be too much to overcome.151 He was also notorious for waf-
fl ing when the time came for a serious commitment to a race. James Wechsler dismissed 
his chances. He bluntly declared, “Averell has been made a fool of in New York politics. 
He allowed his name to be kicked around in the mayoralty campaign and the same 
thing will happen in the gubernatorial campaign.” 152 Wechsler predicted, “if any liberal 
gets it, it will be Frank Roosevelt, Jr.” 153 
Joe Rauh also claimed that Harriman did not have the feel for electoral politics. 
Rauh conceded that the Democrats wanted a winner and FDR, Jr. was the man to beat. 
Despite having the “same irritating characteristics” as his father, he admitted, “Frank 
really seems to have it. He has the will to fi ght for his ambitions, and he has the political 
shrewdness to equip him for the fi ght.” 154 Rauh grudgingly acknowledged, “Junior is the 
popular choice, whether we like it or not.” Harriman would face humiliation. Unless the 
unthinkable occurred that he would buy the election, or Farley would throw “his full 
weight to him in order to get back at FDR through his son,” or by a strange combination 
of circumstances the big bosses in the city would decide “to knife Junior.” 155
FDR, Jr. feared that the ground would shift  to Harriman and began making over-
tures in late August to the city leadership. His talks with DeSapio and Balch produced 
no results. In his meeting with Buckley, FDR, Jr.’s self-confi dent attitude wreaked havoc. 
It cost him the possible support of the infl uential Brooklyn county leader.156 Buckley had 
been leaning toward FDR, Jr. as a far better speaker and campaigner than Harriman. 
When he accepted an invitation to lunch for the purpose of negotiating the terms of his 
support, “FDR, Jr.’s fi rst words to him were: I have got twenty county leaders with me, 
and you had better get on the bandwagon. I did not know that was why you invited me 
to lunch, Buckley said rising from the table without eating.” Whereupon he called Har-
riman to assure him of his support.157
Th is pinpointed at the Achilles’ heel of FDR, Jr.’s campaign. He believed that his 
name and popularity could win any elective offi  ce he desired, particularly the governor-
ship.158 Aft er FDR, Jr.’s exhausting display of condescending self-confi dence, irritating 
independence, and boundless ambition, Alex Rose made sure that no one believed that 
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“young Franklin had a direct line to God.” 159 Rose compared FDR, Jr.’s attitude as if he 
had hired “a young fellow to work in the union, who went around telling everybody he 
wanted to run for president of the International.” Th e Liberal Party leader was fed up 
with his one-time protege because FDR, Jr.’s ambition “got the better of him.” 160 
Since Rose was unable to make him change his mind, he persuaded the hesitant 
Harriman to publicly announce his candidacy on 25 July to stem the tide and cool off  
FDR, Jr.’s drive for delegates. Rose had met continuously the previous weeks with Harri-
man. He had argued that the former Ambassador was the only Democrat that could win 
the election because of his experience and stature as a public servant. A successful gu-
bernatorial campaign could also serve as a stepping stone to the 1956 White House.161
Th e competition between FDR, Jr. and Harriman for the nomination brought to 
light interesting divisions and alignments among the Democrats, particularly in the 
party’s liberal wing. Th ough both candidates were products of the New Deal , and dis-
played marginal philosophical diff erences, FDR, Jr. was regarded as more progressive. 
He derived his support from the party’s young liberal reformers, the ADA , the state’s 
CIO labor unions, and from old professional upstate politicians who were dissatisfi ed 
with the party leadership of the last decade. Harriman’s backing consisted of the older 
and more conservative former New Dealers and Fair Dealers and he had been endorsed 
by the state’s AFL labor unions.162 
Sam Rosenman , FDR’s savvy political adviser, reported to Lehman that FDR, Jr. 
began to lose some ground to Harriman. He felt that Harriman as opposed to the time 
when he announced, was now the better candidate.163 Th e results of a poll in mid-Au-
gust reinforced Rosenman’s observations. Wagner got 30 percent, Harriman 29 percent, 
and FDR, Jr., the alleged popular frontrunner, was listed at 19 percent. Th e outcome 
amplifi ed the general party feeling that Harriman was less controversial and more ac-
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ceptable than FDR, Jr. and could draw broader party support to unite both wings of the 
Democratic Party.164 
By early September, FDR, Jr. boasted that his support had grown to forty-three coun-
ties and more than 350 delegates. His show of strength failed to overpower downstate 
leaders who met at the New York City Biltmore Hotel on 3 September to force a decision 
on a candidate. DeSapio , Rose , Balch , and Julius Edelstein , Lehman ’s aide who was act-
ing as an agent for the Senator, discussed the nomination until the early morning.165
Rose was not to be charmed into forgiveness this time and he emphatically urged 
agreement on Harriman. Rose had promised to deliver the crucial votes of his party 
and had informed Balch that the Liberal Party would accept Harriman, Wagner, or 
FDR, Jr., in that order. He set out to convince the Democratic leaders, notably DeSapio 
and Lehman , to refrain from nominating FDR, Jr. Rose lead the discussion and cited 
FDR, Jr.’s great political liabilities. Aft er consultation, Rose had found that, based upon 
his father’s narrow margins in the 1940 and 1944 elections in New York State, FDR, 
Jr. could not win. Th e Democratic Party’s conservative wing refused to support him. 
He also noted that many people, notably Italians and Jews, would not vote for FDR, Jr. 
because of his poor record in Congress. Catholic voters remained cool toward FDR, Jr. 
because of the Spellman aff air and the divorce of James .166
Rose had been aware of Lehman ’s uneasiness and he constantly sought to reassure 
Edelstein that “what was being decided upon was very much for the best.” Sentimen-
tally, Lehman had been leaning toward FDR, Jr. Earlier, Rose had persuaded the Senator 
to hold off  a public endorsement of FDR, Jr. because he was a “young man in a hurry 
who would improve with age and reverses.” 167 Rose convinced the others to agree upon 
Harriman’s nomination. When private meetings with FDR, Jr. failed to bring his with-
drawal, other downstate leaders added their endorsements bringing Harriman’s total to 
419 votes.168 Th e fi nal nail in FDR, Jr.’s coffi  n came on 7 September when Dewey formally 
announced that he would not run. While the Republicans swung to Irving Ives, Demo-
crats in a large number of counties shift ed their support to Harriman.169
In an attempt to assuage bruised feelings, Lehman had secretly off ered FDR, Jr. the 
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second spot on the ticket with Harriman, that of lt. governor. Edelstein admitted to 
Lehman that it would be “a hard job bringing the two together, if it can be done at all,” 
since both Harriman as FDR, Jr. had developed a marked antipathy to each other.170 
Th e next day though, a headstrong FDR, Jr. left  for Albany and, egged on by the CIO, 
declared there to continue to fi ght and take the contest for the nomination to the con-
vention fl oor.171
FDR, Jr. did not pull out because if he did and Harriman lost, Democrats would 
only blame him, not DeSapio or other leaders. He also wanted to dispel the notion and 
prove the party leaders wrong with regard to the Catholic resentment that had been 
building up against the Roosevelt family. FDR, Jr. had told Dorothy Schiff  that the views 
of the Catholic Church and the opposition of Catholic leaders had swayed Lehman in 
his decision to support Harriman. He had repeatedly hammered at Harriman’s tainted 
association with Yalta and insisted that “this would be a great liability and would lose 
Catholic votes while, he at the time of Yalta served in the Navy and could not be held 
responsible for it.” 172 Th e conservative wing of the Democratic Party had grown tired 
of the New Deal and FDR’s diplomacy. Th ese old-line Democrats repudiated FDR for 
appeasing Stalin at Yalta and felt that they could not bring themselves to vote for a Roos-
evelt on the account of the World War II conference.173
In a desperate attempt to salvage his nomination, FDR, Jr. had asked Schiff  to pub-
lish these charges in the New York Post. Th is would undoubtedly have caused a great 
stir and done harm to Harriman’s pending nomination. Schiff  called Edelstein who 
vehemently denied these charges. DeSapio and Edelstein had met with FDR, Jr. to ex-
plain the choice and had stressed that the preference for Harriman was based upon his 
greater record of achievement and public service. Edelstein denied that for Lehman the 
so-called Catholic opposition had been a factor in his mind. He stated that Lehman had 
never believed that “Frank would lose any considerable number of Catholic votes merely 
because of his mother or his father, … but there might very well be some loss of votes 
because of Ives’ more imposing record as compared to that of FDR, Jr., a factor which 
would not be present in regard to Averell.” 174
FDR, Jr. was furious. He felt betrayed by the city leaders whom, he claimed, had 
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promised him the nomination four years earlier and by former intimate associates of his 
father such as Farley, Lehman , and Harriman who had blackballed his eff orts to emulate 
his father.175 Eleanor never forgave DeSapio . She went on to lead the reform movement 
that defeat him for offi  ce in 1961. 
Convention
Th e bitterness of the nomination fi ght carried over to the convention. On 21 September 
at the 165th Armory in Manhattan, the crowded convention hall was packed with two 
thousand delegates and another 2,700 Democratic spectators. FDR, Jr.’s rapidly failing 
prospects rested upon a stampede in combination with early strength among the early 
delegations of the roll call. FDR, Jr. had installed himself in a little hideaway behind the 
speaker’s platform. Accompanied by Eleanor, he communicated with his leaders on the 
fl oor by walkie-talkie and telephone directing the demonstrations of his supporters. 
At times, the pandemonium looked uncontrollable. His partisans launched a 
last-ditch attempt to alter the inevitable outcome and fl ooded the hall with Roosevelt 
streamers and banners. Th e scene was so heated and riotous that fi stfi ghts broke out 
with the Harriman supporters, the public address system went dead, while power to the 
elevators was shut off  repeatedly.
When FDR, Jr.’s name was placed in nomination, it touched off  a demonstration that 
lasted nearly an hour. To most observers it seemed that FDR, Jr. was only going through 
the motions for those whom had backed him.176 It was only aft er midnight that the roll 
call got under way and over an hour later when Harriman was put over the top, FDR, 
Jr. went to the platform and asked the convention to make the nomination unanimous. 
Aft er the bitter contest, the gracious move drew respect and applause from delegates. It 
signaled praise for his manifestation as a political professional.177 
New York Post columnist Doris Fleeson observed that there was victory in defeat 
because “in a very real sense the Young Roosevelt came of age at that hot, late hour 
in the 165th Regiment Armory. Hard-bitten men left  that session admitting, perhaps 
for the fi rst time that his heredity was more than skin-deep.” 178 By nominating Harri-
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man, Democrats had missed the opportunity to pass the leadership torch on to a new 
generation.
Party leaders convened to name the rest of the ticket. Lehman phoned from his 
Idaho resort to urge DeSapio to off er FDR, Jr. a place on the ticket for Attorney General 
to ensure his active role in the general election campaign and placate disgruntled la-
bor leaders, young people, and upstate supporters.179 Under pressure to accept, FDR, Jr. 
sought the advice of his mother. Eleanor told her son, “you will have to decide. Th ey [the 
party leaders] may never forgive you if you do not run, but you may lose.” 180 At that time, 
common sense assumed that FDR, Jr.’s victory was a shoo-in and he would win by two 
hundred thousand votes. FDR, Jr. saw an opportunity to salvage his career. By matching 
his appeal against Harriman, he could truly prove that he was the most popular Demo-
crat and that the party leaders had erred in picking the railroad millionaire.181
Th e next morning on 22 September FDR, Jr. discussed the off er with his campaign 
staff  before meeting the party leadership at his law offi  ce later that aft ernoon. Opinion 
was evenly divided and no decision was taken. One purist faction urged to continue to 
battle with the party leadership while others reasoned that FDR, Jr. had to cave in some-
time and submerge his own interests or give up on his political career altogether.182 
Party leaders renewed their off er. FDR, Jr. refused because he felt that Harriman 
was a likely loser in the general election and by joint voting he would go down defeat, 
too. Th en the bosses told FDR, Jr. that the ticket needed him. He did not have to raise 
money for the state organization and that Harriman had pledged to run only one term. 
Th ey assured FDR, Jr. that if he did run ahead of Harriman as attorney general, they 
would commit themselves to him for 1958. Finally, he relented and took the bait.183
In defeat, the Roosevelt family clanged together and praised FDR, Jr.’s fi ghting spir-
it. Anna noted, “it sounds like the wisest thing you could do under many circumstances. 
Somehow we felt very confi dent about your chances in the election but feel very unsure 
about Harriman’s.” James wrote optimistically, “you may have lost the battle, but you 
will still win the war.” John agreed and reassured his older brother that “you still have 
time and they will have to come to you.” 184
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Jacob Javits 
FDR, Jr.’s opponent was Republican Jacob Javits , who represented the neighboring twen-
ty-fi rst congressional district. Th ey knew each other well, both represented the Liberal 
Party and sat on the House Foreign Aff airs Committee together. Dewey had selected 
Javits to balance the Republican ticket. He would kill two birds with one stone because 
the outcome would put an end to Javits’ heterodoxy or to FDR, Jr.’s career. Javits was 
considered an anomaly because his political philosophy was somewhat to the left  of his 
own party and closely aligned to the Democratic liberalism popular in the 1950s. Th is 
made the Jewish Javits a formidable opponent for FDR, Jr.185
FDR, Jr. emphasized unemployment as a vital issue in the fall election. Th e econo-
my had slumped into a mild recession and he warned that the number of unemployed 
would reach 7 million in 1956 if the current administration’s policies would continue. 
Javits charged that FDR, Jr. reverted to dangerous and irresponsible statements. Th e 
New Deal era was over, he explained although “Mr. Roosevelt sounds very much like he 
is saying ‘depression is just around the corner’ and the thing we do not have to fear is 
fear.” 186 He maintained that under Democratic administrations between 1949 and 1950 
unemployment was “almost twice what it is now.” 187 
Republicans retorted that FDR, Jr. was trying to create the depression atmosphere 
of 1932 and acidly inquired if they needed a war as medicine for curing the disease of 
unemployment. Th ey denounced his scare tactics and argued that what occurred was 
only a mild postwar adjustment of the economy rather than a mass depression. Th is was 
the diff erence between 1932 and 1954 “… which makes young Roosevelt’s sophomoric 
bombast only a pale carbon copy of that which another Roosevelt once put over so 
eff ectively.” 188
Th e key question in the campaign was the comparative fi tness for offi  ce of the two 
candidates. FDR, Jr. confi dently highlighted his congressional record. He claimed that 
the people benefi ted from the causes he fought for such as strict rent controls, low-cost 
public housing, a broadened social security program, and civil rights. If elected, he 
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would serve as the “People’s Attorney.” 189 FDR, Jr. believed that “his name and popular-
ity could win any elective offi  ce he desired….” 190 
Javits set out to prove the opposite and cleverly exploited FDR, Jr.’s record. He had 
only three years of law practice and no trial experience, an indispensable capacity for a 
state attorney general. Th e Republican denounced FDR, Jr. as a “Congressional Delin-
quent,” with a poor legislative record, absent at his committee sessions and roll calls.191 
In contrast to the hardworking Javits, the Republican message read that FDR, Jr. had 
neglected his district. Th ey agreed on many issues, Javits charged, “but Junior has oft en 
not been there to fi ght for them in Congress and I have. My opponent has a record that 
is virtually a blank page with fancy trimmings. He introduces a few bills in Congress, 
but he never fi ghts for them. It is all a play to the gallery.” Javits employed an eff ective 
soundbite and asked rhetorically, “What is your liberalism worth if you do not fi ght for 
it?” 192 
He also charged that FDR, Jr. covered up his absentee record with the use of pair-
ing. Th is meant that a member who had been absent had his position recorded in the 
Congressional Record on a vote. Javits condemned this practice in his eff ective “empty 
chair” TV spots in which he pointed out, “when you apair, it is the same thing as telling 
your friends how you would have voted if you bothered to show up to vote.” 193
Javits’ shrewd strategy turned the contest for attorney general into a referendum on 
FDR, Jr.’s reputation and record. FDR, Jr. was forced to defend himself. He claimed that 
the independent and non-partisan Congressional Quarterly showed that his views were 
recorded on 80 percent to 90 percent of all roll calls votes from 1949 to 1954. Yet, he was 
unable to rebut the assertions of Javits that the pairing meant that FDR, Jr. was actually 
present on the fl oor for roll call votes slightly over 50 percent during that period.194 
FDR, Jr. blamed the impression of his poor attendance record on the press who had 
played it up because it made news. Th is had started, he sulked, when he “was only ten 
days in Washington and one of the Republican’s hatchet men, Clarence Brown of Ohio 
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was making a speech against me during the housing debate when he said I would know 
more about the issues if I stayed in Washington. I had only been there ten days.” 195 
FDR, Jr. countered with charges of his own that Javits had misled the people about 
his voting record. Javits’ message began to take hold. Th e New York Times and the New 
York Herald Tribune had scrutinized the records of both Representatives. Th ey noted 
that Javits devoted himself to his work while FDR, Jr. did not.196 In a TV statement in 
late October, FDR, Jr. desperately challenged his opponent to quit ducking a discussion 
on the issues.197 He attempted to link Javits to the unpopular Dewey administration. 
Democrats harbored good hopes of ousting Dewey because the traditional mid-term 
losses of his party in power would be increased in the state by its high unemployment 
rate, a harness-racing scandal, and the unpopular fi scal programs of the incumbent 
administration.198
In early 1954, a columnist had echoed the campaign argument that FDR, Jr.’s name 
could beat any Republican opponent. At the same time, he had warned that one ought 
not to underestimate the powerful emotions the Roosevelt name would evoke because 
“if FDR, Jr. heads the ticket, the GOP will be able to consolidate even the bitterest anti-
Dewey Republicans behind their man.” 199 Fanning the fl ames, FDR, Jr.’s political en-
emies were quick to exploit the disappointment many people had begun to feel who had 
expected him to be like his father. Dewey depicted FDR, Jr. as an irresponsible playboy 
and a pale imitation of FDR.200 
On Election Day, FDR, Jr. fell victim to his early reputation as a playboy and record 
as absentee Congressman.201 His strategy of demanding an independent place on the 
ticket backfi red. FDR, Jr. ran 129,779 votes behind Harriman and lost to Javits. He be-
came the only candidate on Democratic ticket to lose.202 
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If it had not been for the vindictiveness between FDR, Jr. and the Democratic leadership, 
Javits would not have had the opportunity to utilize all his support in the State. Liberal 
Democrats and Jewish voters preferred Javits as the individual to FDR, Jr. Javits had 
concentrated on winning these voters in New York City to cut into the Democratic bloc. 
He had waged an independent campaign and disassociated himself from the Dewey ’s 
record.203 
Stubborn and sulking, FDR, Jr. clung to the Catholic opposition issue to explain 
for the fact that political events had taken a turn for the worse. Th e conservative Catho-
lic wing of the Democratic Party felt that they could not bring themselves to vote for 
another Roosevelt. FDR, Jr. feared his mother’s displeasure. Rather than emphasizing 
Eleanor’s role in the Spellman aff air he blamed his defeat on the New York City bosses 
who, he claimed, had ordered leaders in Catholic areas not to work on his behalf.204 
More than this Catholic resentment FDR, Jr.’s reputation as an uncontrollable con-
gressman and his break with the Liberal Party ruined his chances in the 1954 election. 
Liberal Party leaders had advised him to settle down to build a record of public service 
that was not just for political gain and self-advancement. Alex Rose , who was furious 
about his disloyalty, played a key role in orchestrating the opposition of the New York 
City party leaders who vividly remembered FDR, Jr.’s independence in 1949.205 
Th is political opposition coalesced around FDR, Jr.’s attitude of an heir apparent 
that was above the political fray. Th is naked pursuit of offi  ce and sheer self-advancement 
continued to fuel FDR, Jr.’s drive for political offi  ce. FDR, Jr. assumed that the powerful 
name and his popularity on the campaign trail would deliver the votes of the electorate 
but his self-assured display of entitlement alone did not yield a statewide offi  ce. FDR, 
Jr.’s failure to build a record of consistent public service that he needed to back up his 
claim on memory now left  him at a political dead end.
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The Defeat of 1954
FDR, Jr. had unconsciously modeled his political career on his father’s and eyed the New 
York governorship as a stepping stone to higher offi  ce. Th e loss of the Democratic nomi-
nation shattered his dreams of emulating his father’s career. It exposed his naked ambi-
tion. Th e ensuing defeat for attorney general was humiliating and banished him to the 
political woods.1 By the mid-1950s, FDR’s memory, the New Deal coalition and ideology 
were losing its glamour. Th e Roosevelt-baiting had continued with full force aft er 1945. 
FDR, Jr. had felt accountable and had been made accountable by political opponents to 
defend his father’s memory. Th e inability to subordinate the family’s personal ambitions 
also tapped into this backlash against New Deal liberalism.2 
Th ough the general public had accepted the basic size and scope of FDR’s programs, 
the mood of the voters yearned for change but not for sweeping change back to the New 
Deal . A renascent conservatism overtook liberals in their eff orts to make the govern-
ment the protector of outcast people, sick, old, poor, and minority. Postwar social and 
political developments also limited the possibilities for reform. Th e pervasive orthodoxy 
of anti-communism dominated the political agenda. In the absence of an economic cri-
sis there was also no strong incentive for New Deal type reforms.3 
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Also, many liberals had not progressed much beyond logical extensions of New 
Deal and Fair Deal proposals. Th ey lacked a persuasive conception of public purpose 
and bold imaginative leadership. Since liberals were unable to provide cure for postwar 
ills and, consequently, they had to reach back to “warm over the contents of the New 
Deal to suit any new situation.” 4 
Th e position to fall back on New Deal type solutions had fl aws. FDR, Jr. had sensed 
the long drought of original thinking in the liberal movement. He put his fi nger on the 
staleness of the New Deal programs. He explained, “in politics, you cannot take a fi xed 
position and never change. You’ve got to be practical. You’ve got to be fl exible enough 
to try new solutions for new problems. He referred to the unemployment problem as an 
issue he found “totally diff erent from the thirties” and one that would request new solu-
tions.5 FDR, Jr.’s statements in the 1954 election, however, indicated that the liability 
of the liberal movement was his own weakness too. Th e Alsop brothers perceptively 
reported, “what Roosevelt lacks is what the liberal movement lacks, a set of coherent 
underlying political principles, suited to the times.” 6 
A signifi cant transformation in the evolution of liberalism was beginning to take 
place in the late 1950s. Th e emergence of a new group rights-based liberalism moved 
the focus away from New Deal -type economic reform. Few attempted to formulate new 
programs to deal with the changing world of the 1950s. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. analyzed 
that American progressivism could not live any longer off  the brilliance and fertility of 
the New Deal because the old class-based ideas and energies were losing their force.7 
Economist John Kenneth Galbraith stated that the party should present fresh new alter-
natives and stop trading on the imagination and intellectual vigor of the Roosevelt era 
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since that capital was running thin.8 When this rights revolution moved on the agenda, 
liberals eventually failed to balance these two strands of liberalism.9 
Trujillo 
Th e period between 1954 and 1960 were tough years for FDR, Jr. to overcome his set-
back. Th e wounds of squandering his promise healed only slowly because a successful 
race would have surely set him on the track to national prominence. John F. Kennedy 
was convinced that if FDR, Jr. had gotten the New York City bosses on his side he would 
have won, and would have become the 1960 Democratic presidential candidate.10 
FDR, Jr.’s fi rst reaction aft er his defeat was to consider his political career terminat-
ed. Friends talked him out of it. Joe Lash saw even victory in defeat. He drew a parallel 
with the devastating blow FDR had received when he had contracted polio. Lash was 
convinced that the shock was a test of FDR, Jr.’s spirit. It provided an opportunity to fi -
nally develop qualities of will, patience and understanding that had served his father so 
well.11 Eleanor also interpreted the setback as a way to learn from disappointment. She 
advised her son, quite matter of factly, “I am afraid it will be hard but losing, if you take 
it well does no harm.” 12 Herbert Lehman asserted that he remained one of the party’s 
leading political personalities who could not be counted out. Th e senator wanted to 
build a solid front in the party. He advised Harriman to give FDR, Jr. a form of recogni-
tion and put him on his Gubernatorial team.13
When realization had set in some time later, FDR, Jr. admitted the defeat had been 
a wake-up call, the “great shock everybody has to have.” 14 Despite his new position on a 
temporary state commission on educational fi nances, the new consciousness about his 
fl aws had left  him politically empty-handed. Aft er nearly a decade in public service, he 
began to fade into political obscurity. FDR, Jr. returned to private life to resume work 
8. Lazarowitz, “Years in Exile,” 243.
9. Alan Brinkley, Th e End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 3–14.
10. Maxine Cheshire, “Th ey Might Have Been For FDR, Jr.,” Washington Post, 14 March 1965, 
folder FDR, Jr., Personal File, box 344, FDR, Jr. Papers.
11. Joe Lash to FDR, Jr., 6 November 1954, folder Eleanor Roosevelt 1954, box 43, Lash Papers, 
FDRL.
12. Quoted in: Edna P. Gurewitsch , Kindred Souls: Th e Devoted Friendship of Eleanor Roosevelt 
and Dr. David Gurewitsch (New York: Plume, 2003), 146–147. 
13. Joshua Edelstein to Herbert Lehman , 17 November 1954 and Herbert Lehman to Averell 
Harriman , 18 November 1954, all in folder Roosevelt, Hon. Franklin D. Jr., Senate Departmental 
Files, #43, Herbert H. Lehman Papers, Columbia University, NY.
14. Stephen Hess , America’s Political Dynasties: From Adams to Kennedy (New York: Double-
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at his New York City law fi rm. He started and aborted plans to establish a law practice 
overseas with Stevenson , another famous Democrat that roamed the political woods.15
Th e Poughquag farm and its 150 year-old mansion became his home base. FDR, Jr. 
and Sue oft en traveled to Hyde Park and Vall-Kill for weekends to visit Eleanor.16 Th e 
country squire feeling fulfi lled him with satisfaction. Sitting behind a tractor FDR, Jr. 
could let his mind wander over the 300-acre farm and watch “plants and animals grow 
and the even, solid rows of earth come up under the plow.” 17 He had inherited from 
FDR the passion for farming, land and livestock and increasingly became absorbed with 
the business of farming. He was a man of aristocratic life and grand dimensions and 
spent all his money on the farm. Th e undertaking grew to thousand productive acres in 
the 1960s and provided employment for fi ft een people. Th e business became even more 
expensive and extravagant when he started breeding Hereford cattle and thoroughbred 
racehorses. 
FDR, Jr. loved being a farmer. Yet, he struggled to make ends meet to maintain his 
grand country gentleman life style. Th e depressing fi nancial problems underscored his 
feeling of uprootedness. Like his father, his heart was not in the legal give and take. At 
the age of forty and out of offi  ce, FDR, Jr. seemed lost. Confl icts with Ethel over visiting 
rights for the children and their sons’ education exacerbated these personal tensions. 
Liquor served as a relief from the weight of the pressures and the expectations of the 
shoes to fi ll. Th e Roosevelt family affl  iction of alcohol abuse added to the reputation 
that diminished him.18 
Th e farm’s fi nancial drain led directly to one of the biggest controversies of his life. 
As a legal adviser, FDR, Jr. represented companies who looked for mining interests in 
Africa and oil concessions in Jamaica. Th e need to make money was so urgent that he 
accepted a $15,000 retainer to act as a legal representative on behalf of the dictator of 
the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo . Some twenty years aft er FDR had issued the 
Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin America, FDR, Jr. continued to emulate his father’s 
attitude toward dictatorships in the region. 
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65, Schiff  Papers, NYPL; William Benton to FDR, Jr., 9 December 1955, box 123, FDR, Jr. Papers; 
Pete Vack, “Roosevelt Remembers: FDR, Jr. Recalls His Years with Fiat,” Car Collector Magazine 
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16. Gurewitsch , Kindred Souls, 144.
17. FDR, Jr. to C.V. Whitney, 9 May 1946, box 419, folder 1, drawer 4, envelope 6; “Th e Story of 
FDR, Jr.,” folder biographies, box 236, all in FDR, Jr. Papers; “Interview with FDR, Jr. and Doro-
thy Schiff  ,” 9 January 1973, tape #3, box 258, Schiff  Papers, NYPL; Author interview with Trude 
Lash , Martha’s Vineyard, MA, 1 July 1998; Author interview with Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., 
New York City, 4 June 1998.
18. Interview with Donald S. Harrington, #2, by Ed Edwin, New York City, 25 March 1977, 120, 
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Th e repressive military regime of Trujillo who had ruled the Caribbean island with 
iron fi st since 1930 revealed the Achilles heel of FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy. Wash-
ington’s new course in the 1930s aimed to improve relations with countries in the re-
gion through non-intervention, to encourage cooperation and liberalism in the region 
through persuasion rather than force. Th e existence of the Trujillo regime, however, ex-
posed the inherent tension between pragmatic and idealistic principles in FDR’s policy. 
When the crucial question had to be addressed how to deal with dictatorships in the 
United States’ backyard, the treatment of Trujillo showed that if strategic and economic 
motivations prevailed, the American government would follow a hands off  course.19 
Personal relations between Trujillo and the Roosevelt family reinforced this inter-
pretation. Eleanor’s handshake with Trujillo during a refueling stop in June 1934 un-
derscored FDR’s pragmatic maxim that sometimes the need arose “to hold hands with 
the devil” and deal with dictators. When James toured the island in February 1938, the 
Dominican strong man unsuccessfully tried to manipulate him into advising his father 
to revoke the bilateral convention of 1924 and recede complete control of the island’s 
fi nances back to its leader. Th e informal meeting between FDR and Trujillo in July 1939 
where both commanders in chief discussed military and defense matters, underlined 
the pragmatic character of American policy as well as of the nature of the relationship 
between the Roosevelt family and the Dominican dictator.20
FDR, Jr. not only revived and continued this alliance in the cold war era but added 
his own spicy ingredient. It replaced strategic and political interests with impulsive-
ness and greediness. Aft er numerous liberal clients had deserted FDR, Jr. in early 1956, 
Charles Clark had asked him to represent the interests of Trujillo in the United States. 
In April 1956, they reached an agreement with the Dominican ambassador in Washing-
ton, D.C. FDR, Jr. and Clark, who had also been a former lobbyist for Spanish dictator 
Franco, were to serve as legal and political advisers of the Dominican Republic Govern-
ment. Th ey registered with the Department of Justice and the State Department. Th eir 
function was described vaguely as “to render services of advice and consultation con-
cerning economic problems, fi nancial problems, political problems, legislative prob-
lems especially those relative to the Congress of the U.S., administrative problems that 
arise in the Executive Branch of the Government of the U.S., and problems that arise 
in the UN.” 21
19. Eric P. Roorda, Th e Dictator Next Door: Th e Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime 
in the Dominican Republic, 1930–1945 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 1–4. Th is 
meant that as long as the Dominican Republic shared common enemies with the United States, 
fi rst the fascists then the communists, Trujillo could continue his domestic policies while FDR 
looked the other way. Trujillo consolidated this status when he established a military alliance 
with his big neighbor in 1940. Th e ensuing development of a shared military culture sealed its 
position as a Cold War ally.
20. Roorda, Th e Dictator Next Door, 121, 179–180, 198.
21. Drew Pearson, “FDR, Jr. Registers as Foreign Agent,” n.d., folder Roosevelt, Franklin, Jr. 
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On 12 March 1956, Jesus de Galindez, a Spanish exile and a lecturer at Columbia 
University who had written a critical book on the Trujillo regime, disappeared off  the 
New York City streets. Gerald Murphy, who was later killed to secure his silence of 
the kidnapping he had witnessed, was the pilot of the plane that had transported the 
prominent Trujillo opponent. Edged on by the outcry in the press and by liberals, who 
assumed the guilt of Trujillo, the State Department decided to look into the matter.22 
When the inquiry revealed to the public that FDR, Jr. represented Trujillo ’s interests 
in the nation, the dictator’s opponents heaped a deluge of criticism and bad publicity on 
FDR’s son. FDR, Jr. served as a cherished part of a Dominican lobby of lawyers, lobby-
ists, Congressmen and public relations experts in the United States who were hired to 
project a favorable image of the Trujillo regime. Well-known New York civil liberties 
champion Morris Ernst was paid $200,000 to review the Galindez aff air. Th e former 
member of Truman ’s Commission on Civil Rights concluded there was no evidence 
linking the Dominican Republic to the twin murders.23
FDR, Jr. fueled the controversy when he engaged in a rhetorical scrimmage with 
Warren Olney, assistant attorney general in the Eisenhower administration. Aft er FDR, 
Jr. had requested help of the FBI, Governor Harriman, District Attorney Hogan, and 
local police to solve the case, Olney wondered aloud why he had not addressed the ap-
peal to the Dominican government. Taken aback, FDR, Jr. accused Olney of making 
newspaper headlines and political hay of the disappearance.24 
Th e crimes set off  a furious debate over the proper American attitude and revived 
the coalition who opposed close ties with Trujillo among members of Congress, State 
Department offi  cials and the news media. By his acceptance of the $15,000 retainer, FDR, 
Jr. became the perfect whipping boy to churn up anti-Trujillo sentiment and challenge 
the decades-old American aloofness of Dominican internal politics. FDR, Jr. became an 
easy target and scapegoat of outraged liberals who emphasized the interventionist side 
of the debate and who conveniently ignored the historical ties between the Roosevelt 
family and Trujillo.
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Th e Roosevelt-haters and the Junior-baiting returned. At the end of May, Domini-
can revolutionaries and Spanish Republicans-in-exile picketed his law offi  ce on Madi-
son Avenue. Th e demonstrators carried a coffi  n covered with white crosses. Th ey vilifi ed 
FDR, Jr. for taking money from a dictator and asked “would your father approve your 
representing Trujillo even for $5,000 a month?” Th e Dominican government came to 
his defense and rebutted all criticism. It charged that Galindez was a communist play-
ing out the whole aff air as a “typical liberal smear job.” 25
Liberals were embarrassed and ashamed of his association with Trujillo . Joseph 
Rauh declared, “I had no respect for him aft er that business with Trujillo. Money is not 
that important. Th e Roosevelt children always were money-seekers.” 26 Th e aff air ended 
FDR, Jr.’s participation in the American for Democratic Action. He was dropped as the 
organization’s vice president though FDR, Jr. maintained he resigned because of the 
demands of his law practice. 
Th e Trujillo aff air shed light on FDR, Jr.’s insensitive side of his personality. By giv-
ing legitimacy and credibility to a dictatorial regime, he displayed a pattern of invari-
ably getting in trouble through booming gaff es rather than through political calculation. 
FDR, Jr. remained indiff erent of the impact of his disastrous mistake. He maintained 
that all he had done for Trujillo was to arrange for the legal importation of tropical royal 
poinciana seeds from the Dominican Republic. He did not understand that although 
strong men can provide stability necessary for growth and democracy, at the same time 
they stifl e growth and democracy by being strong men. Th is became clear when he ex-
plained to Dorothy Schiff  that he had sent Trujillo blueprints and programs for political 
reform that would make the Dominican government a model of democracy. “Somehow,” 
he naively wondered, “the proposals never made it through” to the dictator.27 
FDR, Jr. refused to end his association. He told Schiff  he felt unable to resign be-
cause liberals would denounce him as a coward if he ran out on a good fi ght. FDR, Jr. 
stubbornly clung to his theory that the story of foul play in the Galindez case was exag-
gerated because to him it was clear that Galindez must have run off  “to Brazil with some 
broad.” Only in late February 1957, aft er direct protests from Eleanor, who had been ap-
palled that her son profi ted from the dictator did FDR, Jr. resign as Trujillo ’s counsel.28
25. NYT, 30 May 1956; Atkins, Th e United States and the Trujillo Regime, 75. Th e Trujillo aff air 
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Th e haunting association with Trujillo made FDR, Jr.’s return to the national politi-
cal scene ineff ective and mere symbolic. FDR, Jr.’s latent political virus had laid only 
dormant and the arrival of the 1956 presidential election campaign reawakened these 
instincts. Democratic Party leaders had come under pressure from liberal groups in New 
York to drop FDR, Jr. as a delegate-at-large to the national convention. In a stunning 
reversal of fortunes, FDR, Jr. now needed public assurances from his former nemesis, 
Carmine DeSapio , to save him from another high-profi le embarrassing rejection. FDR, 
Jr. supported Harriman, New York’s favorite son, but as a lame-duck delegate he exerted 
no such infl uence as at the 1952 convention. He worked for Senator John F. Kennedy’s 
near miss vice presidential bid. Th is eff ort foreshadowed the new role casting where 
Kennedy fulfi lled FDR, Jr.’s political promise. James actively supported Stevenson . Elea-
nor put party unity over principle and accepted a moderate civil rights platform to en-
able to crown her protege for the second time as the Democratic challenger to President 
Eisenhower . During the fall, party offi  cials banished FDR, Jr. to the harmless campaign 
trail where he stumped through fi ft een states for the Stevenson-Kefauver ticket.29
Compared to the time he held political offi  ce the burden of the Roosevelt name 
was relatively easy to bear as a lawyer and as a farmer. When there was no one to rail 
against anymore the chorus of the Roosevelt-haters echoing “Junior” had fallen on deaf 
ears.30 FDR, Jr.’s acceptance of fees from Trujillo reinforced the public notion that the 
Roosevelt children were opportunistic moneyseekers and reinvited the chant of the “Ju-
nior”-baiting. Th e controversy aggravated FDR, Jr.’s political exile because it depreci-
ated his strongest asset, the Roosevelt name. Th e alienation of the liberal community, 
his natural and old constituency slammed the door on a political comeback FDR, Jr. 
had contemplated during 1955 and 1956. Th e controversy also sealed his transformation 
from public offi  cial to private businessman.
Businessman
Th e return to private life did give FDR, Jr. a new opportunity to start a search for identity, 
a commitment to live his own life beyond the “Age of Roosevelt.” His character was by 
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nature suited to get things done in a position with executive responsibility. Fundamen-
tally, FDR, Jr. considered himself a salesman. In the late fi ft ies, he engaged in private 
business and became a national distributor of Fiat cars. FDR, Jr.’s passion for cars and 
the glamour associated with it had been well documented in the press. Th e infatuation 
for cars he had inherited from his father had been headlined in the numerous traffi  c 
violations and speeding tickets during the 1930s and 1940s.31
In contrast to his parents who could live off  their respective trust funds, old money 
did not provide FDR, Jr. with an income base. Th rough his contacts in Italy and his 
acquaintance with Vincent Garibaldi who was the president of Fiat in New York, he 
learned that the company was thinking of introducing sports and economy cars in 
America. Th ese cars had not been sold since the start of World War II and Fiat was look-
ing for opportunities to open up the American market. At a time of growing affl  uence 
for most Americans the mid-1950s saw the beginning of a booming market of aff ordable 
small cars. Foreign cars also enjoyed an increasing popularity. 
FDR, Jr. had thought long and hard about the opportunity Fiat off ered him because 
he was worried that his name and his father’s memory would be taken advantage of. He 
did not want the dealership to be seen as a sell out for the “stab-in-the-back” speech FDR 
had made in the summer of 1940 when the Italians attacked France. He also recognized 
that the value of the Roosevelt brand name and its connections could be instrumental 
in establishing fi nancial independence.32
Dyke Cullum , who had been working in the automobile business before, ap-
proached FDR, Jr. in 1956 to set up a partnership to distribute Fiat cars for the United 
States. Aft er a trip to Italy and extended discussions with Garibaldi, FDR, Jr. obtained 
the distributorship for Fiat cars in nine southeastern states. He formed a partnership 
with Cullum to go into business. No sooner aft er the fi rst Fiat cars arrived in January 
1958 serious diff erences of opinion between FDR, Jr. and Cullum developed. Th e two 
partners disagreed on virtually everything from management of the distributorship to 
the appointment of car dealers in the respective states and the stocking of spare parts. 
Th e continuing friction led Fiat to cancel the agreement of the distributorship. It blamed 
Cullum for the situation whom had “not acted in good faith.” FDR, Jr. dissolved the 
partnership. He alleged that Cullum’s only intentions were making quick money by let-
ting the Fiat Company buy them out and use his name to secure the agreement. Th e 
controversy reached its peak when Cullum went to court and argued that Fiat and FDR, 
Jr. had conspired to deprive him of the fi nancial benefi ts of the distributorship. In early 
1959, both parties hammered out a settlement out of court under which Cullum was 
entitled to an amount for each car sold by the Company.
In March 1958, FDR, Jr. had organized the Roosevelt Automobile Company that 
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was granted the right to import and sell Fiat cars in the same area as the former distribu-
torship. Despite the eventual profi ts, the outlook in the early 1960s was grim. Aft er he 
became the distributor for Jaguar cars in six southeastern states in 1961, FDR, Jr. expe-
rienced the frustrating aspects of the import car business when months went by where 
he did not receive any cars whatsoever from the factory in England. FDR, Jr. adapted 
Fiat’s European outlook to American realities to tackle the poor reputation for reliabil-
ity foreign cars endured. In contrast to Volkswagen and Renault, he stressed advertising 
appeal and public relations. FDR, Jr. stimulated the initiative of the individual car dealer 
because he claimed Americans could sell foreign products better to their countrymen 
than foreigners could. Aft er he became the National Distributor for Fiat cars in 1966 
and put together a strong management team, the company began its expansion in the 
American market.33
FDR, Jr. started from scratch with a borrowed sum of $50,000. Until 1970, when Fiat 
bought the franchise back he sold enough cars to establish a multi-million dollar busi-
ness. Th e success brought him the fi nancial independence that all the Roosevelt children 
had striven for. Despite all setbacks and challenges FDR, Jr. considered his activities in 
the automobile business to be the most satisfying in his professional life. Th e franchise 
off ered him the opportunity to stand on his own feet, because he recognized that his 
name alone would not carry him very long in learning the trade of becoming a good 
businessman.34 In the car selling business, FDR, Jr. continued to build on his strength 
he had demonstrated in his political life, which was eff ectively selling the Roosevelt 
name and its memory as he had done to voters in his election campaigns.
Th e car business was nevertheless a far cry from the political fortunes of public 
offi  ce he had been groomed for since boyhood. It off ered no safety net to prevent FDR, 
Jr. from a free fall into political irrelevancy and obscurity. Th e son of FDR, who had 
internalized the convictions of the “noblesse oblige” ideal, now had joined the entrepre-
neurial class.35 Th e irony of history could be found in the fact that the son of FDR, who 
had vehemently denounced business tycoons as economic royalists now represented a 
multinational industry. 
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Dynastic Change: John F. Kennedy
During the early 1950s, FDR, Jr. had his nose pressed against the window of Democratic 
opportunities. When his promise did not catch fi re the torch of a new political dynasty 
ignited and John F. Kennedy fulfi lled the once bright promise of FDR, Jr. 
JFK stood ambivalent toward the New Deal . He had received mixed signals from 
his father on the Roosevelt family and had been isolated from its admirers during his 
formative years. Joseph Kennedy was a Catholic Irish immigrant who in a rag to riches 
story had made his fortune during the Prohibition. He had served as FDR’s appeaser 
to the business community and as ambassador to Great Britain. On the eve of World 
War II, their relationship imploded when Kennedy openly opposed FDR’s foreign pol-
icy. Rather than representing a tradition of public service or public purpose Kennedy’s 
prime interest had always been the welfare of his family and he identifi ed national wel-
fare as such. Th e patriarch provided fi nancial security for his children to help pave the 
way for their political ambitions.36 
FDR, Jr. and JFK had both been charming and promising politicians who served 
with distinction in the navy during World War II. In early 1948, they served as co-or-
ganizers of the National Veterans Housing Conference for the AVC and the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars. Th e conference aimed to pressure Congress to enact housing legislation. 
Diff erences over the output of each organization put their united front to the test. It also 
demonstrated JFK’s growing uneasiness with the progressive AVC people who were the 
driving force behind the conference.37 
FDR, Jr. and JFK served in Congress where they were friendly socially but not very 
politically involved. FDR, Jr. recalled that JFK was somewhat of a loner in the House. 
JFK considered the reforms of FDR out-dated and felt no inclination to identify himself 
as a New Deal liberal. FDR, Jr. captured the limelight by virtue of name, his promise and 
through his gaff es.38 Personally as well as politically though, the detached Kennedy was 
more secure than FDR, Jr. He suff ered far less sibling rivalry for political offi  ce and had 
at his disposal a fi xed political power base that was absolutely secure Irish. JFK was less 
relaxed campaigning on the stump than FDR, Jr. but the latter’s drive to get recognized 
36. Author interview with Curtis Roosevelt , 22 June 2000; Louis Harris , Th e Anguish of Change 
(New York: Norton, 1973), 288; Aldrich, Jr., Old Money, 212–213; Peter Collier and David Horow-
itz, Th e Kennedys: An American Drama (New York: Summit Books, 1984), 412; Beschloss, Ken-
nedy and Roosevelt, 268–276.
37. FDR, Jr. to John F. Kennedy, 23 January 1948 and Chat Peterson to John F. Kennedy, 18 De-
cember 1947, National Veterans Housing Conference 1948, House Files, box 81, John F. Kennedy 
Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL; William E. Leuchtenburg, In the Shadow of FDR: From Harry 
Truman to Bill Clinton (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 75–76.
38. Author interview with Charles Peters, 20 May 1999; Author interview with Justin Feldman , 
4 June 1998; John A. Blatnik, recorded interview by Joseph E. O’Connor, Washington, D.C., 4 
February 1966, 1, John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program, JFKL (hereaft er JFKL OH 
Program); Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt, 263; Leuchtenburg, In the Shadow of FDR, 75.







led to expediencies. Privately, the Kennedy family thought that the Roosevelt heir had 
too many personal problems to elect him to public offi  ce and a tendency to put his foot 
in his mouth that added to his reputation of bad marks.39 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. noted the paradox in their careers. Whereas “the Roosevelt 
sons had lived beneath their promise and capacity,” he argued, “the sons of Joseph Ken-
nedy, endowed somewhere with a capacity for self-discipline, had risen beyond their 
father and no doubt, because of him.” 40 FDR, Jr. pointed out that in this key circum-
stance “the Kennedys have shown a great deal of talent in subordinating their personal 
ambitions….” 41 
Despite their group achievements the Kennedys found it diffi  cult to avoid succumb-
ing to the Roosevelt magic. During a visit in Israel in October 1951, FDR, Jr. traveled 
around with John , Robert, and Patricia Kennedy. Under FDR, Jr.’s wing, they discussed 
the nation’s situation with Prime Minister Ben Gurion. RFK became exasperated with 
FDR, Jr. who received all the attention and wrote home, and “I have fi nally solved the 
problem as to why the Jews did not accept Jesus Christ FDR, Jr. is what they have been 
waiting for.” Th e Kennedy clan needed and used the memory of FDR in JFK’s 1952 Sen-
ate race. JFK fl ew in FDR, Jr. to campaign for him in the Jewish districts where he had 
encountered serious opposition. FDR, Jr. cloaked the New Deal mantle around JFK and 
rescued him from his father’s reputation that was rumored to be anti-Semitic. FDR, Jr.’s 
eff orts helped to hand him his margin of victory and sent the Senator on his way to the 
White House.42 He repeated this performance in JFK’s 1958 successful reelection race.
The 1960 Election Campaign
In April 1959, FDR, Jr. quit his law fi rm and moved his family to Washington, D.C. to 
devote full time to run his Fiat car distributorship. He settled down with Sue , his seven-
year-old daughter Nancy Suzanne and baby Laura in the fashionable Foxhall Road area 
in a house next to the one that Governor Harriman owned. FDR, Jr. made sure that his 
daughters would be brought up “thoroughly aware of her Roosevelt heritage.” 43 In line 
39. Interview with Ludwig Teller by Donald Shaughnessy, New York City, 6 November 1961, 
332, CUOHC; Author interview with Curtis Roosevelt , 22 June 2000; John F. English, recorded 
interview by Roberta Greene, Mineola, NY, 3 November 1969, 86, Robert F. Kennedy Oral His-
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40. Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt, 262; Kay Halle, ed., Th e Grand Original: Portraits of Ran-
dolph Churchill by his Friends (Boston, MA: Houghton Miffl  in, 1971), 282.
41. “Interview with FDR, Jr. and Dorothy Schiff  ,” 9 January 1973, tape #3, box 258, Schiff  Pa-
pers, NYPL; Author interview with Curtis Roosevelt , 22 June 2000.
42. FDR, Jr. to John F. Kennedy, 25 January 1952, Campaign Files, box 104, JFK Pre-Presiden-
tial Papers, JFKL; Leuchtenburg, In the Shadow of FDR, 74–75; Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy 
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with his aristocratic tradition, he maintained a New York City residence and continued 
to operate his Dutchess farm.
Th e timing of the move gave rise to speculation whether he planned a political 
comeback in the event of a Democratic victory in 1960. As one of the fi rst New York 
Democrats he publicly endorsed JFK’s bid for the presidency who had declared his 
candidacy on 4 February 1960. Th e following month FDR, Jr. told Democratic leaders 
that he was returning to politics to campaign for Kennedy whom, he deemed, was “not 
only the strongest candidate but also unusually qualifi ed to lead our country in these 
perilous times.” 44 He cited his concern that the Democratic candidate should test his 
vote-getting strength among the electorate before the convention in Los Angeles and 
announced he would stump for JFK in the primaries of Wisconsin, West Virginia, Ne-
braska, and Oregon.45
FDR, Jr. had not fi gured out what he wanted to use public offi  ce for other than to 
preserve and continue the memory of his father. JFK, on the other hand, formulated an 
optimistic liberal purpose to move the country to a new frontier beyond unemployment, 
racism and poverty to improve the quality of life.46 Restless liberal intellectuals had 
summoned their countrymen to higher purpose than mere production, conformity and 
complacency. Th e launching of the Russian Sputnik space satellite in early October 1957 
had accelerated the need for a new national purpose by dealing a blow to the American 
self-regard and sense of security. Th e challenges of a new period required a qualitative 
liberalism that “addressed the miseries of an age of abundance” and required imagina-
tion to improve the “quality of people’s lives and opportunities.” 47
Th e upcoming decade required new solutions to new problems. Aft er the dark pe-
riod of the late 1950s when FDR, Jr. was clutching at straws the Kennedy campaign 
signaled an opportunity to revive his political career. FDR, Jr.’s drive for recognition, 
his presence and eff orts reminded JFK of his continuing indebtedness to the Roosevelt 
memory.48
FDR, Jr.’s fi rst opportunity to use his name to counter doubts about JFK’s age, in-
experience and Catholic religion came in early March. In the Wisconsin primary, JFK 
squared off  with Hubert Humphrey . Th e Minnesota senator held an apparent advantage 
envelope 1, box 419, FDR, Jr. Papers.
44. Press Release, 6 April 1960, box 969, JFK Pre-Presidential Papers, JFKL.
45. Ibid.; Washington Post, 3 March 1960; NYT, 25 April 1959, 9 February 1960, 3 March 1960.
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because the two states were alike in terms of their agricultural character and liberal 
Democratic parties with strong local farmer and labor backing. Th e folksy Humphrey 
had been raised in humble circumstances on the South Dakota plains during the Depres-
sion and revered FDR as his hero. He advocated the bread-and-butter issues of the “old” 
liberalism. FDR, Jr. was brought in to undermine Humphrey’s New Deal credentials. 
His arrival was a mixed blessing. FDR, Jr. had declared on the TV news that “he 
saw no diff erences between the two candidates on farm issues,” though he believed that 
“Senator Humphrey had spent more money in some counties than Senator Kennedy.” 
He did not know the source of the funds but he had heard “ugly rumors.” 49 FDR, Jr.’s 
remarks ripped open old wounds and invited the dark clouds of McCarthyism to cast 
their shadow over the primary. Humphrey’s supporters bristled with indignation and 
branded FDR, Jr.’s crack a “reversion to McCarthyism.” Minnesota Governor Orville 
Freeman denounced the charge a “shocking, unforgivable innuendo.” James Loeb con-
demned the accusation as “beneath contempt.” Th e ADA spokesman called FDR, Jr. 
to question his integrity and cynically pointed out that “at least we have not received 
money from Trujillo .” 50 Speechwriter Ted Sorensen blamed their opponents for the 
poisoned sphere of McCarthyism in the campaign. He lamented that liberals for their 
attacks on JFK had used the methods of the once abhorred McCarthy to create an im-
pression of anti-Catholicism.51
JFK had to defend his campaigner at a newsconference. He explained that FDR, 
Jr. must have been “misunderstood.” 52 JFK’s strategy was to become the underdog, to 
prevent attacking the opponent directly, and to avoid rehashing his record. FDR, Jr. 
traversed this completely. He had inadvertently drawn attention by criticizing the fi -
nancing of the campaign to the candidate who criss-crossed the primaries in his private 
plane. FDR, Jr. also raked up the issue JFK wanted most to ignore and avoid. JFK’s 
position on the McCarthy issue was so precarious because it had cast the most doubts 
about him and was hard to defend. Intellectuals and liberals had long been suspicious of 
JFK because they recalled his disturbing silence on Senator McCarthy, and his candid 
admission of not being a liberal at all. FDR, Jr. made his weight felt in Wisconsin but 
his accusations diminished his presence and he became a drag rather than a boost. Th e 
result on April 5, 1960 was a Pyrrhic victory. Th ough JFK had won 60 percent of the vote, 
religious lines had strictly divided the outcome. He had not done as well as he should 
49. William Lawrence, “Roosevelt Stirs Race in Wisconsin,” NYT, 20 March 1960.
50. James Loeb , Jr. to Gaylord Nelson, 17 March 1960, Hubert H. Humphrey Campaign Files, 
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have and badly sought a New Deal face-lift  to emerge victorious in the next primary in 
Protestant West Virginia.53
West Virginia
When the race moved from the fi elds of Wisconsin to the hills of West Virginia FDR, Jr. 
hitched his star to that of JFK as Camelot’s campaigner. He hoped to return to public of-
fi ce on JFK’s coattails. In the pre-campaign period, pollster Louis Harris had researched 
the state. Th e results had given JFK a comfortable lead and what looked like an easy vic-
tory. Yet, Harris had underestimated the impact of anti-Catholic sentiment and in early 
April he found that JFK now was trailing Humphrey .54 
On 5 April a top-level meeting was called in Robert Kennedy ’s house in Virginia to 
discuss strategy for the upcoming primary. In a grim atmosphere, the Kennedy cam-
paign blamed religious prejudice for their reversal in fortunes and claimed their can-
didate had fallen victim of unfair attacks of bigotry. Several campaign workers from 
West Virginia urged the use of FDR, Jr. because of the need to connect with FDR. Th ey 
calculated that the use of “God’s son” would hand Protestant voters a hallmark of ap-
proval to vote for a Catholic candidate. FDR, Jr.’s claim on memory, his magnetism with 
crowds and campaign passion off ered an opportunity to present JFK as an all-out New 
Deal Democrat. JFK enlisted FDR, Jr. to portray himself as a fi ghting liberal who advo-
cated ready-made bread-and-butter issues such as minimum wage and unemployment 
benefi ts and to get across the idea that he was concerned.55 
FDR, Jr. contributed greatly in taking the edge off  the issue of religious prejudice. 
He portrayed JFK as the underdog badly in need of a New Deal face-lift  in a half-hour 
exchange on a paid telecast. Sorensen had outlined the questions and answers to plant in 
the state TV program. Th ey listed the fears about their candidate and dealt with religion, 
leadership, and the state’s economic problems. Th e campaign quickly dropped a ques-
tion on Catholicism and public schools because it would remind voters of Eleanor’s fi ght 
53. Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (New York: Avon Books, 1966), 57–58; Harry W. Ernst , Th e 
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with the Catholic Church. Reporters had already jumped on the issue of tolerance and 
exaggerated its signifi cance. During the broadcast FDR, Jr. demonstrated his skills in 
moderating concerns from the audience in questions. He summarized the candidate’s 
answers to conclude that JFK’s religion did not at all present an obstacle to become pres-
ident. He blessed Kennedy’s New Deal type measures of relief, restoration, and recovery 
to answer the state’s economic woes. In a thinly veiled barb at Humphrey , who had no 
service record, he claimed JFK had the war record and foreign policy experience to lead 
the United States to peace. Th rough his approval of JFK’s answers, FDR, Jr. eff ectively 
granted legitimacy to the claims that they were both heirs of the New Deal.56 
Th e display of the self-conscious identifi cation with FDR’s memory was important 
because of the power of the Roosevelt name in the state. Campaign manager Larry 
O’Brien remembered the aff ection and respect for the name, “You could hardly go into 
a store or a home or an offi  ce without seeing a picture of FDR.” Th e state had received a 
multitude of public works and funds from the New Deal during the 1930s but aft er the 
war it had not shared in middle-class abundance of the prosperous nation. Th e automa-
tion of the coal industry led to massive and permanent unemployment. In the depressed 
mining areas in the southern half of the state people had just an average $30 a week to 
spend.57
Th e focus of the media on the dominant issue of economic plight and the existence 
of extensive pockets of poverty connected well with Humphrey ’s populist message. He 
was the natural working man’s candidate and could expect strong labor support in the 
heavily unionized state with his proposals of New Deal solutions to alleviate economic 
deprivation. His claim on the Roosevelt heritage was also more practiced than JFK and 
he could boast that, “while Jack may say the same as I do … the unemployed coal miner 
just does not believe that Jack means it.” 58 He did not reckon with JFK’s brilliant trump 
card. Th e campaign had the Roosevelt image in the fl esh.
FDR, Jr. carried by implication a personal endorsement of his father and he staked 
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out FDR as Kennedy’s historical shadow. FDR, Jr. worked tirelessly and reminded audi-
ences that he was not only his father’s son but also stood in the tolerant tradition of his 
mother. He criss-crossed the state and introduced JFK at campaign meetings where he 
pointed out that the senator was the only one who could win against Nixon in the fall. 
To Louis Harris it seemed FDR, Jr. himself was running for offi  ce. FDR, Jr. actually drew 
larger crowds than Kennedy and Humphrey and they would oft en mob God’s son.59 
FDR, Jr. admitted that he came close to demagoguing JFK’s cause in West Virginia. He 
bragged to have almost “shamed them into voting for Jack Kennedy.” 60 
Aft er FDR, Jr.’s introduction, JFK then stuck to the script. He constantly referred 
and alluded to the achievements and memory of FDR. In his primary announcement 
he pledged a New Deal for West Virginia to alleviate the abuses of unemployment, pov-
erty and the plights of farmers and the coal mining industry. JFK reinterpreted and 
adapted the memory of the New Deal “to extend and carry on its programs” to meet 
the new challenges of the sixties. He connected the local problems to a scale of national 
depression and blamed the Eisenhower administration for having accomplished less in 
eight years than FDR in his fi rst hundred days. JFK proposed a “rebirth and renewal” of 
the programs of the New Deal, for West Virginia and the country, because they badly 
needed “another such period of immediate, forceful, creative action.” 61 
FDR, Jr. continued to frame the primary issues in the New Deal mold. He praised 
JFK’s ability to rescue the miners from unemployment and poverty just as FDR had 
done in the 1930s. FDR, Jr. was very eff ective in the southern mining districts and coal-
fi elds where pledged to fi ght for poor people’s needs among the lower income Protestant 
groups. Ralph Pryor, a campaign aide, described a typical reception scene. Upon enter-
ing the mill gates in Hancock County, “the reaction of the shift s leaving and entering 
was almost electrical. As soon as word spread a tremendous crowd of steelworkers leav-
ing the mill immediately formed, each eager to shake his hand all telling him how they 
had felt about his father.” 62 
A top adviser of the Humphrey campaign credited FDR, Jr.’s visits as the decisive 
factor in moving the tide of public opinion toward JFK especially in the southern part 
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of the state. Th is eff ectively nullifi ed Humphrey’s strategy of identifi cation with the poor 
Virginians against the wealthy Kennedy.63
FDR, Jr.’s appearances underscored the frustrations of the Humphrey campaign. 
Th e Senator fumed at the Kennedy blitz, “… I refuse to believe he is a God and I refuse 
to worship at his political shrine. Apparently he has a number of converts who are will-
ing to do just these things, but I am not one of them.” 64 Humphrey echoed the liberal 
doubts about JFK’s lack of a progressive profi le and lamented that he was “ganged up by 
wealth” unable to “run around the state with a black bag of money.” 65 JFK considered 
Humphrey a spoiler and stooge for Senator Lyndon Johnson , another presidential hope-
ful, because he had no chance to win the nomination. Mitigating eff orts of labor leaders 
Alex Rose and David Dubinsky to conduct a gentleman campaign failed. Even Eleanor’s 
call to work together for a liberal victory went unheeded.66 
Draft Dodge
Top Kennedy campaign advisers had considered it a great breakthrough when FDR, Jr. 
agreed to stump for JFK. Earlier, however, they had expressed concern about his repu-
tation. When FDR, Jr. injected the issue of Humphrey ’s war record into the race the 
feeling of bad blood between the two campaigns spilled over. FDR, Jr. charged that the 
Senator had actively sought deferment from military service during World War II, one 
time to manage a political campaign in Minnesota in 1945. He branded Humphrey a 
“good Democrat but I do not know where he was in World War II.” 67 
FDR, Jr. claimed he had documents to back up his draft  dodging accusation. Th e 
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campaign had received copies of correspondence between Humphrey and his draft  
board from an anonymous Minnesota source. FDR, Jr.’s charge was not a spontaneous 
incident. Th e campaign had been discussing whether to capitalize on JFK’s war record 
because the issue off ered an opportunity to display their candidate’s heroism and pa-
triotism in a state that had the highest percentage of veterans in the nation.68
Th e press promptly denounced his remarks as a “new low in dirty politics” and a 
reversion to the technique of McCarthy to “combine insinuation, innuendo, implica-
tion, and imputation in attacks on a political opponent, without regards for facts.” 69 
Humphrey assailed his vicious attacks that above all failed to honor the memory of FDR 
and the Roosevelt name. He condemned FDR, Jr. for his opportunism because he had 
eagerly accepted his active support when he was running for Congress. 
FDR, Jr. claimed he did not want to use it because he knew Humphrey had not 
been draft ed because he had been teaching during the war. Robert Kennedy had turned 
over the documents to FDR, Jr. to keep in a locked briefcase during the campaign only 
to use it for retaliation aft er his permission. FDR, Jr. held Robert Kennedy responsible 
because he had needled him relentlessly to attack Humphrey’s war record. He had not 
only planted the attack with FDR, Jr. but New York Times reporter William Lawrence 
had also been given a complete fi le of the letters between Humphrey and his draft  board. 
Lawrence claimed he had an agreement with Kennedy’s top advisers that he was “not 
at liberty to use the documents until they told me that Roosevelt had gone ahead with 
it.” 70
JFK angrily disavowed the attack. He feared the unfair comments would boomer-
ang politically. Sorensen had specifi cally warned not to attack Humphrey on his war 
record and he maintained that Kennedy had decided not to use it. Th e Kennedys blamed 
FDR, Jr. for putting his own foot in his mouth when he made the accusation to a reporter 
and then repeated the charge at a press conference in Charleston. Th e campaign staff  
maintained that FDR, Jr. acted on his own because they had wanted to use the mate-
rial only as a weapon of last resort.71 O’Brien regretted the episode, and stated that “we 
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should have destroyed the rubbish, not turned it over to Frank Roosevelt.” 72 It had no 
decisive impact on the fi nal outcome of the primary. JFK won a persuasive victory that 
eff ectively buried Humphrey’s chances for the Democratic nomination. 
For four weeks in April and May West Virginia had been the center of national 
political attention. Th e enormous presence of reporters from newspapers, wire services 
and news networks trailing Kennedy, Humphrey , and FDR, Jr. recognized the pivotal 
importance of the primary. Th e turning points of the general election were rooted in the 
West Virginia. JFK “broke up old patterns of American politics” by using money and 
modern technology as television.73 His political success would “unlatch the door for 
groups such as Catholics, blacks, Jews, ethnics, women, youth, academics, newspersons, 
and a new generation of young politicians.” 74 JFK did embody the promise of a new era 
and generation. Yet, paradoxically the reinterpretation of the memory of the New Deal 
dominated the primary fi ght. Th e power of the name blunted the religious prejudice 
while the New Deal legend and the presence of FDR, Jr. tied in with the desire for bold 
imaginative leadership. 
FDR, Jr.’s special appeal and eff ectiveness demonstrated a much-needed and looked-
aft er similarity between the need for leadership in the depression days of the early 1930s 
and the need for leadership in the 1960s. His presence revived the memory of his par-
ents and helped to dramatize the most eff ective claim used by JFK, that he would take 
up where FDR had left  off .75 Native campaign worker Charles Peters , who went on to 
found the Washington Monthly magazine, was convinced that FDR, Jr.’s intervention 
had a decisive impact because he “made it possible to vote for Kennedy.” 76 
FDR, Jr. later emphasized this decisive contribution. He declared bluntly that “Lou 
Harris got Jack Kennedy into the West Virginia primary but Jack Kennedy told me that 
Frank Roosevelt got him out of the primary with a victory.” 77 Th is bold statement ex-
plains why FDR, Jr. believed that his support of JFK was a turning point in his life. He 
had helped to pass the torch on to a new generation and stood on his own two feet when 
it was not politically wise to do so. He held the crucial power to connect the New Deal 
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to the New Frontier and had lent JFK legitimacy and credibility to elevate him to the 
status of heir apparent in 1960.78 
Yet, FDR, Jr. failed to distinguish between his own political reputation and that of 
his parents. In West Virginia, people did not credit him and his campaign eff orts per 
se but were swayed by the mythical memory of FDR and ER . Th e draft  dodge aff air 
underscored this distinction in the appreciation between the dynasty and the political 
successor. When the Kennedy campaign had quickly repudiated the accusation they left  
FDR, Jr. out on a limb. He had allowed the Kennedys to enlist him as their hatchet man 
and bore the brunt of his gaff e when he danced as a marionette on their strings.79 FDR, 
Jr. had an inclination to spoil his own chances and he was held accountable for one of 
the biggest mistakes of his political career. Joe Lash ’s diary recording of the judgment 
of Alex Rose expressed the harm done by FDR, Jr. himself. Rose declared, “I will never 
forget F. (FDR, Jr.) in the W.Va. primary, the blowsy blonde, drinking, and letting RFK 
use him vs. HHH.” 80
FDR, Jr. and Eleanor
His attacks on Humphrey did bring FDR, Jr. in confl ict with his mother. Eleanor con-
sidered the charges unworthy of a Roosevelt. Th e aff air demonstrated to her that her 
son lacked a sense of public service to live up to the name. It cooled FDR, Jr.’s relation-
ship with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party considerably because a substantial 
percentage of the Humphrey campaign funds came from former Stevenson backers in 
New York. Th ey had donated money to block JFK and supported Eleanor’s eff orts to 
reform the New York Democratic Party.81 In mid-June, FDR, Jr. apologized to Hum-
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phrey for the “unnecessary and unwarranted statements, which I made in the heat of 
the West Virginia primary….” 82 FDR, Jr. had consulted Lehman and his mother who 
both approved of the written excuse. Humphrey harbored no ill feelings toward JFK but 
he never forgave FDR, Jr., who remained persona non grata among his backers, for his 
irresponsible attack.83
FDR, Jr.’s independent stand and outspoken support of JFK bypassed the wishes of 
his mother. Eleanor favored her old friend Stevenson to become the Democratic candi-
date. She recognized the younger generation had to take over but vehemently opposed 
its representative. Eleanor questioned JFK’s commitment to liberalism. During 1958 
and 1959, they had a public falling out over her accusation that Joe Kennedy’s money 
had paved his son’s road to the nomination. JFK thought she was motivated by envy 
because he stated “she hated my father and she can’t stand it that his children turned 
out so much better than hers.” 84 Both agreed to let the matter stand for the present aft er 
Eleanor fi nally admitted that there had only been rumors. Th e relationship remained 
cool.85
FDR, Jr. beseeched his mother to support JFK. He regularly visited her house in 
Manhattan on E74th St. to fi ll her in on JFK’s positions. In their discussions, he tried to 
overcome her objections to JFK’s lack of liberal profi le and immaturity. FDR, Jr. prod-
ded his mother to follow his example to join the ranks of pragmatic liberals instead of 
putting her reputation on the line as patroness of the New York reform liberals. James 
and Elliott also pressured Eleanor to endorse JFK.86 
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It was not only out of conviction that FDR, Jr. pushed his mother out of the way. 
His political interest was also at stake. He hoped that JFK would reward his eff orts with 
a high profi le position in the new administration. FDR, Jr. made sure to Eleanor how 
strongly he felt about the campaign and how important his eff orts were to him. FDR, 
Jr. realized he was unable to quiet his mother. Yet, FDR, Jr. pointed out to JFK that by 
arguing with her and campaigning he could at least prevent her “from doing anything 
spectacular during this primary session.” 87 
Th e discussions on JFK’s candidacy demonstrated a classic refl ection of FDR, Jr.’s 
ambivalent relationship with his mother. FDR, Jr. wanted to stand on his own feet yet 
counted on her political support. He reverently sought her advice and opinion but feared 
her potential disapproval and criticism if received. He harbored bitterness for the care 
and permissiveness his mother squandered on her coterie of friends. Yet, FDR, Jr. also 
knew how to arouse his mother’s guilt for her emotional aloofness and competed with 
his siblings for her attention. Eleanor off ered all-out protection when her children were 
attacked. She blamed FDR, Jr.’s 1954 defeat on the betrayal of DeSapio . Eleanor never 
forgave the Tammany leader and worked successfully to oust him from power in the 
early 1960s.88 
She did not want to stand in the way of FDR, Jr.’s political success but was also 
critical of the lack of commitment and consideration he demonstrated. Mostly, Elea-
nor blamed herself but one time she furiously blurted to David Gurewitsch that FDR, 
Jr. “could never be satisfi ed and that he always wanted more.” Her friend and doctor 
reassured her FDR, Jr. was genetically determined, “that is how he is and he will never 
change.” 89
FDR, Jr. reported to the Kennedy campaign that he had the impression that his 
eff orts to neutralize his mother were helpful. Th ough he could not “promise what will 
happen at convention.” 90 Eleanor was not insensitive to FDR, Jr.’s ambitions and what 
the possible consequences of a JFK victory would hold for her son. On the other hand, 
her sentimental aff ection for Stevenson implied that she had to publicly oppose her 
son.91 She solved the dilemma by planning not to go to the Democratic convention. She 
would leave the limelight to FDR, Jr. Aft er Stevenson persuaded to change her mind 
Eleanor hurried to Los Angeles to speak out on his behalf and cast doubt on Kennedy’s 
impending nomination. When faced with her sons’ active support for JFK she framed 
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their eff orts as “the plight of a mother who knows best but who like all mothers must 
sigh and sit back to at the idiocies of youth.” 92
FDR, Jr. set out to woo his mother aft er the convention. He acted as an intermedi-
ary to enlist his mother’s support. In a demonstration of her independence, Eleanor 
had gone home right aft er JFK’s nomination and had let the campaign know they could 
reach her through FDR, Jr. He successfully pressed his mother, who held out at Val-Kill, 
to drop the indecisive Stevenson and urged her to receive JFK. In mid-August, Elea-
nor had a lunch meeting with JFK where they brokered a peace.93 Th ey agreed to use 
FDR, Jr. as a channel to pass on requests and suggestions for the campaign. He would 
confer with the Kennedy campaign and report back to Eleanor on JFK’s reaction to the 
meeting.94 FDR, Jr. helped arrange the meeting that also united the feuding New York 
Democrats. He had urged his mother to serve as honorary chairman of Kennedy’s com-
mittee in the state. Aft er JFK promised to work together with Stevenson and Bowles, 
Eleanor agreed to accept the chairmanship of the committee.95
In the general election he accompanied Eleanor on campaign tours throughout 
New York State. FDR, Jr. resuscitated the New Deal coalition in the Protestant “Bible 
belt” states and the depressed areas of the Appalachian states such as West Virginia, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and North Carolina. He evoked the political magic of his 
father’s memory among the black population in the northern states. Aft er JFK had nar-
rowly beaten Republican candidate Richard Nixon, FDR, Jr. had toured thirteen states 
and made over a hundred speeches.96 
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Conclusion
FDR, Jr.’s transformation from public servant to private businessman between 1954 and 
1960 gave him the opportunity to learn from disappointment and stand on his own feet. 
He considered himself a salesman and the challenge for expansion in his Fiat distribu-
torship and in his farm business gave FDR, Jr. a real feeling of accomplishment. Th is 
new sense of eff ectiveness did not temper his ambition to return to public service. Poli-
tics was in his blood and FDR, Jr. felt accountable for the Roosevelt memory.97 
Th e notion to sell his claim on memory for political gain became an opportunity to 
leave the political woods. He jumped on the Kennedy bandwagon in the West Virginia 
primary where his campaign contributions had a decisive impact. Th is Roosevelt stamp 
of approval helped to elect JFK to the presidency. What was really at stake was FDR, Jr.’s 
expectation to profi t politically from his association with JFK in 1960. Ironically, his 
devotion to the cause of the Kennedys helped JFK to redeem FDR, Jr.’s old promise. 
It was not only bad luck that he was reduced to campaigning for the new dynasty. 
FDR, Jr. failed to distinguish between credit for his own performance and the reputa-
tion of his parents. Th e draft  dodge gaff e that built upon the memory of the Trujillo 
aff air shaped his reputation. Th ese stories exemplifi ed his political carelessness. Th ey 
overshadowed his hopes of political rehabilitation and continued to haunt FDR, Jr. in 
his eff orts to launch the second stage of his political career.
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In December 1960, FDR, Jr. applied for the job of secretary of the Navy. In an illustra-
tion of easy informality he addressed the president-elect as “Jack” and “put down some 
strong personal feelings” about the Navy Department. FDR, Jr. found that the fi ghting 
capacity of the Navy had deteriorated because the service had become “land-locked 
and bogged down in a quagmire of over-administration.” He appealed to JFK’s sense 
of an activist foreign policy and promised to restore the Navy’s immediate retaliatory 
missile capacity to cope with a Russian surprise attack. Not only did he plan to cut the 
Department of Defense’s red tape, FDR, Jr. would infuse the mariners “with a love for 
the sea.” 1 JFK wanted to appoint his friend as a reward for his eff orts in the West Vir-
ginia primary. 
So sure seemed his appointment that FDR, Jr. had already held a press conference 
to accept the position aft er JFK had leaked his decision to the New York Times. Th e 
message was intended for Robert McNamara, the powerful designate secretary of De-
fense. McNamara claimed it never occurred to him that FDR, Jr. wanted to follow in his 
father’s footsteps and had arranged the appointment with JFK.2 He told the president 
that FDR, Jr. was totally unqualifi ed for the job because he had a reputation as a playboy, 
a womanizer and a drunk. Aft er meeting FDR, Jr. at his New York FIAT offi  ce at JFK’s 
behest, he reported back to the president that FDR, Jr. was still incompetent to become 
secretary because he had no business or executive experience. McNamara had secured 
an unprecedented commitment from JFK that he would have a free hand in recruiting 
the department’s political appointees and he vetoed the appointment.3
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FDR, Jr. traveled to Palm Beach where he lunched and played golf with the presi-
dent-elect. Th e real purpose of his visit was to collect his political debt because as FDR, 
Jr. claimed he had “helped put Jack in the presidency.” 4 He wanted to land in a job in 
the new administration. FDR, Jr. rejected JFK’s off ers to become ambassador to the 
Philippines, Canada and Italy. Th ese positions were either too far removed from politi-
cal life or too expensive. He told JFK he had his eyes set on a job as assistant secretary 
of state for Latin American aff airs. Th is ran into strong opposition from Adolf Berle , an 
expert on Latin American policy. Th e former braintruster of FDR suggested to Dean 
Rusk two days before the inauguration, that “it would be fatal” because liberals in the 
region vividly remembered that FDR, Jr. had been one of Trujillo ’s lawyers. JFK wanted 
to avoid the association with dictators and decided against making FDR, Jr. a symbol 
of the administration’s continuity with the Good Neighbor policy. JFK had termed his 
Alliance for Progress program a “New Deal for Latin America.” Berle secured the job as 
chairman of an interdepartmental task force on Latin America.5 
FDR, Jr. continued to search for a meaningful task. Th e State Department rejected 
appointments as representative to Vietnam and South Korea. Finally, FDR, Jr. under-
took goodwill missions to Argentina to celebrate its independence in July 1961 and 
to the ceremonies of the newly independent African nation of Tanzania in December 
1961.6 Despite his position as JFK’s roving personal representative FDR, Jr. fell victim 
to the administration’s mantra for “the best and the brightest.”
Th e relegation to the social friend category was a poor consolation prize. On Sunday 
night 22 January 1961 FDR, Jr. and his wife Sue dined with the presidential couple at the 
Kennedy’s fi rst dinner in the White House. Aft er the women retired to the Green Room 
for coff ee the men went around looking for a bathroom. Th ey wandered from room to 
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room while everyone berated FDR, Jr. for not knowing where a bathroom was located. 
Aft er all he had spent so many years in the White House.7 He also accompanied the 
new president when JFK took guests on tours in his fi rst week at the mansion. Oft en JFK 
deferred to FDR’s son to explain “the history of a particular room or furnishing….” 8 
FDR, Jr. acted as if the family still owed the place. Yet, his close proximity to power and 
presence at the intimate dinner table could scarcely make up for the fact that FDR, Jr. 
had not been included in the new administration. As long as two years JFK would keep 
him at political arm’s length.9 
JFK tried by various social means to give dignity and importance to FDR, Jr. during 
the fi rst year of his presidency. Th ey spent weekends at the Kennedy’s Glen Ora retreat 
in the Virginia countryside, cruised on the Honey Fitz, sailed at Hyannis Port, and 
played rounds of golf at Newport.10 Upon his return from a weekend with the Kenne-
dys in October 1961 FDR, Jr. boasted to James that he had “spent a lot of time with the 
President and Mrs. Kennedy on the Honey Fitz and Jackie and I got two rounds of golf. 
You should see her on a single water ski. Even an old man like you would enjoy it.” 11 Th e 
Roosevelts were frequently invited to the White House for private and state dinners. At 
one social event, FDR, Jr. highlighted his reputation for booming blunders. At a party 
for Jackie’s sister, Princess Radziwill, he delivered a long toast to a mustached guest he 
took for her husband, who wasn’t present, and fi nally raised his glass on high to Mrs. 
Kennedy’s dress designer Oleg Cassini.12 Th e embarrassed Washington society gloated. 
Only to be summoned when JFK needed easy and informal company, FDR, Jr. felt bitter 
and double-crossed, but his upbringing prevented him from carrying a grudge or disap-
pointment openly.13
Death of Eleanor Roosevelt 
Th e coveted position in the Kennedy administration had also served as a springboard 
for a possible return to New York State politics. FDR, Jr. sought an opportunity to build 
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himself up as an opponent to Governor Nelson Rockefeller in 1962 whom JFK expected 
to be his opponent in the 1964 presidential election. At the end of 1961, he asked his 
mother for advice on his intention to run for governor. Over dinner at Vall-Kill Eleanor 
immediately talked him out of it.14 In the spring of next year Mayor Robert Wagner be-
came the odds on favorite to win the Democratic nomination. FDR, Jr. was not discour-
aged because he had set eyes on national offi  ce. He explained to FDR III that he would 
utilize the next two years to build up for a possible run as New York Senator in 1964.15
In the fall of 1962, FDR, Jr. needed to attend to a more urgent matter than to solely 
quench his thirst for public recognition. Eleanor contracted tuberculosis and had been 
given risky blood transfusions over the summers. When the illness aff ected her bone 
marrow and ability to produce blood her condition worsened. She spent her seventy-
eight birthday in a New York hospital. A week later in mid-October, Eleanor returned 
home to die. FDR, Jr. spent most of his time in New York to visit his mother. He kept JFK 
up to date on her condition.16 
FDR, Jr. maintained that his mother had an agreement with David Gurewitsch , her 
doctor, to prevent her from living under degrading circumstances. He blamed his sister 
for the fact that their mother had lived for several more weeks in indignity. Anna had 
moved in with Eleanor to be in charge and had sent for “… three specialists who over-
ruled David and did the very thing Eleanor was trying to avoid.” 17 When Eleanor died 
on 7 November 1962 it seemed an era had ended. FDR, Jr. reminisced that his mother 
“lived a very full and unusually constructive life …, and perhaps, most important an 
unusually unselfi sh and good life.” 18 
Undersecretary of Commerce
Like his mother FDR, Jr. did not want to observe life from the sidelines. He explained to 
his son Frank that he wanted to be involved in government because an observer missed 
“… the satisfaction of beginning a project and seeing it through to a successful conclu-
sion.” FDR, Jr. liked the challenge of the participation in public service “… because you 
can infl uence millions by infl uencing the right small number of people.” 19 
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15. FDR, Jr. to FDR III , 9 March 1962, folder Roosevelt, Franklin D. III, box 343, FDR, Jr. 
Papers.
16. FDR, Jr. to FDR III , 3 November 1962, folder FDR III, box 424, FDR, Jr. Papers.
17. Dorothy Schiff  to Files, September 23, 1975, folder Roosevelt, Jr., Franklin D., 1966, October 
10 – 1989, January 23, Editorial Files, box 65, Dorothy Schiff  Papers, NYPL; Gurewitsch , Kindred 
Souls, 224, 274–293.
18. FDR, Jr. to David and Edna Gurewitsch , 4 February 1963, quoted in: Gurewitsch, Kindred 
Souls, 287–288.
19. FDR, Jr. to FDR III , 17 November 1965, folder Roosevelt, F.D. III, box 343, FDR, Jr. Papers. 
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Aft er waiting over two years for an acceptable job, FDR, Jr. got the nod from JFK to 
become the new Undersecretary of Commerce. FDR, Jr. was anxious to get back into 
public offi  ce and he considered the position an “exciting opportunity….” 20 Th e press in-
terpreted the announcement in January 1963 as the payoff  of a political debt. For a man 
who would be in the position to infl uence national policies aff ecting business and indus-
try the Washington Post reported that it was also unable to discover qualifi cations, other 
than being “an amiable politician who happened to help President Kennedy win the 
Democratic nomination in 1960.” 21 In a recurrence of the old sport of Roosevelt-baiting, 
the newspaper editorialized, “the country cannot aff ord the luxury of royal families, in 
which a name alone is suffi  cient to entitle the bearer to high public responsibility.” Th e 
New York Times denounced the appointment as dubious, “FDR, Jr. may have helped 
JFK get elected, but his seven years’ experience as the proprietor of a foreign motor-car 
agency … would not seem to be a particularly eminent qualifi cation for appointment to 
the second most important position in the Government in the whole area of domestic 
and foreign business.” 22 
Th e observations refl ected the reputation of FDR, Jr. as a man whose past had tend-
ed to mar his future, though not his hopes. A Herblock cartoon pictured a grinning 
FDR, Jr. sitting on a pile of Trujillo money who stated, “I’m Broadminded-I’m Just As 
Willing To Work For A Democracy.” 23 Opponents of JFK seized the announcement to 
attack the new administration. Th ey sneered that apparently it “did not count what but 
whom you know and what you have done to move the New Frontier forward.” 24 Th e 
appointment was widely seen as a deliberate move by JFK to push FDR, Jr. back in the 
political arena. Th e New York Journal-American noted, “there is voting magic in a name, 
if you are a politician” and suggested that FDR, Jr. and JFK were far more interested in 
a possible 1964 Senate race against New York Senator Keating.
FDR, Jr. shrugged off  the nasty publicity. He told the old New Dealer Isador Lu-
bin, “… this is politics, and I guess I have to put my elephant skin on again.” 25 FDR, 
Jr. expected a relatively easy confi rmation. He optimistically confi ded to FDR III he 
was told that “except for some nasty Republican partisan questions, I do not have too 
20. FDR, Jr. to Joe Lash , 7 March 1963, folder Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr. 1940–1965, box 16, 
Joseph P. Lash Papers, FDRL. 
21. “What’s in A Name,” Washington Post, 5 February 1963.
22. NYT, 4 February 1963; Author interview with Curtis Roosevelt , Middelburg, the Nether-
lands, 22 June 2000. Former Senator Claiborne Pell and Justin Feldman both claimed to have 
been instrumental in obtaining the position of Undersecretary of Commerce for their friend, 
Claiborne Pell, interview by John . F. Stewart, Washington, D.C., 6 February 1967, 39, JFKL OH 
Program; Author interview with Justin Feldman, 4 June 1998.
23. Washington Post, 6 February 1963; Stephen Hess , America’s Political Dynasties (New York: 
Doubleday, 1966), 212.
24. Hess, America’s Political Dynasties, 212; “Junior’s Reward,” Chicago Tribune, 6 February 
1963; Washington Post, 5 February 1963; Washington Daily News, 1 February 1963; New York 
Journal American, 11 February 1963. 
25. FDR, Jr. to Isador Lubin, 11 March 1963, folder Tape File, box 387, FDR, Jr. Papers.







much to worry about.” 26 Th e Senate Commerce Committee scheduled hearings on his 
nomination during three days in mid-March. Th e Democratic chairman had lined up 
the party’s senators who held a clear majority on the committee. Th e whirlwind of con-
troversy led media to expect a good grilling over FDR, Jr.’s job qualifi cations, political 
ambitions and reputation. 
Despite the thirty-one reporters, seventeen cameramen and a large crowd of spec-
tators the actual hearings were disappointingly uneventful. FDR, Jr. sailed through the 
confi rmation sessions. Senator Claiborne Pell introduced his long-time friend as a “sin-
gularly able, competent administrator and leader” whose strong character though en-
gendered strong reactions. Aft er casting a quick glance at the Republicans, he pointed 
out, “there will always be those who will dislike and abuse him as they did his father 
before him.” 27 Pell’s colleagues also gave FDR, Jr. a friendly reception. 
Th e Republican senators discarded the Democratic inquiries as an “extended white-
wash and love feast.” Th ey fi red questions at FDR, Jr. if his philosophy toward business 
and industry was as “harsh as his father’s.” 28 Vermont Senator Winston Prouty warned 
him to “stand on his own record rather than relying on family prestige and the achieve-
ments of family members in the past.” 29 Th eir exchange reduced the Trujillo matter to 
a ludicrous discussion in which FDR, Jr. explained that all he had done was to arrange 
the legal importation of tropical seeds. He defended his action by appealing to the obli-
gation of the legal profession to take unpopular clients. FDR, Jr. had to concede though 
that he “perhaps would have been just as well off  if I had not represented this particular 
client.” 30 
FDR, Jr. had come well prepared. He answered adroitly to the inquiries and by-
passed comments on his so-called “public-be-damned attitude.” He convinced his crit-
ics of his knowledge and competence on international trade issues and defended the 
administration’s new economic policies that employed measures as a tax cut, retraining, 
and area redevelopment to combat unemployment. He assured the committee he was a 
private enterprise man who would endorse government-instigated projects as the TVA 
and other public power projects. 
FDR, Jr.’s past and future came full circle. His mixture of charm, frankness, can-
dor, and informative competence pleased the Democrats. His salesman display caught 
the Republicans off  guard and disarmed their accusations before they came. FDR, Jr. 
had overcome his past unmarked. It helped eradicate his old image, his friends main-
26. FDR, Jr. to FDR III , 2 March 1963, folder FDR III, box 424; Memo for Files, 31 January 1963, 
folder Roosevelt, Franklin D. Jr., box 343, FDR, Jr. Papers.
27. Hearings Before the Committee on Commerce U.S. Senate, Eighty-Eight Congress, First Ses-
sion on Nomination of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., To Be Under Secretary of Commerce, 12, 13 and 
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tained.31 Th e critical Washington Post conferred the highest accolade upon “Junior.” It 
admitted that FDR, Jr. had displayed “some of the political fi nesse of his dad” during 
the three-day hearings.32
Poverty
At the end of March, President Kennedy swore him in. At the ceremony he stressed 
the Roosevelt family tradition of distinguished public service and public responsibility. 
FDR, Jr. realized he had to rein in his political ambition, particularly for elective offi  ce. 
He defi ed critics who had stated that he was appointed to the job to be shoved under the 
rug. As JFK’s active lieutenant, he cast himself deliberately in his new role as defender 
of the businessmen’s interests rather than being locked up inside an unhurried and dull 
bureaucratic function. FDR, Jr. urged the businessman to call on the Commerce De-
partment when in need of support. He clamored that the business voice got lost in the 
administration shuffl  e, while the voices of labor and agriculture came through loud and 
clear.33 FDR, Jr.’s opinion tied in with JFK’s view of a style of liberalism that regards all 
interest groups having equal rights. 
FDR, Jr.’s attitude and salesmanship also underscored JFK’s conviction that govern-
ment and business were necessary allies. JFK framed economic policies to create a stable 
environment for corporate prosperity and expansion. His economic advisers employed 
Keynesian tools to fi ne tune the economy, proposed a package of defi cit spending, and a 
tax cut to stimulate the economy, promote full employment and create prosperity.34
Aft er FDR, Jr. joined the administration he supervised this Area Redevelopment 
Administration (ARA) out of the Commerce Department. Th e program channeled pub-
lic works and money into economically depressed regions of the country, particularly 
in Appalachia. In the late 1950s, liberal reformers had identifi ed unemployment, racism 
and poverty as society’s main problems. JFK’s victory gave them hope of solving these 
31. Joe Lash to FDR, Jr., 9 February 1963, folder Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr. 1940–1965, box 16, 
Lash Papers, FDRL.
32. “Questions for the Under Secretary of Commerce,” March 1963, folder Personal: Nomina-
tion, Press, etc., box 325, FDR, Jr. Papers; Brower, “Last Chance for Junior,” Saturday Evening Post 
(27 July 1963): 32–33; Th e Wall Street Journal, 13 March 1963; Washington Post, 14 March 1963. 
33. “Press Release 26 March 1963: Remarks of the President at the Swearing in of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Jr. as Under Secretary of Commerce,” Speech Files, 2/25/63–4/30/63, box 43, President 
John F. Kennedy’s Offi  ce Files, JFKL; Author interview with Curtis Roosevelt , 22 June 2000; 
Brower, “Last Chance for Junior,” Saturday Evening Post (27 July 1963): 33. 
34. Allen J. Matusow, Th e Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1986), xiv, 32–59; Timothy N. Th urber, Th e Politics of Equality: Hubert H. 
Humphrey and the African American Freedom Struggle (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1999), 120.







problems. Initially, JFK handled the poverty issue with as much caution as the economy. 
He identifi ed few social problems that needed minor reforms. 
Th e example that seemed to violate this notion was JFK’s pledge to send a bill to 
Congress to combat poverty aft er he had been shocked by his experiences in West Vir-
ginia. Th e administration’s bill aimed at using federal aid to create jobs and prevent peo-
ple from migrating out of the depressed areas. In May 1961, the ARA proposal became 
JFK’s fi rst major legislative accomplishment.35 FDR, Jr. acted as ARA’s troubleshooter. 
Th is was necessary because the program had serious fl aws. Limited in money and con-
ception, the agency missed an overall approach and was notorious for its bureaucratic 
autonomy. It was overstretched and became well known for its ineptitude and failure 
to build a solid infrastructure, giving loans to marginal enterprises. By the summer of 
1963, the ARA had come under review because of the frequent criticisms and Congress 
cut funding for the agency.36 
While the administration displayed its concern with the appalling conditions in 
Appalachia, Kennedy was also under increasing pressure from the emerging civil rights 
movement. Th eir successful eff orts to sway the majority of white public opinion to its 
cause forced JFK to meet the issue head-on during the summer of 1963. Th e president 
had been sympathetic to the civil rights demands but had not followed up with ac-
tual policies. In May JFK fi nally addressed the issue. In a televised speech the president 
framed it as a national moral crisis and announced to send an unprecedented compre-
hensive civil rights bill to Congress. 
The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC )
During 1962 and 1963, Michael Harrington’s Th e Other America and reports on Eastern 
Kentucky by Homer Bigart for the New York Times brought poverty home to the general 
public and helped JFK to grasp the problem and take action. It fell to the Governors of 
the region to prevail on JFK in April 1963 to create the Appalachian Regional Program. 
FDR, Jr. spearheaded the Kennedy administration’s attack on poverty. He served 
as chairman of this new federal-state task force that would stand as a model for other 
parts of the country to wage war on the economic miseries of the region.37 Former ARA 
35. James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: Th e Eisenhower , Kennedy, and Johnson Years (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Th e Brookings Institution, 1968), 60; Matusow, Th e Unraveling of America, 97; Her-
bert S. Parmet, Th e Democrats: Th e Years Aft er FDR (New York: MacMillan, 1976), 175. 
36. FDR, Jr. to John T. Connor, 21 December 1964, folder FDR, Jr., Personal File, box 344, FDR, 
Jr. Papers; Joe W. Fleming II interview by Stephen Goodell, 19 February 1969, 5, Oral History 
Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library (hereaft er LBJL); Matusow, Th e Unraveling of America, 
96–127; Sundquist, Politics and Policy, 60, 101; Reeves, President Kennedy, 524. Discredited and 
having produced little results to help the Appalachian region, the ARA was dissolved in 1965.
37. Washington Post, 16 July 1963; Jerald Ter Horst, “No More Pork Barrel: Th e Appalachia 
Approach,” Th e Reporter (11 March 1965): 27–29, folder Appalachia Bill — 3/9/65, box 35, Of-
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administrator William Batt had suggested to put FDR, Jr. in charge and to put the pro-
gram on a high level in the hierarchy to get more cooperation from other agencies. JFK 
concurred because FDR, Jr. had the acceptance, name, and will to do the organization 
work, and the ability to get all the agencies in the government concentrating on it. Th e 
bureaucratic Commerce Department was an unlikely source to off er signs of hope but 
it wanted to house the program because it was losing major functions to other depart-
ments.38 Th e appointment put FDR, Jr. in the center of liberal reform.
“Coal has always cursed the land in which it lies,” Harry Caudill observed in Night 
Comes to the Cumberlands, a vivid account of the squalor and poverty on the Kentucky 
Cumberland Plateau.39 Th e problems that beset the whole Appalachian region were low 
income, high unemployment, lack of urbanization, low educational achievement, and 
a low standard of living compared to the rest of the nation. Because coal, the principal 
resource had declined aft er World War II, large numbers of people were moving out of 
the region further aggravating the declining tax base. 
Aft er meeting in early April with President Kennedy, Governors of the nine Appa-
lachian States, fourteen federal departments and agencies the parties agreed to set up a 
comprehensive program. Under FDR, Jr.’s direction, the task force defi ned three major 
goals for the development of Appalachia. It established a joint federal-state committee, 
reviewed federal agencies and presented programs for the region, and worked closely 
with the region’s offi  cials to form the Appalachian institute, a research and training 
center.40 
FDR, Jr. responded to the challenging opportunity “with ability and energy.” 41 He 
supervised a staff  about of hundred people from various departments and federal agen-
cies. On his swing through Appalachia to promote the program, FDR, Jr. had found 
nearly universal enthusiasm. He visited each state and established a network of com-
mittees and subcommittees to consider every form of aid the federal government could 
off er. Th ey discussed the region’s needs and its problems with public and private experts, 
labor, business, education and political leaders. FDR, Jr. sat down with all the Governors 
involved to develop solutions and praised the bipartisan cooperation between state and 
fi ce Files of the White House Aides, Horace Busby, LBJL; Matusow, Th e Unraveling of America, 
96–127.
38. FDR, Jr. to John T. Connor, 21 December 1964, folder FDR, Jr., Personal File, box 344, FDR, 
Jr. Papers; Fleming interview by Stephen Goodell, 33, Oral History Collection, LBJL; Luther H. 
Hodges interview by Dan B. Jacobs, Washington, D.C., 21 March 1964, 53, Oral History Collec-
tion, LBJL; William L. Batt, Jr., interview III by Larry J. Hackman, Washington, D.C., 10 May 
1967, 180–182, JFKL OH Program; Washington Post, 16 July 1963.
39. Harry M. Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumberlands (New York: Little, Brown, 1962), x.
40. FDR, Jr., “Progress Report on the Special Program for Appalachian Development,” 15 May 
1963; FDR, Jr. to JFK, 16 May 1963, Part 3: Departments and Agencies File, President John F. 
Kennedy’s Offi  ce Files, 1961–1963, reel 7, Roosevelt Study Center microfi lm edition (hereaft er 
RSC); J. Tallmer to Paul Sann, 11 October 1966, folder Roosevelt, Jr., Franklin D., 1950, Septem-
ber 14 – 1966, October 23, Editorial Files, box 65, Schiff  Papers, NYPL. 
41. Schlesinger, Jr., A Th ousand Days, 1007–1008.







federal governments. Aft er only a month of consultations in mid-May, FDR, Jr. could 
optimistically report to JFK that the program “made good progress.” 42 
As ideas began to pour in between June and November 1963, FDR, Jr. and his staff  
planned a far-ranging ambitious program of liberal reform with an innovative region-
al approach to analyze the needs of the region and develop permanent cures for their 
chronic problems.43 To get long-term solutions in motion to try to change the economic 
character of the area FDR, Jr. proposed a doctrinal breakthrough by defi ning the prob-
lem as regional. He created a technique of federal partnership with a group of states. Th e 
concept to hand power from federal to state and local level had originated with Ken-
tucky Governor Combs and his staff . Federal money would be concentrated regionally 
and not fl ow directly to the impoverished people. Th e governors bore responsibility for 
its projects. Th e involvement of the states was crucial because they stood closer to the 
problem and could serve as an alternative political lightning rod. 
Th is new federalism radically diff ered from the ARA approach. Th e redevelopment 
agency had off ered businessmen subsidies to reactivate idle public facilities, factories 
and hotels in the depressed areas. One commentator wryly observed, “this might work 
in Massachusetts but was absolute nonsense in Appalachia.” FDR, Jr. built on the prem-
ise of stimulating migration and further urbanization within the region. He proposed 
to invest funds in areas with signifi cant potential for growth and used methods such 
as loans and grants, technical assistance, and manpower (re)training. Th e President’s 
Appalachian Regional Commission that came out of the task force would serve as a 
permanent coordinating and policy-making agency.44
In mid-November, FDR, Jr. toured the region for a fi nal time. He discussed and 
reviewed the fi rst draft  of the report that was set to be delivered at the end of that month. 
Th e task force held their last meeting in Hagerstown on 22 November 1963 when JFK 
42. FDR, Jr. to JFK, 16 May 1963, JFK’s Offi  ce Files, JFKL.
43. “Statement of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Under Secretary of Commerce,” Hearings before 
the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Appalachian Regional Development of the Commission on Public 
Works of the House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 2nd session, 5 May 1964, folder Testimony: 
House Public Works Committee, box 388, FDR, Jr. Papers; Ter Horst, “No More Pork Barrel: 
Th e Appalachia Approach,” 27–29, Th e Reporter (11 March 1965): 27–29, folder Appalachia Bill 
— 3/9/65, box 35, Offi  ce Files of the White House Aides, Horace Busby, LBJL; Fleming interview 
by Stephen Goodell, 1–2, Oral History Collection, LBJL; John L. Sweeney interview by David G. 
McComb, 14 November 1968, 14, Oral History Collection, LBJL; Washington Post, 16 July 1963; 
Sundquist, Politics and Policy, 101–103. 
44. FDR, Jr. to FDR III , 17 November 1965, folder Roosevelt, F.D. III, box 343, FDR, Jr. Pa-
pers; Fleming interview by Stephen Goodell, 7–12, Oral History Collection, LBJL; Ter Horst, 
“No More Pork Barrel: Th e Appalachia Approach,” 27–29, Offi  ce Files of the White House Aides, 
Horace Busby, LBJL; Washington Post, 16 July 1963. United Mine Workers stalwart John Lewis 
criticized the ARC approach for being on the wrong foot, stating that the federal government 
should continue to invest in the market for coal, lower tariff s on American coal and require the 
use of coal in government installations, “Statement of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Under Secretary 
of Commerce.”
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was shot.45 Days aft er the murder FDR, Jr. refl ected on the slain President as “my boy-
hood friend, my associate in the war, my colleague in Congress, and my Chief for the 
last eight months.” 46 
Lyndon B. Johnson
FDR, Jr. wanted to start off  on the right foot with the new president, Lyndon B. Johnson, 
the former vice president and powerful majority leader from Texas. He claimed that at 
the 1960 convention he had urged JFK to name LBJ as his running mate. FDR, Jr. as-
sured the new president “to give in return the same devotion and the same loyalty you 
gave my father.” 47 Despite the emphasis on the Roosevelt connection, FDR, Jr. gave a 
less fl attering description when he later portrayed LBJ as a wild, insecure, power-grab-
bing fi gure, and a “terribly diffi  cult man.” 48 LBJ publicly identifi ed with the Roosevelt 
memory as a source of strength. As a young politician during the 1930s, he had revered 
FDR almost as an adopted son. Th e emphasis on FDR and the New Deal as his role mod-
els reassured liberals in the November confusion of the presidential transition. LBJ also 
associated himself with FDR’s children. He wanted to be included in their circle and be 
regarded as an authentic liberal by Northern Democrats who had been leery of him.49
Observers credited FDR, Jr. for sparking interest from LBJ in the Appalachian pro-
gram and rescuing it from oblivion. At the end of 1963, the Appalachian program was 
in trouble. LBJ and his staff  did not show any interest in the program because it had 
been so closely identifi ed with JFK. FDR, Jr. persuaded a reluctant LBJ that there was a 
political rationale behind the program. He suggested that with an upcoming election 
it provided a perfect opportunity to get into the ignored South. It was a way to fi nd 
common ground with the Southern governors and do something for their region, com-
pletely outside the civil rights issue. Th e region’s governors exerted pressure on the new 
45. Sweeney interview by David G. McComb, 14–15; Fleming interview by Stephen Goodell, 9; 
Batt interview III by Larry J. Hackman, 180–182, 189, all in Oral History Collection, LBJL.
46. FDR, Jr. to LBJ, 26 November 1963, folder FDR, Jr. Personal File, box 344, FDR, Jr. Papers.
47. Ibid.; Author interview with Louis Harris , New York City, 15 July 1999.
48. Illustrating the backlash against LBJ’s Great Society in the 1970s and 1980s, FDR, Jr. blasted 
the former president’s social policies in 1982 who had been “confused between the temporary 
emergency solutions and the permanent fl oor under the economy that were two sides of FDR’s 
philosophy. As a result … we moved in a socialist trend greatly stimulated by Lyndon Johnson 
[whom] I do not think was an intellectual enough to understand [this diff erence],” FDR, Jr., “Th e 
Roosevelt Legacy,” in Kenneth W. Th ompson, ed., Portraits of American Presidents: vol. 1, Th e 
Roosevelt Presidency: Four Intimate Perspectives of FDR (New York: University Press of America, 
1982), 52.
49. Public Papers of the Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Offi  ce, 1966), 2: 919, 604, 681, 897; Public Papers of the Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson, 
1963–1964 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Offi  ce, 1965), 2: 640, 652–3; Leuchtenburg, 
In the Shadow of FDR, 132–137, 159.







president by lauding FDR, Jr.’s role in the task force.50 FDR, Jr. was strategic in getting 
political support from within the administration. His name and political acumen made 
him a successful intermediary between the Kennedy and the new administration.
LBJ withheld approval for a time but he felt trapped between the glare of the public-
ity in which the mixed federal-state commission had been launched and operating and 
the backing of the leadership of nine states. He had also diffi  culty to control the ARC 
because the agency had been given policy and budget power by his predecessor. FDR, 
Jr. needed to guard these prerogatives and to defend the commission’s regionalism ap-
proach because he faced hostility from entrenched bureaucrats, particularly in the Bu-
reau of the Budget (BOB) and in the ARA, the agency that would be doomed by the new 
plan. Known as the administration’s “no-agency,” the Budget had raised fi nancial and 
political objections. At the end of 1963, the Budget claimed the proposed expenditures 
for the ARC were “extravagant.” It also feared that the agency would become too inde-
pendent and recommended against establishing a permanent commission.51
FDR, Jr. stated that the ARC was not subject to the normal process of budget review 
because the report represented the views of the federal-state commission members and 
not the administration as such. Th e agency assured LBJ that it had “made every eff ort 
to square recommendations with federal policy and programs” to meet the administra-
tion’s goals of a sound economy and balanced budget. FDR, Jr. denied the claim that the 
ratio of funds between the federal and state governments was unwise because it would 
be too generous to states and set precedent. Instead, he argued that its approach broke 
new ground because it aimed to “reverse a national policy of investment” which had 
long ignored Appalachia.52
Th e Bureau found the program unbalanced with too much emphasis on road build-
ing. Two-thirds of the ARC ’s funds were earmarked for highways instead of educational 
or social programs. With regard to the more than 1 billion dollars in federal funds for 
highways in a single region, FDR, Jr. confi ded to LBJ that for political reasons the report 
had spelled out a more costly highway program. He explained that the governors would 
accept his revision to reduce the budget. In return, since the states were unable to pay 
their 50 percent share, his proposal altered the overall formula by increasing the federal 
government’s expenditures to 70 percent. Th e governors wanted the highways built in 
50. West Virginia Governor Barron reported to the new president, “Th e Undersecretary is do-
ing an outstanding job in his examinations of the Appalachian problems,” William Wallace Bar-
ron to LBJ, 29 November 1963, Subject Files, BE 5–5/CO 1 Appalachian Region, 1/22/63–7/31/64, 
box 36, White House Central Files, LBJL (hereaft er WHCF).
51. Bureau of the Budget to LBJ, 28 January 1964, Subject Files, CO 1 (Appalachia), box 5, 
WHCF, LBJL.
52. FDR, Jr. to William Moyers, 10 February 1964, FG 155 Department of Commerce, Febru-
ary 1, 1964 – April 8, 1964, box 218, WHCF; John Sweeney to LBJ, 27 January 1964, Subject Files, 
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their states and had warned the president that they would not sign a report that did not 
“realistically off er adequate solutions to Appalachian problems.” 53 FDR, Jr. indicated to 
LBJ that the program would fall apart and the governors would be in political trouble at 
home, if stripped of its substance and lacking “fairly long commitments.” 54
Special counsel Lee White advised LBJ to agree with the emphasis on roads and the 
formula by which federal and state shares were determined and to make a commitment 
to a long-range program without accepting the exact recommendations of the commis-
sion.55 LBJ decided to reduce the costs in the bill by building roads of a lesser quality 
thereby still providing the same mileage. It remained a matter of dispute when the bill 
came before Congress because the House Public Works Committee increased the high-
way budget to its original fi gure of over a billion dollars. While BOB recommended 
against it and FDR, Jr. urged that Congress was permitted to raise the amount, LBJ sided 
with the BOB in opposing the increase.56
In March 1964, with the exception of the crucial highway program FDR, Jr., the 
BOB and the White House reached agreement on the contents of the special message 
to Congress and accompanying legislation that mirrored recommendations in the ARC 
report. Th e bill contained a variety of measures from the development of fl ood control, 
water and timber resources facilities, to programs for the conversion of cropland to 
pasture to increase production livestock, human resources and promoting the uses of 
coal to be coordinated by an Appalachian Regional Commission.57 Lee White issued 
the fi nal report to presidential adviser Bill Moyers. He described its fi erce battle as “a 
hard fought agreement between Frank Roosevelt and Budget with me serving as referee, 
interlocutor and King Solomon.” 58
53. Scranton to LBJ, 5 June 1964; FDR, Jr. to Scranton, n.d.; FDR, Jr. to Lee White, 16 June 
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54. FDR, Jr. to LBJ, 5 February 1964, FG 155 Department of Commerce, February 1, 1964 – 
April 8, 1964, box 218; FDR, Jr. to LBJ, 5 February 1964, BE 5–5/CO 1 Appalachian Region 
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In April 1964, LBJ fi nally gave his blessing to the program at a meeting with the gover-
nors in Huntington, West Virginia. Events rapidly unfolded thereaft er. ARC executive 
director John Sweeney recalled that “we all climbed on the plane and he (LBJ) called 
Frank Roosevelt and myself back into his part of the cabin and said, “Can you have 
the bill ready for me by Monday morning?” Frank reached in his briefcase and pulled 
out the draft  bill and gave it to him. Th e next day Johnson announced the Appalachian 
program and submitted the bill to Congress.” 59 
Th e next month, FDR, Jr. accompanied LBJ on his visit to poor families in the region 
to dramatize the Appalachian program and his attack on poverty. LBJ put himself in 
the mantle of FDR as the champion of the poor and neglected. He proclaimed on the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Square in Gainesville, Georgia, “… with Franklin Roosevelt’s 
young son, Franklin Roosevelt, Jr., by my side, I have come back … to say that his work 
and ours is not fi nished; his dreams and ours are not yet realized; his hopes and ours are 
not yet fulfi lled.” 60 LBJ wanted to make maximum use of the Roosevelt name. He hoped 
that the high-profi le presence of FDR, Jr. and its identifi cation with the New Deal would 
help win quick acceptance for the program on Capitol Hill. 
In April, the Appalachian bill had been introduced in Congress. FDR, Jr.’s major 
role was to sell the program. Due to his campaign activities and position as a former 
congressman he had “maintained good relations with the membership.” 61 His strongest 
asset remained the Roosevelt name. In May, FDR, Jr. testifi ed before the Special Appa-
lachian Subcommittee of the House Public Works Committee. He declared, “I am part 
of Appalachia for I remember touring the counties with my father, seeing its coal mines 
with my mother and campaign through the region in the primaries and election of 
1960.” 62 FDR, Jr. interpreted his involvement as a personal commitment and appealed 
to the New Deal memory and its characteristic spirit and tradition of benevolence, opti-
Approach,” Th e Reporter (11 March 1965): 27–29, folder Appalachia Bill – 3/9/65, box 35, Offi  ce 
Files of the White House Aides, Horace Busby, LBJL; Sweeney interview by David G. McComb, 
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mism, and innocence. He pointed out that there was “no reason why three-thirds of this 
nation cannot be well-housed, well-clothed and well-fed.” 63 
Liberal media explained the program as the eff ort of another Roosevelt who was 
going to wage war on poverty. Th e New York Post reported that FDR, Jr. planned an 
“Appalachian TVA” though the comprehensive attack on the economic ills of the region 
would not be as big as his father’s program in the 1930s.64 It was not only the New Deal ’s 
spirit that permeated the Appalachian discussion, but also the shared belief in techno-
logical fi xes to solve social problems that tied the administration’s liberals to the coun-
terparts of the 1930s. FDR, Jr. believed the huge emphasis on building a solid technical 
infrastructure was necessary because he pointed out that “the human condition cannot 
be materially improved until the region itself is upgraded.” 65 Former New Dealers had 
also concluded that technological improvements could solve vast problems of resources 
and power. 
Despite reports that recent legislative battles over LBJ’s War on Poverty had exhaust-
ed the sympathy for the poor FDR, Jr. stated, “our bill is something Congress knows 
about since the regional program is the largest since father created the TVA.” 66 Th e fi rst 
study of the Appalachian dated from 1936 but FDR, Jr. emphasized that the ARC pro-
gram was no such relief project as the controversial TVA. Th e program diff ered because 
of its unique regional concept that ignored state boundaries and covered a much broad-
er area. Whereas the TVA was completely federal, state and local governments primar-
ily made the decisions in the ARC. Th e state and federal governments would each buy 
half of the stock selling the bonds to the public and channeling the proceeds through 
this agency for the local development of public facilities. Th e Appalachian bill blended 
various kinds of programs. It advocated long-term solutions to alter the area’s economy 
rather than just resource development such as providing hydroelectric power.67
FDR, Jr. regularly conferred with Representative Cliff  Davis who chaired the special 
subcommittee and moved swift ly to hammer out the fi nal form of the bill. He explained 
that the regional approach could be a model for other areas with economic problems. 
Yet, the Committee rejected the program’s provision of a federal-state corporation. Th e 
majority compared the set up of a new government entity to the establishment of a new 
TVA. It feared that ARC would become too independent and uncontrollable. In early 
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July, FDR, Jr. reported to LBJ that Davis vehemently opposed bringing the bill out of 
committee because they lacked the votes. Th e administration pressed on but the chair-
man rebelled. Davis insisted that the bill had to be kept off  the fl oor until the big poverty 
program had passed.68
FDR, Jr. emphasized that he had made an eff ort to avoid duplication with the na-
tional war on poverty program that was headed by Sargent Shriver out of the Offi  ce 
of Economic Opportunity. He assured worried congressmen that ARC supported the 
poverty approach and that “in many conversations with Shriver and his staff  (they had) 
worked out specifi c areas in which OEO and ARC will operate.” 69 Th e Appalachian 
commission had hastily declared to delete its short-range human skills programs that 
included work training school lunch, and food stamps services from the bill and move 
them under the direction of Shriver. FDR, Jr. also brought the ARC funds for these ser-
vices into the budget that he originally had appropriated to supplement the OEO aft er 
Shriver had agreed to coordinate and align its activities in Appalachia by using the new 
commission.70 
FDR, Jr. realized LBJ’s preference for the war on poverty proposal. He walked a 
tightrope to plan strategy with the administration’s legislative liaison offi  ce, to satisfy 
Congress, and to accommodate criticisms from the governors who rightly suspected the 
president to subordinate the interest in Appalachia to the general poverty program.71 
Th e Appalachian Regional Program became one of the few major setbacks in 1964 for 
LBJ. Th e bill passed the Senate but the House adjourned before it came to a fl oor vote. 
Th e Democratic congressional leadership had found that there was no stamina or room 
for another brand new liberal reform program because during the summer it had al-
ready passed the War on Poverty bill and also a proposal to extend the ARA program 
and a public works bill resided in Congress. Speaker John McCormack convinced the 
administration to wait until the 1965 session and not risk defeat. Aft er the recess it 
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sailed through Congress and became law in March 1965.72 LBJ credited FDR, Jr.’s cru-
cial role and declared that he had “done so much to make the Appalachian program a 
reality.” 73
In this respect the relationship between LBJ and FDR, Jr. was of mutual conve-
nience. Th e president was proud to have somebody named FDR, Jr. in his administra-
tion, which he could boss while FDR, Jr. had the inside platform to develop and promote 
his program. FDR, Jr. had been instrumental in establishing and selling the Appala-
chian Regional Program. He later pointed out to FDR III that “perhaps the most satis-
fying experience of my recent life was the undertaking of the study of the problems of 
Appalachia and seeing this through to the passage of legislation by Congress, (which 
had been) entirely the result of my recommendations, in less than two years from the 
beginning.” 74 
FDR, Jr. declared before Congress that poverty in the region was not only based on 
deprivation and need, it was also founded on feelings of neglect and lacking of a future. 
He identifi ed poverty as a regional lack of opportunity and compared it to “waiting in a 
surplus food line instead of waiting in a supermarket checkout line” and as “having your 
children inherit your relief check.” 75 When FDR, Jr. defi ned poverty as the absence of 
such opportunity rather than the presence of material hardship, it tapped into the na-
tional commitment to the American creed of equal opportunity. Th is approach off ered 
the poor a chance to fulfi ll the American dream and created an opportunity for govern-
ment to do good. LBJ could boast to his advantage that poverty had decreased and his 
programs worked when his administration formulated poverty in absolute terms as a 
lack of income in a growing economy. Yet, the liberal reform programs did little to di-
minish the existing inequality and therefore failed to reduce poverty.76
Despite FDR, Jr.’s good intentions, imagination and determination in these cir-
cumstances the ARC failed as a successful reform program and became an example of 
liberal benevolence going haywire. Th e Appalachian program wanted to aff ect institu-
tional reform but redistributed power rather than the income remedy. FDR, Jr. allowed 
the White House and Congress to use the ARC as a way to dispense services to the poor 
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through local governments. He appropriated most of the funds for highways to appease 
the Governors involved.77 Th e ARC program catered to vested interests rather than 
serving as a model for other parts of poor America through a new regional approach. 
While it played down the civil rights issue the program fell victim to LBJ’s preference 
for political consensus and the administration’s shift  of attention from white to black 
poverty, from the Appalachian to inner cities.78
The 1964 Presidential Election
FDR, Jr. had commanded respect in the Commerce Department aft er his salesmanship 
for the Appalachian program. Herbert Klotz, former assistant secretary of Commerce 
expressed his astonishment because FDR, Jr. was “much brighter and more intelligent 
than he is usually given credit for,” and had a “very substantial breadth of understand-
ing and knowledge, and phenomenal memory.” 79 FDR, Jr. was not always given as wide 
a scope of activity as he would have liked but when he was assigned a job he was interest-
ed in, he worked well. He resolved labor unrest on the nuclear merchant ship Savannah, 
negotiated the continuing opening of the Miners’ Hospitals in Eastern Kentucky and 
West Virginia and testifi ed frequently on behalf of the Commerce Department before 
congressional committees.80
At all times, FDR, Jr. was aware of the political exposure of his activities. During the 
pre-convention period a number of reports were publicized that urged LBJ to use the 
magic in the name and pick FDR, Jr. as his running mate and vice president on the ticket 
for the 1964 election. Th ere is no evidence that LBJ seriously considered the Roosevelt 
option but FDR, Jr.’s advisers did discuss his chances of a return to politics by pulling 
off  such a stunt. Th is depended on the “degree to which the public and Democratic Con-
vention delegates perceived his presidential stature …” because the “… quality which 
goes under the name of ‘image’ will be most important.” 81 
In that regard, his prospects seemed dismal. Despite his achievements as in the 
Commerce Department, Democratic Party leaders rejected him on the basis of his old 
reputation and dilettantism. FDR, Jr. wisely limited his role in the election by follow-
ing Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater as a one-man truth squad. He 
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campaigned in thirty-fi ve states for the Johnson-Humphrey ticket and added the luster 
of the Roosevelt name to the LBJ bandwagon.82
LBJ wanted to surpass his old mentor and the size of FDR’s 1936-reelection victory. 
Goldwater gave him a helping hand when he blamed the welfare state as the source of all 
evils. While Goldwater defi ed the liberal spirit of the decade and the New Deal achieve-
ments of previous ones, LBJ won an easy victory. Th e president scored 61.1 percent of 
the popular vote to Goldwater’s 38.5 percent. Th e Electoral College tally was 486 to 52 
votes.83 LBJ had established a wide-ranging coalition that sealed his presidential legiti-
macy beyond dispute. He interpreted the outcome with its overwhelming congressional 
majorities as a clear mandate to proceed with liberalism.
Ambitiously, FDR, Jr. looked ahead to the next job. LBJ planned a government re-
shuffl  e aft er the election. FDR, Jr. had oft en found his tasks boring and in November 
he off ered his resignation to be appointed as representative to the United Nations’ Eco-
nomic and Social Council. Already rumors had accompanied his appointment that he 
would succeed Commerce Secretary Luther Hodges who returned to North Carolina 
because he felt bypassed and disagreed over the administration’s civil rights policies. 
When word of this imminent appointment leaked out LBJ changed his mind.84
FDR, Jr. remained at Commerce and was assigned to administer the highway pro-
portion of ARC . John T. Connor , a former president of a big drug company became 
Secretary. While relations with Hodges had been uneasy, relations between Connor and 
FDR, Jr. were strained and deteriorated quickly. He was the under secretary with the big 
personality who was better known than the Secretary. Th e jealousy and frequent lack of 
understanding led FDR, Jr. to look for another government position.85 He assured his 
loyalty to LBJ and wanted to remain in a visible federal job. A relegation or dismissal 
would refl ect badly on his image in New York and his intentions to run for governor in 
1966.86
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For over six months FDR, Jr. tried to remain patient. Yet, he became interested in 
the 1965 election for New York City Mayor. As a matter of coincidence, FDR, Jr. hap-
pened to be the third Roosevelt son who showed interest in becoming mayor in 1965. 
In the spring, James ran unsuccessfully for mayor of Los Angeles. A few months later 
Elliott secured his fi rst public offi  ce as mayor of Miami Beach.87 A hesitant FDR, Jr. 
eventually refused to jump in the race though political advisers, friends and his wife 
Sue had been pushing him. Th e White House had continued to keep a very close eye on 
the political situation in New York because LBJ feared the popularity of nemesis Robert 
Kennedy and Republican John Lindsay as possible opponents in 1968. Administration 
offi  cials were right in anticipating that FDR, Jr. would not enter the race because he 
would not want to risk losing and destroy his chances to run for governor in 1966. 
FDR, Jr. confi rmed that strategy in a letter to his son Christopher . He had come 
close to running because the Roosevelt name still evoked powerful memories. His 
polls had indicated he enjoyed considerable popularity in the state. Serious consulta-
tions with Kennedy, Wagner and the “friendly, fatherly advice” he had sought from LBJ 
brought FDR, Jr. back to earth in June 1965. He had concluded that to unite the hope-
lessly divided Democrats would be near impossible. Th e new mayor would have to take 
unpopular measures that included the impossible task of raising taxes to deal with the 
problems the city faced. It was LBJ’s considerable pressure that decided the case. FDR, 
Jr. was told to stick to his new responsibility of chairman of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission because a New York candidacy would be inappropriate and a 
source of embarrassment to the administration.88 
Th e unease that the civil rights and anti-war movements evoked strongly infl uenced 
the 1965 election for a new mayor of New York City. Th e 1964 Harlem riot, police mis-
conduct toward minorities and the assassination of Malcolm X in February 1965 put 
already strained race relations to the test. Frequent tax increases had not resulted in 
fi scal responsibility while political extremism reinforced the apparent divisions. Th e 
turmoil generated by these circumstances allowed the victory of John Lindsay . Th e lib-
eral Republican soundly defeated his opponents, the conservative Democrat Abraham 
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Beame and National Review editor William F. Buckley , the candidate of the Conserva-
tive Party.89
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Th e turmoil over FDR, Jr.’s intention to run for mayor coincided with the launch of a 
new civil right agency that came out of the 1964 Civil Rights Act . On 2 June 1965, LBJ 
launched the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Th e EEOC administered 
title VII of the Civil Rights Act that would become eff ective the following month. Th e 
provision handed the EEOC the responsibility to “assure all in the American labor mar-
ket will be hired or promoted on the basis of ability and qualifi cations without regard to 
their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 90 
Th e newest federal enforcement agency possessed potential for improvement and 
real achievements. It handled formidable new responsibilities to outlaw discrimination 
in employment and had a relative independence. Th e EEOC also faced a monumental 
task because Congress had stripped the commission of decisive enforcement powers. As 
a voluntary agency the EEOC groped for an identity and had to manage carefully to in-
tegrate its eff ort with other federal employment agencies. Th e EEOC needed a salesman 
to fulfi ll its unknown potential and realize uncertain possibilities.
LBJ had decided to make maximum use of the Roosevelt name. He cited FDR’s 
responsibility for the fi rst Fair Employment Practice Committee as his motive to name 
his son to be chairman of his employment agency.91 FDR, Jr. confessed he accepted the 
EEOC appointment on less than twenty-four hours notice. Th e White House wanted a 
prestigious name to chair the commission. Under pressure aft er the consideration and 
rejections of an extensive number of names, at the last minute LBJ surprisingly turned 
to FDR, Jr.92 Dissatisfi ed civil rights groups had complained to the press about the delay 
in appointing the new EEOC Commissioners. Discrimination in hiring, paying and 
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promoting practices in employment had deteriorated the already dismaying situation 
for blacks in the job market.93
FDR, Jr. told LBJ he appreciated the opportunity. He had been dedicated to the 
subject, also because it was a family tradition. Th e president publicly reiterated the key 
element of his parents’ memory. At the White House Conference on Equal Employment 
Opportunity in August, LBJ declared, “Chairman FDR, Jr., I always feel stimulated and 
inspired a little bit just to repeat that name, FDR, Jr., I know that your father and mother 
would be very happy if they could observe how your talents are being used in this criti-
cal hour in our national history.” 94 
FDR, Jr. assured LBJ that he would “carry forward what they so well began.” 95 He 
traditionally enjoyed the confi dence of minorities and labor unions and had played a 
prominent and vocal role within the administration to bridge the gap between business 
and minorities. In July 1963, FDR, Jr. testifi ed before the Senate Commerce Commit-
tee on JFK’s civil rights bill. FDR, Jr. argued that business nationwide would welcome 
this legislation because it had an adverse eff ect on interstate commerce. He declared 
that “racial discrimination has become an explosive national issue and is crying for an 
answer.” 96 
JFK had employed delaying tactics to hold the surging civil rights movement at a 
distance and remained friends with the white South. Yet, the boycotts, riots, CORE’s 
Freedom Rides and SNCC’s Voter Education Projects in the South shattered this deli-
cate balance and upset the status quo. As a result, JFK’s political strategy collapsed and 
his unprecedented proposal refl ected a new moral commitment of the federal govern-
ment to abolish segregation. LBJ picked up where his predecessor had left  off . He wanted 
to integrate the South in the mainstream of American economic life. Th e greater in-
volvement of the federal government in the mid-1960s broke the gradualist approach of 
the previous decades. LBJ’s achievements climaxed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that formally guaranteed integration and equality before 
the law.97
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FDR, Jr. headed a task force out of the Commerce Department to seek greater busi-
ness opportunities for minority groups. He set up the quite successful program to en-
courage blacks to start businesses under franchise operations in popular projects such 
as “chicken delight” and “Mister Donut.” 98 FDR, Jr. “persuaded a lot of businessmen 
to take affi  rmative steps to hire Negroes and other minority groups.” 99 He laid down 
liberal policies that underlined the administration’s treatment to achieve equality by 
promoting individual opportunity and was well received by the White House.
The First Hundred Days of the EEOC
In early June, FDR, Jr. was sworn in as its chairman and Luther Holcomb , Aileen Her-
nandez , Richard Graham and Eugene Jackson as commissioners. FDR, Jr. faced a daunt-
ing task to build the commission from scratch. In its report over its fi rst year in opera-
tion the EEOC admitted that it had gotten off  to a “sudden and unrehearsed start.” FDR, 
Jr. had only one month to recruit a staff , establish regional offi  ces, draw up guidelines 
to interpret a complex law, and prepare for their major function of investigation and 
enforcement policies.100
Fundamental philosophical diff erences with regard to the relations with state agen-
cies hampered the set up, as did disagreements over the internal organization. FDR, Jr., 
Holcomb and Edelsberg wanted, and ultimately prevailed, to model the commission on 
a hierarchical cabinet agency. Graham, Hernandez and Jackson argued for a collective 
model.101 Graham pressed successfully to hire minority staff . He argued that staff  diver-
sity strengthened the EEOC because it would help shore up the support of minority and 
civil rights groups whose confi dence was fragile. Th ough the staff  was in majority black 
Matusow, Th e Unraveling of America, 60–96; Lawson and Payne, Debating the Civil Rights Move-
ment, 40–41.
98. Lee White to FDR, Jr., 28 May 1964, FG 155 Department of Commerce, May 27, 1964 – July 
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Jr., Franklin D., 1950, September 14 – 1966, October 23, Editorial Files, box 65, Schiff  Papers, 
NYPL; Davies, From Opportunity to Entitlement, 45. FDR, Jr.’s task force also developed propos-
als for educational and training opportunities for minority employees of the Department, and 
took the initiative to encourage them to go into fi elds as engineering. 
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civil rights groups denounced the hiring practices because the EEOC had not hired 
minorities for top-level staff  positions.102
Th e major hurdle that FDR, Jr. faced was the implementation of the complicated 
and ambiguous title VII. During the arduous negotiations battle over the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act the warring factions had struck a compromise that shaped the EEOC as a 
regulatory agency but stripped the new agency of enforcement powers. Th e EEOC had 
no power to initiate lawsuits. Th e charter’s boundaries limited the commission to react 
to individual private complaints and supporting them to go to court to defend their 
rights against employment discrimination rather than to attack broader public patterns 
of employment discrimination. Th e EEOC strove to shore up their status of a voluntary 
agency with legal powers where it could take the initiative to “hear and determine cases 
of alleged discrimination and order appropriate relief that was subject to judicial review 
in the same manner as regulatory agencies.” 103
During these fi rst weeks of EEOC meetings, FDR, Jr. had publicly discouraged any 
organization or agency to drum up complaints. Yet, the NAACP boasted that it had 
already gathered some 1,000 complaints and presented them to FDR, Jr. personally. Th e 
dramatic number nearly paralyzed the commission. LBJ’s temporizing over the summer 
in 1965 had contributed to the civil rights groups’ disappointment. Th e Legal Defense 
Fund of the NAACP attempted to prove the Commission’s unworkability and had start-
ed to fl ood the EEOC with employment discrimination complaints to amend title VII. 
In their fi rst hundred days it received nearly 1,400 complaints though its budget had 
only anticipated 2,000 for the whole fi scal year. By the time FDR, Jr. left  the commission 
in April 1966 the EEOC had received 5,000 complaints, heading to double that number 
for the whole year.104 Even before the commission opened its doors it had fallen behind 
and continued to fall behind when the complaint load rose uncontrollably.
FDR faced the key question to decide whether the EEOC applied a policy of specifi c 
102. Richard A. Graham to FDR, Jr., 2 July 1965, Graham to FDR, Jr., 8 September 1965, folder 
Commissioner Richard A. Graham, box 207; Dan Day, “Capital Spotlight,” Th e Baltimore Afro-
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remedies to specifi c cases or followed an affi  rmative action program based upon group-
based preferential treatment. FDR, Jr. instituted a new policy based on a group approach 
and patterns of discrimination as a result of the overwhelming complaint load. Th ereby, 
he radically transformed title VII from “an individual, complaint-centered, conciliatory 
anti-discrimination program into a group-centered enforcement of affi  rmative action.” 
Th is shift  refl ected LBJ’s proposal at Howard University in June 1965 to establish an 
affi  rmative action program to compensate minorities for past wrongs. Th e EEOC had 
initially defi ned affi  rmative action as a package of programs that “broadened recruit-
ing sources and aggressive hiring, training and promotion practices.” 105 Rather than 
investigating discrimination on the basis of intent against an individual FDR, Jr. con-
centrated on the consequences for the aggrieved group as a whole. 
FDR, Jr. interpreted the complaint load as a sign of confi dence and an indication 
that the ban on discrimination in employment was working. He appealed to budget 
director Charles Schultze to process the backlog and urged that it was “absolutely es-
sential for the EEOC to obtain additional funds.” 106 Th e commission needed extra staff  
because statutory deadlines prescribed that the manpower-intensive investigation and 
conciliation of complaints were to be handled within thirty days. FDR, Jr. pointed out 
that the EEOC needed a nationwide affi  rmative action program of “persuasion, educa-
tion and promotional eff orts” which in the long run would “reduce the cost of Com-
mission operations which are now devoted almost exclusively to investigation of indi-
vidual complaints.” Such a program would directly benefi t taxpayers, the economy and 
minorities.107 
He also based his request on the assumption that Congress had recognized earlier 
that the EEOC would probably require supplemental funds aft er its initial budget had 
been reduced. In his fi rst testimony on 1 July FDR, Jr. was unable to convince an unen-
thusiastic Senate subcommittee on Appropriations to allocate funds. Skeptical mem-
bers found that the commission had “no experience upon which to base its request.” 108 
Th e EEOC was denied most of the additional funds for 1965.
FDR, Jr. returned from a sailing vacation on 21 July to report to the House Labor 
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and Education subcommittee on discrimination. He explained the organizing progress 
of the EEOC to James who chaired the committee. FDR, Jr. also testifi ed in support of 
his brother’s proposal to grant the EEOC cease-and-desist authority.109 During a televi-
sion interview he had earlier stated that conciliation and public hearings could compen-
sate for the lack of enforcement powers. At the same time, he assured the public that he 
would go back to Congress to ask for stronger tools if the former turned out to be unfi t 
to work with.110 
In early August, FDR, Jr. went out sailing for a second time when Congress debated 
the next year’s budget of the EEOC. His absence was duly noted and highly publicized 
in the press. His display of insensitivity quickly became a public relations catastrophe. 
FDR, Jr. remained carefree at sea when the Senate Appropriations Committee cut the 
commission’s budget. Th e combination of conservative skepticism with committee-
wide irritation over FDR, Jr.’s unavailability to testify made the Senate take nearly a 
third out of a budget of 3.2 million requested by the White House. Th ough half of the cut 
was eventually restored on the Senate fl oor, the lack of interest FDR, Jr. had displayed 
considerably annoyed Congress and rattled LBJ.111
EEOC’s executive director Herman Edelsberg explained the rationale behind the 
decision to go yachting: “Th ere are two Washington views of that. I am sympathetic 
with the fi rst. He met with the senior staff  aft er the hearings to discuss the then pending 
budget. Now the question was how much more lobbying should we do. In the judgment 
of our legislative liaison guy, we had worn out our welcome. So FDR said maybe this is 
the time to take that fi rst vacation in two years, and nobody on the staff  said no. To be 
perfectly fair, there is that other view: the hard line: that when your budget is up, you 
stay.” 112
FDR, Jr.’s response to the challenge of the commission’s fi rst budget negotiations 
in Congress by sailing off  for a vacation week of yachting led to renewed charges of ir-
responsibility. Political pundits explained his failure to take the helm of the commission 
because New York politics remained his main interest. Th ey emphasized that his choice 
of the position was motivated by ambition to seek a platform more in the public eye than 
the Commerce Department. 
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Edelsberg alleged that FDR, Jr. had already told him in October 1965 that “he would 
be leaving in the summer to run for governor of New York, and that the White House 
had an understanding to that eff ect when he took the job.” 113 FDR, Jr.’s appointment 
gave him exposure in the most controversial issue of the era. It allowed him to travel 
widely and make numerous civil rights speeches. His outline of the EEOC program of-
ten left  ample opportunity to discuss local and political (race) problems. It also allowed 
him to build up a political organization for the gubernatorial election.114 
Yet, since FDR, Jr.’s political capital was strongly connected with his name the 
yachting controversy was a public relations disaster. Th e incident reinforced the public 
conviction that FDR, Jr. was appointed more for his famous name than for his admin-
istrative abilities. Undoubtedly, the expectations presidential children had to live up to 
were more demanding and the judgments they faced more harsh but FDR, Jr.’s own ac-
tions contributed greatly to his irresponsible and undisciplined reputation.
Watts
FDR, Jr.’s congressional eff orts failed also in part because LBJ was unenthusiastic to 
follow up promising legislation with active policies because of the escalating pace of 
racial confrontations.115 In June 1965, FDR, Jr. had expressed hope that the summer 
racial riots would not be repeated. If unrest broke out, he claimed his experience in the 
Commerce Department’s program to provide summer jobs to get youth off  the streets 
could be useful.116
Just days aft er the Voting Rights Act passed in Congress and a month aft er the 
EEOC was installed the rising black aggressiveness exploded. In August 1965, rioting 
broke out in Watts , LA’s black ghetto. Liberals had seen earlier riots in other cities but 
the explosion of the Watts ghetto was bigger, more signifi cant and a widely publicized 
national event that resulted in thirty-four dead, $35 million dollar in property dam-
ages and a surging white and black backlash against federal policies. Th e riot signifi ed 
a turning point. It powerfully displayed the lack of equal opportunity and the de facto 
segregation. Th e persisting problem of racial discrimination forced the LBJ adminis-
tration to rethink and adapt its policies aft er the civil rights struggle shift ed violently 
beyond equal opportunity to achieve factual equality and results. 
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Taken aback by the ferocity and scale of the riot, to FDR, Jr. Watts demonstrated 
the rationale for the EEOC and signifi ed the necessity of a group-based approach. He 
stepped in to fi ll the gap where the programs of poverty czar Shriver had failed. Th e 
EEOC radically widened its approach. It interpreted its mission as going beyond “em-
ployment, to become an opportunity commission, and develop all of its capacity to 
improve opportunities.” 117 FDR, Jr. stressed the need for the creation of meaningful 
affi  rmative and eff ective programs to provide services as equal education and living 
opportunity for deprived citizens to settle the struggle between the haves and have-nots 
in Los Angeles.118
Initially, LBJ reacted with stunned silence but did not give up completely on civil 
rights. He ordered a massive federal program to address the grievances in Watts but 
these eff orts were disorganized and kept out of the public eye. Th e president remained 
unwilling to scale down his Great Society to adapt to the escalation of the war in Viet-
nam. As a consequence, the dilemma of how to address social and economic abuses 
without rewarding the rioters remained unsolved. Federal enforcement eff orts in the 
fi eld of civil rights unraveled as the liberal appetite for the civil rights struggle slowly 
disappeared in Congress.119
Aft er its fi rst and formative hundred days of operation, the EEOC searched for an 
identity. In late October, Graham reported to FDR, Jr. that “the commission is doing well, 
far better than realized but there is much to be done.” He blamed the press for lambast-
ing the EEOC instead of giving it credit for its eff orts. Yet, the commissioner also listed 
a number of improvements that touched on nearly all the commission’s responsibilities. 
Th is underscored the diffi  culty the EEOC had to fulfi ll its potential.120 Th e EEOC had 
also been established at an awkward moment. It faced a political environment that was 
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dominated by a radicalization of the civil rights movement, a white backlash of racial 
politics, growing infl ation and an escalation of the American eff ort in Vietnam. It re-
vealed that the conventional liberal remedies of color-blind treatment were inadequate 
to establish the demanded redistribution of political and economic power. 
Th e highly charged political atmosphere of late 1965 put extra pressure on the 
EEOC’s enforcement eff orts. It underscored their dilemma they had formulated as “un-
less anti-discrimination laws were enforced discrimination would go unchecked, but if 
anti-discrimination laws were enforced, quotas would result.” 121 Th e problem was that 
title VII banned preferential treatment, racial quotas and record keeping as illegal. FDR, 
Jr. had to fi nd out if he could pursue the administration’s affi  rmative action program 
without these policies. He attempted to broaden the commission’s mandate by encour-
aging civil rights groups to seek enforcement over the head of the commission in the 
federal courts. Ironically, the weakness of the EEOC as an administrative and regula-
tory agency turned out to be source of strength because it forced the aggrieved to ad-
dress their complaints in courts of law.122 
In December 1965, FDR, Jr. protested to Schultze to a proposed budget cut that 
would eliminate the EEOC’s Offi  ce of Research. It would handicap carrying out its man-
date because the EEOC would be unable to collect “data indicating patterns of minority 
employment on an industry, area and occupational basis.” 123 He pointed out that the 
EEOC had proposed to adopt such a radical general reporting system to extend it to all 
employers covered by title VII. Th ey could use the essential method of record keeping 
as an eff ective method to locate the most likely target and follow up on the results to 
bring about equal employment. He argued that to enhance eff ectiveness this method 
was vital “to develop a voluntary program of affi  rmative action by demonstrating a to-
tal employment pattern,” as well as to defi ne social and economic aspects of minority 
group unemployment and evaluate progress of the employer. Other federal employment 
agencies had also agreed to the reporting system for joint use.124
Schultze agreed with his plea but LBJ severely curtailed the budget of the EEOC. 
FDR, Jr. had to accept the budget cuts that limited the Commission’s research and af-
fi rmative action programs. He wrote to Joe Lash , “My only consolation is that I under-
stand that all of the domestic programs are being similarly restricted….” 125 FDR, Jr.’s 
eff orts to widen the EEOC’s approach from opportunity to equality foreshadowed the 
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limits of liberalism. Th e staggering costs of the American involvement in the Vietnam 
War overtook the Great Society. LBJ chose guns over butter. He muted his commitment 
to the civil rights crusade. LBJ had become isolated from the militant grassroots gen-
eration aft er the civil rights movement moved north to attack and expose the region’s 
double standard in racial discrimination. He became less inclined to enforce his presi-
dential authority to eradicate racial inequality aft er the Watts riot made the civil rights 
association a political liability and a liberal Congress had begun to lose its interest.126 
The Politics of Gender: The EEOC and Sex Discrimination
At FDR, Jr.’s fi rst news conference as head of the EEOC on 2 July 1965 inquiries turned 
to the ban on sex discrimination when a reporter asked him what his opinion was about 
sex. FDR, Jr. answered jokingly, “Do not get me started. I am all for it.” Behind his light-
hearted treatment loomed serious questions that he had to address because of a total of 
9,000 complaints one-third of which dealt with sex discrimination.127 
Th e complex forces of gender equality that surrounded the ban on sex discrimina-
tion and general insignifi cance of women rights led the EEOC to treat the issue lightly. 
When conservative Representative Smith had added the ban on sex discrimination to 
title VII to bring about the bill’s defeat, it divided the women groups. Crusaders sup-
ported the amendment while moderates opposed this action. LBJ supported the latter 
because he feared the Smith amendment would burden the bill. Title VII survived intact 
in part because civil rights supporters wanted to pass the whole bill in the most expedi-
ent way.128
Th ough the new responsibility was real enough, the interpretation of the intent and 
reach of title VII to defi ne sex discrimination was clouded with doubts. FDR, Jr. was 
unable to fall back on legal precedent. He declared the ban on sex discrimination “ter-
ribly complicated.” Th e EEOC had granted priority and devoted most of its manpower 
and attention to black employment discrimination. In September 1965, FDR, Jr. issued 
guidelines to soft  pedal the discussion of sex discrimination because he needed funding, 
authority, enforcement powers and cooperation from Congress.
FDR, Jr. remained ignorant and confused of the brand new area. He held a meeting 
with Labor Secretary Wirtz to discuss preliminary regulations in the fi eld because in his 
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department the Women’s Bureau was located. FDR, Jr. reasoned that there were some 
jobs where an employer should have a right to specify. Particular jobs were only suited 
to a man or woman because of “culture and mores, personal inclinations and physical 
limitations.” 129 Yet, he would not have an answer to the thorny question to determine if 
a sleeping car porter should be a man or a woman. Gradually, FDR, Jr. moved into the 
direction toward greater and serious involvement with sex discrimination. He wanted 
to give the EEOC status as the leader in the fi eld and to shore up the support of the 
women’s groups rather than to display real care for the issue.130
FDR, Jr. had indicated that the EEOC would judge each case on its merits as to cau-
tiously devise a policy on sex discrimination. In mid-August, FDR, Jr. banned racially 
segregated employment ads. Yet, he appointed a commission to study the question of 
single sex ads. Th e resulting compromise required advertisers to publish a disclaimer 
with their classifi ed ads. In the spring of 1966, the EEOC retreated from its compromise 
position under pressure from publishers. Th is major blunder became a rallying point 
and united the feminist groups. Women activists discovered that they had to pressure 
and “to fi ght to get the EEOC to enforce the ban on sex discrimination.” While title 
VII had created a legal base for women’s rights, feminists had become frustrated by the 
clashes with the masculine Great Society programs. Th e demands of the emerging femi-
nist movement quickly went beyond the fatherly intentions of the LBJ administration. 
Th ese cautious guidelines on sex discrimination contrasted sharply with the EEOC’s 
aggressive stance on race discrimination. Th e inconsistency and unwillingness of FDR, 
Jr. and the EEOC’s double standard in enforcing sex and race discrimination accelerated 
and radicalized the resentment of the women’s movement. FDR, Jr.’s policies became the 
catalyst to spark the resurgence of feminism. It led in October 1966 to the foundation of 
the National Organization for Women (NOW) and paved the way for a new policy of the 
EEOC in the late 1960s that treated sex and race discrimination alike.131
Salesman
Given the hostile political circumstances, FDR, Jr. established a strategy to accept and 
concentrate on the stronger cases of employment discrimination. He ordered to be 
drawn up a zero list of large government contractors with no minority employees. Th e 
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strategy to isolate key landmark cases and to bring these to a prompt settlement suited 
FDR, Jr.’s ability as the EEOC’s salesman.
In December 1965, FDR, Jr. personally secured a modest agreement with business 
and black and white unions of the Louisiana Crown-Zellerbach Paper Company plant 
who had agreed on the commission’s plan for eliminating segregated work lines and 
seniority lists. He met with the company and the unions in the strife-torn, Klan-ridden 
community of Bogalusa. In his impassioned plea to its members FDR, Jr. successfully 
recounted the eff orts of his parents in their struggle for human rights. Aft erwards, he 
declared that the meeting could turn out as a milestone in industrial race relations and 
as a foundation for improving race relations because it removed “the economic basis 
of Negro second-class citizenship by opening up top jobs to Negro workers.” FDR, Jr. 
optimistically predicted that it would “… become a pattern for integration throughout 
the industry of the South and should lead to integration of presently segregated unions 
in time.” 132
In March 1966, FDR, Jr. referred the case of Newport News plant to the Attorney 
General to fi le suit as a “pattern and practice” case aft er the initial conciliation eff ort 
failed. Th e shipyard insisted that it had not violated title VII. Th e threat of a lawsuit and 
the support from the Departments of Justice, Defense and Labor forced the company to 
climb down. Th e nation’s largest shipbuilder did not want to endanger its government 
contract by continuing to defend its Jim Crow practices. Th e Newport plant in Virginia 
employed some 20,000 workers of whom a quarter was black.133 
FDR, Jr. persuaded the company to accept a hiring agreement and establish a new 
promotion system based on the length of service, and provided on the job training 
for minorities that compensated them for past discrimination. In its report the EEOC 
boasted that the Newport agreement was “perhaps the most comprehensive and exem-
plary settlement in the history of fair employment practice legislation.” Th e commission 
called the settlement a precedent-making case that “provided a major breakthrough 
dealing with equalizing promotion policies, pay rates, and desegregating facilities.” 134
Despite the acclaimed success this was an exception on the rule, the EEOC had 
succeeded in correcting one plant’s system where minorities had been relegated to lower 
paying and inferior jobs under a segregated seniority system in segregated facilities. Yet, 
the adoption of the affi  rmative action system signifi ed a victory with deceptive ease. Th e 
132. FDR, Jr. to Joe Lash , 24 December 1965, folder Joe Lash , NAL, Eleanor Roosevelt Biography, 
box 285; Edelsberg to All Employees, 29 December 1965 and Th e Baltimore Afro-American, 25 
December 1965, folder Executive Director Herman Edelsberg, box 234, FDR, Jr. Papers.
133. Weekly Activities Report, 7–11 March and 21–25 March 1966; FDR, Jr. to Bill Moyers, 5 April 
1966, folder Weekly Activities Report, EEOC, all in box 409, FDR, Jr. Papers; Moreno, From Di-
rect Action to Affi  rmative Action, 232–233; Graham, Th e Civil Rights Era, 243. 
134. First Annual Report of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 8–10, 18, box 317, 
FDR, Jr. Papers; Graham to FDR, Jr., 8 September 1965, folder Memo Graham, box 297, FDR, 
Jr. Papers; Weekly Activities Report, 21–25 March 1966, box 409, FDR, Jr. Papers; Herber, “Staff  
Losses Curb Job Rights Agency,” NYT, 14 August 1966.
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shipyard was vulnerable for a concerted well-coordinated federal enforcement eff ort 
because a great majority of its business came from defense contracts. 
Th at same month FDR, Jr. visited local community centers in Watts and encoun-
tered a distressing employment situation. He met with leaders of labor, civil rights, and 
Mexican-American groups, government and community organizations. Th ey told him 
that the major problem was a shortage of jobs and that relations between employers, 
labor unions and the minority community remained tense. Th e Californian EEOC 
chapter had already warned of repeated riots because the basic problems of poor police 
community relations and lack of employment had not changed.
He conferred with chief executives of the major corporations in the area. In sepa-
rate meetings he urged upon the business leaders to create new minority jobs. He called 
upon them to establish a massive affi  rmative group-based recruitment and training 
program. Th e Watts example demonstrated to FDR, Jr. that the EEOC could only capi-
talize upon its opportunity by obtaining strong enforcement powers to improve their 
eff ectiveness.135 In its fi rst year under the direction of FDR, Jr. other actual conciliation 
agreements were few and modest in number. By May 1966, the EEOC had been deluged 
by more than 7,000 complaints whereas it had only been able to accomplish the concili-
ation of seventy charges to its solution.136
Th e Roosevelt name gave enormous exposure to the EEOC. By virtue of his drive 
and concern for the issue, FDR, Jr. created an image around the country that the EEOC 
had more stature and importance and possessed genuine power than their relatively 
meager budget allowed. In an exemplary speech in November 1965, he berated a gath-
ering of businessmen that “so many of their companies chant the old familiar cry that 
they would love to hire Negroes but cannot fi nd qualifi ed Negroes.” Aft er he had listed 
the opportunities to employ qualifi ed minorities, FDR, Jr. judged his mission a success 
when businessmen told him aft erwards that “for the fi rst time they had understood and 
discovered why they as businessmen, should and can take a broader role.” 137 Th e Roos-
evelt name drew many invitations for the EEOC to supply speakers. Aft er FDR, Jr. left  
the commission in May 1966 these demands fell off  dramatically.138
135. A. Dove to Ben Segal, 4 March 1966; A. Dove to Lucks, 7 March 1966; “Minority Job Gains 
Praised by Roosevelt,” Los Angeles Times, 4 March 1966; folder Watts, L.A. Riot, box 397; Weekly 
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136. “Press Release EEOC,” 12 May 1966, folder FDR, Jr.: EEOC, box 221, FDR, Jr. Papers; Gra-
ham, Th e Civil Rights Era, 243. When aft er the agreement a strike broke out at Newport News, 
congressional conservatives blamed the EEOC for the labor unrest by having forced racial quotas 
to compensate for past discriminations upon the shipyard. Graham, Th e Civil Rights Era, 523. 
137. FDR, Jr. to Warren Phillips, 19 October 1965, folder W-EEOC, 1965, box 222; FDR, Jr. to 
Nancy Graham, 1 December 1965, folder no title, box 420, all in FDR, Jr. Papers. 
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By the time it published its fi rst annual report in the spring of 1966, FDR, Jr. had 
been unable to fully resolve the essential matter on how to follow up on its cases in prac-
tice. Th e commission felt it had had to draw a line between affi  rmative action and re-
verse discrimination. Th e report stated that because discrimination against blacks was 
class-based the commission needed results that affi  rmative action did not produce. It 
deliberately asked itself if in the case of employment discrimination “… should not the 
remedy require specifi c results, immediate hiring and promotion of Negroes in appro-
priate cases, rather than procedures that off er them equal opportunity in the future?” 139 
FDR, Jr. and the EEOC pointed the way for a future entitlement approach. In their 
national attack on poverty and discrimination liberals had initially based their eff orts 
on a color-blind rationale because they argued that individual opportunity was all the 
poor needed. Th e changing character of the black struggle for equality undermined this 
principle. Th e EEOC stood at the center of this transformation from a belief that em-
phasized color-blindness, individual rights, and equal opportunity into a liberal formu-
la based upon color-consciousness, group rights, and equality of result.140 In its fi rst year 
of operation the EEOC paved the way to adopt future affi  rmative action policies that 
went beyond legal equality. FDR, Jr. set a precedent to establish a future result-based and 
entitlement approach in the fi eld of employment discrimination.141 Th e EEOC would ac-
cumulate real unexpected power aft er 1968 when the federal courts defi ned new guide-
lines for preferential treatment and result-based affi  rmative action that were built upon 
previous discrimination suits.
Conclusion
FDR, Jr.’s improved ability to apply himself and focus on his responsibilities led to ac-
complishments. He committed himself to issues rather than political ambition. His 
drive and determination helped establish a regional approach to poverty in the Ap-
palachian. Despite examples of insensitivity and carelessness FDR, Jr. also displayed 
knowledge and concern for the pressing civil rights issue. As the EEOC’s fi rst chairman 
he distinguished himself by advocating affi  rmative action in employment discrimina-
tion and future gender equality. In the end, though, LBJ’s program ran aground on the 
limits of liberal reform.
Nevertheless, he continued to sell the Roosevelt name and memory only this time 
Files, box 143, DNC Records; Herber, “Staff  Losses Curb Job Rights Agency,” NYT, 14 August 
1966. 
139. First Annual Report of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 8, box 317, FDR, Jr. 
Papers; Andrew III, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society, 52.
140. Moreno, From Direct Action to Affi  rmative Action, 1–5; Davies, From Opportunity to En-
titlement, 45, 56; Divine, Exploring the Johnson Years, 147.
141. Moreno, From Direct Action to Affi  rmative Action, 231–232; Lawson, Debating the Civil 
Rights Movement, 39–42. 
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to put the Appalachian Regional Commission and the EEOC on the map the way he had 
draped JFK in the New Deal mantle in 1960. FDR, Jr.’s role as salesman in the service 
of successive Democratic administrations did not temper his ambition. He always kept 
one hopeful eye on the political situation in his homestate. He reckoned that the endur-
ing power of the Roosevelt memory could still help him to win elective offi  ce and satisfy 
his political ambition. Th is need for recognition by the voting public fueled accusa-
tions that New York politics remained his main interest. Th e New York Times reported 
that in the months before he left  “Roosevelt’s infl uence on the commission waned.” 142 It 
came then as no surprise when in May 1966, FDR, Jr. resigned from his EEOC position 
to run for governor of New York.
142. Herber, “Staff  Losses Curb Job Rights Agency,” NYT, 14 August 1966. 
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FDR, Jr. capitalized on his roles in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to improve 
his political position in New York. Twelve years aft er his last attempt the 1966 election 
off ered an opportunity for FDR, Jr. to test the value of his political brand name. Th is 
time around, he would appeal to ideals and issues to gain personal and political respect. 
He wanted to resign the EEOC chairmanship on 1 June 1966, announce his candidacy a 
day or two later and tour the state. Yet, he felt managed and boxed in by Senator Robert 
F. Kennedy’s proposal to organize a series of public forums throughout the state. 
In September 1964, RFK had left  his position of Attorney General in the Johnson 
administration to run for Senator of New York. In a tight race he had beaten the incum-
bent, Republican Kenneth Keating and had quickly become the state’s most powerful 
Democrat. Th e public forums were to be held in May and June where voters would have 
the opportunity to evaluate the Democratic candidates for governor. Kennedy’s move 
was seen as to force all prospective candidates to openly declare their interest in the 
months to follow.1 Eventually, FDR, Jr. agreed to join the public forums. Privately, he 
grumbled about running without the assurance of his support. He complained to Lash 
that he was “not a marionette dancing on RFK’s strings….” 2
Th is meant that FDR, Jr. needed to adjust his plans with the administration. He 
informed LBJ and expected a warm presidential sendoff  because this would serve him 
well in New York. Anxious that the absence of such a public exchange of letters would 
be taken as a sign of presidential disfavor, FDR, Jr. appealed to his “special relationship, 
past, present and future with the president.” 3 LBJ, however, refused to let FDR, Jr. use 
1. New York Times, 16 May 1966 (hereaft er NYT).
2. Diary Entries 2 March, 19 March, 31 March, 1 May 1966, Diary Joe Lash , folder FDR, Jr., 1966, 
box 16, Joseph P. Lash Papers, FDRL; FDR, Jr. to Jackie Kennedy, 20 January 1966; FDR, Jr. to 
Joseph P. Kennedy, 20 January, 28 February 1966, all in folder Kennedy Family (Including White 
House Correspondence), box 282, FDR, Jr. Papers, FDRL; NYT, 30 January, 16 May 1966.
3. John Macy, Jr. to LBJ, 5 April 1966, folder Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(hereaft er EEOC), box 39, Confi dential File FG 655; McPherson to Marvin Watson, 26 April 1966, 
Harry McPherson, Jr. to LBJ, 3 May 1966, folder EEOC, November 23, 1963 – June 2, 1967, FG 
655, box 381, all in White House Central Files (hereaft er WHCF), LBJL.







the White House as his personal launching pad for the fall election. He was actually 
relieved about FDR, Jr. leaving the administration because his involvement in political 
activities in New York could only become a source of embarrassment to his administra-
tion. LBJ told his aides to handle this aff air and strictly adhere to the existing policy that 
resignation letters were not released. He prohibited any press at FDR, Jr.’s going away 
party to avoid any further publicity.4
FDR, Jr. caved in aft er the presidential pressure bore down on him. He did not want 
to reinforce LBJ’s paranoia of leaks to the media and assured a presidential aide that he 
had “made an eff ort to keep rumors of his impending announcement out of the press.” 
Th is satisfi ed LBJ enough to agree to see FDR, Jr. on 11 May. Th e presidential sendoff  was 
hardly a reassuring occasion. FDR, Jr. saw the president “as he was dressing, absolutely 
naked, doing his toilet while his valet handed him underpants….” 5 He made another 
eff ort to mellow the president. As Governor he would loyally bring the state in full part-
nership with the administration. LBJ thanked him sarcastically and told FDR, Jr. that 
“he could manage on his own.” 6 Finally, he accepted FDR, Jr.’s resignation though thor-
oughly edited the letter. Th e annoyed President had struck out “references to Roosevelt’s 
distinguished service” and “to his regard and aff ection of an old friend of the family.” 
Instead, LBJ formally hailed his contribution as EEOC chairman. At the conclusion of 
the meeting, FDR, Jr. was referred to an assistant who pointed him to a back door as to 
avoid the press.7 His eff orts to use the Roosevelt memory failed to sway LBJ in a strong 
and solid endorsement for the fall.
At a press conference the next day FDR, Jr. made public the letter LBJ had sent him 
upon his resignation. Th e announcement of his candidacy for the governorship of New 
York was a perfect occasion to display the power of his political brand name and the 
claim on its memory to its fullest extent. FDR, Jr. indiscreetly claimed that since the late 
4. John Macy, Jr. to LBJ, 5 April 1966; Marvin Watson to McPherson, 26 April 1966, McPher-
son to LBJ, 28 April 1966, folder EEOC, all in box 381, WHCF; John W. Macy, Jr. to LBJ, 27 April 
1966, Name File, Roosevelt, Franklin Jr., WHCF, LBJL; James Jones to Marvin Watson, 28 April 
1966; John Macy to Marvin Watson, 3 August 1965, Part II: EEOC, Administrative History, Civil 
Rights During the Johnson Administration, 1963–1969, reel 3, microfi lm edition Roosevelt Study 
Center (hereaft er RSC).
5. Diary Entry 13 May 1966, Diary Joe Lash , folder FDR, Jr., 1966, box 16, Lash Papers, opened 
at the request of the author on 29 July 1999.
6. Ibid.; McPherson, Jr. to LBJ, 3 May 1966; Resignation letter FDR, Jr. EEOC, n.d., folder: 
EEOC, FG 655, WHCF; FDR, Jr. to Jack Valenti, 5 May 1966, Marvin Watson to LBJ, 6 May 1966, 
MJDR to LBJ, 11 May 1966, President’s Appointment File (Diary Backup), box 34, May 1, 1966 
– May 15, 1966; LBJ to FDR, Jr., 11 May 1966, Name File, Roosevelt, Franklin Jr., all in WHCF, 
LBJL.
7. Diary Entry 13 May 1966, Diary Joe Lash , folder FDR, Jr., 1966, Name File, Roosevelt, Frank-
lin Jr., WHCF, LBJL, box 16, Lash Papers; Hugh D. Graham, Th e Civil Rights Era: Origins and 
Development of National Policy, 1960–1972 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 201, 515. 
LBJ extended his “gratitude for the groundbreaking job you have done in making the Commis-
sion an instrument of enlightened public policy.” LBJ to FDR, Jr., 11 May 1966.
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seventeenth century the Roosevelt family had stood for the common people whereas his 
opponents represented the aristocracy. He continued to spray his speech with symbolic 
references to his family’s history of state leadership and declared somewhat ambigu-
ously that “the great adventure of life, my parents taught me, is that we move along un-
charted paths.” 8 He quoted his mother that he wanted to do his share to improve the 
world for the children. His candidacy off ered an opportunity for a better life for more 
people and would symbolize the goodness of public service.9 
Th is “new Roosevelt” assured his audience that he stood in the tradition of public 
service. He had matured to stand on his own feet and live up to his name. FDR, Jr. felt he 
was a more experienced public offi  cial than his last campaign in 1954 and could present 
better qualifi cations and demonstrate considerable knowledge of state aff airs. His am-
bitions had been tempered by understanding. He added in a sobering refl ection, “time 
does bring a more humble approach to the burdens of public service.” 10 
FDR, Jr. backed up the claim of his reinvention by taking an unequivocal and prin-
cipled stand on a number of controversial issues. He threw his full weight around a 
proposal advocated by minority and civil rights groups to establish a civilian domi-
nated review board that would oversee the New York City Police Department. He would 
provide leadership and vision to mobilize the resources of the state to wage a war on 
poverty and discrimination: issues that the Republican administrations had failed to 
attack. He envisioned a “new day” for the state and proposed a $5 billion state loan to 
help fi ght poverty and issued thorough plans on education and welfare. FDR, Jr. called 
for a $1 million limit on campaign expenditures to prevent the corrupting infl uence of 
money in the election, as much as to disqualify Rockefeller’s personal wealth and negate 
his ability to buy the election.11 
Now a self-proclaimed sadder and wiser man, FDR, Jr. centered his campaign 
around the theme of greater citizen participation in politics. He emphasized the ide-
alistic message of the memory and embodied Eleanor’s saying that one’s philosophy is 
best expressed in the choices one made. Th e dramatically changing social, racial and 
economic circumstances off ered opportunities for public action and liberal reform. To 
8. “Statement FDR, Jr. Announcement Candidacy for Governor of New York State,” 12 May 
1966, folder Correspondence 1966, box 224, FDR, Jr. Papers.
9. FDR, Jr., “Why I am a Candidate for Governor of New York State,” 12 May 1966, folder: 
Roosevelt, Franklin D. Jr., 1967–1975, General Correspondence, box 16, Lash Papers; “Press Re-
lease,” 13 May 1966, folder Gubernatorial Campaign Material, 1966, box 404, FDR, Jr. Papers; 
FDR, Jr. to LBJ, 11 May 1966, Subject File, Gen PL/ST 32, 10/14/65 – 9/15/66, box 56, WHCF, 
LBJL; Luther Holcomb, interview by T.H. Baker, 24 June 1969, 11–16, Oral History Collection 
LBJL; Diary Entry 1 May 1966, Diary Joe Lash , folder FDR, Jr., 1966, box 16, Lash Papers; “Roos-
evelt Hails Open Convention” NYT, 16 May 1966.
10. Murray Kempton , “Th e Rich Boy,” New York Post, 13 May 1966; Mitchel Levitas, “Rise, Fall 
and … of FDR, Jr.,” New York Times Magazine, 23 October 1966, 27, 42, 44, 49–52, 57–70; NYT, 
12 September 1966.
11. NYT, 9 September, 14 and 18 October 1966.







vindicate this principle FDR, Jr. called for a statewide direct primary through which 
the people should pick the candidates. By distinguishing himself with principled posi-
tions on unpopular issues he sought to lift  the shadow of his past reputation.12 Before 
the 1966 election, many observers framed FDR, Jr. as a politician who bore “the gift  of 
contemporaneous sincerity.” He believed but in the manner of many politicians whose 
beliefs were subordinate to their aspirations.13 Aft er his mother’s death, FDR, Jr. felt 
more deeply about carrying on the family tradition of liberalism and social progres-
sivism. FDR, Jr. wanted to run in the 1966 election to command political and personal 
respect that was unrelated to a number of votes.14
He explained his new commitment to political principles and issues to Anne Roos-
evelt, the wife of his brother John . Th e principles he was fi ghting for were important 
ones. FDR, Jr. staked the credibility of his campaign on the theme that he was the 
people’s choice. He assured his sister-in-law, as much as himself, that although he was 
now running as a Democrat on the Liberal Party line, this election was a time “when 
issues are bigger than political parties.” 15 FDR, Jr. portrayed himself as the indepen-
dent-minded candidate who had demonstrated concern for the problems of the people 
in New York. Th is maverick label helped him to link up with an age where voters and 
liberalism had broken adrift .
Th e birth of a “new Roosevelt” in 1966 occurred in an atmosphere of social, eco-
nomic and political polarization. Th e Democrats continued to sag in popular support 
because of their identifi cation with increasing infl ation, crime, and the war in Vietnam. 
Despite the earlier electoral successes at the national level that had produced a fl ood of 
Great Society legislation, New York Democrats had not reaped the fruits. Th e politics 
of race had divided the traditionally liberal Democratic constituency. Th e upcoming 
white backlash translated itself into the emergence of a Conservative Party that was 
fueled by popular uneasiness about surging crime, racial unrest and urban riots. Th e 
Liberal Party radiated a new independence aft er their support of Mayor Lindsay in 1965. 
Republican factions jockeyed for domination over the state GOP because their leader 
had a weakening hold in the party. Governor Rockefeller came into the 1966 election at 
the nadir of party and public popularity aft er his tax increases, and a widely publicized 
divorce and remarriage.16
Th e series of public forums across the state that RFK had instigated displayed this 
12. Of the four major candidates, Republican Nelson Rockefeller, Democrat Frank O’Connor 
and Paul Adams of the Conservative Party, FDR, Jr. stood so far to the left  that the New York 
State Communist Party declared him as the most attractive candidate. NYT, 24 October 1966.
13. Levitas, “Rise, Fall and … of FDR, Jr.,” New York Times Magazine, 23 October 1966, 27, 42, 
44, 49–52, 57–70.
14. FDR III to FDR, Jr., 11 November 1966, folder R, box 173, FDR, Jr. Papers; New York Post, 6 
September 1966; Lee Berton, “Marriage of Convenience,” Wall Street Journal, 3 October 1966. 
15. FDR, Jr. to Anne Clark Roosevelt, 26 September 1966, folder R, box 173, FDR, Jr. Papers.
16. David McGregor, “Leadership Roles in New York Democratic State Nominating Conven-
tions, 1952–1966” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1969), 462–466.
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Democratic confusion and indecision. FDR, Jr. competed for the nomination with 
New York City Council President Frank O’Connor , Nassau County Executive Eugene 
Nickerson and upstate industrialist Howard Samuels. Th eir eff orts did not result in a 
party consensus on a candidate. Th e Democrats only agreed that a consensus should be 
reached before the convention in early September and that RFK would decide the nomi-
nation. Against his better judgment FDR, Jr. continued to express his hope that RFK 
would abandon his hands off  position. During the summer he publicized several polls 
to show that he was the only candidate who could beat Rockefeller.17 FDR, Jr. forced 
the issue by pointing publicly to the obligation RFK faced. Despite stories of a growing 
distance he appealed on a live TV program to the Senator. He coolly made the point to 
“expect Kennedy to support him as a ‘winner,’ and gratuitously stated Lou Harris got 
Jack Kennedy in the West Virginia primary but Jack Kennedy told me that FDR, Jr. got 
him out of this primary with a victory.” 18
Th ough a great campaigner, FDR, Jr. was a poor organizer. He had started late and 
had been sluggish in his fundraising eff orts. Annoyed, he complained to Lash that poli-
ticians who had promised support were not coming through publicly as was the case 
with promised money. His understaff ed campaign organization had passed up numer-
ous TV interview appearances. Eff orts to cultivate the support of upstate county chair-
men, liberal Democrats and target ethnic communities failed to catch fi re.19 By the end 
of June, many observers reported that FDR, Jr.’s campaign had “stalled.” FDR, Jr.’s calls 
for a direct primary and other signs that he deeply cared about the aff airs of the people 
“simply failed to make much headway among potential delegates to the democratic nom-
inating convention,” reported Joseph Alsop.20 
Bosses
In a more pragmatic sense, the larger issue FDR, Jr. faced in the election was how to 
deal with the political establishment. During his father’s administration New Dealer 
17. FDR, Jr. to Carol King, 24 May 1966, folder K 1961–1966, box 170; Richard Strunsky to FDR, 
Jr., 3 June 1966, folder S, box 173, all in FDR, Jr. Papers; Diary Entry 2 March 1966, Diary Joe Lash , 
folder FDR, Jr., 1966, box 16, Lash Papers; McGregor, “Leadership Roles,” 479–482, 489–490.
18. FDR, Jr. to Joe Lash , 24 December 1965, folder Joe Lash , NAL, Eleanor Roosevelt Biography, 
FDR, Jr. Papers; Robert E. Kintner to LBJ, 19 July 1966, Confi dential File, box 150, Name File 
“RO,” LBJL.
19. Jim Vlasto to FDR, Jr., Joe Lash , William Holzman, 23 June 1966, folder Staff , Jim Vlasto, 
box 380; FDR, Jr., “Memoranda for Private Files,” 7 and 15 February 1966, folder Confi dential 
Meeting, box 238; “A Survey of the Political Climate in the State of New York,” March 1966, 
75–77, folder Personal Polls, Quayle, Oliver Quayle and Company, box 324, all in FDR, Jr. Papers; 
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Raymond Moley had already acknowledged that, “bosses are mortal but bossism is hu-
man nature’s eternal summer.” 21 Th e prospect to deal with the political bosses worried 
FDR, Jr. He confessed to Joe Lash that he was only just coming out of a depression. FDR, 
Jr. had liked the life in Washington, D.C. and he told Lash how unhappy he was about 
resigning the chairmanship of the Commission and pulling up roots there. He feared 
the Democratic Party leaders would block his nomination, as they had done in 1954, 
because they felt he could not be controlled. In such moods of dejection, FDR, Jr. admit-
ted to Lash that he even toyed with the option of making a deal with the establishment 
if that were to be the price of the nomination.22
Campaign consultants had advised FDR, Jr. to build a new public image to pre-
vent that the political leadership would revert to his old reputation. Th is “new Franklin 
Roosevelt” would help to erase the negative image where he “was described more as a 
person than as a public servant.” Th e pollsters predicted that to secure the nomination 
would be the most diffi  cult part because he had to walk a narrow road “between being 
independent and not antagonizing the organization.” Optimistically, they argued that 
it could be done.23
In his new role, FDR, Jr. went in overdrive. He defi ned the evil of “bossism” not 
merely as the shady backroom dealings of a few party leaders. It involved a “sinister 
coalition of politicians, lawyers, businessmen who do business with the city and state 
infl uence peddlers who are in politics to make money.” Th ough he had never been par-
ticularly close to the New York reform groups who wanted to liberalize the party, FDR, 
Jr. declared that in the upcoming election the basic concept of government was at stake. 
Th is progressive claim of good government that involved common decency and social 
responsibility to the people justifi ed his election crusade to “drive bossism out of our 
political life once and for all.” 
FDR, Jr.’s exile in Washington, D.C. had made him a relative outsider in the struggle 
between the machine and the insurgents. Th e reform group though had a sentimental 
weakness for the Roosevelt family, particularly Eleanor. Th ey did not regard FDR, Jr. as 
a real reformer because he had not proved his seriousness. FDR, Jr. conceded that he had 
neither been an active reformer or part of the movement. Yet, he had kept his distance 
from the bosses as well. FDR, Jr. had not actively cooperated with the party bosses since 
1954, sometimes out of principle, at other times because he reasoned that his name 
made him unassailable for their reach. Th is ambivalent stand did not go well either with 
the bosses who never trusted him or with the reformers.24 
21. Lyle W. Dorsett, FDR and the City Bosses (Port Washington, NY: Kemnikat Press, 1977), 
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FDR, Jr.’s new commitment also failed to impress the “bosses.” Th ere had been little 
likelihood that the suspicious party leadership would hand the nomination to him on 
a silver platter. In confi dential meetings with the party’s establishment he had failed to 
convince them that he could successfully take his case to the people. He had promised 
to shelve his ambition by not running for president, to work harder in Albany than any 
man before him, even his father and to show an intricate knowledge of state aff airs. He 
became aware that a politician stood or fell by his public image, which had been built up, 
over a period of years, in the public mind.25
FDR, Jr. injected the bossism issue into the election to put more pressure on RFK. In 
early July, FDR, Jr. charged to the press that a deal had been struck between Democrat 
Frank O’Connor and Brooklyn and Bronx county leaders Stanley Steingut and Charles 
Buckley . O’Connor had withdrawn from the 1965 Mayoral race to run as City Council 
candidate in return for pledges by the two bosses to release the delegates under their 
command to him in the 1966 gubernatorial election. Th e number of Bronx and Brook-
lyn delegates would virtually ensure the nomination of O’Connor at the convention.26
FDR, Jr.’s bombshell charge of the backroom deal clouded the Democratic dis-
cussion of all other issues until the convention.27 FDR, Jr. had verifi ed rumors that 
O’Connor had made a deal and he confronted Buckley in his home to fi nd out if he in-
deed was knocking his head against a stone wall. During a remarkable conversation on 7 
July the candid Bronx boss admitted that the nomination had been locked up in favor of 
O’Connor. He told FDR, Jr. to check the story with Steingut to see if his co-conspirator 
still felt a moral commitment to O’Connor. Th e Brooklyn leader conceded the commit-
net for young Democrats,” FDR, Jr. took the lead in organizing a New York group of a new gen-
eration of progressive and idealistic politicians to “further liberal and progressive policies and 
bring young and vigorous leadership into the Democratic Party.” Fending off  attraction to liberal 
voters from third parties as the Liberal Party and the American Labor Party, he emphasized 
to work closely with the Democratic State organization. He had received the blessing of state 
chairman Fitzpatrick , Mayor O’Dwyer and Bronx boss Flynn. Roosevelt’s group turned out to 
be merely another in a long line of liberal policy groups within the Democratic Party. Minutes 
of Initial Meeting, 26 November 1946; Minutes of Executive Meeting, 11 December 1946; FDR, 
Jr. to Charles Lynch, 27 December 1946; Unknown to FDR, Jr., 18 March 1947, all in box 142, 
FDR, Jr. Papers. Young liberal Democrats such as Robert Wagner , Jr., Joseph Lash , Jack Bingham, 
Herbert Swope, Jr. joined this group.
25. Long Island Press, 22 June 1966; Joseph and Stewart Alsop , “Can FDR, Jr., Get His Father’s 
Old Job?” Saturday Evening Post, 4 September 1954, Personality Clippings Files, box 144, DNC 
Records, JFKL.
26. G. Wilmers, Strategy Paper “Robert Kennedy and the Democratic bosses,” 11 September 
1964, folder Keating campaign 1964, series 5, subseries 2, box 14, Jacob Javits Papers, SUNY at 
Stony Brook; Chris McNickle, To Be Mayor of New York: Ethnic Politics in the City (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), 175–179; Allen Nevins, Herbert H. Lehman and His Era (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s, 1963), 381–383; McGregor, “Leadership Roles,” 462–466.
27. McGregor, “Leadership Roles,” 493–502.







ment but refused to confi rm the meeting where the deal had been closed in 1965. Ste-
ingut agreed to discuss the issue with upstate county leaders and other party leaders.28
FDR, Jr. had dictated the conversations with Buckley and Steingut in private memo-
randa. Now he faced an agonizing dilemma, to publicize his fi ndings or keep quiet. 
When he would reveal the ‘deal’ he would damage the prospects of the Democrats in 
a year where Rockefeller looked vulnerable. He would surely become the party’s scape-
goat. Yet, the alleged deal involved principal concerns because it disregarded popular 
democratic processes and made a mockery of electing delegates, the Kennedy forums 
and the convention. To drop the subject would signify his surrender to the bosses and a 
defeat of party democracy. 
While FDR, Jr. pondered what to do, the O’Connor campaign picked up the stories 
on the Roosevelt memos. Th ey arranged a confrontation with the Roosevelt camp be-
fore state party chairman Burns where O’Connor fl atly denied the allegations. When 
newspapers began to run partial accounts of the deal and subsequent denials by Buckley, 
FDR, Jr. felt legitimized to reveal all he knew. He decided to salvage his own chances 
and thereby hoped that the public airing of the charges would knock O’Connor out of 
the race and force RFK to support him. In a reaction to the press reports, Buckley had 
turned the tale upside down. Th e boss declared that the allegations were “a lot of bunk.” 
He branded him “a punk” and claimed FDR, Jr. simply wanted revenge because Buckley 
refused to support him. Steingut echoed this hostility and scorned the charges as “pure 
fabrication.” 29 
FDR, Jr. was shocked at the expressed hatred and defended his charges of a deal at 
a news conference on 26 July. He solemnly declared that he had acted responsibly and 
discreetly because his aim had always been “to protect the party and public interest.” 
Despite the fact that he had sought the votes of the Bronx and Brooklyn delegates he cast 
aside motivations as opportunism and self-interest. FDR, Jr. argued that these regular 
consultations with county leaders were vastly diff erent from this “cynical trade.” He had 
handled in good faith, followed the advice of the party leadership to join the forums, 
and gave up his EEOC position and left  Washington, D.C. FDR, Jr. framed the issue as a 
clear-cut distinction between evil bosses and good-government advocates. He claimed 
to represent the people of the state who called for an end to the “old ways of wheeling 
and dealing where a small handful of men rather than the enrolled Democrats and their 
28. Roosevelt felt Buckley wanted to be relieved of his pledge to Steingut because he did not think 
O’Connor was the strongest candidate, Memo on FDR, Jr. by Katz, n.d., folder Series on Tanan-
baum Brothers, 1966, October 1 – January 12, 1967, box 74, Editorial Files, Dorothy Schiff  Papers, 
NYPL; Memorandum #1, 8 July, Memorandum #2, 12 July, Memorandum #3, 12 July 1966, folder 
Gubernatorial Campaign Material, 1966, Deals concerning candidacy, box 404, FDR, Jr. Papers.
29. “Press Release,” 26 July 1966, folder Gubernatorial Campaign Material, 1966, box 404, FDR, 
Jr. Papers; Diaries Entry, 23 July 1966, Diary Joe Lash , folder FDR, Jr., 1966, box 16, Lash Papers; 
James Wechsler , “FDR, Jr.’s Memo: Th e Fight is On,” New York Post, 8 September 1966; Paul Hoff -
man, “FDR, Jr. Gives Data on ‘Deal’ By O’Connor,” New York Post, 26 July 1966; NYT, 23 July 
1966; McGregor, “Leadership Roles”, 493–502.
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delegates make decisions vital to our party and state.” His plea ended with a call upon 
the party to reject the brazen attempt by the bosses “to impose this deal on the people 
of the state.” 30
During the next weeks the buzz of numerous denials, counter charges and diff er-
ent versions of the story ended the gentleman fashion in which the campaign had been 
waged. Both Buckley and Steingut reiterated their denial of the deal and pointed out 
that it was FDR, Jr. who had sought their support. O’Connor blasted FDR, Jr.’s charge as 
“an act of sheer desperation” and to stoop so low was “tragic for a son of one of our great-
est presidents.” 31 FDR, Jr. repeatedly requested an investigation into the allegations 
and urged Burns to name a panel of wise men, preferable RFK, Averell Harriman and 
Th omas Finletter to conduct the inquiry. Th e New York Times editorial backed up his 
call for an inquiry but the state chairman rejected the proposal. Burns formally pointed 
out that the convention would be free and open though his refusal was mainly moti-
vated by considerations to save the party from any embarrassment.32 Murray Kempton 
blamed both candidates. Th e reporter sarcastically observed that “it must have been a 
harsh struggle for O’Connor to become a gentleman as it certainly was for FDR, Jr. to 
give up being one.” 33
Robert F. Kennedy
Th e public airing of the deal had boomeranged in FDR, Jr.’s face. Th e key to success had 
been to woo RFK’s support. Th erefore, he had started his fundraising in January to ask 
two icons of the Kennedy dynasty, Joseph Sr. and Jackie , for fi nancial campaign contri-
butions. FDR, Jr. expected that they would repay their political debt by pressuring RFK 
to support him. He reminded them of his close ties to the family and assured them of 
his renewed sense of warmth and friendship for RFK. Th is picture was largely based on 
wishful thinking.34
30. “Press Release,” 26 July 1966, folder Gubernatorial Campaign Material, 1966, box 404, FDR, 
Jr. Papers.
31. Years aft erward, O’Connor continued to deny a ‘deal’ had taken place. “We all thought it 
was a despicable thing; we thought it was untrue; we know for a fact that FDR, Jr. went to Buck-
ley with his hat in his hand pleading for Buckley’s support. When he couldn’t get it he did this 
perfectly horrible thing and made up … this outrageous story which he then released. … He 
admitted he had it [the memo] and was going to release it. I said it was totally untrue … this 
was a thing he made up himself.” Frank D. O’Connor, recorded interview by Roberta W. Greene, 
Jamaica Plains, NY, 19 June 1970, 19, Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Project, JFKL (hereaft er 
RFK Oral History Project).
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33. Murray Kempton , “A Gentleman Earned,” New York Post, 16 August 1966.
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1966, box 16, Lash Papers; FDR, Jr. to Jackie Kennedy, 20 January, 1966; FDR, Jr. to Joseph P. 







As the dominant fi gure of the rising dynasty, the hard-boiled RFK was not suscep-
tible to the Roosevelt claim on memory. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. euphemistically main-
tained that RFK did not regard FDR, Jr. as a candidate the Democratic Party should be 
running. He had too many personal problems, “bad marks,” to be an ideal candidate, 
though “he retained a fondness for him over the years.” 35 Th is observation concealed a 
troubled and uneasy relationship fueled by mutual suspicion. FDR, Jr. had falsely ex-
pected that his loyalty to the Kennedy clan would be repaid politically in New York. Yet, 
RFK did not need him. Instead, he dealt with him as a threat that could become a rival 
power in the state. 
A long talk with RFK in March did not improve the situation. RFK preferred to 
stay neutral. Th e senator had appreciated his past help and wished him well. FDR, Jr. 
emerged from the meeting feeling that RFK considered his candidacy a threat despite 
RFK’s promise to confer with him before he made a decision. Th e campaign contri-
bution at the end of their meeting reinforced his inclination. Th e substantial check of 
$5000 seemed to FDR, Jr. a way to fi nancially redeem his political debt.36 
Th e strategy to use the memoranda to convince RFK not to back O’Connor and 
therefore throw the nomination to FDR, Jr. backfi red. At the end of July, FDR, Jr. met 
with the senator again in Washington, D.C. RFK had warned FDR, Jr. that the reaction 
of the Democratic machine would be utterly hostile and it would hurt his chances. He 
blamed him for letting the story of the deal leak to the press. FDR, Jr. denied the leak 
and contradicted the accusation that he would challenge the senator’s state authority. 
He stressed his service of seven years to the Kennedy family. As governor he would 
ally himself with RFK and pleaded, “my future in your hands.” Kennedy remained un-
moved.37 FDR, Jr. courted Bobby’s support but he resented the dependency on the heir 
Kennedy, 20 January, 28 February 1966, all in folder Kennedy Family (Including White House 
Correspondence), box 282, FDR, Jr. Papers; NYT, 21 and 30 January 1966.
35. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York: Ballantine Books, 
1978), 755.
36. Albert Blumenthal, recorded interview by Roberta Greene, New York City, 10 October 1975, 
64, 86, RFK Oral History Project; Diary Entry 2 March 1966, Diary Joe Lash , folder FDR, Jr., 
1966, box 16, Lash Papers; McGregor, “Leadership Roles,” 471–474, 479–482. According to a pri-
vate memo by Dorothy Schiff  Nelson Rockefeller had called her at the hairdresser to ask if she 
thought FDR, Jr. would get the Democratic nomination. If he did, she confi ded, “Nelson was cer-
tain he would be beaten. Franklin thinks so too; this had been the reason that Bobby denied him 
the nomination.” If Roosevelt had become governor, the argument went, he would have been on 
his way to the White House in 1972, in Dorothy Schiff  to Files, 23 October 1978, folder Roosevelt, 
Jr., F D., 1966, October 10 – 1989, January 23, box 65, Schiff  Papers, NYPL.
37. Diary Entry, 30 July 1966, Diary Joe Lash , folder FDR, Jr., 1966, box 16, Lash Papers; John 
F. English, recorded interview by Roberta Greene, Mineola, NY, 3 November 1969, 69, RFK Oral 
History Project; Wechsler , “FDR, Jr.’s Memo: Th e Fight is On.” Later, FDR, Jr. confi ded to Alex 
Rose that he suspected RFK himself of leaking the story of the deal “as the fastest way to get 
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of the new political dynasty. FDR, Jr.’s arguments only sustained the claim that the 
Roosevelt dynasty stood in the shadow of the Kennedy clan. He later claimed to hold 
RFK responsible for his defeat in 1966. Even in 1978, bitterness still lingered. Aft er he 
received a copy of Schlesinger’s biography on RFK he revealed to Dorothy Schiff  “he 
hated Bobby and still does.” 38
During August it became clear that the charges hurt his chances the most. Delegates 
pledged to him left . His disloyalty angered many old-line Democrats who announced 
they would back O’Connor. Th e allegations not only shattered party unity, it also gave 
the Republicans the opportunity to use the bossism issue to attack the Democrats.39 
When RFK announced that he would support the choice of the convention it signifi ed 
the inevitability of O’Connor’s nomination. FDR, Jr. realized his strategy had blown up 
in his face. He declared himself unable to support O’Connor and withdrew from the 
race. 
FDR, Jr. continued to frame the struggle in terms of the contrast between prin-
ciple and bossism. At a press conference where he announced his withdrawal he warned 
“those who refuse to heed the lessons of history are doomed to repeat their miscalcula-
tions.” As a result of the Buckley-Steingut deal, the bosses would lead the Democrats 
towards another 1958 election disaster. Polls showed half of the rank-and-fi le Demo-
crats supported him to continue his fi ght to democratize the party. He urged Governor 
Rockefeller to enact into law a proposal of a direct primary. FDR, Jr. dropped a second 
bombshell when he strongly hinted at a break with the Democrats by returning to the 
Liberals. He claimed that a Liberal Party candidate could defeat both Rockefeller and 
O’Connor.40
FDR, Jr. dug his own grave when he framed the struggle between absolute good and 
evil. It exposed his fl aws the “new-Roosevelt” had hoped to conceal. He portrayed the 
bosses as mythical powers who by exercising fearsome and despotic tactics ruthlessly 
tyrannized their cities. In contrast to this mythical fi gure stood the proverbial idealistic 
and altruistic good-government reformer. FDR, Jr.’s clear-cut distinction was a blurred 
image in practice. Th e quid pro quo had characterized American traditional political 
culture. A deal with the Indiana delegation at the national convention had brought 
38. Schiff  to Files, 23 October 1978, folder Roosevelt, Jr., F D., 1966, October 10 – 1989, January 
23, box 65, Schiff  Papers, NYPL. 
39. Frank S. Robinson, Machine Politics: A Study of Albany’s O’Connells (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Books, 1977), 102; NYT, 26 July, August n.d., 1966. Th e Rockefeller camp did not 
miss a beat rubbing it in. State chairman Carl Spad argued that the Democratic leadership should 
conduct public hearings into FDR, Jr.’s charges. Spad stated, “I feel that TV facilities would be 
made available to Mrs. O’Connor, Roosevelt and Burns for such a public service discussion be-
cause rank-and-fi le Democratic voters are entitled to a public airing of the entire mess.” State-
ment Carl Spad, Press Release NYS Republican Campaign Headquarters, 18 August 1966, folder 
Rockefeller Campaign 1966, series 5, subseries 2, box 37, Javits Papers.
40. “Press Release,” folder August 25, 1966, FDR, Jr. Withdrawal Statement, box 401, FDR, Jr. 
Papers; NYT, 25 August 1966.







Abraham Lincoln the Republican nomination in 1860. FDR could not have won the 
presidency in 1932 without closing deals with the big city bosses. New York State had 
seen a rich tradition of political deals and deal making. Nor did the Democrats have 
the exclusive rights on the quid pro quo. Th e Republican and Liberal Parties had also 
their share of bosses. Th e cigar smoking, backroom-dealing boss was not only a relic of 
a past long gone, the label was ambiguous. James Farley contended that “one man’s boss 
is another man’s leader.” FDR, Jr. used the label to term a political power a boss if he op-
posed his candidacy but he elevated the politician to the status of a leader aft er having 
received his support.41 
FDR, Jr. had inserted a shopworn strategy in the race because in 1966 county lead-
ers and political machines had lost most of their former powers. His exaggeration of 
the bossism issue and allusion to the supposed inevitability of O’Connor’s nomination 
infl ated the meaning and increased the infl uence of the bosses. It also invited coun-
tercharges. Members of the O’Connor campaign accused FDR, Jr. of making similar 
deals.42 Dorothy Schiff  claimed FDR, Jr. himself was no principal opponent of the deal-
making culture within the Democratic Party.43 FDR, Jr.’s handling of the deal issue 
reinforced his irresponsible image in the eyes of many observers and regular Democrats. 
He had labeled himself the “people’s candidate.” Yet, his actions now left  the door wide 
open for the nomination by a political party that was dominated by a single wheeling-
and-dealing boss: Alex Rose . 
Liberal Party Nomination
Two days aft er his withdrawal, FDR, Jr. met with Rose and Donald Harrington . Th e 
Liberal Party leaders declared that they were impressed with his grasp of the issues and 
41. Dore Schary to RFK, 26 July 1966, box 29, William VandenHeuvel Papers, JFKL; NYT, 4 
September 1966.
42. Columns Marianne Means, 13 and 15 September 1966, folder PL/ST32 10/14/65–9/15/66, 
box 65, Subject File, WHCF, LBJL; McGregor, “Leadership Roles,” 493–502. Th e O’Connor cam-
paign claimed FDR, Jr. approached them to make a deal. He would support O’Connor for mayor 
in 1969 and in return he would receive their support for the 1966 governorship. Hoff man, “FDR, 
Jr. Gives Data on ‘Deal’ By O’Connor”; New York Post, 11 August 1966.
43. Dorothy Schiff  off ered a revealing insight into the atmosphere of charges and countercharg-
es and FDR, Jr.’s eagerness to a quid pro quo. “… it reminds me that [FDR] Jr. and Justin Feldman 
came to see me at home one aft ernoon, a Sunday, I think, during the time when Lindsay was 
looking for a Democrat to run on his ticket in ’65. We discussed names and I said perhaps he 
might be asked. Jr. immediately suggested a ‘deal’ and referred to his idea as such. If I could get 
Lindsay to support Jr. for Gov. he would support Lindsay for mayor. I laughed, but Jr. was not 
joking. Curiously enough the phone rang just then. Justin answered. It was Lindsay’s campaign 
manager, now Deputy Mayor Bob Price.” Schiff  to Files, 30 September 1966, folder Series on 
Tananbaum brothers, 1963, June 27 – 1966, September 30, box 74, Editorial Files, Schiff  Papers, 
NYPL. 
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serious determination to continue his obligation in public service. Rose wanted FDR, Jr. 
to run on the Liberal Party ticket and smoothed the way. He defended his choice with 
the striking argument that the election revolved around idealism and principle. Th e 
Liberals were fi ghting for principle, against the bosses and to involve the people of the 
state through a primary system. FDR, Jr. had demonstrated in his fi ght for the Demo-
cratic nomination that he embodied these principles. Th e Liberals announced to aban-
don their usual support to the Democrats. O’Connor was a boss-controlled nominee 
and had taken evasive stands on the issues. Rose maintained that his strong Catholic 
beliefs did not appeal to the largely Jewish membership of the Liberal Party.44
Under the cloak of principle a true political trade occurred. FDR, Jr. had held make-
up sessions in March with Liberal Party leaders that had gone well but produced no real 
results. Th ey still held his past ingratitude and inconsistency against him. Th ough they 
appeared not unbudgable Joe Lash recorded Rose in his diary, who admitted “I have a 
fondness for Frank, but is he steady?” FDR, Jr. ate plenty of humble pie but the Liberal 
leaders would not make a decision before early August.45 By that time the expedient 
Rose had buried his feud with FDR, Jr. His private polls showed that FDR, Jr. possessed 
an amazing strength as a third-party candidate. His claim on memory still inspired 
older voters, minorities and labor unions and could produce a million votes.46
Despite these predictions that optimistically portrayed FDR, Jr. as an attractive 
maverick candidate, Rose essentially used the Roosevelt name to save line C on the bal-
lot. Th e newly established Conservative Party threatened to outpoll the Liberals as the 
state’s third largest party. Th is relegation would underline the reality that the Liberals 
lived beyond their political means. Originally, the party had been founded to keep the 
Republicans liberal and the Democrats decent. Th is principal watchdog role had become 
diluted over the years and had been replaced by party machinery to protect patronage 
rewards. Rose needed FDR, Jr.’s nostalgic vote-pulling power to preserve the prestige of 
the party and maintain its claim of being a local power. FDR, Jr. had been secretly en-
couraged by Rose to reveal the deal and thereby torpedo the Democratic campaign.
Th is display of political expediency received biting criticism. Th e state chairman 
of the Conservative Party scolded the Liberals for their manifest attempt to “coast in 
on a name.” O’Connor later claimed that Rose had confi ded to him that the party had 
picked Roosevelt solely for political reasons to maintain their position as third party in 
the state.47 Reporter Marianne Means blasted both Rose and FDR, Jr. for destroying 
44. Author interview with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. , New York City, 27 May 1998; McNickle, To 
Be Mayor, 220–221; NYT, 27 and 29 August, 8 and 9 September 1966; James Wechsler , “Th e Back-
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46. Diary Entry 21 July 1966, Diary Joe Lash , folder FDR, Jr., 1966, box 16, Lash Papers; Mari-
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the Liberal’s “carefully nurtured image as the one pure, untainted symbol of idealistic 
liberalism here by picking a weary man who inherited his father’s name but little of 
his courage, intellect, character or dedication to liberal principles.” 48 Columnist Mur-
ray Kempton also harshly condemned the actions as expedient. “Th e attack on Frank 
O’Connor as the choice of the bosses is polluted at the source. FDR, Jr. is like a man 
who tried to buy a bottle from a respectable bootlegger and was turned back as already 
quite drunk enough and forthwith began screaming that the country was controlled by 
bootleggers.” 49
Th e new-Roosevelt had apparently not taken root everywhere. Observers acknowl-
edged that FDR, Jr.’s powerful claim on memory contained a source of almost inex-
haustible capital. No fault of the hereditary prince or adversity seemed to be able to nul-
lify this inheritance. Nevertheless, critics relentlessly pitted the “new Roosevelt” against 
the shadow of his reputation. His attitude to take success for granted had now taken its 
toll on FDR, Jr. the argument went. Th e New York Post stated that FDR, Jr. had been the 
benefi ciary of his father’s intellectual grasp of history but lacked the “persistence which 
makes it universal in a statesman.” Th is made him susceptible to situations where he 
could be brought under the illusion that he might win the coveted position in Albany. 
FDR, Jr. as so much acknowledged this assumption. In a newspaper interview he real-
ized that he was aware that he had to “convince a lot of people that I really care about 
the things I’m talking about.” 50
Privately, FDR, Jr. told Elliott that he would run as an independent on the Lib-
eral line because he sensed “real frustration and dissatisfaction among Republicans 
and Democrats.” Despite that fact that “the odds would be heavily against my winning” 
FDR, Jr. emphasized that it would be well worth to take on the fi ght for principle. His 
self-respect required a declaration of political independence. If he would walk away 
from political fi ghts he asserted “nobody would respect me.” At least by taking on the 
“system,” the Democratic leadership, he could “come out with clean hands.” 51
Underneath these high-minded refl ections FDR, Jr. also had a pragmatic bone to 
pick with the bosses. Th e Liberal leadership wanted to teach the Democrats a lesson 
on how much they were dependent on the third party’s support. FDR, Jr. had been well 
aware that the Roosevelt name would bring in enough votes to compel the Democrats 
to consider him as a political asset at a next election. In late August, he had privately 
warned Burns to reckon with a Liberal candidacy. Soon enough, FDR, Jr. came under 
recorded interview by Roberta Greene, 19 June 1970, 23–24, RFK OH Project; New York Daily 
News, 5 September 1966, box 34, DNC Papers, LBJL; J.F. Zimmerman, Th e Government and Poli-
tics of New York State (New York: New York University Press, 1981), 80–81.
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49. Murray Kempton , “A Gentleman Earned,” New York Post, 16 August 1966.
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pressure from various Democrats not to burn his bridges. O’Connor urged him to not 
accept the nomination and bolt the Democrats. Party stalwarts Wagner and Harriman 
threatened FDR, Jr. that his desertion would destroy any hope he might have had on a 
future political career within the party.52
Undaunted, FDR, Jr. continued to build up support in the Liberal Party for his nom-
ination. During the fi rst week of September Rose managed to persuade most of its lead-
ership. He had been disappointed with FDR, Jr. but stated that the “new-Roosevelt” had 
now matured and come to terms with himself. He set up a series of interviews between 
FDR, Jr. and the leadership. A mixture of nostalgia, political expediency and convic-
tions swayed a majority of the leadership to support his nomination. FDR, Jr. showed 
dedication, sincerity, humility and knowledge of the issues to pass the screening tests 
and successfully overcame the sentiment that he had not lived up to his responsibilities 
and potentialities. Ben Davidson, the party’s executive director claimed the choice was 
based on ideological grounds. He jubilantly declared, “FDR, Jr. was by far the ablest and 
most informed and the most liberal-minded in his knowledge of and his approach to the 
problems facing New York State.” 53
A sizable minority did not share Davidson’s rosy view. Th eir opposition caused a 
profound and public split within the party. Th ey argued that there existed a very nega-
tive feeling toward FDR. Jr. because he had let them down in the past. His record of black 
marks as the representation of Trujillo was incompatible with the party’s voice of prin-
ciple and conscience. Th e Liberal Party would be regarded hypocritical when it attacked 
the conservative Democratic candidate with a ticket linked to the Dominican dictator. 
Many Liberal clubs had passed resolutions to bar Roosevelt as their candidate.54 
Louis Stulberg , who recently had taken over the presidency of the International 
Ladies’ Garment Workers Union (ILGWU ) from David Dubinsky led the opposition. 
Stulberg held a personal grudge toward Rose because of his domination of the party. 
In mid-August, he had stated his objection against former Democratic candidates for 
governor to run on the Liberal ticket. Th is ruled FDR, Jr. out because his embarass-
ments prevented him from representing the ideals of the party. Stulberg diff ered also in 
52. NYT, 4 September 1966; Baltimore Sun, 10 September 1966; McGregor, “Leadership Roles,” 
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political outlook with FDR, Jr. Th e ILGWU boss was more interested in securing (labor) 
legislation than in allegations of bossism.55
On 7 September FDR, Jr. accepted the nomination at the Liberal Party convention 
despite the opposition. An exuberant FDR, Jr. announced that New York State was going 
to see a new-Roosevelt who could redeem his lost promise. He felt “like a man reborn” 
and apologized for the Trujillo and draft  dodge aff airs. Despite the fact that he declared 
himself clean from the past he would remain a Democrat and would run as political 
independent to establish a coalition of conscience. FDR, Jr. struck more principled 
notes and pledged to restore parties to the people and take politics out of the backroom 
through the proposal of a direct primary. He issued proposals that went well beyond 
those of his opponents. New York needed more than a New Deal , the people of the state 
needed a new day: to eliminate bossism, to put an end to poverty, and to guarantee 
employment to every citizen. FDR, Jr. envisioned a campaign of fair play where the can-
didates would refrain from personal attacks and unlimited campaign expenditures.56
FDR, Jr. had kicked off  his campaign on a high note but it did not end the divi-
sion among the membership. Observers noted a considerable lack of enthusiasm among 
the party workers and convention delegates for his candidacy. Th e Liberal clubs, the 
backbone of the campaign and the party charged that the leadership had brushed them 
aside. Th ey accused Rose , Harrington and Dubinsky of failing to communicate, using 
“bulldozing tactics” and propaganda to impose FDR, Jr.’s nomination as a “fait accom-
pli to a rubber stamp convention.” 57 Stulberg’s announcement that he had cut down 
fi nancial support of his union for the campaign cast a dark cloud on the expectation of 
supporters of FDR, Jr. that a large vote would restore unity. Th e opposition among the 
ILGWU not only resulted in a lack of funds because the union traditionally contributed 
one-third of the party’s campaign money but also led to a split within the union. Th e 
state locals could make up their own minds whether to join the Roosevelt campaign.58 
FDR, Jr. returned to pushing traditional buttons. He exploited his claim on memory 
with the New York labor unions who had constituted a crucial part of the Democratic 
electoral coalition both fi nancially and in terms of manpower. No sooner than March 
1965, Joseph Curran , the president of the National Maritime Union and a confi dante of 
FDR, Jr., had urged the New York State AFL-CIO leadership to back Roosevelt in 1966. 
55. Evelyn Dubrow to Louis Stulberg, 14 September 1966, folder 6a, box 36; “Statement on 
1966 New York Gubernatorial Election and Liberal Party by President Stulberg,” folder: 10, box 
1, Louis Stulberg Papers, International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union Archives, Cornell Uni-
versity, NY; NYT, 18 and 20 September 1966; Berton, “Marriage of Convenience,” Wall Street 
Journal, 3 October 1966.
56. Wechsler , “Th e Backstage Story,” New York Post 8 September 1966; NYT, 9 September 1966.
57. Carol Isenberg to Edward Morrison, 9 September 1966, folder Edward A. Morrison Per-
sonal 1966, box 67, Liberal Party Papers, NYPL.
58. NYT, 7, 9, 11, 12, 18 and 20 September 1966; New York Post, 14 October 1966.
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FDR, Jr. stood out “as the logical choice for labor and those who share our concern for 
good government.” 59 
FDR, Jr. hoped to patch up the relationship with the labor state leadership he had 
neglected during his years in Washington. He went to great lengths not to antagonize 
the union movement. In his campaign speeches he took great care in emphasizing issues 
that were popular with labor such as raising the minimum wage, the war on poverty and 
medicaid. Th e eff orts to gain substantial labor support by himself did not bear fruit. 
Th e magic of the Roosevelt name did not hold any attraction for Stulberg or for other 
major labor leaders. Frustrated by his refusal to fully commit the union resources to his 
campaign, FDR, Jr. admitted that he was “fed up” with the union president. He asked 
Joseph Curran to set up an, unsuccessful, Independent Labor Committee for Roosevelt 
to circumvent Stulberg and to re-establish relationships with other labor leaders.60 
Th e row with Stulberg demonstrated that his claim on memory did no longer cast 
a spell on the labor movement. Th e unions in general divided their support between 
the Liberal, Republican and Democratic Parties. Th e circumstances in the 1966 elec-
tion contributed to the temporary end of a monolithic New York labor movement. Th e 
dramatic transformation of the political environment had strained the traditional ties 
between labor and the Democrats. Whereas the days of FDR had been divided along 
economic lines, social divisions like civil rights and the war in Vietnam fragmented the 
country in the 1950s and 1960s.61
Involvement of the LBJ Administration
Th e Vietnam War infl uenced the race. As an offi  cial of the administration, FDR, Jr. had 
played the role of the loyal member of the LBJ team. Th is placed him within the camp 
of the traditional liberals. Th ey supported the administration’s claim that the war in 
Vietnam was an aggressive example of the Cold War threat of international commu-
nism. Th e line FDR, Jr. took in his speeches did not go well with the anti-war groups 
in New York. Th e unwillingness to suspend the bombing campaign without reciprocal 
action by North Vietnam and the rejection of negotiations was anathema to the reform 
59. Joseph Curran to Raymond Corbett and Louis Hollander, 12 March 1965; FDR, Jr. to Joseph 
Curran, 19 March 1965, folder Joseph Curran, box 167, FDR, Jr. Papers. 
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movement. Th ey opposed the containment of communism and rejected the war out-
right. During the course of the struggle for the Democratic nomination FDR, Jr. decided 
to duck the issue and allowed Justin Feldman , a senior campaign aide, to express his 
militant anti-LBJ position to satisfy the reform clubs.62
Over the summer FDR, Jr. shift ed his position on Vietnam. Opinion polls revealed 
a growing uneasiness with the failure of the administration to produce a quick victory 
in Vietnam that was also refl ected in a growing division among Democrats. FDR, Jr. be-
gan to walk a middle ground on the issue. Aft er the administration had intensifi ed the 
bombing campaign in Vietnam, moderate liberals like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. , John K. 
Galbraith , Rienhold Niebuhr and FDR, Jr. became increasingly frustrated with the war. 
Yet, they feared to alienate the liberal administration by publicly opposing LBJ. Also, the 
war itself and public opposition to it would threaten the Great Society programs.63 FDR, 
Jr. supported the bombing of military targets in North Vietnam to protect American 
soldiers but he objected to further escalating the war by bombing Hanoi and civilian 
targets. Privately, he began to consider seeking a peaceful solution to the confl ict. Th e 
United Nations should establish a ceasefi re and supervise international procedures by 
deploying a peacekeeping force to hold free elections in South Vietnam aft er all North 
Vietnamese and American military forces had withdrawn.64
FDR, Jr. turned more dovish as the war dragged on. His voice would be heard on 
the side of sanity, reason and morality. FDR, Jr. worried about the domestic and foreign 
consequences of the American involvement in Vietnam. Th e “cruel, frustrating war in 
Vietnam” would cast a “lengthy shadow with rising pressures for mindless escalation 
and a smell of McCarthyism in the air.” 65 Like Schlesinger, Jr. and Galbraith , FDR, Jr. 
recognized that peace in Vietnam was vital to all the Great Society programs of social 
progress. He favored a negotiated settlement and declared that he supported every eff ort 
to achieve a peaceful end to the war. In a departure from his earlier position he stated 
to be in favor of halting the bombing of Vietnam when Hanoi would de-escalate their 
war eff orts. Rather than stepping up the bombing campaign, FDR, Jr. went beyond the 
increasingly unpopular policies of the administration to call upon more bold initiatives 
to achieve peace in Vietnam. FDR, Jr. urged to establish a fi ve-nations United Nations 
62. Diary Entries 9 March, 21 July 1966, Diary Joe Lash , folder FDR, Jr., 1966, Lash Papers.
63. Allen J. Matusow, Th e Unraveling of America (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 376–394; 
Robert A. Divine, ed., Th e Johnson Years: LBJ at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 1994), 30.
64. Diary Entries 9 March, 21 July 1966, Diary Joe Lash , folder FDR, Jr., 1966, Lash Papers; 
FDR, Jr. to Milo Sklar, 15 June 1966, folder Policy Letter, Vietnam (to Milo Sklar), box 327; FDR, 
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force to supervise a ceasefi re and bring about peace negotiations with the North-Viet-
namese that would include representatives of the VietCong.66
FDR, Jr. stopped short from an outright opposition to the war. As the Liberal nomi-
nee he distinguished himself in the campaign by taking the most dovish position on 
Vietnam. Rockefeller endorsed the policies of LBJ while O’Connor compromised. Th e 
divided New York Democrats approved the course of the administration while also re-
serving the right to dissent. FDR, Jr.’s development on Vietnam illustrated the divisions 
within the liberal community and the divergence of liberalism. More important, FDR, 
Jr.’s position had angered the president. It helped to strengthen LBJ’s determination to 
support O’Connor and to consolidate his resolve to deal with the Liberals only through 
Stulberg.67
During late August and early September, LBJ received warnings of the danger of 
the impending Roosevelt candidacy. Jack Bingham told him that he and other reform 
leaders in New York strongly opposed FDR, Jr.’s spoiler role. Ed Weisl , the National 
Committeeman and presidential liaison in New York who controlled federal patronage 
urged LBJ to prevail upon FDR, Jr. not to run because this would prevent O’Connor 
from becoming Governor. LBJ concurred but ordered an aide to “tell him [Weisl] I have 
no infl uence with Roosevelt.” 68
LBJ had originally decided to remain neutral and to stay out of the fall election be-
cause the political situation had deteriorated. Urban rioting that had started in previous 
summers continued during 1966. Infl ation started to rise and the administration had 
committed itself to the war in Vietnam by sending hundreds of thousands of Ameri-
can soldiers to do the fi ghting. When his popularity took another downward turn in 
the early fall, LBJ continued to shy away from party politics. He refused to campaign 
for Democratic candidates and had ordered to curtail party fundraising ventures to 
stave off  further Republican accusations that big contributors were receiving favorable 
treatment.69 
Th e candidacy of FDR, Jr. and the attraction of the Roosevelt brand name did carry 
enough weight to trigger an exceptional involvement of the LBJ administration. Despite 
inclinations to sit out the election and insulate himself from an approaching Republican 
66. Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961–1973 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 335–339; NYT, 30 September 1966; James Wechsler , “Dissenting Vote for 
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victory, LBJ intervened in New York. He attempted to prevent FDR, Jr. from accepting 
the Liberal nomination. A worried LBJ pressed Rose and Dubinsky at a White House 
dinner not to pursue their course of action and asked Harlem Congressman Adam 
Clayton Powell to help him “on the Franklin Roosevelt problem….” 70 LBJ established a 
liaison connection with a grateful O’Connor that had been proposed since June. He met 
with O’Connor at the White House and fi nancially assisted the Democratic campaign 
that had already gone broke during early October. In a comment on the meeting, FDR, 
Jr. paraded his newly acquired independence and self-respect. He condemned the Dem-
ocrat because “… O’Connor cannot stand on his own two feet … Mr. O’Connor stands 
on his crutch. Mr. Rockefeller on his money, and I stand on my own two feet.” 71 
FDR, Jr.’s charge and rebuff  angered LBJ who reacted to beef up the administration’s 
involvement in the O’Connor campaign. LBJ enlisted Hubert Humphrey , who had been 
close to O’Connor to reinforce the campaign team with speechwriters and advisers. Th e 
vice president introduced the Democratic nominee to labor offi  cials and important lib-
eral campaign donors. At the Democratic convention in early September he recalled 
that FDR had always been a true Democrat “who fought out his problems and wishes 
and fi lled it in his party.” As the party’s hatchet man, Humphrey cast FDR, Jr. in the 
role of the election’s spoiler for having turned his back on his party. In mid-October LBJ 
committed himself publicly to the Democratic nominee and took a full day campaign 
swing, accompanied by Humphrey, RFK and O’Connor through the boroughs of New 
York City.72 
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Fall Campaign
During the fall campaign, FDR, Jr. ran as a Democrat on the Liberal Party ticket to 
establish a coalition of conscience of Liberal, Democratic and independent voters. FDR, 
Jr. pushed all the liberal and progressive buttons. He promised to deal with education 
by improving the Headstart program, off ered state aid to public schools and free tuition 
programs to the State University system. His anti-poverty and welfare plans pledged 
to reduce the high unemployment among minority teenagers and raise the minimum 
wage. As a good government advocate who held a fi rm belief in the representation of 
the people, FDR, Jr. off ered political reforms to “attract young people, new people, with 
new ideas and new solutions into the political process.” He proposed a direct primary 
for statewide offi  ces and invited Rockefeller and O’Connor to agree to curb campaign 
spending.73
FDR, Jr. distinguished himself among the gubernatorial candidates by his all-out 
and principled support for the Civilian Review Board (CRB) to oversee the New York 
City Police Department.74 As a vocal and maverick campaigner, FDR, Jr. defi ned the 
CRB as one of the major issues in the election. He hoped the nostalgic appeal of the 
Roosevelt name and its traditional association with civil rights causes would attract 
many sympathetic voters. FDR, Jr. campaigned to help clarify the misunderstandings 
about the review board because “he had never seen an issue … on which there was so 
much confusion and deliberate misrepresentation.” 75
Th e civil rights movement reached its zenith during the summer of 1964, but it also 
revealed a larger crisis in race relations. Aggravated by New York City’s social problems 
of urban inequality these racial divisions came to the forefront during a heatwave in 
July 1964. Racial tensions exploded aft er reports that a policeman had shot a black boy. 
Four days of racial confrontations, rioting and fi res in Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant 
left  two people dead and 140 others injured.76 Aft er the riots a number of civil rights 
leaders and politicians called for an independent review board to hear charges of po-
lice abuse and recommend possible action to the police commissioner. In March 1966, 
Mayor Lindsay issued an executive order to create a Civilian Review Board of three 
policemen and four civilians.77
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Th e police union reacted furiously to the civilian infringement upon their work and 
the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) succeeded to place the issue in a referen-
dum on the ballot for the November elections. It allowed the voters to decide over the 
fate of the new CRB. Supported by the Conservative Party, the American Legion, the 
John Birch Society and business, taxpayers’ and homeowners’ groups, the PBA ran a well-
funded campaign to abolish the CRB. Th e police union launched a slick ad campaign 
that cleverly capitalized on the emotional and intertwining factors of increasing fears of 
race and crime. Th e PBA meaningfully linked the fear of crime with the subconscious 
imminent danger of being robbed, raped or assaulted by an African American at night 
on an empty street. It argued to a growing susceptible public that the CRB would seri-
ously impede police work. Th e police would hesitate to act against criminals who could 
bring charges against individual offi  cers. Th e questioning of their integrity would also 
contribute to an unmotivated police department and result in an increase in crime.
Th e police union resented civilian control and feared a witchhunt. It depicted the 
CRB as an attempt by their liberal opponents to “handcuff  the police from eff ectively 
controlling a militant, criminal, nonwhite community.” 78 In a climate of strong racial 
tensions and polarized politics, the PBA succeeded in mobilizing the resentment of the 
white population by adopting scare tactics to emphasize their underlying association of 
crime and race. John Cassesse, the president of the PBA, declared “I am sick and tired 
of giving in to minority groups.” 79
Th e PBA had whipped up emotional distrust of the board fi ght that tapped into 
surging anti-civil rights sentiments among the white population. An August Gallup 
Poll revealed that a majority of the population condemned the LBJ administration for 
achieving integration too fast. Th e outcome of the referendum would have national re-
percussions. A defeat of the CRB would clearly signal a major setback for the march of 
the civil rights movement. It would demonstrate the resentment and intensity of the 
white backlash. In a city well known for its progressive legacy the result would be sym-
bolic for displaying the limits of liberalism.80
FDR, Jr. was taken aback by the intensity of the emotions that the arguments over 
the CRB had touched off . He argued that the misunderstanding of the review board 
had been a result of the scare tactics of the PBA. Individual policemen had nothing to 
fear from the CRB. Instead, the review board should be used as a positive instrument 
to help improve relations between various groups. Th e review board in place had not 
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diminished police effi  ciency or decreased its morale, rather it had led to “new respect 
for law and order in the city.” FDR, Jr. emphatically pushed to broaden the concept of 
the review boards by calling for a state ombudsman to review complaints against the 
conduct of public offi  cials and agencies.81
FDR, Jr.’s arguments were an echo of the statements of the liberal coalition that ad-
vocated the CRB. Democratic, Republican and Liberal Party politicians, the American 
Jewish Committee, civil rights organizations such as CORE and the NAACP , the New 
York Civil Liberties Union and some fi ft y other groups organized themselves under the 
banner of the Federated Associations for Impartial Review (FAIR).82 Th e thirty-eight 
full-time staff  members of the coalition set out to dispel the PBA claims about the CRB. 
Th ey argued that the CRB had been operating since July and that the city had not seen a 
rise in crime or a reduction in arrests. Th us far the whites had fi led the most complaints 
undermining the claim that the board was created to keep peace with the minority 
population. FAIR declared that even the police commissioner had admitted that a CRB 
was necessary, but that they disagreed over its composition. Th e CRB would not under-
mine police morale and destroy police eff ectiveness. Th ere would be no case of outside 
control over the police force because the police commissioner and not the CRB held the 
fi nal authority over possible disciplinary action.83 
Th e liberal coalition could undermine factual claims of the PBA but to nullify the 
underlying association between crime and race proved diffi  cult. Th is put them on the 
defensive. Th e advocates of the CRB attempted to transform the controversy into a lit-
mus test of honesty by stressing the racial content of the confl ict. Th ereby, they hoped to 
dispel the fears the PBA had capitalized upon. FDR, Jr.’s name and eff orts put the CRB 
on the map but at times, his enthusiasm on the stump got over the top. Despite fl imsy 
evidence FDR, Jr. charged the PBA was under the infl uence of gambling and criminal 
interests who mobilized their resources to help defeat the CRB. Th e police union denied 
the allegations and retorted that FDR, Jr. conducted guilt by association tactics. 
FDR, Jr. also used the CRB struggle as a campaign theme to attack his gubernato-
rial opponents. He declared that he had been the only candidate who had the courage 
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to publicly fi ght for the review board. O’Connor and Rockefeller merely paid lipservice 
to the issue. FDR, Jr. accused O’Connor of appealing to the backlash vote by predict-
ing that the voters would reject the CRB.84 FDR, Jr.’s concentration of his attacks on 
the Democratic nominee underscored the internal problems that weakened the FAIR 
coalition. Th ere was a lack of funding and RFK, Senator Jacob Javits and John Lindsay 
squabbled over tactics. Th ey correctly feared that the gubernatorial candidates, FDR, 
Jr., O’Connor and Rockefeller turned the issue into a competition of who supported the 
CRB the most.85
Th e outcome of the referendum on the CRB delighted the PBA and shocked the 
liberal community. Voters overwhelmingly rejected the review board. Two-thirds of the 
electorate voted to defeat it while only one-third chose to maintain the board. Th e PBA 
celebrated the defeat as a victory for all 8 million New York City inhabitants. John Cas-
sesse even boasted, “thank God, we saved this city.” 86 Th e New York Times respected 
FDR, Jr. for his strong stand on principle. Yet, the traditional attraction of the Roosevelt 
name failed to sway many voters for the cause of civil rights. FDR, Jr. aft erwards as-
serted that his unequivocal campaigning for the review board had cost him support 
in white middle-class areas. He hit a wall of white resentment and opposition when he 
went beyond the liberal orthodoxy by issuing preferential treatment to achieve equal 
results.87 
FDR, Jr. mistakenly discounted the impact of the white backlash on the outcome of 
the referendum. Th e defeat demonstrated that liberals like FDR, Jr. had overestimated 
the commitment of the white population to racial equality and equal opportunity and 
turned a deaf ear to the undercurrent of white resentment against minority gains.88 Th e 
fi ght over the CRB displayed the limitations of modern liberal reformers like FDR, Jr. 
Th e conventional liberal remedies were suited to guarantee legal equality. Th ey proved 
inadequate providing solutions to redistribute power to enduring social and economic 
problems such as poverty and racism.
Race had been the chief consideration in determining the outcome. Th e majority 
saw no need for a CRB for the civil rights of minorities because they perceived it as 
granting preferential treatment to minorities that was withheld to other groups. Th e 
rejection of the review board in the “citadel of liberalism” contributed to the halting of 
the gains of the civil rights movement. Th e impact of the white backlash combined with 
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rising crime, urban unrest and racial tensions hastened the collapse of the broad sup-
port that had existed for the civil rights issue.89 
FDR, Jr. also attached his claim on memory to sell the other principled issue of 
bossism. His relentless pounding had kept the issue alive. FDR, Jr. had lashed out that 
both his major opponents were boss-dominated. O’Connor was no true liberal but a 
“synthetic liberal” who outdid Senator McCarthy . Democrats reacted by attacking FDR, 
Jr. as a spoiler candidate who had been duped by Alex Rose to save line C for the Liberal 
Party. FDR, Jr. had to contradict Democratic allegations that he himself was a bossed 
candidate. Democrats also charged that FDR, Jr. was living on the image of his parents. 
Party chairman Burns depicted O’Connor as the underdog, the son of an Irish immi-
grant engaged in an uphill fi ght against the sons of famous fathers who were dependent 
on them for success. Th e Rockefeller campaign mounted a concerted eff ort to discredit 
FDR, Jr. Th ey emphasized to the press his past reputation of representing Trujillo and 
his record as an absentee Congressman.
Th e bossism issue had been his major campaign issue because it had seemed to be 
popular with both the people and the press. In mid-September, Anna had cast early 
doubts on the bossism campaign strategy. She correctly warned that he ran the risk of 
getting a backlash if he pounded too hard on the bossism issue. Like their father had 
done, she advised her brother to “… campaign on two or three of the best issues which 
you can pluck from the Liberal platform.” 90 Inevitably, FDR, Jr.’s tactics invited coun-
tercharges and proved counterproductive.
A chronic shortage of money also plagued the Liberal Party campaign. Th e ratio-
nale behind FDR, Jr.’s proposal to limit campaign spending to one million dollars for 
each party and a fair allocation of tv time, was to negate the advantages of Rockefeller’s 
personal wealth and the money available in the Democratic Party. When the Republi-
can refused, FDR, Jr. accused him of using his personal wealth to buy the election. He 
could put no vital commercials on TV because the campaign lacked funds. FDR, Jr. was 
denied access to the big Democratic donors as an independent, and his campaign ran on 
small daily contributions.91 Th e inability to catch fi re with the Liberal Party organiza-
89. Walter A. Jackson, Gunnar Myrdal and America’s Conscience: Social Engineering and Ra-
cial Liberalism, 1938–1987 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 302, 309; 
Divine, Johnson Years, 93–118; McNickle, To Be Mayor, 214–215; Th urber, Politics of Equality, 7, 
197. 
90. Joseph Robinson to FDR, Jr., 28 September 1966, folder R, box 173, FDR, Jr. Papers; New 
York Post, 14 October 1966. She described FDR’s method of campaigning to her brother: “I re-
member Father always almost concentrated on one angle of a popular issue in one speech: going 
to another angle on a closely following one. Th is was so much more eff ective than Adlai’s method 
of covering ten important issues in each of his speeches—leaving the audience groggy and con-
fused…” Anna to FDR, Jr., 13 September 1966, box 68, Anna Roosevelt Halsted Papers, FDRL.
91. Joseph Robinson to FDR, Jr., 29 September 1966, folder R, box 173; FDR, Jr. to Louis Fin-
kelstein, 20 October 1966, folder F 1966, box 169, all in FDR, Jr. Papers; Arthur Massolo to Dick 
Aurelio, 14 October 1966, folder Rockefeller campaign, 1966, series 5, subseries 2, box 19, Javits 
Papers; NYT, n.d. September 1966.







tion mirrored the evident lack of enthusiasm among the New York electorate for FDR, 
Jr.’s candidacy. His label as an independent maverick did not hold. Voters considered 
him a spoiler who interfered and had acknowledged that he had no chance of winning 
the governorship.92
Th e unoffi  cal returns had FDR, Jr. running neck and neck with Paul Adams , the 
Conservative Party candidate, with Roosevelt holding only a slight margin. Yet, in mid-
December the offi  cial count certifi ed that the conservatives had edged out the Liberal 
Party by a few thousands votes and captured the coveted line C on the ballot.93 Th e 
Conservative Party had drawn more votes in the liberal bastion of New York City than 
the heir of liberalism’s greatest icon. FDR, Jr. had drawn only half of the projected 1 mil-
lion votes. He had been hurt by his strong stand on the unpopular CRB. Reports in the 
last weeks of the campaign of an apparent close race between Rockefeller and O’Connor 
had also contributed to his weak showing as did media polls who had branded him 
a lost cause candidate.94 Rockefeller won a relatively comfortable third-term victory. 
Th e fi nal election results signaled a shift  away from liberal consensus to confl ict and 
conservatism. 
Conclusion
Th e birth of a “New Roosevelt” demonstrated the importance of the 1966 election. FDR, 
Jr. argued he was a changed man because he had begun to demonstrate a solid dedica-
tion to the philosophy of his parents and had built a record of liberal public service. 
Matured by previous accusations of living off  the name or not living up to it, he had now 
learned to stand on his own feet. In the 1966 election, FDR, Jr. wanted to back up the 
claim on memory with independent achievements. He claimed that for the fi rst time he 
had adjusted to the Roosevelt name. Th is new sense of direction made him realize he 
could earn respect by fi ghting for principles and advocating political reforms. Person-
ally, FDR, Jr. took the greatest satisfaction in the fact he had made his children, Chris , 
Frank , Nancy and Laura , proud of the battle he had waged for issues rather than for 
political offi  ce.95
Despite the inspiration the Roosevelt memory provided there were a number of 
92. Quayle, “A Survey of the Political Climate of New York State,” October 1966, folder 1966, 
box 68, FDR, Jr. Papers.
93. NYT, 9 November 1966. Adams drew 510,023 votes compared to 507,234 votes for FDR, Jr. 
NYT, 18 December 1966.
94. Joseph Lash to Anna and James Halsted , 12 November 1966, folder Halsted, Anna and 
James, box 7, Lash Papers, FDRL; NYT, 13 November 1966.
95. FDR III to FDR, Jr., 11 November 1966, folder R, box 173, FDR, Jr. Papers; Joe Lash to Anna 
and James Halsted , 12 November 1966 and Anna to Joe Lash , 6 December 1966, folder Halsted, 
Anna and James, box 7, Lash Papers, FDRL; New York Times, 15 May 1966; New York Post, 9 
November 1966.
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circumstances that hampered FDR, Jr.’s claim for respect. Th ey refl ected ideological and 
political realities. He ran into strong opposition from LBJ, RFK and local Democratic 
leaders who, for various reasons, saw the Roosevelt name as a threat to their aspirations. 
More important, despite his claim of a new attitude toward political offi  ce FDR, Jr. had 
always kept one hopeful eye on the political situation in his home state. During the 
1960s, he waited for an opportunity to sell his claim on memory to win elective offi  ce. 
In 1966, this hope for a political comeback quickly dashed. FDR, Jr. executed his 
campaign tactics with the usual mix of self-assuredness and reliance on the Roosevelt 
magic that antagonized Democratic Party leaders, as was the case when he inserted 
the worn-out issue of “bossism” into the election. Rather than sustaining the claim of a 
committed “New Roosevelt”, the “deal” strategy and alliance with Alex Rose made him 
a spoiler candidate who had ruined the chances of the Democrats in the eyes of many 
voters. Aft er FDR, Jr. had burned his bridges, New York party leaders kept equating the 
Roosevelt name with uncontrollable ambition.
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FDR, Jr. stood at crossroads aft er his humiliating loss. In November 1966, FDR III can-
didly told his father that he faced a fundamental decision. He could hope for a political 
comeback. If FDR, Jr. would keep on advocating the right issues this might become a 
real possibility. Yet, the “odds were not very high in favor of this possibility.” 1 FDR, Jr. 
could also consider becoming a private person and “enjoy doing little things that help 
other people and cultivate relationship with friends and family.” 2 
FDR III illustrated this alternative approach to life with the example of his own life. 
He emphasized that he felt out of place in politics. Th is world that constantly identifi ed 
him as a Roosevelt threatened him. He realized that his father had lived his life on the 
notion that “recognition by the voting public is the highest criterion of worth.” 3 FDR 
III stressed he had grown up without the feeling that politics was everything and had 
now found another goal in life in teaching at Columbia University.4
Rather than to search for a new identity FDR, Jr. immediately started working for 
a political comeback. Th is had already been clear on the night that the election results 
came in. FDR, Jr. claimed, “I have got to make clear that I’m going on with this fi ght. 
Th ey are gonna try to fi nish me off . I’m not taking that.” 5 He was too proud on his 
name to play politically dead aft er the election had seen him fi ghting for his political life. 
At fi ft y-two, he felt too young to be out of public offi  ce. 
In January 1967, FDR, Jr. rented a Manhattan town house and transformed it into 
a temporary political headquarters. He hired three staff ers and eagerly spoke out at 
schools forums in the city on the issues he had addressed in his campaign. FDR, Jr. sug-
gested a National Marshall Plan to attack the current domestic problems and to promote 
entrepreneurship. He emphasized the importance to adopt a statewide primary because 
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he knew it was his best opportunity to establish a comeback to a major elective offi  ce.6 
Th erefore, FDR, Jr. needed the help from the state’s most powerful Democrat. Aft er a 
telephone call from Senator Ted Kennedy he endorsed Robert F. Kennedy for president 
in April 1968.7 Th e next year, he remained involved in New York City politics and at-
tached his name to candidates for city council and mayor.8
His political activities did not bring him the reward that business initially had pro-
duced. In January 1970, FDR, Jr. sold his stock in the Roosevelt Motor Company to 
Fiat. Th is deal made him a multi-millionaire. Th e negotiated check of six millions dol-
lars brought him fi nancial security. FDR, Jr. quickly reinvested the capital in a travel 
agency business and real estate ventures.9 When the 1972 presidential campaign for 
the Democratic candidacy geared up, he applied his eff orts for the frontrunner, Maine 
Senator Edmund Muskie . In early 1972, FDR, Jr. planned a campaign tour in the winter 
for his personal friend and fellow member of the Roosevelt Campobello International 
Park Commission. In return, he expected to be named secretary of the Interior. Th is 
turned out be idle hope aft er Muskie self-destructed and withdrew from the race in 
mid-1972.10
Crisis
FDR, Jr.’s salesmanship capabilities could not make up for the fact that his life had 
started to unravel. As the political future grew bleaker so did his personal outlook. He 
confi ded to Joe Lash that he had grown estranged from Sue . Th ey had decided their 
marriage could not work. In the summer of 1969, he had met Felicia Warburg Sarnoff  , 
the former wife of Record Company of America executive Bob Sarnoff  and daughter of 
Felix Warburg, a wealthy philanthropist and international fi nancier. By the end of June 
6. FDR, Jr. to Stanley Hart, 28 September 1967, Personal Files box 317, FDR, Jr. Papers; Har-
old H. Harris , “Don’t Count Out FDR Jr.,” New York World Journal Tribune, 20 January 1967, 
Personality Clippings Files, box 143, DNC Records, JFKL; Timothy N. Th urber, Th e Politics of 
Equality: Hubert H. Humphrey and the African American Freedom Struggle (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1999), 204–206.
7. Joseph P. Lash to Earl Miller, 8 April 1968, Interviews conducted by Joseph P. Lash, Roos-
evelt Study Center, the Netherlands (hereaft er RSC); New York Times, 4 April 1968 (hereaft er 
NYT).
8. NYT, 25 June and 1 August 1969.
9. Diary Entry 18 May 1970, Diary Joe Lash , folder Roosevelt, Franklin D. Jr. 1980–1981, 
General Correspondence, box 16, Joseph P. Lash Papers, FDRL; FDR, Jr. to AL, 28 June 1982, 
folder General (relates to farm) 1982, box 274, FDR, Jr. Papers.
10. Dorothy Schiff  to Files, 1 February 1972, folder Roosevelt, Jr., Franklin D., 1966, Octo-
ber 10 – 1989, January 23, Editorial Files, box 65, Dorothy Schiff  Papers, NYPL; NYT, 28 March 
1972; James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: America, 1945–1974 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 759; Michael Barone, Our Country: Th e Shaping of America From Roosevelt tot Rea-
gan (New York: Th e Free Press, 1990), 498–501.
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1970, FDR, Jr. fl ew to Mexico to fi nalize his divorce. Custody of Nancy , eighteen, and 
Laura , eleven went to Sue.11 
Yet, FDR, Jr.’s new commitment fell victim to the pitfall of most of his brothers’ 
marriages. Th eir women had married into the family for their name and tradition. In 
February 1975, FDR, Jr. revealed to Dorothy Schiff  that his marriage with Felicia was 
busted. She was an “anti-Semitic” and a “snob.” 12 He realized that Felicia had always 
wanted to be in the Jet Set and marry a rich WASP. Her snobbishness also extended 
to his friends. She had no use for Joe and Trude Lash . Only aft er his book on Eleanor 
had become a great success, Felicia invited them to dinner. FDR, Jr. had been named 
his mother’s literary executor aft er her death. He was responsible for her private pa-
pers at the FDR Library and had asked Joe to write a biography of Eleanor based upon 
this personal archive. In 1971, the book won a Pulitzer and National Book Award for 
biography.13
FDR, Jr. was also concerned that Felicia’s tactlessness and bluntness would dam-
age him politically because she wanted to join his Muskie campaign. He had thought 
he loved her but she could not stand the comparison with Sue who had been far more 
helpful at the farm. FDR, Jr. confi ded that he considered remarrying his former wife 
now that he had returned to be on speaking terms with Sue.14 Schiff  had invited FDR, 
Jr. to dinner to off er him a position as an associate publisher at the New York Post but 
expressed shock at his physical deterioration. FDR, Jr. looked awful and had “very, very 
bad shakes and was unable to hold a glass.” 15 Schiff  thought that he was over the hill. 
Joe Lash did not think that FDR, Jr. was shunted out. In June 1975, he counseled 
his friend that he could still be politically eff ective. Lash claimed he possessed the spark 
of command and leadership. His name could “fi re up the troops as a candidate” for the 
upcoming presidential election. Despite his lack of organization and the certain “merci-
less beating” in the media his claim on memory stood out in the fi eld of mediocre can-
didates.16 FDR, Jr. did not take the bait. In April 1976, he endorsed presidential hopeful 
Jimmy Carter . Th e Georgia Governor hoped that the refl ected glory would strengthen 
his claim as heir to the memory of FDR and the New Deal . FDR, Jr. was present when 
Carter announced his candidacy from the steps of the “Little White House” in Warm 
11. Diary Entry 18 May 1970, Diary Joe Lash , folder Roosevelt, Franklin D. Jr. 1980–1981, 
General Correspondence, box 16, Lash Papers; New York Post, 30 June 1970, Anna Roosevelt 
Halsted Papers, FDRL.
12. Dorothy Schiff  to Files, 1 February 1972, folder Roosevelt, Jr., Franklin D., 1966, October 
10 – 1989, January 23, Editorial Files, box 65, Schiff  Papers, NYPL.
13. Ibid.; “Introduction by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.,” in Joseph P. Lash , Eleanor and Franklin 
(New York: Smithmark, 1995), xiii–xiv.
14. Schiff  to Files, 1 February 1972, folder Roosevelt, Jr., Franklin D., 1966, October 10 – 1989, 
January 23, Editorial Files, box 65, Schiff  Papers, NYPL
15. Ibid.
16. Joe Lash to FDR, Jr., 2 June 1975, folder Roosevelt, FDR, Jr. 1986, General Correspondence, 
box 16, Lash Papers.






Springs, Georgia.17 He later described Carter as his “personal friend” though these 
warm feelings did not result in the coveted appointment as the new president’s ambas-
sador to the United Nations.18
At the end of that month, FDR, Jr. offi  cially divorced Felicia. Shortly thereaft er, he 
met Patricia Oakes during a foxhunt in the neighborhood of his farm. In May 1977, they 
married in a horseback wedding. Th e age diff erence underscored FDR, Jr.’s personal cri-
sis. He was sixty-three while she had turned twenty-seven.19 Th eir marriage produced 
a son, John Alexander , that year but was not a success. Patricia had personal problems of 
her own and was not at her place at the farm. Th e staff  was unable to get along with the 
new Mrs. Roosevelt. Th ey described her as “very abusive,” “crazy” and “unreasonable in 
her criticisms.” Patricia’s demanding treatment led many people who had been working 
for FDR, Jr. for years to leave the farm.20
Financial stress aggravated FDR, Jr.’s depression. Soon aft er he had placed his capi-
tal in the hands of the investment fi rm, FDR, Jr. had learned that they had lost most of 
his money from the sale of his company to Fiat. He was forced to sell his house in New 
York City and moved permanently to the farm. FDR, Jr. had kept up an aristocratic life. 
He vacationed on exclusive Martha’s Vineyard and visited Jackie Kennedy in Greece 
where he chartered a boat to cruise the Mediterranean. He regularly sailed in the waters 
around Campobello and traveled extensively.21 Yet, failing businesses led him to can-
cel going to his beloved Campobello because he did not have the money. 
FDR, Jr. had lost more money in a Moped venture he had started in 1977. Th e busi-
ness had become a major fl op aft er it developed a bad reputation among the public. 
When sales dried up during 1978 FDR, Jr. traveled, almost desperately to fi nd solutions 
to rescue his investment without any loss. At the end of the year he had to take an ad-
ditional mortgage on the farm to cover the liquidation of his stock. In October 1978, 
he admitted to FDR III he had become relieved because “the year of trial is almost 
over.” 22
He started to concentrate his eff orts on the horse breeding business to profi t from 
the Th oroughbred boom in New York State. By the early 1980s, he proudly wrote Frank 
17. NYT, 6 April 1976.
18. FDR, Jr. to Bert Lance, 3 November 1977, folder Jimmy Carter, Campaign, box 201, FDR, 
Jr. Papers; FDR, Jr., “Th e Roosevelt Legacy,” in Kenneth W. Th ompson, ed., Portraits of American 
Presidents, vol. 1, Th e Roosevelt Presidency: Four Intimate Perspectives of FDR (New York: Uni-
versity Press of America, 1982), 52.
19. Statement marriage Felicia Sarnoff , folder Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Personal & Confi den-
tial 1969, box 351, FDR, Jr. Papers; NYT, 23 April 1976; Newsweek, 6 May 1977.
20. FDR, Jr. to AL, 6 October 1981, folder General (relates to farm) 1982, box 274, FDR, Jr. 
Papers.
21. Dairy Entry 18 May 1970, Diary Joe Lash , folder Roosevelt, Franklin D. Jr. 1980–1981, 
General Correspondence, box 16, Lash Papers, FDRL.
22. FDR, Jr. to FDR III , 10 July 1978, folder Roosevelt, F.D. III, box 343, FDR, Jr. Papers.
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and Chris that he had built “the best horse breeding farm and facilities in the East.” 23 
Success was only of short duration. FDR, Jr. had neglected to buy mares for his opera-
tion that could have produced yearlings to sell. His mistake of judgment made him un-
able to pay back the loans he had taken out to fi nance the horse business.
In December 1982, FDR, Jr. explained to his sons that within months he might have 
to shut down the business since he was unable to buy feed for the horses and meet the 
payroll. Th e last year and a half, he had been “totally absorbed” in solving his fi nancial 
diffi  culties. He had tried to fi nd syndicates who were willing to take over the farm and 
business. He feared his lack of success would force him into bankruptcy and that he 
would have to sell the farm.24
Th e tensions of fi nancial insecurity had an immense impact on FDR, Jr. In late 1982, 
he revealed to his sons, “I have never worked so hard, with such total frustration and 
fear, and I cannot describe the depression, which results.” 25 His deepest concern had 
been to provide an opportunity for his babyson Jack for a start in life and for his heritage. 
He received reproachful letters from FDR III about his continuing absence. FDR, Jr. was 
“very hurt” and “desolated” by his son’s criticism. He accepted it and asked forgiveness. 
He had felt unable to pay attention to his family because of the “tremendous pressures” 
to remain fi nancially afl oat. FDR, Jr. had missed seeing his family and hoped that they 
could “forget the past” and look forward to “a happier future.” 26 Eventually the farm 
was placed on sale and he moved to the neighboring village of Millbrook.
Identity
In those years of trial, FDR, Jr. remained committed to the Roosevelt tradition. He felt 
that the centennial of his father’s birthday on 30 January 1982 should start at Spring-
wood and the Library at Hyde Park . He had invited President Reagan as the main speak-
er to commemorate his father. When Reagan declined, FDR, Jr. publicly criticized the 
president for his absence. He was also piqued that Reagan had not issued an offi  cial 
proclamation since the Post Offi  ce had issued FDR centennial stamps. Th is came on 
top of the public aff ront that Congress had only appropriated $25,000 for the festivities 
whereas it had devoted $7,5 million to celebrate Hoover’s centennial.
In early January, Reagan did invite the Roosevelt family to the White House. FDR, 
Jr. refused to attend the ceremony with two hundred other people and denounced the 
invitation as “too little, too late.” He claimed that Reagan wanted to play down the cen-
23. FDR, Jr. to FDR III , 2 December 1982, folder Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. Personal and Con-
fi dential, box 351, FDR, Jr. Papers.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. FDR, Jr. to FDR III , 10 July 1978, folder Roosevelt, F.D. III, box 343; FDR, Jr. to FDR III, 
2 December 1982, folder Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. Personal and Confi dential, box 351, both in 
FDR, Jr. Papers.






tennial year and refused to “help maintain his false image of great admirer and follower 
in the steps of FDR.” 27 Not only did the president fail to show up at the Hyde Park 
ceremonies James and Elliot were also absent. FDR, Jr. felt some vindication when he 
learned that the March of Dimes ball that James chaired had become a “total fl op.” Th e 
fundraiser had been scheduled on the same night as the Hyde Park event.28
FDR, Jr. found solace in his role as the protector of his parents’ memory and served 
as an example for his children. He devoted his eff orts to highlight their achievements 
at countless offi  cial events. He supported the Four Freedoms Awards ceremonies and 
helped establish the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute in Hyde Park , NY. Oft en, 
he attended these events with his new wife, Linda McKay Weicker , whom he had mar-
ried in 1984 aft er his divorce from Patricia. FDR, Jr.’s last years were happy ones aft er 
Toby, as she was called, contributed to the revival of his spirit.29
Campobello had his special attention because he had been born on the island. He 
devoted his energies as a long-term member of the Roosevelt Campobello International 
Park Commission to make the place a landmark and to honor his father. In 1986, FDR, 
Jr.’s eff orts and the spirit of international cooperation also led to the establishment of the 
Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg, the Netherlands. He claimed that the founda-
tion of the institution had been “an historic occasion which opens the door to scholars, 
teachers and students for a better understanding of America and the Roosevelt era.” 30 It 
was his last major accomplishment. On 17 August 1988, FDR, Jr. died of lung cancer at 
Vassar Brothers Hospital in Poughkeepsie. It was his seventy-fourth birthday.
27. FDR, Jr. to Clayton Faulkner, 9 February 1982, folder Roosevelt, FDR, Jr. 1981–1986, Gen-
eral Correspondence, box 16, Lash Papers, FDRL.
28. Ibid.
29. Memorial Service for Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., 15 September 1988, Funeral Book Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Jr., 1–24, RSC.
30. “Transcript of Speech by Cornelis Boertien,” Held at the Memorial Service for Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Jr., 15 September 1988, 18, Funeral Book Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., RSC.
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Name as an Asset to be Sold
Th e morning aft er his shocking defeat on 5 November 1954, Louis Harris recalled FDR, 
Jr.’s revealing reaction. “We were in this suite in the Lombardy Hotel, our campaign 
headquarters, and Franklin is in the bathroom. And all of a sudden I hear this strong 
man, a 6 ft . 4 strapping man of strength and self-possession, weeping in the bathroom, 
weeping openly.” Aft er FDR, Jr. came out, his eyes red, Harris asked him, “Frank what 
in the world is [the] trouble? Do you want to tell me what happened?” FDR, Jr. shook his 
head and said, “Lou, I must tell you, it is just too much. Just too much for one individual 
to bear.” “What do you mean?” a puzzled Harris asked. “To be the son of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Eleanor Roosevelt ,” FDR, Jr. admitted, “it is too much to live up to. And 
I guess I have not done it.” 1
Presidential children were usually eclipsed by their famous fathers. Th e experiences 
of FDR, Jr. were no exception to this rule. Th e compelling memory of his father ran FDR, 
Jr.’s life and framed his decisions. FDR, Jr.’s life and political career signaled an eff ort to 
come to terms with this birthright, the Roosevelt name and tradition. Th ese eff orts, to 
fi nd a way of living up to expectations, remains fascinating because FDR, Jr. used his 
name and tradition as a claim on memory. More than other presidential children FDR, 
Jr. interpreted this claim as a political asset to be sold. He believed that “his name and 
popularity could win any elective offi  ce he desired….” 2 FDR, Jr. was a salesman who 
founded his ambition upon the political capital represented in his name and sold this 
brand name to run for elective offi  ce. 
His name and the examples of his parents’ distinguished service in public life drove 
this ambition to enter politics. In public service FDR, Jr. found a goal in life. Yet, his 
claim on memory was overshadowed by a strong sense of entitlement, ambition and 
independence. Th is focus on dynastic status had originated during FDR, Jr.’s upbring-
ing and education. 
1. Author interview with Louis Harris , New York City, 15 July 1999.
2. Jacob K. Javits with Rafael Steinberg, Javits: Th e Autobiography of a Public Man (Boston, 
MA: Houghton Miffl  in, 1981), 201.








FDR, Jr. grew up in an environment where public life overshadowed family care.3 It 
turned his upbringing into a complex experience without any real sense of security to 
defi ne his life. Th e communication between Sara , Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and 
between parents and children was distant and oft en tense. FDR’s political career, his 
recovery from polio and ER ’s emancipation implied a frequent absence and unavail-
ability. Th ese struggles for independence in public life signaled the Roosevelts’ inability 
to stabilize at a normal family life. 
Th is had a strong impact on FDR, Jr. In the relationships with his parents he created 
attitudes of strong admiration and attention neglect. FDR, Jr. did also develop attitudes 
that he found diffi  cult to control. Th is strong streak of independence, arrogance and 
carelessness underscored the lack of parental guidance and lame discipline. Like all 
his brothers, FDR, Jr. demonstrated this search for individualism by driving recklessly, 
rushing into a jet-set marriage that embarrassed his father politically and celebrating a 
glamorous life. Unlike his brothers James and Elliott though he did not succumb to the 
temptation of quick promotional money. 
FDR, Jr.’s (grand)parents had also instilled in him a sense of entitlement and tra-
dition. Th is set of values FDR, Jr. was brought up to believe in determined the role he 
played. As a political son, he based his life and career on the notion, as his son Franklin 
D. Roosevelt III perceptively described, “that recognition by the voting public is the 
highest criterion of worth.” 4 In 1949, the victory in the special election for a seat in 
Congress successfully fulfi lled this need for approbation. Public offi  ce and public ap-
proval gave FDR, Jr. a notion of security and identity. 
In the New York City election, FDR, Jr. imitated the model of his father. FDR had 
also used the name and fame of TR to start and advance his own political career. FDR, 
Jr.’s entry in the twentieth congressional district evoked memories with Roosevelt sup-
porters and haters of “good old times” and became a referendum on the memory of the 
late president. FDR, Jr. emulated his father’s campaign style, tactics and strategy. His 
smile and voice were a copy of FDR and he displayed the quick charm and easy assur-
ance on the campaign trail his father had been known for. FDR, Jr. established a brain 
trust, a liberal-labor coalition and ran on New Deal issues. Th e opposition of Tammany 
Hall gave him the anti-bossism campaign theme to defl ect the inevitable attacks that he 
was trading on his father’s name. FDR, Jr.’s victory reinforced old sentiments and served 
as a tribute to the memory of FDR amidst a conservative political resurgence. 
Astonishingly, the 1949 election was FDR, Jr.’s only real victory for public offi  ce. 
Th is lack of success at the ballot had everything to do with his notion that the Roosevelt 
memory was an asset to be sold. If FDR, Jr. could only gain public approval through 
the ballot, every political campaign became a naked pursuit of offi  ce and sheer self-ad-
vancement. He always saw an opportunity to run for “something” on the basis of his 
brand name.
3. Rexford G. Tugwell, Th e Democratic Roosevelt (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957), 457.
4. FDR III to FDR, Jr., 11 November 1966, folder R, box 173, FDR, Jr. Papers, FDRL.
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His tenure in Congress and the 1950 and 1954 gubernatorial elections in New York 
demonstrated that FDR, Jr. built a record of public service for political gain and to sat-
isfy individual ambition. During the fi rst half of the 1950s, these were the only answers, 
FDR, Jr. was able to provide to crucial questions of how important public offi  ce was to 
him and what he wanted to use it for.5
Despite the advantages of his inherited political capital, campaign skills and natu-
ral charm FDR, Jr. was a “national fi gure without being ready for it”.6 He established 
himself in the fi eld of civil rights and advocated extension of New Deal measures but 
did not follow through on his commitments. As heir apparent, FDR, Jr. displayed sheer 
eff ectiveness on the stump but lacked the essential political skills and shrewdness of his 
father. FDR, Jr. acted frequently as above the political handwork of creating a coalition, 
carefully cultivating and cooperating with colleagues. FDR, Jr. became overexcited and 
considered himself the political star in the ascendant. He ambitiously built a national 
reputation rather than educating the voting public on issues. Frustrated by his new re-
sponsibilities, his congressional seat quickly became a launching pad for higher offi  ce 
such as the 1950 and 1954 New York gubernatorial elections.
FDR, Jr. distinguished himself by his desire for independence that built upon his 
claim on memory. By virtue of his name and inherited advantages he did not conform 
to the applied rules of predictability that defi ned the political culture of the 1940s and 
1950s. Democratic leaders in New York and Washington, D.C. resented this birthright 
attitude. Th ey reasoned FDR, Jr. needed more seasoning in Congress. More than an-
noyance and dislike they feared FDR, Jr.’s independence.7 Recognizing him as a great 
threat these political professionals began to thwart the rise of the young man in a hurry. 
Th is was very damaging because FDR, Jr.’s political fate was still tied to these party 
leaders who wielded enormous power. Politics in the 1940s and 1950s remained the 
prerogative of a small number of political bosses whom in the proverbial smoke-fi lled 
rooms decided upon the candidates for public offi  ce.8 In such an environment of con-
trived elections the bosses based their power and positions on predictability. FDR, Jr.’s 
impatience to wait for his turn to run and his impossibility to be controlled yielded a 
risk they were unwilling to take. Th ese circumstances sharply reduced the value of the 
asset FDR, Jr. could sell. 
In contrast to his political opportunism in the 1950s, FDR, Jr. hoped to show a more 
profound commitment to political principles in the 1966 election for governor. Sad-
der and wiser, the proverbial “New Roosevelt” wanted to achieve political and personal 
5. Joe Lash to FDR, Jr., 2 April 1950, folder Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr. 1940–1965, box 16, 
Joseph P. Lash Papers, FDRL.
6. Mitchel Levitas, “Rise, Fall and … of FDR, Jr.,” New York Times Magazine, 23 October 
1966, 27, 42, 44, 49–52, 57–70.
7. “Transcript of Speech by Justin N. Feldman,” Held at the Memorial Service for Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Jr., 15 September 1988, 15, Funeral Book Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., RSC; Stephen Hess , 
America’s Political Dynasties: From Adams to Kennedy (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 212.
8. Washington Post, 18 September 1999.








respect.9 Th is revised meaning for the use of political offi  ce had been prompted by 
FDR, Jr.’s new attitude aft er the death of Eleanor in 1962. During the election, he dis-
tinguished himself by his dedication and commitment. As the candidate of the Liberal 
Party, FDR, Jr. assumed leadership by taking independent and principled stands on a 
number of issues that were ahead of his times, and stuck to those positions.
Still, his belated re-invention in 1966 was unconvincing. FDR, Jr.’s main goal re-
mained self-advancement to satisfy political ambition. He wanted to resuscitate his 
career and use a good result at the ballot as a springboard to future elective offi  ces. 
Th e outcome of the election demonstrated that in number of votes FDR, Jr.’s claim on 
memory had been devaluated. His actions to sell his magic name to advance his career 
failed to make much political impact. Nor did the eff orts enhance his political stature 
within the Democratic Party. FDR, Jr.’s decision to use the “bossism” issue to capture 
the nomination antagonized Democratic leaders. Th is expedience also showed when he 
turned his back on the party of his father and allowed Alex Rose to use the prestige of 
his name to rescue the Liberal Party from oblivion, without success. 
Guardian of his Father’s Place in History
Th e conception that his claim on memory was an asset to be sold also characterized 
FDR, Jr.’s responsibilities as the guardian of his father’s place in history. Aft er FDR’s 
death the Roosevelt family had become trustees of his heritage. Yet, fi nancial disagree-
ments, political competition, marital and health problems among the children and 
Eleanor stretched the loyalty of the family ties. Th eir display of strong individualism 
hampered the Roosevelt family to unite behind an approach to preserve and use FDR’s 
name and tradition.
Th ough FDR, Jr. became the family’s legal representative, what he really wanted was 
to profi t politically from the trusteeship of FDR’s heritage. He used the eff orts to defend 
the accomplishments of FDR to enhance his opportunities for political offi  ce. In the im-
mediate postwar years, this behavior of individual ambition shaped his attitude toward 
President Truman . FDR, Jr. became impatient with the accidental president whom he 
felt lacked style, inspiration and personal leadership qualities. He wanted to assure that 
FDR’s liberal vision would survive under the new administration and determine where 
his father would stand on current issues.10 Truman issued a rivaling claim on memory. 
Several times the president tried to commit the Roosevelt name to his administration 
but FDR, Jr. held back. 
He built upon his disdain for Truman and the unpopularity of his administration 
9. Joseph P. Lash , Eleanor and Franklin (New York: Norton, 1971), 343.
10. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “Two Years Later: Th e Roosevelt Family,” Life Magazine (7 April 
1947): 113–119, Kuhn Collection, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, the Netherlands (here-
aft er RSC); Peter Collier with David Horowitz, Th e Roosevelts: An American Saga (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1994), 450.
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to lead the eff ort to draft  staunch conservative Dwight Eisenhower as candidate for the 
Democratic nomination in the 1948 election. In this fl awed Eisenhower draft  he imi-
tated the model of his father to create a political base by opposing Truman and the party 
establishment. Th e impulsiveness and expedient nature of the dump-Truman move-
ment demonstrated FDR, Jr.’s eagerness to reap the profi ts of a political offi  ce. 
Th e opportunity to sell the prestige of his name also defi ned FDR, Jr.’s relationships 
with the politicians of his generation. Aft er 1954, when his career in public offi  ce was 
halted, FDR, Jr. lent the prestige of his name to sell fellow politicians as heirs to the 
throne of his father. Aft er unsuccessful eff orts that involved Eisenhower in 1948 and 
Averell Harriman in the 1952 presidential election, FDR, Jr. managed to sell John F. 
Kennedy to the American public as FDR’s successor. FDR, Jr.’s independence bypassed 
the wishes of his mother and a part of the Democrats to lift  his adopted candidate on 
the Roosevelt shield.11 Th ough his interventions in the 1960 West Virginia primary 
did have a decisive impact, FDR, Jr.’s hopes of acquiring a position in the new Kennedy 
administration quickly dashed. He had helped to facilitate the transition between the 
two dynasties but the new sense of relevance that the prestige of the Roosevelt name 
had acquired only underscored the recurring theme of his service to the Kennedy fam-
ily. Th is development signaled that FDR, Jr. had lost the command of his life. Politicians 
now started to use his claim on memory to pursue their goals rather than the other way 
around.
When FDR, Jr. joined the Kennedy administration in early 1963, the nature of his 
claim on memory changed. He employed the prestige of his tradition to work in fi elds 
where the Roosevelt name was traditionally held in high regard: poverty relief and civ-
il rights. Th e dedication to the Appalachian Regional Program was obvious. Lyndon 
Johnson used FDR, Jr. and the memory of his parents to sell the program to the region 
and to Congress. 
FDR, Jr. also displayed a commitment for the pressing civil rights issue. As the fi rst 
chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 1965 he gave the new 
civil rights organization unprecedented exposure. Despite the concern FDR, Jr. demon-
strated for the issue that went back to his eff orts on the 1946 Committee on Civil Rights, 
his mind remained set on the next available opportunity to run for elective offi  ce. Th e 
exposure of the high-profi le position became a way to stage a comeback in New York 
politics. In what became his fi nal political campaign in 1966 he, once again, failed to 
convert the magic of his name to satisfy political ambition.
Presidential Son
Th e life and political career of FDR, Jr. demonstrated that the interpretation of FDR’s 
11. Kathleen H. Jamieson, Packaging the Presidency: A History and Criticism of Presidential 
Campaign Advertising (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 126–127. 








memory and the emulation of his political model not only proved diffi  cult for presiden-
tial successors but particularly produced pitfalls for his children. FDR, Jr. had admitted 
so himself, aft er the defeat in the 1954 election, that the heritage was too much to live 
up to.12 
Th is complex memory was overwhelming. During his four terms in the White 
House, FDR had recognized the burden of the presidential offi  ce. He had bluntly admit-
ted, “one of the worst things in the world is being the child of a president. It is a terrible 
life they lead.” 13 Since FDR had reigned longer in the White House than any other 
president, his daughter and four sons were the fi rst presidential children that became 
national celebrities. FDR, Jr. operated in the relentless and ruthless spotlight of national 
publicity and his reputation suff ered from it.14 
Th e deep-seated ambivalence about presidential children helps explain FDR, Jr.’s 
failure to answer the expectations of shoes to fi ll. Th e American public perceived the 
abstract notion of this hereditary principle as threatening to democracy and equal op-
portunity.15 Th e treatment of FDR, Jr. exemplifi ed the distinction made between the 
family dynasty and its political successor.
Author Th eodore White stated that, “all contemporary national politics descend 
from Franklin Roosevelt.” 16 Despite revisionist claims, the popular reputation of FDR 
has remained largely intact and his legacy has continued to cast its shadow over the 
postwar decades. In their admiration for the Roosevelts as aristocratic icons most peo-
ple respected its defi nition of a common purpose and cultivated ideal of public service. 
Th ey began to refer to the Roosevelt dynasty as the “royal family.” 17 
How diff erent people perceived and treated political heirs. FDR, Jr. had to establish 
himself to a doubtful audience. He had to show that he had been humbled to transform 
his image that he was coasting on his parents’ name. FDR, Jr. walked a tightrope to face 
high standards and meet built-up expectations. He could achieve political success only 
by exceeding those excessive expectations. Yet, he would still have to deal with accusa-
tions of entitlement and self-indulgence. 
Th e point was that during the era when FDR, Jr. was an active politician people still 
measured contemporary politicians by the memories of FDR and ER .18 Th is defi nition 
12. Author interview with Louis Harris , New York City, 15 July 1999.
13. Quoted in: Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 466.
14. J.J. Perling , Presidents’ Sons: Th e Prestige of Name in a Democracy (New York: Th e Odyssey 
Press, 1947), 310–311; Hess, America’s Political Dynasties, 192.
15. Adam Bellow, In Praise of Nepotism: A Natural History (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 5; 
Adam Bellow, “American Dynasty,” Newsweek Special Edition Issues 2004, December 2003 – Feb-
ruary 2004, 85.
16. Th eodore H. White, America in Search of Itself: Th e Making of the President, 1956–1980 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 47.
17. Bellow, In Praise of Nepotism, 7.
18. William E. Leuchtenburg, In the Shadow of FDR: From Harry S. Truman to Bill Clinton 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 57.
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caused FDR, Jr. to feel accountable and to be made publicly accountable by friends and 
critics alike for the reputation and achievements of his parents.19 Author Stephen Hess 
rightly considered this life as an unfortunate paradox: if FDR, Jr. succeeded “it was be-
cause of his parents’ achievements, if he failed it was his own fault.” 20 
FDR, Jr. paid more dearly for mistakes than non-political successors because he was 
held to this higher and admittedly unrealistic standard. Laboring under these ambigu-
ous circumstances he inherited the enemies of his parents who continued the tradition 
of Roosevelt bashing. Th ey matched him against the shadow of his reputation and de-
nounced him as “nothing more than a Junior.” Adolph Berle , a former offi  cial in the 
administration of his father, scoff ed FDR, Jr. for being a “young man in a hurry, fi lled 
more with ambition than ability or ideas.” 21
Rise and Fall of Liberalism
By 1966, longstanding sectional, urban and racial confl ict had shattered the superfi cial 
consensus of the two preceding decades. Th e collapse of this liberal consensus contrib-
uted to FDR, Jr.’s bumpy ride. Th is development also made it more diffi  cult to sell his 
brand name because the Roosevelt memory became less and less attractive during the 
two decades aft er 1945. 
FDR, Jr.’s eff orts in the EEOC to put equality of result rather than equality of op-
portunity on the agenda refl ected these limits of liberalism. FDR, Jr. came to advocate 
a group-centered enforcement of affi  rmative action and legal means to fi ght discrimi-
natory practices rather than stress economic justice for a disadvantaged class like his 
father had done. Th e resulting confl ict between a white backlash over preferential treat-
ment and a violent black reaction that drew attention to continuing social and economic 
deprivation triggered the break up of the domestic status quo. 
Th is was also evident in the Civilian Review Board controversy of the 1966 New 
York gubernatorial election. Th e issue had split the New York community between a 
liberal-minority coalition, including FDR, Jr., who championed the review board and 
angry white conservative groups including the police union, who strove to abolish the 
board. Its defeat refl ected the national climate of white resentment over civil rights suc-
cesses and also demonstrated the limits of liberal reform. 
Th is white backlash fueled the resurgence of conservative policies. Th e melting away 
of labor support and major Republican gains among white Southern and blue-collar 
voters weakened the New Deal electoral coalition. Radical activists of the “New Left ” 
generation on the other end of the political spectrum faulted FDR and the New Deal 
19. Brock Brower, “Last Chance for Junior,” Saturday Evening Post (27 July 1963): 32–33.
20. Hess, America’s Political Dynasties, 215.
21. Chris McNickle, To Be Mayor of New York: Ethnic Politics in the City (New York: Columbia 
University Press), 104, 110.








for the persistent inequalities in American society such as poverty and racism. Th ese 
charges also contributed to the diminished attraction of the New Deal memory.
Personality and Reputation
Even more important was the notion of his claim on memory as an asset to realize his 
political ambitions, to explain for FDR, Jr.’s failure to answer the expectations. Th is idea 
determined his reputation as a presidential son. Journalist Arthur Krock stated that, 
“the sons of famous men labor under the special diffi  culty that they are expected to live 
up to their immediate heredity. Sometimes endeavouring to do this in the same pursuits, 
they have become inferior and oft en ludicrous caricatures of their progenitors.” 22
FDR, Jr. struggled with the choice, as historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. defi ned it, 
“between a social conscience and the bright lights.” 23 He tried to become a political heir 
to live up to expectations. Having imitated his father’s education at Groton and Harvard, 
FDR advised him to become a lawyer before jumping into politics. Yet, this option in-
volved accomplishment, commitment to fi ghting for ideals, hard work and discipline. 
FDR, Jr.’s dependence on the family tradition fostered illusions that undermined 
the credibility of his claim on memory. Voters, who had familiarized themselves and 
were looking for the Roosevelt memory, became disillusioned with FDR, Jr. when they 
discovered he suff ered from ordinary human weaknesses. People recognized that for 
the political son, for whom life had been too easy, there had been no need to discipline 
himself or test his political principles.24 FDR, Jr. failed to master a thorough form of 
self-discipline to surmount personal sins. Th e struggle with polio had largely resolved 
the confl ict for his father. Th e sense of entitlement and overconfi dence applied to FDR, 
Jr. Feeling that he did not have to prove who he was, FDR, Jr. founded his political ambi-
tion on the asset of his name.25 
Th is misconception linked up with personal mistakes that reinforced FDR, Jr.’s im-
age as a man whose only qualifi cation was his name. During a youthful period of aim-
less drift ing his image of a reckless and pampered playboy had been imprinted in the 
public mind. Th is reputation stuck despite his heroic actions in the Navy during World 
War II. Even aft er FDR, Jr. left  his familiar New York City nightclub-crowd behind him, 
22. Kay Halle, ed., Th e Grand Original: Portraits of Randolph Churchill by His Friends (Boston, 
MA: Houghton Miffl  in, 1971), 176.
23. Schlesinger, Jr., “Two Years Later: Th e Roosevelt Family,” Life Magazine (7 April 1947): 119, 
Kuhn Collection, RSC.
24. Murray Kempton , “Can Rockefeller Win?” New York World Telegram, 30 March 1966, 
folder Gubernatorial Campaign Organization and Murray Kempton, “Th e King in Exile,” New 
York Post, 12 October 1966, both in box 260, FDR, Jr. Papers.
25. Author interview with Curtis Roosevelt , 22 June 2000, Middelburg, the Netherlands; Edna 
P. Gurewitsch , Kindred Souls: Th e Devoted Friendship of Eleanor Roosevelt and Dr. David Gur-
ewitsch (New York: Plume, 2003), 147, 149. 
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the label of a party animal and womanizer remained affi  xed to his name, highlighted by 
a number of highly publicized marriages and divorces. 
Conclusion
Despite his abundance of political talent, FDR, Jr.’s inclination to spoil his own chances 
saw to it that this reputation remained tainted in the eyes of the public. Notorious politi-
cal gaff es such as the careless Trujillo aff air and the impulsive West Virginia draft  dodge 
accusation continued to haunt him. Th ese allegations of political expedience and arro-
gance caught up with FDR, Jr. Critics denounced his reputation of spoiled opportunism 
and blatant sense of entitlement. Close associates dismissed the claims that FDR, Jr. had 
squandered his promise and not lived up to the name. Th ey portrayed the Roosevelt 
heir as an indefatigable natural campaigner with a good record of government service 
and exciting political credentials whom “carried with honor the most noble American 
patronym of this [twentieth] century.” 26 
Despite this praise for being the committed guardian of the Roosevelt memory and 
intrinsically representing its ideals and dreams, FDR, Jr. failed to imbibe his parents’ 
sense of public service. He sold his claim on memory for a political career, ran for offi  ce 
because he felt entitled to and built a political record for self-advancement rather than 
principles.
Th ese unsuccessful eff orts to sell his claim on memory defi ned FDR, Jr.’s life. He felt 
the weight on his shoulders as a curse rather than as a blessing and he crumbled under 
the pressure of shoes to fi ll. His failure to become a political heir meant that FDR, Jr. 
remained a ceremonial fi gure. He led a life that tied up “the loose ends of a larger story” 
and that was distinguished by expediency and entitlement.27 All in all, he remained a 
man more imprisoned and intimidated than empowered and inspired by the legacy of 
his parents. 
In this sense, FDR, Jr. was a unique fi gure among presidential children. No other 
presidential son or daughter faced the daunting legacy of both their parents. Th e politi-
cal infl uence of Eleanor and the competition of his brother James also made FDR, Jr.’s 
life and career exceptional. He did not apply the personal and political crises he went 
through between 1954 and 1960 as a way of refl ection. Th e continuing demand for the 
use of his claim on memory prevented him to learn from adversity and fundamen-
tally rethink his outlook on life and politics. Th is absence of any real sense of catharsis 
such as JFK or George W. Bush had experienced contributed to make FDR, Jr. a tragic 
fi gure. 
26. “Transcript of Speech by William J. vanden Heuvel,” Held at the Memorial Service for 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., 15 September 1988, 16–17, Funeral Book Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., 
RSC.
27. Collier, Th e Roosevelts: An American Saga, 471.
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Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. (1914–1988) ontleent zijn historische relevantie aan zijn af-
komst. Hij werd geboren als derde zoon van Franklin D. Roosevelt en Eleanor Roosevelt , 
het invloedrijkste presidentiële paar uit de Amerikaanse (politieke) geschiedenis. Dat 
zijn positie als “Junior” geen doorsnee leven beloofde moge duidelijk zijn. FDR was tij-
dens zijn leven en zeker na zijn dood in 1945, verheven tot een mythisch fi guur. FDR, 
Jr. had niet alleen te maken met het gewicht van deze erfenis, zijn uitgesproken poli-
tieke ambitie leidde er toe dat de ogen van alle commentatoren gericht waren op de 
troonpretendent. 
Het presidentschap van FDR had niet alleen consequenties voor zijn opvolgers in 
het Witte Huis, maar ook een directe uitwerking op FDR, Jr., de politiek erfgenaam on-
der zijn kroost. De publieke fascinatie met de Roosevelt familie benadrukte de unieke 
positie waarin FDR, Jr. zich bevond. Hij nam de verantwoordelijkheid voor het beheren 
van de herinnering aan zijn vader en diens (politieke) wapenfeiten. De vraag is dan 
ook op welke manier FDR, Jr. deze erfenis beheerde en de nagedachtenis aan zijn vader 
interpreteerde. Deze dynamiek ging gepaard met een persoonlijke en politieke strijd 
waarin FDR, Jr. het evenwicht diende te bewaren tussen het verwezenlijken van poli-
tieke ambities en het beheren van de Roosevelt traditie van “public service”. Deze studie 
geeft  antwoord op de vraag hoe FDR, Jr. een balans trachtte te vinden tussen de lusten 
en lasten van zijn complexe erfenis. Het laat zien op welke manier FDR, Jr. de herin-
nering aan zijn vader gebruikte voor politiek gewin om te voldoen aan de torenhoge 
verwachtingen om de Roosevelt dynastie voort te zetten. 
De lotgevallen van andere presidentskinderen spraken niet bepaald in FDR, Jr.’s 
voordeel. Velen zaten gevangen in het keurslijf van verwachtingen dat het ambt van 
hun vader met zich meebracht en berustten in hun lotsbestemming als erfgenaam. Ze 
hadden af te rekenen met een relatief hoger gemiddeld aantal scheidingen, alcoholisme 
en voortijdig overlijden. Slechts een klein aantal, waaronder John Quincy Adams , de 6e 
president van de Verenigde Staten, traden uit de schaduw van hun beroemde vaders. Het 
was veelzeggend dat de historicus Edmund Morris oordeelde, “if the greatest gift  our 
constitution can bestow is the presidency of the United States, one of the worst curses is 
to be son of a chief executive.”
In vrijwel alle gevallen werden presidentskinderen dus overschaduwd door hun be-
roemde vaders. Het leven van FDR, Jr. vormde hierop geen uitzondering. De erfenis van 















zijn vader en diens nagedachtenis domineerden de politieke carrière van FDR, Jr. Zijn 
pogingen te voldoen aan de publieke en private verwachtingen bleven fascineren, juist 
omdat hij de nagedachtenis aan FDR en de Roosevelt naam claimde als een bezit dat 
politiek te gelde kon worden gemaakt. FDR, Jr. was ervan overtuigd dat de populariteit 
van zijn naam en de herinnering aan zijn vader ieder politiek ambt mogelijk zouden 
maken. Meer dan andere presidentskinderen, gebruikte FDR, Jr. zijn geërfd politieke 
kapitaal, naam en connecties dan ook om politieke ambities kracht bij te zetten en ver-
kiezingen te winnen. Deze grenzeloze ambitie en zijn drang naar autonomie bepaalden 
zijn politieke loopbaan.
FDR, Jr.’s opvatting dat hij vanwege zijn afk omst recht had op een functie in de poli-
tiek, vond zijn oorsprong in zijn opvoeding. De jeugd van FDR, Jr. stond in het teken 
van dienstbaarheid aan de publieke zaak. Deze traditie en de publieke loopbanen van 
zijn ouders betekende dat FDR, Jr. opgroeide in een complexe omgeving zonder een 
duidelijk idee van zekerheid en veiligheid. De strijd tussen Sara , FDR en ER maakten 
een stabiel familieleven ook vrijwel onmogelijk. De consequentie was dat FDR, Jr. zijn 
politieke ambities zou bouwen op een roekeloze drang naar onafh ankelijkheid en nei-
ging tot opportunisme.
FDR, Jr.’s drijfveer was de erkenning door en waardering van het electoraat, zoals 
zijn zoon FDR III het formuleerde. Het gaf FDR, Jr. de zekerheid waaraan het tijdens 
zijn jeugd had ontbroken. De electorale waardering kreeg in 1949 zijn beslag toen FDR, 
Jr., in New York City, de verkiezing won voor een zetel in het Congress. De overwinning 
werdt alom beschouwd als een tribuut aan de nagedachtenis van FDR.
Verbazingwekkend genoeg, was het FDR, Jr.’s enige electorale success. Zijn inter-
pretatie om de herinnering aan FDR politiek te verzilveren is debet aan dit opvallende 
gebrek. Tijdens FDR, Jr.’s campagnes is het vervullen van de eigen politieke ambitie zijn 
antwoord op de vraag waar hij een politiek ambt voor wil gebruiken. Tijdens de eerste 
helft  van de jaren vijft ig bouwde hij een nationale reputatie maar miste de capaciteiten 
voor een dergelijke functie. Opportunisme, ongeduld en het onvermogen FDR, Jr. poli-
tiek in bedwang te houden, maken hem tot bête noir onder de machtige Democratische 
partijleiders. Na de dood van Eleanor in 1962 toonde FDR, Jr. meer toewijding. Hoewel 
hij streed met open vizier voor zaken die zijn direct politiek belang ontstegen, was zijn 
metamorfose uiteindelijk niet overtuigend. Roemloos ging FDR, Jr. af langs de zijdeur, 
nadat hij als vierde en laatste eindigde tijdens de gouverneursverkiezingen van de staat 
New York in 1966.
De idee dat de claim op zijn vader’s herinnering politiek te gelde kon worden ge-
maakt, bepaalde ook de manier waarop FDR, Jr. omging met de verantwoordelijkheid 
als hoeder van deze erfenis. Hij gebruikte zijn pogingen de erfenis van FDR te bescher-
men niet alleen als springplank voor een politieke loopbaan, maar ook om zijn naam 
te verbinden aan troonpretendenten als Dwight Eisenhower in 1948, Averell Harriman 
in 1952 en John Kennedy in 1960. FDR, Jr. had een belangrijk aandeel in de succesvolle 
campagne en belichaamde mede daardoor de overgang van de Roosevelt naar de Kenne-
dy dynastie. FDR, Jr. verloor daarbij wel de controle over zijn leven nadat hij de prestige 
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van de Roosevelt naam en erfenis in dienst stelde van JFK en zijn opvolger, Lyndon John-
son . FDR, Jr. zette zich in voor armoedebestrijding en de gelijkberechtiging van zwarte 
Amerikanen, gebieden waar de Roosevelt naam traditioneel in hoog aanzien stond.
Hoewel presidentiële opvolgers als Truman er ook mee worstelden, hield FDR’s er-
fenis des te meer valkuilen in voor FDR, Jr. en zijn politieke ambities. Na zijn nederlaag 
in 1954 gaf de troonpretendent zelf toe dat hij met geen mogelijkheid kon voldoen aan 
de hooggespannen verwachtingen. Hier waren verzachtende omstandigheden voor aan 
te voeren. De vier termijnen van FDR betekende dat zijn dochter en vier zonen, als een 
van de eerste presidentskinderen, nationale beroemdheden werden. De niet afl atende 
aandacht van de media bepaalde deels FDR, Jr.’s “playboy” reputatie. Daarnaast speelde 
mee dat het politieke programma van FDR, de New Deal , aantrekkingskracht verloor 
doordat in de decennia na de Tweede Wereldoorlog de populariteit van liberale hervor-
mingen afnam. Vanaf het midden van de jaren zestig domineerden conservatieve en 
radicaal progressieve krachten de politiek en de publieke opinie.
Een van belangrijkste oorzaken voor de tragiek van FDR, Jr.’s leven was de scha-
duw van zijn vader (en in mindere mate zijn moeder). Politici in de naoorlogse periode 
werden beoordeeld naar de maatstaven van FDR. Als politiek erfgenaam werd FDR, Jr. 
verantwoordelijk gesteld voor de reputatie van en herinnering aan zijn ouders. Dit had 
een ongelukkige paradox tot gevolg. Wanneer FDR, Jr. successen boekte, was dat dank-
zij zijn ouders, wanneer hij faalde was dat door eigen toedoen. 
FDR Jr.’s prominente positie als troonpretendent en presidentszoon benadrukte de 
spanning tussen het meritocratische ideaal dat de Verenigde Staten vertegenwoordigde 
en de dynastieke realiteit van de historische praktijk. De Amerikaanse publieke opinie 
vatte het bestaan van politieke erfgenamen op als een bedreiging voor het democrati-
sche credo van gelijke kansen. Het overdragen van politieke ambten op basis van erfelij-
ke afk omst, in plaats van verdienste, was onverenigbaar met de fundamentele gedachte 
van deze ideologie. Desondanks had het Amerikaanse volk al vanaf de dagen van de re-
publiek zijn heil gezocht in een klein aantal politieke families en haar opvolgers om het 
land te besturen. In een land waarin het geloof in gelijke kansen voor iedereen hoogtij 
vierde, nam een aparte klasse, kinderen van presidenten, een bijzondere plaats in. Deze 
ambivalentie betekende dat politieke erfgenamen als FDR, Jr. door de publieke opinie 
met argwaan bekeken en beoordeeld werden. 
De idee dat de claim op zijn vader’s herinnering politiek verzilverd kon worden, was 
uiteindelijk de oorzaak van het falen van FDR, Jr.’s politieke ambities. Blunders op per-
soonlijk en politiek vlak versterkten deze tragische interpretatie. Het gebrek aan disci-
pline, roekeloosheid en vermeende onaantastbaarheid ondermijnden de geloofwaardig-
heid van de Roosevelt erfenis. FDR, Jr. gebruikte de prestige van en nagedachtenis aan 
zijn ouders om een politieke loopbaan op te bouwen in plaats van deze in te zetten voor 
het publieke belang. Het gewicht van de erfenis drukte op zijn schouders. Het betekende 
eerder een vloek dan een zegen. Ondanks zijn onmiskenbaar politiek talent had FDR, Jr. 
de neiging zijn eigen glazen in te gooien. Zo bleef hij een ceremonieel fi guur.
FDR, Jr. was een uniek politiek erfgenaam onder kinderen van Amerikaanse presi-















denten. Hij ging gebukt onder het gewicht van een dubbele erfenis. De politieke invloed 
van Eleanor en de concurrentie van broer James speelden een grote rol. FDR, Jr.’s claim 
op zijn vader’s herinnering maakte hem tot een bijzondere troonpretendent. Het vast-
houden aan deze “claim on memory” en de veelvuldige vraag om de prestige van de 
Roosevelt naam te verkopen, boden FDR, Jr. geen mogelijkheid zijn kijk op de politieke 
erfenis die hij beheerde, te veranderen of aan te passen. Hij was dan ook niet in staat tot 
enige refl ectie om te leren van politieke en persoonlijke fouten. Als gevolg van de afwe-
zigheid van een dergelijke katharsis bleef FDR, Jr. een tragische troonpretendent.
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